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
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
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BROWNSON'S

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME II.

(THIRD SERIES.)

July no. p/ 273-45? wanting

BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY BENJAMIN H. GREENE,
124 WASHINGTON STREET.
1854.

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BROWNSON'S



QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME II. *Part II July 1854*

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July no. pp. 273-408 wanting



BOSTON:

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1854.

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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1854.

ART. I.—*Uncle Jack and his Nephew: or Conversations of an Old Fogie with a "Young American."*

UNCLE JACK, as he is familiarly called, is a hale old man, nearly seventy years of age, though in appearance not much over fifty. His form is erect, his step elastic, and his dark, thick hair has as yet no sprinkling of gray. His disposition is mild and gentle, and his feelings are youthful and buoyant. He is not precisely a scholar, but he has travelled, mingled a good deal in society, read some, observed much, and reflected more. He lives now very much retired, surrounded only by a few young persons, of whom he is very fond, and with whom he delights to converse on the various things which he has seen, or of which he has read. He is averse to all display of superior knowledge, but whenever he does chance to open himself, you see that he is well informed on most topics, has a cultivated mind, and a rich and varied experience.

His most intimate companion is a young nephew, the only child of his youngest and favorite sister. This nephew was graduated at the early age of sixteen at the oldest and most renowned of our American literary institutions, with the first honors of his class, and as the general favorite of his classmates. He subsequently spent five years at a celebrated German university, under several famous German professors, and afterwards visited Berlin, Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Venice, Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Naples, spent six months at Rome and Florence, and a year at Paris, whence he has re-

turned home to take an active part in the affairs of his own country. He is a tall, finely proportioned young man, with handsome features, an open and manly countenance, and modest and prepossessing manners. As his father and mother are both dead, he for the present lives with his Uncle Jack. He has won the heart of the kind old man, but does not fail, nevertheless, to give him much uneasiness. Uncle Jack is called an Old Fogie, and he certainly sees very little in modern notions and movements to approve, while his nephew is a genuine son of the nineteenth century, having thoroughly imbibed its spirit and fully adopted its ideas. He shares its good and its bad qualities, — is liberal, philanthropic, fond of action, indifferent to religion, impatient of restraint, enthusiastic for social regeneration and progress, and carried away by a sort of revolutionary mania. It may very well be believed that there are few topics on which he and Uncle Jack do not take opposite views. Their conversations are long and frequent, and sometimes assume almost the form of elaborate discussions. Minutes of some of these conversations have been furnished us, and a portion of them we venture to offer to our readers. They will be read, we doubt not, with eagerness, and perchance with much pleasure and some profit, as they touch subjects of deep interest at all times, but more especially at the present.

CONVERSATION I.

“ I like best, my dear Dick, the rule that leaves it to old men to counsel, and young men to execute. Your Young America, Young Ireland, Young France, Young Italy, and Young Germany forget this rule, settle your plans, form your resolutions, call upon us to help you carry them into execution, and then denounce us as Old Fogies, or tell us that our eyes are on the backside of our heads, and that we dwell only among the tombs, if we refuse. Is it not possible that you youngsters, in your zeal for the rights of man, forget the rights of age ? ”

“ Not intentionally, my dear uncle ; but forgive me if I am unable to understand the rights of age to damp the holy ardor and generous zeal of the young. Those are noble words which Schiller puts into the mouth of the Marquis of Posa, — ‘ Tell him, when he is old, not to forget

the dreams of his youth.' Old age is sometimes cold and selfish, and feels too little interest in the amelioration of society and the progress of civilization."

"And youth in its rashness and inexperience often attempts what is impracticable, and indulges dreams which no wise man could wish to see realized. Age has no right to do wrong, and I admit that there are old men who have profited little even in the hard school of experience, and who are devoured by an insane ambition or an insatiable avarice long after they have outlived every other passion, and when they have one foot already in the grave. Yet, Old men for counsel and young men for war, remains as one of those precious maxims in which is condensed the wisdom of mankind. The young prince who, on coming to the throne, dismisses the experienced counsellors of his wise father, and surrounds himself with advisers of his own age, is generally regarded as on the high-road to the ruin of himself, if not of his kingdom. Sometimes, indeed, we find a marvellous young man, wise beyond his years; but ordinarily the wise head is not found on young shoulders."

"But, Uncle Jack, you forget that the youth of our generation have advantages which those of former generations had not."

"I do not know that. The young fancy every succeeding generation superior, as the old regard it as inferior, to its predecessor. Both old and young are probably wrong. If the young were right, the world would by this time have made such progress that nothing would need amending; and if the old were right, it would have become so bad that there would be no enduring it. The young count all changes improvements, and the old count them deteriorations. Perhaps, if a just balance were struck, one generation would be found not much superior, nor much inferior, to another."

"At any rate you will concede that we better understand liberty, and are prepared to make more generous sacrifices to obtain it."

"Not in any worthy sense of the word. Our age perhaps surpasses all others in its skill in using good words in bad, or old words in new senses. One not initiated into your philosophical, moral, and political doctrines can hardly understand you, even when you speak plain English. Oblige me by telling me what you mean by *liberty*."

"I mean by liberty democracy, freedom from kings and aristocrats, tyrants and oppressors, the free and full exercise of all my rights as man."

"So you recognize liberty only under a democracy."

"There can be none under kings and aristocrats."

"If among the rights of man you recognized the right to be governed, could you not conceive it possible that liberty might exist wherever man is wisely and justly governed, whatever the form of the government?"

"No man is free under a tyrannical and oppressive government."

"Yet, my dear Dick, you must settle the question what is liberty, before you can determine whether any given government is or is not tyrannical and oppressive. For aught I know, you may regard as oppressive what I regard as wise and salutary restraint, and as tyranny, what I hold to be just and legitimate government. We must know what liberty is before we can know what violates it."

"Liberty, I have said, is the free and full exercise of all my rights as man."

"It is undoubtedly that, but is it nothing more?"

"I can conceive no broader liberty than that."

"The rights of man as man are simply his natural rights, rights which one has by virtue of the fact that he is a man, and which every man has equally with every other man. If you recognize only these rights, you exclude from your notion of liberty your rights as a scholar, as a gentleman, as a citizen, as a proprietor, and, if such you were, your rights as a magistrate, as a senator, as a sovereign prince. Do you hold that there is true liberty where these rights, civil rights, adventitious or vested rights as they are called, are not secured to their possessors?"

"All men have equal rights, and liberty is enjoyed only where equal rights are secured to all."

"As men, all have equal rights, and there is no liberty where these are not secured to all, however high or however low, however rich or however poor, I grant; but do you wish to be understood to maintain that liberty excludes or denies all rights not included in those equal rights possessed alike by every man?"

"Liberty demands equality, and admits no unequal rights or special privileges."

"Regarded simply as men in a state of nature, as it is

called, all that is very true. But men live in society, and are to be regarded not as existing in a state of nature alone. In civil society they have or are supposed to have unequal rights; special rights growing out of their special relations, — the rights of husband and wife, of parents and children, rights of property, rights of position or rank, rights of office, &c. Do you deny all rights of this sort, or do you hold that true liberty requires the free and full exercise of these rights, as well as of the natural rights, or the rights of man as man?"

"I know no rights but my simple natural rights as a man."

"And these rights being equal, every man has an equal right with yourself to your very large and desirable estate. Every man has an equal right to every man's wife. Either General Pierce has no right to fill the office of President, and to discharge its duties, or else every other man, no matter of what nation or country, has an equal right to call himself President of the United States, and to act as such. As much must be said of every governor of a State, of every senator or representative, of every magistrate, and of every public officer. There would be some confusion and disorder were we to admit all this. Government would be impossible, and civil society would be dissolved; for civil society is possible only on condition that there are civil rights, and that these rights are secured."

"As a democrat I assert universal suffrage and eligibility. All should be citizens and electors, and all should be eligible to any and every office in the gift of the people. One man has no more right to be elected President than another."

"Be that as it may, it is nothing to our present purpose. The question relates to the rights of the incumbent of the office. Now that he is elected to fill that office, and during the term for which he has been elected, has not General Pierce certain vested rights which no other man in the world has, — certain exclusive rights, which during that period no other man may claim or exercise? If you say No, you deny his exclusive right to officiate as President, and deny all civil authority, and all civil society, even democracy itself; for democracy asserts the right of the people to choose representatives to act in their name, and to clothe each of them with certain special and exclusive powers. If

you say Yes, you must concede a class of rights not included in the simple natural rights of man as man, that is, civil rights, or, in general terms, vested rights. Now, is there freedom in any broad and adequate sense of the term, where there is no security for the free and full exercise of these vested rights ? ”

“ You know, my dear uncle, that we democrats are opposed to your Old Fogie doctrine of vested rights. It is in the name of vested rights that tyrants reign, and all abuses are perpetuated. It is precisely against what are called vested rights of kings and nobilities, that we rebel, and have sworn eternal hostility. It is in the name of vested rights that the people are enslaved, that social progress is arrested, reforms are resisted, and the noble and generous friends of the people are martyred. How many of our brothers, free and noble spirits, who lived but to emancipate the people, have fallen victims to this bloody Dagon of vested rights ! Their blood cries to us from the ground to avenge them, and avenge them we will, or die in the attempt.”

“ All very fine, my young revolutionist. But if these rights really are rights, it is not they who assert and maintain them that war against liberty, but you who deny and seek to destroy them. I understand by liberty the secure possession and enjoyment by every man of all his rights, whether natural or civil ; and I look upon the man who seeks to rob me of my vested rights, whether he do it in the name of liberty or any other name, as a tyrant and a despot in heart and in deed. You are mistaken, my dear Dick, when you say that it is in the name of vested rights that tyrants reign, for a tyrant is, by the very force of the word itself, one who has no vested right to reign, and one who exercises the supreme power in the city or state in opposition to vested rights. Tyrant, as the word is now used, means literally a usurper, one who deprives others of their vested rights, and reigns without any vested right to reign. It is precisely this fact that has rendered this word universally odious. You revolutionists are laboring to annihilate all vested rights, and against all such rights to grasp and wield the supreme power of the state, and you are consequently tyrants in the present strict and proper sense of the word. I cannot agree with you any more when you say that in the name of vested rights the people

are enslaved, for it is no slavery to be debarred from robbing the state or individuals of their rights."

"But your pretended vested rights are merely usurpations, and in compelling those who hold them to abandon them, we do them no wrong, and are laboring only to restore the just and legitimate order of things."

"These vested rights are not usurped, unless they have been illegally assumed, or are in their nature contrary to the natural law. They are held by authority of civil society, and are not assumed in contravention of the civil law, and they are not contrary to the natural law, unless they violate some natural right of man, or some precept of the law of God. What precept of that law do they violate? To what natural right of man as man are they repugnant?"

"They are repugnant to the natural right of equality."

"I am not aware of any such natural right. All men have certain equal rights, for all are equally men; but it does not follow from that fact, that all have a natural right to equality in all things. Even you yourself would shrink from so gross an absurdity. You do not pretend that all men have an equal right to be of the same height, and that those who are below a certain standard must be stretched, and those who rise above it must be lopped off. If it were so, your own head would be in danger. Neither can you pretend that all have a natural right to equality of intellect or genius. All have an equal natural right to property, but not therefore to equal property. All have an equal natural right to marry, but not therefore an equal right to demand of every woman the rights of a husband. Every one has an equal right to be himself, but not to be another; an equal right to his own, but not that his own shall be equal to every other man's own. Up to a certain point, all men have equal rights, and are to be treated by general and civil society as equals; that is, the rights which we possess in virtue of our simple humanity or as men are equal. These rights I hold to be sacred and inviolable, and there is no true liberty where they are not equally recognized and secured in the case of every one. But beyond these are the rights of individuals, not simply as men, but as such or such men. These rights are unequal, because men as such and such men are unequal; but these contravene not the other rights which are equal. The

equal rights are general, the others are special, but the special does not contradict the general. I do John Smith no wrong when I employ instead of him Bill Thompson to be my coachman; I do no wrong to Peter Hagarty's nephew in leaving my estate to my own nephew instead of leaving it to him, although by so doing I make my nephew a rich man, and leave Peter's poor; for Peter's nephew has no natural or acquired right to my estate. If he is suffering, I am bound by the common ties of humanity and religion to relieve him, but not to enrich him.

"So you see, dear Dick, that your dream that men have a natural right to equality in all things is a dream, and a very silly dream, not worth relating. There are two classes of rights, natural rights and civil rights, or the rights of men as men and the rights of men as members of society, both as members of natural society and of civil and religious society. You and your associates recognize only the first class of rights, and regard liberty as restricted to the free and full exercise of them, and as a consequence, their right to make war on all other rights, and to rob their possessors of them. Here is where you are wrong, and here is why I cannot hold you to be true friends of liberty, but its enemies rather. Your views of what liberty is are too superficial and narrow. You do not mean enough by liberty to satisfy me. Your liberty would leave me only a small portion of my rights, and I demand a liberty which leaves me in full possession of all my rights. You claim the right in the name of liberty to dispossess me of all my vested rights, and in so far you make liberty a pretext for robbery and oppression. We whom you call Old Fogies have a broader and deeper love of liberty than you have. We assert the natural and equal rights of men as energetically as you do, and are as ready as you are to war for them in words, and deeds too, if necessary. It is not, as you foolishly pretend, because we do not hold these rights as sacred and as inviolable as you do, that we do not make common cause with you. Are we not men as well as you? And is not whatever is human as near to us as to you? Who gave you youngsters the monopoly of humanity? Who made you more alive to wrongs and outrages upon a fellow-man than we are? Do you imagine, because age thins the blood and abates the fire of passion, that it dries up the affections of the heart, and blunts the sense of justice?

Foolish boy! wait till you are old, and you will learn that the heart of the old beats as warm and as lovingly as that of the young, and that nothing pertaining to the soul ever becomes sear and yellow. We go not with you, we oppose you, because we hold vested rights as sacred and inviolable as the natural rights themselves, in which they have their origin and foundation, and because you trample on them, and are banded together to destroy them, and thus to take away all our protection even for our natural rights. We love liberty too much, and are too determined to maintain it in its broadest and fullest sense, to be your accomplices. It is as the friends of liberty, it is in the name of liberty, a sacred name for us, and which you only profane, that we oppose you, and resist to the utmost your revolutionary schemes, and your anti-liberal, your tyrannical movements."

CONVERSATION II.

"You gave, my dear uncle, in our last conversation, an unexpected turn to the subject on which we were talking, and I confess that I hardly know what to say to the view you presented; but I am not satisfied with it. I think there must be some sophistry on your part somewhere, though I may not be able to detect it. All the more enlightened men of our enlightened age seem to have fully settled the question that liberty is practicable, nay, conceivable, only under a democracy. But if liberty requires the assertion and maintenance of vested as well as of natural rights, we should be obliged to maintain, as a condition of maintaining liberty, even monarchy where it is a vested right, and assert the doctrine of legitimacy to its fullest extent. We should be obliged to respect nobility where it is a vested right, and with it the exclusive privileges of rank. This is so contrary to the spirit of our age, that I cannot accept it."

"But, my dear Dick, in appealing to the authority of the nineteenth century against my views, you abandon the very cause you espouse. Natural rights rest on the authority of reason, which is the same in all men, and is no more in all men than it is in each particular man. They are the rights of each individual man, and can neither be confirmed nor denied by the authority of one age or

another. They have nothing to do with the consent of mankind, or with the people, collectively taken, in any age or country. The people can neither give them nor take them away, for they are the rights of man as man, and therefore are good against the people acting as sovereign, good against kings and nobles, good against all human authority whatever. If then you allow an appeal beyond the individual to the age, to the ages, to the community, to the people, you recognize rights not included in the list of natural rights. Either the nineteenth century is an authority which has the right to give the law to the reason of the individual, or it is not. If it is, you abandon your doctrine; if it is not, it deserves no consideration with me, and even if it condemns my views, I am under no obligation to abandon them. You cannot assert the supremacy of my natural rights as man, and then call in the opinion of the age as an authority to which I must submit. Moreover, the authority of the nineteenth century, whatever it be, is not and cannot be greater than that of any other century, and can never set aside the authority of all the ages which have preceded it. If you may appeal to it in support of your denial, I may appeal to all its predecessors in support of my assertion, of vested rights, for they have all asserted them, and indeed even those who deny them in this age are only a minority, who have less right than we Old Fogies to speak in the name of the nineteenth century."

"But if we are the minority, we nevertheless represent the intelligence of this century."

"In your own estimation, very possibly; in reality, not so certain. You have given me no remarkable proofs of your superior intelligence, and when you have more years over your head, you will not need any one to tell you that much which you now call your wisdom is nothing but ignorance and folly. In my youth, I reasoned as you do, and prided myself on being superior to the prejudices of past ages. I gloried in the name of reform, and I was madder than you are in my zeal for political changes and social ameliorations. Hitherto, I said, the world has gone wholly wrong; nobody has really understood the true science of government and society. For the first time in the history of the human race, true science is possible, and true wisdom is conceived. I thought I and my radical associates were the only sages the world had ever seen, and

that the hopes of mankind were centred in us, or rather in myself alone, as their chief. But I have lived long enough, Dick, to laugh at my folly, and to see that my egotism was the result of my feeble understanding and deplorable ignorance. There never was a time when the world could not have survived my loss, or when I could not have died without its suffering any serious detriment. He is a very ignorant man who fancies all ignorant but himself, and a very proud man who imagines that he is superior to all the world beside. No little of our lofty estimate of our own superior knowledge is the result of our real ignorance. We fancy we understand propositions, simply because we do not understand them, because we have not penetrated to their real significance, and comprehended them in their various relations with other propositions. In early life we take without examination the principles or premises which the popular sentiment of our age, our country, or our circle gives us; from these we draw conclusions, sometimes logical, and sometimes illogical, and then assume these conclusions as certain truths according to which the world should be constructed, society organized, and government constituted and administered. Finding, the moment that we look out of ourselves, that the world is constructed, society organized, and government constituted and administered on precisely contrary principles, we assume the attitude of hostility to all generally received principles and usages, and believe it our mission to revolutionize the whole moral, social, and political world, and reorganize the whole according to the conclusions we have drawn from the premises furnished us by popular opinion.

"All this is very natural, and I am not disposed to be very hard upon the young men of our age. In nine cases out of ten, those who reject with horror their conclusions, maintain with a dogged tenacity their premises. I had the temerity when a young man to publish an essay in which I only pushed the principles stoutly contended for by all my Protestant and democratic countrymen to their logical consequences, and forthwith I was denounced from one end of the country to the other as holding horrible doctrines. They were horrible doctrines; I now see and own it; but they were doctrines which every Protestant and every democrat should accept, or renounce the premises he holds. My error was not an error of logic, for my

conclusions followed necessarily from my premises, but in accepting false premises; the error of my Protestant and democratic countrymen was not in recoiling from my conclusions, and denouncing them as horrible, but in doing so while they held the premises which warranted them. I took some interest in the Dorr rebellion in Rhode Island, and felt it my duty to support the public authorities against it. I even went so far as to visit the State and give one or two public addresses against the revolutionary movement and in favor of the party of law and order. My addresses were listened to with sufficient respect, and at their conclusion I was invited to eat an oyster with a club composed of several old Dons of the State who had been the firm supporters of the government against Mr. Dorr and his party; and yet, to my surprise and very great scandal, I found myself obliged to defend in this club itself, against these old Dons themselves, the only principles on which the Dorrites could be consistently condemned. The two parties adopted the same principles, and one of the most distinguished lawyers in the State, and who had signalized himself in defence of the constituted authorities, boldly maintained against me the popular right of revolution, and that the question between the government party and the Dorr party was not one of principle, but simply a question of expediency. The Constitution of this Commonwealth in the preamble to its Bill of Rights defines the State to be a voluntary association, and asserts the right of revolution in the broadest terms; thus denying all government in the very instrument in which it constitutes it, and settles its powers. The majority of our people are Protestants, and Protestantism is based on the supposed right of rebellion and revolution, or the denial of all authority. I cannot therefore cast all the blame on you young men. Nay, I have a respect for you which I have not for the real Old Fogies who oppose you, for you have the merit of being faithful to their principles, which they have not."

"But it strikes me, Uncle Jack, that you are hardly consistent with yourself, when you say my views are embraced by only a minority of even our own age. It would seem from what you have last said, that the great majority embrace them."

"The majority embrace your premises, a minority only accept your conclusions; not indeed because your conclu-

sions are not warranted by their premises, but because their practical good sense is stronger than their theoretical or speculative sense. It is never only a small minority of mankind that have the courage to be consistent. I have been myself censured by even my Catholic brethren as "more Catholic than Catholicity," simply because I love consistency and venture to draw from the premises which every Catholic admits, and must admit, their strictly logical conclusions. To be more Catholic than Catholicity, is not to be Catholic at all, but a heretic or an infidel, and yet these good people who denounce me as being ultra-Catholic do not pretend, and dare not pretend, that, on the points even on which they represent me as ultra, I am heterodox. The meaning of their denunciation is, that I push Catholic principles farther than they find it convenient to go with me. The sin which they would lay to my charge is not a sin of heresy, material or formal, but a sin of imprudence; and they, in order to guard against my assumed imprudence, not unfrequently fall into real heresy of doctrine. The spirit of compromise, of obtaining a settlement of difficulties by splitting the difference, as we see in our High-Church Episcopalians, who try to find a *via media* between Catholic truth and Protestant falsehood, is a very prevalent spirit, and has done and does no little mischief."

"You forget, uncle, that I am a Protestant, as you yourself were at my age."

"I am not likely to forget it, since I pray day and night for your conversion. Yet Protestant as you are, you may find young Catholics enough who go with you heart and soul six days out of seven. Some of the most rabid Jacobins in the country, and who push the democratic doctrines of our countrymen to the most dangerous extremes, were brought up Catholics. The worst radicals abroad are or were nominally Catholics. The founders of Protestantism had all been Catholics, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, Melancthon, Bacon, Henry the Eighth, and his daughter Elizabeth, and her secretary Cecil. There are a large number who will be damned as Catholics, as well as Protestants and infidels. Voltaire was reared a Catholic, and so were D'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, and the majority of the French philosophers of the last century. Joseph the Second of Germany, and, if I am not mistaken, his minis-

ter Kaunitz, were nominally Catholics. Comparatively few men, I tell you, Dick, have the courage to be consistent, and the majority seek by one set of principles to serve God and save their souls, and by another to serve Mammon and make sure of the world. Protestantism is essentially anarchical, at war with all authority and all vested rights, and yet there are Protestants who in practice are staunch upholders of authority, and able defenders of liberty in its truest and broadest sense. The Church is conservative, every consistent son of the Church must be conservative, and yet there are Catholic radicals as well as Protestant radicals."

"How do you account for this fact, uncle?"

"I account for it, in the first place, from the fact, that the flesh, with its concupiscence, remains in all men after baptism, and therefore in Catholics as well as in others; and the flesh seeks naturally the world, with its vanities and its pride, and to seek reason, to seek always God, the right, the truth, demands self-denial, a warfare against the flesh, a strong and continued effort, which few have the resolution to make. I account for it, in the second place, by the prevalence of false notions in all modern communities, which supply a set of false premises and dangerous maxims to both young and old. Protestantism grew out of the old heathen doctrines in regard to the mutual relations of the spiritual and the temporal orders, or the Manicheanism propagated and transmitted by various heretical sects, and the civil authorities and their supporters. Protestantism gave birth to the Baconian philosophy in England, and to the Cartesian philosophy in France. These two philosophies have passed into general literature, and given Protestant premises to the great body of the young in all countries, whether Catholic or Protestant. All general literature has become Pagan, and therefore Protestant. Protestant philosophy has permeated the whole modern world, and hence, save in what is expressly of dogma and ritual, the whole thought of our times has become uncatholic. Uncatholic premises, in relation to society, to politics, to earthly felicity, are the first premises adopted by our educated youth, and from these they are diffused to a frightful extent even among the uneducated. In our own country, the tendency, you well know, is to a wild and rabid democracy, and Catholics have felt it

dangerous to resist that tendency; and some have even attempted to show that Catholicity favors it. Your great standing charge against our religion is, that it is incompatible with democracy. We naturally seek to repel this charge, and our easiest way to do it is to show ourselves extremely democratic. Moreover, the majority of our Catholics are emigrants from foreign monarchical states, where for ages they had suffered the most cruel oppression. Nothing more natural than that they should ascribe their oppression there to monarchy, and the liberty they enjoy here to our democratic form of government, although nothing is farther from the truth.

"Then, again, you must remember, my dear boy, that men are governed more by their passions and their interests than they are by their principles. Catholics are not seldom worse than their principles, Protestants are sometimes superior to their principles; or rather Catholics often abandon certain Catholic principles which some Protestants now and then adhere to. Lord Aberdeen showed more Catholic principle in opposing, recently, in the English Parliament, the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, than did Lord Beaumont or Mr. Chisholm Anstey in denouncing the measure which called forth that bill. We often find, in reading history, courtly prelates who side with the court against the Church, and seldom do we find a Catholic statesman or politician that has not at least a dash of Manicheanism, and is not disposed to uphold the temporal against the spiritual power. Worldly interests have, over most men, during the more active portion of their lives, a predominating influence, and in pursuing them they forget their God and their religion, and in their intercourse with the world live and act as if there were no God, or as if God had no business to meddle with the temporal order. Nobody can doubt that James the Second of England was sincerely attached to the Catholic faith, but he was far enough from maintaining Catholic morals and manners; and at the very moment that he was risking his crown for his faith, he kept his mistresses, and was very remote from listening as a dutiful son to the prudent advice of the Holy Father. We find thousands of Catholics in our days who would die sooner than renounce their faith, who yet are real atheists or pantheists in their politics. Interest, passion, false

philosophy, triumph over their faith in practice, and leave them to act in real hostility to their religion. It is in this way I account for the fact that so many Catholics are Protestants six days out of seven."

"But how do you make good your assertion, Uncle Jack, that Protestantism originated in Manicheanism?"

"I do not mean to say that it had an exclusively Manichean origin, for in some respects it had an atheistic origin; that is to say, in the assumption of the superiority of the temporal to the spiritual. But, practically considered, it originated in the quarrels between the two powers. Save at brief intervals, the leading temporal powers of Europe have been and are Manichean. The essence of Manicheanism is the assertion of two eternal and independent principles, a dual first and dual final cause of all things. The doctrine almost always maintained, or at least acted on, by temporal governments, is what since 1682 has gone by the name of Gallicanism, and Gallicanism involves the essential principle of Manicheanism. It asserts a dual end or final cause of man, and therefore by implication asserts a dual first cause or origin. It assumes the Church and the state to be two distinct and independent powers, or that the secular and the spiritual have each an end of its own distinct from and independent of that of the other. If this be true, the two orders cannot have had the same first cause. Unity of the first cause implies unity of the final cause. If you assert the unity of the final cause, you must assert that the temporal and the spiritual are ordered to one and the same end, and then it is absurd to assert them as two coexisting and mutually independent orders. One must be subordinated to the other, and either the spiritual must be for the temporal, or the temporal for the spiritual, and subject to it. But as Gallicanism denies this subordination, it must admit two ends of man, each absolute, one secular, the other spiritual; then it must admit two mutually distinct and independent first causes of man; then two eternally distinct and independent principles, which is the essence of Manicheanism.

"Protestantism is only full-blown Gallicanism, and Protestants are distinguished from Gallicans only in being a little more daring, and drawing one or two conclusions which the Gallican shrinks from. Protestantism not only asserts the two principles, but it completes its Maniche-

anism by making one good and the other wicked. According to it the secular or principle represented by the state is the good principle, and the spiritual or principle represented by the Church is the bad or wicked principle. Hence it calls the Church the 'mystery of iniquity,' and the Pope 'the man of sin,' 'Antichrist.' Protestants claim to be the descendants of the Albigenses, who were the descendants of the Paulicians, who were, as is well known, Manicheans. I might prove Protestantism to be Manichean, when not atheistic in its character, by an examination of its early dogmas, but it is not necessary."

"You would then maintain that Gallicanism contains the germs of all that you find to condemn in us liberals of to-day."

"Most assuredly. You are all children of the old French Revolution, and that revolution was only the last word of Gallicanism. The Gallican bishops, in the first place, emancipated the temporal order from the spiritual, and asserted its independence; and in the second, by undertaking to define the extent and limits of the papal power, they practically asserted the right of subjects to judge their sovereign. They transferred to the spiritual order the principles on which the English rebels had acted in the civil order, and deprived authority in both orders of all its sacredness. The Convention, in judging Louis the Sixteenth, and condemning him to death, only applied to the civil order the principles asserted by the Assembly of 1682. The Assembly consecrated the principle of rebellion by sitting in judgment on the powers of their spiritual chief, and the principle of rebellion once consecrated, all authority is denied, all vested rights are annulled, and nothing can be asserted but the simple natural rights of man as man, which ends either in pure individualism, or in pure social despotism; that is, either in atheism or pantheism. All the dangerous heresies of our times were in principle sustained, almost from the first, by the leading monarchies of Europe, in spite of the anathemas of the Church, and these monarchies are now reaping their reward. It is perhaps fitting that they should be punished by their own sins."

"But I thought Gallicans were Catholics, and the better class of Catholics."

"They are, doubtless, Catholics against whom Protestants have the fewest objections to urge, which to a Catho-

lic mind is not much to their credit. Gallicans who do not push their principles to their logical conclusions, who really submit to the Sovereign Pontiff as supreme pastor and governor of the Church, and neither in theory nor in practice deny his spiritual supremacy, are, doubtless, Catholics; but that does not say that Gallicanism, logically developed, is not an unsound opinion, and destructive of all legitimate authority, and incompatible with that reverence and submission which we owe to the Holy See. The Four Articles may not have been formally condemned; indeed, we are told that they have not been, but the Holy See has shown, on more occasions than one, that it disapproves them. Innocent the Eleventh annulled them, and declared them of no authority; and Pius the Sixth, in his Bull *Auctorem Fidei* against the acts of the Synod of Pistoia, seems to me to come very near expressly condemning them. Pius the Ninth seems also to have condemned the very principle of the first of them, which I regard as the worst, in his recent condemnation of Professor Nuytz's work on Canon Law, and Bailly's *Theology* heretofore used in several French ecclesiastical seminaries. However, of these matters I am no judge. I only know that these articles are not, and never were, accepted at Rome; and I seek to be a Catholic as they are Catholics at Rome, not merely as they are at Paris, for Rome, not Paris, holds the chair of Peter. Yet the French are not the worst Gallicans in the world, and it would be wrong to suppose that Gallicanism, save at the court, predominates in France. The doctrine, since it was attacked by De Maistre, has lost ground, and the immense majority of the French bishops and clergy reject it as strenuously as I do. It is retained now by very few anywhere, except by the laity, and they, it is hoped, will soon abandon it. The Ultramontane doctrine is, no doubt, very odious to the civil power, and to non-Catholics; but it is the Roman Catholic doctrine, and all odious as it is, we are not a little indebted for the wonderful increase of Catholicity during the last thirty years to its fearless and energetic assertion. Gallicanism is a species of Old Fogysm, in the proper sense of the word, and as such is powerless. Even non-Catholics are forced to respect the Catholic who is not afraid nor ashamed to be true to the most rigid doctrine of his Church."

CONVERSATION III.

"Forgive me, my dear uncle, but you seem to me as little satisfied with things as they are, as I am. To you, as well as to me, the world is out of joint. The child is the father of the man, and I suspect you have still, as in youth, the spirit of a reformer."

"There is some truth in what you say, my dear Dick. We retain usually through life our early characteristics. St. Paul retained the same zeal, the same energy, the same earnestness, the same unreserved devotion to what he regarded as the cause of God, that had distinguished the young Saul of Tarsus. St. Augustine, the Catholic bishop, retained the tenderness, the activity, the inquisitive and penetrating intellect, the same tendency to give himself up heart and soul to whatever he undertook, that had characterized Augustine the rhetorician; and St. Francis Xavier, as a priest and missionary, had the same desire of excelling that he had shown in his literary and philosophical studies. Conversion does not change one's nature, or the original bent of one's character; it changes simply the direction of his affections, the objects on which he places them, and the motives from which he acts. No doubt I am the same man that I was before my conversion, with the same mental and moral characteristics. I am just as little contented with what I see that is wrong, and just as earnest in pursuit of those ameliorations which I regard as necessary and practicable, as ever I was; but I hope from higher and purer motives, and with a juster understanding of the changes to be effected, and the means of effecting them. I am an old man, but not in reality an Old Fogie, though it pleases my young friends to regard me as one, and to them I perhaps am one. An Old Fogie is one who, from indolence, interest, or cowardice, refuses to push the principles he holds to their legitimate consequences, or condemns his more consistent brethren for laboring to effect those changes which are authorized by the principles which he and they hold in common. Thus a Protestant who opposes those who push their denials to the absolute rejection of Christianity, an Episcopalian who wars against dissent, a Protestant Churchman who throws up his hands in holy horror at the Puritan, the English Whig that frowns

upon the English radical, the American democrat that talks of law and order, or the Cartesian that objects to private judgment, and appeals to authority, is an Old Fogie, because he will not follow out nor suffer others to follow out his principles. He says two and two, but will neither add nor suffer you to add, *make four*. Indeed, all except strict, thorough-going Catholics have more or less of the Old Fogie in their character. For myself, I love the free, bold, consistent mind that pushes its principles to their legitimate conclusions, and recoils from an inconsequence as from a mortal sin, even when it is in error; and I have more respect for the young Sauls who breathe forth threatenings and death against the disciples of the Lord, than I have for the Gallios who care for none of these things. There is always hope of a man who has the courage or the energy to be consistent; such a man has principles, and is capable of distinguishing between truth and falsehood. You have only to show him that his premises are false, to lead him to embrace the truth.

But if things are out of joint with me as well as with you, they are not so for the same reason, nor do I seek to set them right by the same means. You are a Cartesian, and would begin by destroying all existing institutions and denying all existing beliefs. You would annihilate the old world, and create a new one. I am less ambitious. My notions of reform are restricted to the right use of the world as it is, and hearty conformity to the institutions which God has already given us. You would make yourselves gods, and be always annihilating old worlds and creating new ones; I would have men understand that they are creatures, and that their business is to love and serve their Creator, and to seek the end he has ordained by the means he has provided. My work is much humbler than yours, but perhaps in the end it will amount to somewhat more."

"I do not precisely understand you, uncle, nor can I conceive why you should call me a Cartesian. I have no respect for that shallow Frenchman. I have studied, you know, in Germany, where we have little respect for any thing French."

"Descartes regarded it as his mission to reform philosophy, to take away all uncertainty in regard to philosophical questions, and to put an end for ever to all the scanda-

lous wranglings of philosophers. A great and noble mission, perhaps; but he began, or laid it down that we ought to begin, by doubting all things, — all our previous scientific notions, all our religious beliefs, the universe, and even God himself, — and to admit nothing save as we demonstrate its truth. Consequently he compelled himself to begin in nothing, and from nothing to reconstruct God and the universe, religion and science, man and society. The poor man carried his doubt as far as he could, but his egotism was too great for him to doubt himself, and so he exclaims, *Eureka! Cogito, ergo sum*, — I think, therefore I exist. Having thus by a miserable sophism proved his own existence, he proceeds from the conception of his own *ego* to demonstrate, after the manner of the geometricians, God, man, and the universe, which of course could on his hypothesis be only modes or affections of himself. You adopt his method. You begin by doubting or denying whatever exists, by sweeping away the existing world and starting with your new world from nothing, or what is the same thing, from your sublime self. But as man has no proper creative power, you can obtain by your labors only nothing, or at best only self. He who begins in philosophizing by denial or doubt, can never arrive at an affirmation, and that the Cartesian philosophy, a product of the seventeenth century, had much to do with the doubt and incredulity of the eighteenth, can hardly be questioned. It reduced to almost nothing the sphere of revelation, enlarged beyond all bounds that of natural reason, and at the same time threw doubt on reason itself. How it could ever have obtained the vogue it has among men who have no sceptical tendencies, is to me a mystery. I find its method defended in the most popular text-books of philosophy used in the schools of France and this country even at the present moment, and I have been much pleased to find the *Civiltà Cattolica*, at Rome, during the last year, opening its batteries against it. He who would philosophize must begin, not by denying, but by affirming, — in truth, not in falsehood, if he means to arrive at truth for result.

So he that would reform what is amiss in society or in the administration of government must begin with a truth, something positive, and proceed to maintain it, and labor not for organic changes, but for the simple correction of

abuses ; that is, to bring men to the right use of the institutions God in his providence has founded for them. In beginning by destroying, you deprive yourself of the spot on which to rest the fulcrum of your lever ; you have nothing to work with, and therefore can substitute nothing in the place of what you destroy. Luther imagined abuses in the Church, and he sought to remedy them, not by laboring to remove the obstacles which the Church everywhere encountered to her free and salutary action, not by exerting his gifts to induce men, cleric and laic, to conform to her discipline, but by attacking the Church herself, casting off her authority, and founding a new church of his own. You know the result. Others followed him, and thought his Church was quite imperfect, and set to work to make a new one in its place. These were followed by others who treated their work as they had treated Luther's, and thus on down to our time, till you more advanced Protestants have found yourselves without any church, and, giving up church-making in despair, boldly maintain that no church is necessary, and, indeed, that the grand mistake committed by all Protestants since breaking away from the old Church has been in supposing a church of some sort is needed. Luther's work, which started with destruction, has resulted only in destruction. Neither he nor his followers have been able to construct any thing. The case is the same with regard to dogmas of faith. Luther thought that he must reform the creed of Christendom. He began by denying a few articles, though retaining the larger number. His followers thought he retained too many, and they denied a few more ; their followers thought the denial ought to be carried a little further, and each new generation has carried it still further, till now the great body of living Protestants have denied the whole creed, from the *credo in Patrem Omnipotentem* down to the *vitam æternam*. You reject all dogmatic theology, resolve Christianity into a sentiment of the heart, which many of you are beginning to resolve into mere lust. Beginning by destroying, you can end only in destruction ; beginning by stripping off one garment after another, you needs must find yourselves at last reduced to simple nakedness. In society you arrive at the same sad result. You begin by attacking the government and its institutions, denying all vested rights, and you find yourselves thrown out of civil

society, out of a well-ordered state, back into a state of pure nature, below that of our American savages. All this is inevitable, if you start as destructives, and the more logical and daring you are, and the fewer Old Fogies you have among you, the sooner you will find yourselves at this sad termination of all your labors.

Count, my dear Dick, the history of the past as worth something. You know that I have been stating to you only simple historical facts. You have the history of the Reformation before you. In religion Luther engendered Voltaire, in philosophy Descartes, in politics Jean Jacques Rousseau, in morals Helvetius. In religion you have ended in the rejection of the supernatural, in philosophy in doubt and nihilism, in politics in anarchy, in morals in the sanctification of lust. Here is the fact which you cannot deny, which stares you in the face, and with which all Protestantdom groans. This fact ought to have followed, it is a logical consequence of your premises, and you need not imagine that you can, by going through your process again, arrive at any other result."

"You may be shocked, my dear uncle, but I do not wish to arrive at any other result. I read history as you do, and I acknowledge that the movement of the Reformation has been precisely as you describe it. I accept the result obtained by the more advanced Protestant party. That result is what was implied in Luther's movement, only he knew it not, and it brings us back to pure and primitive Christianity, to Christianity as it lay in the mind of its Author, though his ignorant and superstitious disciples, with their minds obfuscated by their Jewish prejudices, never understood it. The Church has never done justice to the free and noble thought of her Master. She has applied to a future world, to a supposed life after death, what he understood of this world, and applied to an extramundane God what he affirmed only of God in man. He taught that God has come in the flesh, and that the God we are to love, worship, and obey is the God that lives, moves, and speaks in the instincts and aspirations of man's own nature, — those very instincts and aspirations which the Church condemns and commands us to mortify. It is the man-God that Christianity proposes to the worship of man, — God in the flesh that she bids us adore. To be true followers of Christ, then, we must renounce all your

sacerdotal doctrines and spiritualistic dreams, and put man in the place you assign to your God, the earth in the place of your imaginary heaven, and the flesh in the rank you claim for the spirit. Here is the true and genuine doctrine of Him whose name you wrongfully usurp, and to this the Reformation has, perhaps against its intention, conducted us, and therefore we honor it. This is the mighty progress it has enabled us to make."

"A progress, by the way, in losing,—a sort of progress which you cannot continue much longer, for I do not see what more you have to lose. You have reached the last stage this side of nowhere, and another step, and you must vanish in endless vacuity. In plain words, if I understand you, my dear Dick, and I ought to understand you, for—I blush to confess it—I once held your very doctrine, you would have me hold that the Divine Founder of our religion came into the world to teach us that there is for us no God but man, to free us from all religion, from all moral obligation, and to bid us live as we list,—Atheism for doctrine, and Epicureanism for morals. You have, indeed, made a marvellous progress—backwards. Why, my dear Dick, the Devil must be in his dotage, or else he finds you very easily duped. Your so-called Christianity, under the name of heathenism or carnal Judaism, is a very old doctrine, and has long since been condemned by the common sense of mankind. Satan preached it six thousand years ago to our first parents, and your enlightened nineteenth century is just able to revive it. Well, well, Solomon was right when he said, "There is nothing new under the sun; the thing that is has been, and the thing that has been shall be." Even the Devil has failed to invent a new delusion, and you with all your wonderful progress have fallen into his old snare. I am almost ashamed of you, Dick. I did hope that, if a heretic you were resolved to be, you would at least embrace a heresy not wholly discreditable to your intellect. If you recognize Christianity at all, or in any sense the authority of Jesus Christ, you must admit that he never taught the vile heathenism you ascribe to him. It was not because he sought to establish an earthly kingdom, and to promote the worldly prosperity of mankind, that the Jews rejected him, and refused to own him as the Messiah, but because he came as a spiritual prince, and taught men to mortify their lusts,

to crucify the flesh, to trample the world beneath their feet, and to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. It was because he did *not* teach what you allege, but the exact opposite, that they crucified him between two thieves. He condemned the doctrine you ascribe to him as heathenism, as you must know if you know any thing of his teachings. If there is any one thing certain with regard to our Blessed Lord, it is that he taught that our true good is not derivable from this world, and is enjoyed in this world only by promise; that the good of the soul in all cases takes precedence of the good of the body; that, if we will be his disciples, we must deny ourselves, take up our cross, and follow him; that we are to set our affections, not on things of the earth, but on things of heaven, and that we are to lay up treasures, not on the earth, where moth and rust corrupt, and thieves break through and steal, but in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal. He bids us not fear him who can kill the body, and after that hath no more power, but Him who hath power to destroy both body and soul in hell. No, my poor boy, you cannot shelter your heathenism and your worship of the flesh under his August Name. On this point at least there is no difference between his teaching and that of the Church, and the Jews rejected him for precisely the same reasons that you reject her. You must either renounce your doctrine of the earth, earthy, your deification of man and the worship of lust, or not have the audacity to call yourself a Christian or to pretend that you embrace Christianity."

"You may be right, Uncle Jack, but we of the movement party have prejudices enough against us already, and more than we can easily overcome. A large portion of so-called Christendom have indeed outgrown the Church, become indignant at Christian asceticism, and attained to the very rational conclusion, that man is placed in this world to enjoy himself, that his present concern is with this present life, and that, if a heaven hereafter there be, the best way to secure it will be by making sure of a heaven on earth; but still many retain a sort of reverence for the name of Christ, and, bold as they are, would not dare to avow the truth itself under another name. Truth indeed is truth under any name, but not every name is equally

good to conjure with. To a great extent even the far advanced are still the slaves of names, and require for the present to be treated as nurses treat sick children. If we should come out and boldly disavow the name of Christ, and declare what we are aiming at is in direct opposition to what he taught, the majority would shrink from going with us, and we should fail to accomplish the emancipation of mankind. It is in the name of Christianity that we must proceed to emancipate the world from Christianity. This is the way taken by the reformers themselves. It is very likely that they had views which reached much further than their adherents imagined, much further than their age could bear. There are expressions to be found in Luther which lead one to suspect that he saw the truth; but he would have ruined his whole cause if he had brought it out clearly under its own name. He avowed no hostility to Christianity; he even professed a profound reverence for it, and to be more Christian than the Papists themselves. He comprehended how much his age would bear, and he made his principal war on the Pope and the Papacy, in which he could make sure of the sympathy of a large portion of his countrymen, and of the open or secret support of the greater part of the temporal princes of the time. Having demolished the Papacy in the name of Christ, the Church, and the Scriptures, he broke the authority of the spiritual power, and prepared the way for his successors to go further. These successors distinguished between Christianity and the Church, as he had distinguished between the Church and the Papacy, and in the name of Christ denounced the Christian Church, whether Catholic or Protestant, and made war on all organized Christianity, resolving Christianity into mere doctrine and sentiment, to be determined by each one for himself, by his own private interpretation of the Scriptures. These were followed in turn by a new generation of reformers, who distinguished between Christianity and the Scriptures as these distinguished between Christianity and the Church, and in the name of Christ denied all authority and all revelation except man's own spiritual nature. We act on the same principle in distinguishing between man's spiritual nature and his carnal nature, and asserting always in the name of Christ the supremacy of the latter. It is a wise and necessary policy. For ourselves, indeed, it

makes no difference whether you call the truth by the name of Moses, Zoroaster, Confucius, Christ, Arius, Manes, Mahomet, Luther, Joe Smith, or Saint-Simon, but by taking the name of Christ, as the Christian world does, as the symbol of truth, and proclaiming the truth in his name, and our own doctrine and purposes as the real significance of his, we prevent suspicion, we disarm prejudice, and induce multitudes to coöperate with us, who otherwise would stand aloof from us, perhaps oppose us."

"There is no doubt of what you say. If you can make the world believe that what you teach and are aiming at is what our Lord *meant*, — and there are not wanting fools enough who can be made to believe so, as I can testify from my own experience, — you can bring to your aid whatever authority his name still retains. But, my dear Dick, what right have you to do so, knowing as you do that what you seek to make the world believe is false? Do you not feel degraded even in your own eyes by the deception you practise?"

"I regret, my dear uncle, that it is necessary to practise it, for I avow I prefer open and manly dealing. I love the straightforward and ingenuous policy which says what it means, and means what it says. But you must take the people as you find them, and the world as it is, and when you cannot do as you would, you must do as you can. The people will have something to worship, and when they can have nothing else, they will worship a log or a stone, a crocodile or a calf. We must humor them, if we would do them any good. It is always right to emancipate them from the thralldom in which the Church for so many ages has held them, to free them from the priestly domination which degrades them, and to use such means as are necessary to this end. If deception is necessary, then we have a right to practise deception. If we deceive the people it is for their good, to emancipate them from those who have so long abused them."

"After all, Dick, you hardly dare accept your own doctrine. If you had full confidence in it, why labor to prove that your cause is not repugnant to moral principle? You aim to emancipate the flesh, nay, to elevate the flesh to the rank of the Supreme Divinity. You propose as your God, God in the flesh, not in the Christian sense of the Incarnation, as you would fain make fools believe,

but in the pantheistic sense that the flesh is God and lust is his worship. Why then should you apologize for following the flesh, and doing its works? 'Now the works of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcraft, enmities, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrels, dissensions, sects, envy, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like.' These, though mortal sins in view of the Christian, must be heroic virtues in yours. On your principle there can be nothing in lying, deceiving, cheating, robbing, stealing, murdering, assassination, to be ashamed of, to apologize for, or to defend, as your European friends very clearly show by the means they adopt for carrying out their plans of political and social regeneration. Do they not make a free use of the stiletto, and have they not instituted the worship of the dagger? You reverse the whole moral code of mankind, and call by the name of truth what has hitherto gone by the name of falsehood; a holy act what has generally been punished as a crime; virtue what old-fashioned morality has stigmatized as vice. In all this you are consistent with yourselves, and loyal to your principles. Your doctrine consecrates vice and divinizes crime. If you are right in principle, your conduct needs no defence. But I suspect, Dick, that your good sense and better feelings disavow your doctrine, and refuse to worship the idol you set up."

"You wrong us, uncle. We do not advocate even what you call vice, and we abhor what you name, after Paul, as the works of the flesh. We love and venerate virtue, and our sole object is to render all men sincere, honest, virtuous, and to enable them to live together in a holy society, in a loving brotherhood, in peace and friendship, each loving his brother as himself. We would realize on earth the sweet vision of Paradise."

"All very fine—in words, my poor boy; but the mischief is that you miscall words, and are the dupes of your own cunning. You are really seeking to emancipate the flesh. One of the ablest of the fathers of Young Germany was Heinrich Heine, who praises Luther's Reformation because it was, as he says, a noble assertion of sensuality, of the rights of the flesh against the spirituality of the Church; and he contends that we ought to institute festivals in honor of the flesh, to atone to it for the wrongs and indignities for so many ages heaped upon it by Catholicity.

You cannot emancipate the flesh without asserting your right to do the deeds of the flesh. These deeds are never good; they are always bad, and destructive of both soul and body. The experience of all ages proves that the works of the flesh are what the Apostle asserts, and that virtue, that love, that friendship, that peace, domestic or social, private or public, is possible only on condition that the flesh is resisted and kept in subjection to the law of the spirit. Appetite and passion are subjected to reason, and reason to the law of God.

Time was, my dear Dick, when I thought and reasoned as you do. I imagined that the whole world had gone wrong from the beginning, and because men had set out with the persuasion that the inclinations of the flesh are to evil, and that to be virtuous we must resist them and practise self-denial. I placed the evil I saw and deplored in restraint, in the restraint which moralists teach us to impose upon ourselves, and to which priests and magistrates always labor to subject us. Only give us liberty, only leave us free to follow our instincts, the natural sentiments of our own hearts, the promptings of our own natural affections, and vice and crime will disappear, wrongs and outrages will cease to be committed, and the whole world will live in peace and love. But, alas! I found by a painful experience that the heart is deceitful above all things, and exceedingly corrupt, that human nature, whose praises I had chanted, is rotten, and that the sweetest and apparently the purest sentiments easily become the most degrading and disgusting lusts, and that to give loose reins to the flesh is only to be precipitated into unbridled licentiousness. I found peace, and recovered self-respect, only in proportion as by the grace of God I was enabled to practise self-denial, and to return and conform to the very doctrine which I had regarded as the origin and source of all the evils flesh is heir to. Be assured, my dear nephew, that the evil originates not in the restraints imposed by religion and morality, but in breaking through them, and following wherever our natural inclinations lead."

- ART. II. — 1. *Prælectiones Philosophicæ*. Claramon-Fer-
randi. 1849. 3 tom. 12mo.
2. *L' Autocrazia dell' Ente. Commedia in tre Atti*. Roma :
La Civiltà Cattolica. Vol. III. 1853.

THE author of the first named of these works is a French Sulpitian of rare merit, formerly Professor of Philosophy at Clermont, now, we believe, at Issy. He is a young man, but he has made good philosophical studies, and is animated by a noble philosophical spirit. His work, which might, perhaps, gain by condensation and vigor of style, is certainly one of great value, and, saving the part which treats of ethics, one of the best manuals of philosophy we are acquainted with. It strikes us as a very great advance, as to its principles, we say not as to the ability of the author, on the *Lugdenensis*, the popular work of Bouvier, the manuals of Liberatore, Dmowski, and even Rothenflue. The author, perhaps, adheres too closely to Malebranche, but he rejects Cartesianism and modern psychologism, and bases his system on sound ontological principles. If we should object at all to his *metaphysics*, it would be to his having failed to adapt his method to his principles. But we are so thankful to find a philosophical work, in these days, generally sound in its fundamental principles, that we can overlook minor faults, and give it a most hearty welcome, although we may not regard it as perfect. The philosophical student will not fail to prize the author's *Prolegomena* very highly, and his refutation of pantheism is decidedly the best we have ever seen, and leaves on that head, as far as we can judge, nothing to be desired.

The author, undoubtedly, departs in some respects from the philosophical system of our more generally used manuals, and many will regard him as an innovator; but if he innovates, he innovates antiquity, for the school to which he inclines is older than the school which will oppose him. The ontological school, both among the Gentiles and among Catholics, is older than the psychological or Peripatetic school, as it was formerly called. The latter school hardly makes its appearance in the Catholic world till the Middle Ages, and owes its introduction in a great measure to the influence of the Mahometan schools in the East, on the coast of Africa, and in Spain. If its adherents can pro-

duce a catena of great saints and doctors from the twelfth or thirteenth century down to our times, their opponents can produce a catena of no less eminent saints and doctors from the Apostolic age down to our own. If the school which would charge the author with innovating can plead in its favor an Abelard, an Alesius, an Albertus Magnus, a St. Thomas, an Occam, a Suarez, he can plead in his favor a St. Augustine, and nearly all the fathers, St. Anselm, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, St. Bonaventura, a Duns Scotus, a Gerson, a Ficinus, a Malebranche, a Thomassin, a Vico, a Gerdil, and a Bossuet and a Fénelon, who were Cartesians only in name. If it comes to the authority of great names, our author has nothing to fear; for if the single name of St. Thomas is a host, that of St. Augustine is not inferior to it, nor to any other name in philosophy; besides, it is evident to the student of the works of the Angelic Doctor, that, if he adopted the Peripatetic philosophy, it was not so much because he preferred it as because he found it generally received, and because he would use it against the enemies of religion, who for the most part professed it, and compel it as a slave to serve the cause of revealed truth. Wherever he breaks from the old Stagirite, and philosophizes freely, so to speak, on his own hook, he accepts and defends ontological and realistic principles.

The second work named at the head of this article is from the modern psychological school, and is a very successful attempt to turn the shafts of wit and ridicule against those who have the temerity to defend the principles and method of the ontological school. As a *jeu d'esprit* we can read and enjoy it, but as an argument we cannot respect it so highly as we could wish, for it confounds the bastard ontology of the heterodox with the views of the so-called ontologists among Catholics, and concludes against the truth of the latter from the absurdity of the former. We are sorry to see this mode of warfare adopted by any philosophical school, because it presents a false issue to the public, and is calculated to arouse passions in poor human nature any thing but favorable to the cause of truth. We are ourselves as strongly opposed to that bastard ontology as is the writer of *L'Autocrazia dell'Ente*, and it is not pleasant to be held up to the public as embracing it, because we do not happen to embrace the

psychological school. There is an ontological school as far removed from the heterodox German ontological school, or the Rosminian *ens in genere*, as from the school defended by the *Civiltà Cattolica*.

We like earnestness, we like zeal in the defence of what one holds to be truth, but we should not dare to defend even dogmatic truth by unfairness towards its opponents, much less mere philosophical opinions. Two schools of philosophy, it is well known, exist among Catholics, each aspiring to the throne of the philosophical world. These schools, under different forms and different names, have subsisted among us for a long time, and both are tolerated by the Church, which leaves each free to maintain its own opinion in Christian charity, and to dispute that of the other, so long as it does not advance its opinion as Catholic dogma, or maintain any thing repugnant to the decisions and definitions of Popes and Councils, and the unanimous teaching of the Fathers. Undoubtedly this does not imply that both schools are equally sound, that their respective opinions are equally probable, and that there is no ground for preferring one to the other; but it does prove that one may belong to either without imperilling the salvation of his soul, and therefore that the differences between the two schools may be discussed without heat or passion on either side. These matters of difference lie in that sphere where the Church wills us to be free, and where, as long as we advance nothing immediately against faith, or that immediately tends to weaken its defences, she leaves us to follow our own reason and will, as she does in political or domestic economy. We say *immediately*, because, no doubt, every error even in the natural order has some bearing, more or less remote, on revealed truth, since the revealed order presupposes the natural. But to tolerate no error of reason, however remote from the revealed dogma, would be to deny to man all free intellectual activity, which is contrary to the uniform practice of the Church. Her authority is full and universal as representing the Divine authority on earth, but her uniform practice is to leave men in philosophy, in government, in social and domestic economy, all the freedom compatible with the end for which she has been instituted; for her wish is to rear, not a race of mere slaves, but free and loyal worshippers of God.

The philosophy more generally taught in our schools is what we term the psychological, though of course free from the glaring defects of the psychologism which obtains in the schools of the heterodox. But though permitted to be taught, there is a wide and growing feeling among earnest and devout Catholics, that it does not afford that strong defence to religion and society, and those facilities for the refutation of modern heresies, which we have the right to demand of a philosophy taught to Catholic youth. That we, to some extent, share this feeling, we have no disposition to deny, but we are not very warm on the subject, and we guard against blaming, in any degree, our professors. That philosophy may have, in our opinion, remote bearings injurious to faith; but it is not heretical, and may be held without any impeachment of one's orthodoxy. Moreover, it is not the professor's business to construct a new or revive an obsolete system of philosophy; his business is to teach a system already constructed, and approved by his superiors. The introduction of new, or the revival of old systems, by individual professors, each on his own responsibility, would produce no little confusion in philosophical teaching, and tend to generate that scepticism in the minds of youth which it is so important to guard against. It is always dangerous to disturb the settled order of things, even though that order may not answer to the highest and most perfect ideal. If the hostility of kings and princes to the Pope, and their desire to possess themselves of the goods of the Church, had the principal share in preparing the revolt of the sixteenth century, the quarrels of the Schoolmen, the attempt to dislodge Aristotle and enthrone Plato as the philosopher, had no little to do in detaching the minds of men from the theology of the Church, and preparing the way for the Protestant heresies. When the whole method of public teaching was adjusted to the scholastic philosophy, it was not easy to attack that philosophy without seeming in the minds of many to be attacking the Church, who had permitted her theology to be cast in its mould, and some of whose most revered saints had professed it.

However objectionable many may regard the philosophical system embodied in our more generally used textbooks, it must be conceded that the objections which might be urged against it are to no inconsiderable extent modified and practically obviated by the manner in which it is

applied; and even if it were not so, what have we to take its place? Its modern opponents have criticized it, and written able essays on the principles and method of philosophy, but we are not aware that there is any better system of philosophy drawn out in that systematic order and completeness which fit it for the professor's use. Suppose, for a moment, that the ontological principles and methods insisted on by Gioberti are sound, what is the professor to do with them before his class? They are not systematized; there is no philosophy based on them drawn out in all its parts and adjusted to the general system of public teaching. What is the professor to do? Is he to interrupt his lessons till he has constructed all the parts of philosophy in harmony with them, — a work demanding years of patient study and labor, and that high order of metaphysical talent and genius scarcely to be found in one man in a century. Whatever changes may be demanded in the public teaching of philosophy, the time has not yet come for them, as the professor before us, as well as Father Rothenflue, fully proves, for while he adopts in his *Prolegomena* the principles of the ontological or synthetic school, he has not dared to depart from the language and method of the scholastic psychologists.

With these feelings towards the school with which we do not wholly agree, we cannot enlist with much zeal in any controversy against it; or in an animated defence of a rival school; and if we take part now and then in the controversy between them, it is more through our love of fair play than through any strong feeling of the absolute necessity of dispossessing one school and establishing another in its place. On certain questions we undoubtedly sympathize with the so-called Ontologists, but properly speaking, we have for ourselves no philosophical system, belong to no school, and swear by no master, neither by Gioberti nor by Father Curci. We regard, as we often say, philosophy simply as the rational element of supernatural theology, never capable by itself alone of being moulded into a complete system even of natural truth, and never worthy of confidence when it aspires to disengage itself from revelation, and to stand alone as a separate and independent science. All we aim at is, to make a right use of reason in discussing those questions pertaining to reason which come in our way when defending Catholic faith and

morals. Indeed, logic is the only part of philosophy we set much store by, and if we enter into the discussion of the higher metaphysical problems, it is chiefly for the sake of logic, because we cannot otherwise make sure of a logic which conforms to the real order of things. It is with a view to defend such a logic, not for the sake of one or another school of metaphysics, that we ask our readers to follow us a little into the question in dispute between the two schools respectively represented by the authors of the works we have cited, and perhaps, after all, we shall end by showing them that these two schools can much more easily be made to harmonize with each other than is commonly supposed.

The difference between the ontological and the psychological schools is perpetuated by the very general adoption in our schools of the Aristotelian logic, and what we regard as the errors of the psychological school we think have obtained among Catholics in consequence of that adoption. Aristotle's logic partakes of the general error of his philosophy. We wish to speak with all becoming respect of one whom the great St. Thomas terms the Philosopher; but he was, after all, a Gentile. He went, perhaps, as far as a Gentile could go; but we must remember that all Gentile philosophy was incomplete and fragmentary. The whole Gentile world had lost or corrupted the dogma of creation, and resolved creation into emanation, generation, or formation. They had broken the unity of the primitive language of mankind, had lost the integrity of the primitive tradition, and lacked the light which supernatural theology sheds on the great problems of human science, and hence, whatever their genius, their talent, or their industry, they were utterly unable to construct a complete and self-coherent system of philosophy. Ignorant of the dogma of creation, and holding the doctrine of formation in its place, it was not in Aristotle's power to construct a logic that should correspond to the order of things. He might have a wide and varied knowledge of phenomena, he might have a marvellous sagacity and great subtilty, he might reason powerfully and justly on many aspects of things, but he could never explain the syllogism, or render a just account of reasoning. The fundamental vice of his logic is, that it does not conform to the real order of things, whether taken subjectively or objectively. It does not

bring us face to face with reality, although no man ever labored harder to find a logic which would do so; it always interposes a *mundus logicus* between the reason and the real world, and deals with the lifeless forms of abstract thought, instead of the living forms of things. Always is there interposed between the cognitive subject and the intelligible object a world of phantasms and intelligible species, which are neither God nor creature, neither nothing nor yet something, but a *tertium quid*, by means of which in some unintelligible way the cognitive subject comes into relation with the cognizable object. A little meditation on the fact that God has created all things by his own power from nothing, would speedily have made away with these intermeddling phantasms and intelligible species, annihilated this *mundus logicus* unnecessarily interposed between subject and object, by showing that whatever is not *thing* is *nothing*, that whatever thing is not God is creature, and that whatever thing — *entity* in scholastic language — is not creature is God, and that his intelligible light, indistinguishable from him, is the only medium between the cognitive faculty and its object, that can be asserted or conceived.

The old Scholastics, of course, knew and held the dogma of creation, and vindicated it whenever it was an express thesis; but, unhappily, when that dogma was not immediately in question, they adopted without modification the Aristotelian logic, and attempted like him to explain the facts of human cognition and reasoning without its light. Hence their everlasting abstractions, their subtle distinctions of forms of mere thought, not of things, and their unreality, which have so hurt their reputation, and so vitiated a no small portion of their philosophical labors. Of course we speak of the Scholastics as philosophers treating freely rational questions, not as theologians treating Catholic dogmas, or even rational questions in their immediate relation to faith. This same Aristotelian logic has served as the model of that still in use, and hence we find in the present scholastic philosophy traces of the original vice. In all that immediately touches dogma, it conforms to the dogma of creation, and is, as we should say, ontological, while in all else it conforms to the Aristotelian notion of formation, and thus is not in harmony with itself.

The psychological school is divided into two principal branches, the Cartesian and the Scholastic. It is possible that the modern Scholastics will object to being termed psychologists, but we see not how they can with propriety. The characteristic of the psychologist is to assert the soul, a contingent existence, as the starting-point of all philosophy, and that the necessary, the absolute, as real and necessary being, is not apprehensible in immediate intuition, and is attained to only by a logical induction from intuition of the contingent, that is, intuition of creatures. The Scholastics of our time, as well as those of mediæval times, assert this, contend that the contingent only is immediately known, and that God in the natural order is known only logically, as a logical induction, and therefore are really psychologists. We shall so call them, not to offend, but to distinguish them. They differ from the Cartesians as to evidence or the criterion of certainty, and especially as to the methodical doubt, real or feigned, recommended by Descartes. They profess to commence with a certain truth or fact, and to proceed from the known to the unknown, by demonstration, which rests for its certainty on the principle of contradiction; the Cartesians profess to begin by doubting or questioning every thing, and they place evidence or certainty in clearness and distinctness of ideas. The Scholastics regard philosophy as *demonstrative*; the Cartesians as *inquisitive*.

The Scholastics have certainly as to method the advantage over their Cartesian brethren. Descartes lays it down that a man should begin by doubting all that he has been taught or hitherto believed, and believe henceforth only what he is able to prove by bringing it to the test of clear and distinct ideas. But this method, which is precisely the Protestant method of examination and private judgment, is obviously inadmissible, for the doubt, if real, is in a Catholic impious and forbidden; if unreal, it is no doubt at all, and amounts to nothing. To begin in a feigned doubt is to begin in a fiction, in falsehood; to begin in a real doubt is to begin in uncertainty, and there is no logical alchemy by which certainty can be extracted from pure uncertainty, or truth from pure falsehood. Descartes himself proves this, for he gets out of the doubt he places as his starting-point only by a shallow sophism, *Cogito, ergo sum*, "I think, therefore I exist," — which is a

sheer begging of the question. We know that, when hard pressed by his opponents, Descartes denied that he intended this as an argument to prove his existence, and maintained that he only gave it as a statement of the fact in which he became conscious of existing. But if so, only so much the worse for him, for it was precisely an argument to prove his existence that he needed. It is true that he might allege that proof in his system consists in clearness and distinctness of ideas; but in the act of thinking he has a clear and distinct idea or conception of his existence, and therefore he really does prove his existence. But that evidence is in clear and distinct ideas he does not anywhere prove, and that always, in thinking, one has a clear and distinct idea of his own existence, is not true, for ordinarily we have only an obscure and indistinct conception of ourselves as existing. Moreover, reasoning is always from premises, and if these be uncertain, so must be the conclusion.

But if the Scholastics are right against the Cartesians in adopting the demonstrative instead of the inquisitive method, they seem to us to fall into a very grave error as to the province of demonstration itself. They assume that demonstration proceeds from the known to the unknown, and enables them to conclude beyond the matter intuitively presented. The whole question between them and us lies precisely in this assumption. They deny all intuition or direct cognition of real and necessary being, and yet they contend that real and necessary being is legitimately concluded from the cognition of contingent existences. They must hold, then, that they can conclude more than they have in their premises, contrary to the well-known rule of logic: —

"Latius hunc quam præmissæ conclusio non vult."

If they contended that the demonstration simply distinguishes real and necessary being from the contingent in the intuition in which it is presented only in an obscure and indistinct manner, their conclusion would not be broader than their premises, and there would be no essential disagreement between them and the Catholic ontological school. But they do not admit this; they deny that we have any direct apprehension of real and necessary being at all, and then either they conclude what is not contained in their premises, and their conclusion is invalid, or the necessary

and absolute which they conclude is a mere logical abstraction formed by the mind itself. Their God, then, whom they profess to demonstrate, would be only an abstract God, and they would have no right to laugh at Fichte, who remarked to his class as he concluded one lecture, "In our next lecture, gentlemen, we will make God."

Demonstration is the work of reflection, and reflection is never primary. The Italians happily express it by the word *ripensare*, to re-think, or to think again, and surely the mind must have thought before it can re-think; it must have had the matter of reflection presented before reflecting on it. Reasoning, the syllogism, demonstration, is only the instrument of reflection, whose sole office is to distinguish, clear up, systematize, and verify our immediate intuitions, and though it may and usually does contain less, it can never contain more than the matter presented in our direct cognitions, or by faith, human or divine, in things natural or in things supernatural. As to the reality contained in it, our science begins and ends where begin and end our immediate intuitions or direct cognitions; all beyond is not science, but faith, and can never be legitimately included in our philosophy.

We do not deny that the mediæval Scholastics — the Peripatetics, we mean — have the air of asserting that the syllogism is an instrument by which we advance from the known to the unknown; but this is to be understood of knowledge under a reflective and scientific form, not as to its matter, and their own expression is from the better to the less known. Reality simply presented or merely apprehended in intuition they do not regard as known, because known only in an obscure and indistinct manner; but they never suppose that in formal science they ever advance beyond the reality thus presented. Their real doctrine is not readily seized, because they do not admit, precisely in our sense, immediate intuition. We know according to them only by means of phantasms and intelligible species; but when we have penetrated to the real fact which they mean to assert, we shall find that the phantasms are simply the means by which we actually cognize sensible or corporeal things, and the intelligible species are the means by which we really apprehend intelligibles or incorporeal things. The sensitive faculty does not, according to St. Thomas, terminate in the phantasms, but by them

attains to their objects, and the intellective faculty does not terminate in the intelligible species, but through it attains to the intelligible reality. The phantasms and species present to the intellect their respective objects, and St. Thomas expressly teaches that nothing can be known by us not so presented. But as so presented, the reality is only the *materia informis* of science, and becomes science only as abstracted from the phantasms and species in which it is presented. It is easy to understand, then, why the Angelic Doctor regards the syllogism as the instrument of advancing science; he does so because on his principles it is by it that the intellect impresses on our simple apprehensions the form of science, and it is the form that gives actuality to the matter; but he was too good a logician to hold that the matter concluded can exceed the matter apprehended.

The scholastics followed Aristotle, and held that all cognition begins in sense, *quod principium nostræ cognitionis est a sensu*; but we must beware how we suppose that such scholastics as St. Thomas held that only objects of sense are really apprehended in the phantasms or sensible species. They held that the intelligible is really apprehended in the phantasms, but under a sensible form, and is distinctly known only as abstracted or distinguished from them by the reflective intellect; and as nothing is really scientifically known except under an intelligible form, we see again how they could assert that the syllogism, the instrument of reflection, is a means of extending knowledge. But they do not represent it as extending knowledge beyond the matter apprehended, for their meaning is not that the intelligible is obtained from the sensible by a strictly analytic judgment, but that the intelligible is presented in the phantasms, or along with the sensible. That is, in our own language, what is called simple apprehension is simultaneously the apprehension or intuition of the sensible and intelligible as conjoined one with the other.

Under a certain point of view we are disposed on this last point to agree with the Peripatetics in opposition to the Platonists, or at least in opposition to Platonism as represented by Aristotle and understood by St. Thomas after the Neo-Platonists. Aristotle represents Plato as teaching that we have immediate intuition of intelligibles as separate from all apprehension of the sensible. We

are far from being satisfied that Plato held this, and certainly, though we have been a somewhat diligent student of his works, we have never found it in them. Plato's problem, as we understand it, was not so much how we know, or by what faculty we are first placed in relation with reality, as what we must know in order to have real science. He placed science in the knowledge of the essences of things, which he called ideas, not in the knowledge of their exterior or sensible forms, which are variable and corruptible. But that these ideas are apprehensible in themselves without apprehension of the sensible to which they are joined, we have not found him teaching. But be this as it may, St. Thomas, after Aristotle, argues, and justly, that the intelligible is to the sensible as the soul is to the body, and that as man is in this present life always soul united to body, he can perform no operations which are not conjointly operations of both. Not being a pure spirit, but spirit united to matter, — not being a pure intelligence, like the angels, but intelligence united to sense, — he can apprehend the intelligible only as united to the sensible, the spiritual only as united in some way to the material. We apprehend the intelligible indeed, — the *idea* in the language of Plato, — but only in conjunction with the sensible, and therefore God never as separate from his works. Thus far we agree with the Peripatetics, and hold that every intuition of the intelligible even includes the sensible.

But we do not accept the doctrine that our cognition begins in sense, or the sensible species. The argument from the union of soul and body admits a double application, and if it proves that we can have no intellections without sensations, it proves equally that we can have no sensations without intellections, no sensible intuition without intelligible intuition. Indeed, it proves more than this. The intellective is to the sensitive, the intelligible is to the sensible, what the soul is to the body. But the soul is, *forma corporis*, the form of the body. The intelligible, therefore, is the form of the sensible, intellect the form of sense. The *principium* is in the form, not in the matter, for the matter is potential, simply *in potentia ad formam*, and is made actual by the form. Therefore it is the intellect that gives to sensation its form of cognition, or that renders it actual perception of the objects of sense. Without

intelligible intuition, sensation is a mere organic affection, and no actual perception at all. Cognition is the basis of all sensible perception, for whatever the objects or conditions of knowledge, the cognitive faculty is one and the same. We have not, as Aristotle perhaps held, one faculty called sense by which we know particulars, and another called intellect, by which we know universals. We know both corporeals and incorporeals, sensibles and intelligibles, by the intellective faculty, the former through sensible affection, and the latter on the occasion of such affection, or more simply, in conjunction with the former. Properly, then, though both the universal and the particular, the intelligible and the sensible, are presented simultaneously in one and the same intuition, the *principium* of our cognition is in the intellect, not in the senses, for till the intellect is reached there is no commencement of cognition. The Scholastics were misled by Aristotle, who, denying creation and asserting an eternal matter *extra Deum*, in which he placed the possible of determinate things, was obliged to place the *principium* in matter, that is, in the potential, which, since not actual, should be regarded as nothing at all. The Scholastics, knowing perfectly well the dogma of creation, ought not to have fallen into this error, for they were not ignorant that the possibility of things is in the Divine essence, and that the potential in that it is simply potential is a nullity. To say of any thing that it is potential, is simply saying that it does not exist, but that God has power, if he chooses, to create it. God is the creator and the creability of all things, is both their formal and their material cause, in so far as material cause they have, and therefore the potential regarded as *extra Deum* is, as we have said, simply nothing. To place the *principium* in the potential is then a simple absurdity, and in the Scholastics wholly uncalled for, an inconsequence. To place the *principium* of cognition in sensation, which is only *in potentia ad cognitionem*, were as absurd as, after having declared the soul *forma corporis*, to pretend that the *principium* of the soul is in the body, or that the soul derives its life and actuality from the body, as pretend our modern materialists, instead of the body being made an actual and living body by the soul, and being, when separate from the soul, not a body, but a carcass.

The Scholastics, having placed the *principium* of our cog-

dition in sense, were obliged to assume intelligibles or universals only as abstracted from the phantasmata or sensible species in which they are originally presented. This abstraction they suppose the intellect is competent to make by its own powers, and does make, as St. Thomas says, *dividendo et componendo*, or by ratiocination. Hence we find them uniformly, after Aristotle, and like all our modern inductionists, reasoning in a *vicious* circle. They tell us all knowledge begins *a sensu*, and that through the senses we know only particulars, and universals, genera and species, are obtained by reasoning, abstracting them from the particulars. Experience furnishes the particulars, and reason by way of induction obtains from them the universals, which, reapplied to particulars, give *sapientia*, or wisdom, the end of all philosophy. But they also tell us that all reasoning, all demonstration, proceeds from universals to particulars! So they assume universals in order to get particulars, and particulars in order to get universals. They prove their particulars by their universals, and their universals by their particulars. The universals are obtained by reasoning, and yet there is no reasoning without universals. And we are to be held up to ridicule and made the butt of Italian wit, because we cannot accept this as sound logic! Nay, denounced as pantheists, as enemies of religion, and as laboring only to destroy the defences of the Catholic faith! Yet no man who has made himself even superficially acquainted with the Aristotelian logic, can deny that it involves this *vicious* circle.

The mistake of Aristotle was not so much in denying the distinct intuition of universals, as it was in supposing that reflection originally obtains them by abstraction from the sensible species. The intellect does not, and cannot, so obtain them, for the reasons already assigned to prove that we never have intuition of the intelligible without the sensible. Intellect is joined to sense in the reflective order as much as it is in the intuitive, and therefore it cannot in reflection, any more than in direct cognition, apprehend the purely intelligible. As in intuition it is sensibly *presented*, so in reflection it must be sensibly *represented*. Here is a point which, as far as we have seen, neither Aristotle nor even St. Thomas sufficiently elucidates, and in the elucidation of which we must find the method of escaping from the Peripatetic circle. This sensible repre-

sentation is not furnished by the sensible species or phantasms, for in them the intelligible is presented, not represented, — presented to the intuitive, not represented to the reflective understanding. It is impossible for man himself to furnish the medium of sensible representation, and it cannot be furnished by the objects themselves, for the precise work to be done is to separate the purely intelligible from the sensible species, or the sensible, in the intuition or apprehension of objects themselves. The Creator then must himself furnish it, and he does furnish it in language, which is the sensible sign, symbol, or representation of the intelligible. And hence man cannot reflect, or perform any operation of reasoning, without language, as has been so ably proved by the illustrious De Bonald, although his arguments would have been more conclusive, if he had taken pains to distinguish between reflective and intuitive thought. Intelligibles or universals are intuitively presented, as we say, — presented in the intelligible species, as the Schoolmen say; but they are objects of reflection, of distinct apprehension, or reflex cognition, only as sensibly represented in language. So represented, they are supplied to the mind prior to the intellectual operation of abstracting them from the sensible species or intuitions, and therefore may be legitimately used in reasoning before they are thus obtained. Consequently, by language, which sensibly represents the universals, we can get out of the Peripatetic circle. It is, in fact, by means of the word, of language, that Aristotle himself escapes from that circle; for he very nearly identifies logic with grammar, places the elements of the syllogism in verbal propositions, and makes the explanation of reasoning little else than the explanation of the right use of words. He avails himself of the fact of language, but he does not render a proper account of it, or legitimate the usage he makes of it. His practice was truer than his theory. This fact of the divine origin of language, and its necessity as the sensible representation of the intelligible in the reflective understanding, is one of vast importance, and, if attended to, would save philosophy from that too rationalistic tendency objected by the respectable Bonnetty and others, and teach our scholastic psychologists that to their demonstrative method they must add tradition or history, and prove to the heterodox that true philosophy can be found only where the

primitive tradition and the unity and integrity of language have been infallibly preserved, therefore only in the Catholic Society or Church. Outside of that society there is no unity of speech, no integrity of doctrine; the primitive tradition is broken, and there are only fragments, *disjecta membra*, even of truth pertaining to the natural order. Alas! heterodoxy, whether in the natural order or the supernatural, is that wicked Typhon of Egyptian mythology, who seized the good Osiris and hewed him in pieces, and scattered his members far and wide over the land and the sea. So deals it with the fair and lovely form of Truth, and no weeping Isis, however painful her search, can gather them up and mould them anew into a living and reproductive whole!

It is these mistakes into which our Scholastics fall in their laudable efforts to avoid, on the one hand, the pure materialism of old Democritus, and the pure spiritualism or incorporealism of the Platonists on the other, that have induced them to deny all immediate intuition of the intelligible, and to maintain that the necessary is obtained only by induction from the contingent. Correcting these mistakes, dismissing their vexatious phantasms and intelligible species, and understanding that we stand face to face with reality, whether corporeal or incorporeal, spiritual or material, intelligible or sensible, with nothing but the intelligible light of God between as the medium of both intelligible and sensible intuition, they might easily find themselves in accord with the Catholic ontologists, and their philosophy corresponding to the order of things. They might then easily perceive that their principal objections to the ontological method are founded in misapprehension, and that they, though formally denying, do virtually admit all that we ourselves contend for. Their objections to the ontologists are based on the supposition that they assert pure and distinct intuition of God by our natural powers, or clear and distinct intuition of the necessary and intelligible prior to and without the contingent and sensible; but this, though true of the heterodox or bastard ontologists, such as we find among non-Catholics, is by no means the case with all who reject the psychological and assert the ontological method. The alternative presented is not, either that the necessary and intelligible must be concluded, by an analytic judgment, from the

intuition of the contingent and sensible, or that the contingent and sensible must be concluded from the necessary and intelligible. These are two extremes alike false and dangerous, the one leading to nihilism through atheism, the other through pantheism. We have already explained that the intelligible is never presented alone, or separate from the sensible, but that both are in this life presented together, in one and the same intuition, and therefore that we have no simple intuitions or apprehensions, but that every apprehension, intuition, or thought is a complex fact, including both the intelligible and the sensible. As the sensible always represents the subject, it follows that there is never intuition of the object without intuition or apprehension of the subject, and none of the subject without the object, and therefore that there can be no intuition of God, real and necessary being, without the apprehension of the soul, contingent and relative being, or existence. Then the *primum philosophicum* can be neither the necessary, the absolute, the *primum ontologicum* alone, as maintain the German ontologists, or rather pantheists, nor the contingent, the relative, the *primum psychologicum*, as maintain the scholastic psychologists, but must be the simultaneous presentation of the two in their real synthesis or union. In this real and necessary being, or God, is really presented in the intuition, not separately, but in relation with the soul, or the contingent, not as clearly and distinctly known, but, as in all direct cognition, as known only in an obscure and indistinct manner.

This view, which we may call the synthetic, is opposed, as our readers cannot fail to perceive, alike to those who make the intuition of real and necessary being their starting-point, and profess to descend, by way of deduction, to contingent existence or to creatures, and to those who profess to start with the soul alone, and to be able from intuition of the contingent to rise by induction to necessary being, that is, to God. When by ontologists are meant the former, we must disclaim the name, for deduction is simple analysis, and attains to no predicates but such as lie already before the mind in the subject, and from the single conception of being can be obtained only being and its attributes. Here is, in our judgment, the principal fault of the work of the excellent Father Rothenflue. Father Rothenflue represents real and necessary

being — God — as first in the order of intuition, but he does not take note of the fact that the necessary is never, in this life, presented to us without the contingent; for we never, in this life, see God as he is in himself, and at all only as he is related to us, or in his relation *ad extra*, as the theologians call it, of Creator. We see not, then, how Father Rothenflue's intuition of real and necessary being is to be distinguished, save in degree, from the intuitive vision of the blest; nor do we understand how he contrives to include in his philosophy contingent existences, or, in other words, after having assumed the *primum ontologicum* as his *primum philosophicum*, how he can by any legitimate process escape pantheism. He can relieve himself from this objection only by taking note that along with the necessary, as that on which it depends as its *principium*, is always presented the contingent in the same complex intuition, and therefore that the *primum philosophicum* cannot be being alone, any more than it can be the soul or contingent existence alone.

On the same principle, we object to those who profess to rise from the contingent discursively to the necessary, because, if they have only the *ens contingens*, they can conclude only the contingent and its phenomena. The scholastic psychologists teach that the first object of the intellect is *ens reale et actu*, a real or actual *ens*, but they deny that this is *ens necessarium*, and pretend that it is simply the soul or *ens contingens*. From this *ens contingens* they profess to be able to conclude *ens necessarium*, or God. But this is not possible by deduction, or analytic reasoning, which requires the predicate to be already in the subject, because the *ens necessarium* is not in or a predicate of, *ens contingens*; since if it were the contingent would not be contingent, but necessary, — a manifest contradiction in terms. It is equally impossible by synthetic reasoning, which adds to the subject a predicate not contained in it; for the judgment cannot join to the subject an unknown predicate, or a predicate not intellectually apprehended, as Kant has sufficiently proved in his *Critic der reinen Vernunft*. And here it is denied that the predicate *ens necessarium* is apprehended, since the very object of the process is to find it. In all synthetic or inductive reasoning, the conclusion is invalid if it goes beyond the particulars enumerated or the reality observed, and in the case before

us it is contended that the *ens necessarium* which is to be concluded escapes all observation, and is wholly unknown. How, then, is the mind, in its judgment, to add it, bind it, to the subject, *ens contingens*?

The fact is, that our Scholastics do really assume the necessary to be apprehended by the intellect, although they imagine that they do not. They hold that God can be demonstrated by way of induction from contingent existences, and this argument holds a prominent place in their ontology. We do not question, nay, we maintain, the validity of this argument when properly understood. But what is their process? The contingent is known to exist, but, as its very name implies, it does not suffice for itself, has not the reason of its existence in itself, and cannot stand alone, and therefore it is necessary that there be something else on which it depends for its existence, which has caused it to exist, and sustains it. This something, since what is not real cannot act, and since we cannot suppose an infinite series of causes, must be real and necessary being, or the eternal and self-existent God. That is, in the apprehension of *ens contingens* they apprehend or have intuition of the *necessity* of *ens necessarium et reale*. The intuition of this necessity must be conceded, or the argument is good for nothing, and the conclusion cannot be asserted as *necessary*, and, indeed, cannot be asserted at all. Now this *necessity* of real and necessary being which is apprehended in apprehending the contingent, and which is the principle of the conclusion, what is it? The Scholastics, no doubt, regard this necessity as something really distinct from the necessary being itself. Otherwise they could not assert a progress in their argument from the known to the unknown, or deny the immediate intuition of real and necessary being. But is it something distinct? And does not their mistake lie precisely in supposing that it is?

This necessity is either something created or uncreated. It is not something created, for if it were it would be the contingent itself, and a contingent necessity is not admissible. If uncreated, it is either *ens* or *non-ens*. If *non-ens*, a nonentity, it is simply nothing, and can be no medium of concluding the necessary from the contingent. If *ens*, then it is *ens increatum*, and *ens increatum* is God, real and necessary being. Consequently, the distinction

contended for, between the apprehension of the necessity of real and necessary being, and the apprehension of real and necessary being itself, does not and cannot in reality exist, and the apprehension of the necessity is *ipso facto* apprehension of real and necessary being, of God himself, although we may not always do, and certainly not always advert to it.

The Scholastics have been misled on this point by their devotion to Aristotle, who was obliged, in his theory, to explain the production of things and human knowledge without the fact of creation. Their error, if they will pardon us the word, lies precisely in supposing a logical necessity distinct from necessary being, and that from the apprehension of the necessity of real and necessary being to the judgment such being is, there is a progress. Hence why we began by insisting so strenuously on the recognition of the fact of the creation of all things from nothing, as essential to the construction of a sound logic, or a logic that conforms to the order of things. It is not till we learn that God has created all things out of nothing, that we are able to say that whatever is not God is creature, and that whatever is not creature is God. God and creature comprise all that is or exists, and what neither is nor exists is simply nothing, and is and can be no object of thought, as both St. Thomas and Aristotle teach. "*Ens namque est objectum intellectus primum,*" says the Angelic Doctor, "*cum nihil sciri possit, nisi ipsum quod est ens actu, ut dicitur in 9 Met. Unde nec oppositum ejus intelligere potest intellectus, non ens.*"* Yet Aristotle, who confounds creation with formation, and makes the essences of things consist partly in the form and partly in the matter, imagined a sort of *tertium quid*, neither God nor creature, not precisely something, nor yet absolutely nothing. Corresponding to this *tertium quid*, he imagines a sort of *ens logicum* distinct from *ens physicum*, a sort of middle term between *ens* and *non ens*. Hence a *mundus logicus* distinct from the *mundus physicus*, and a logical necessity distinguishable from physical necessity, or necessary being. Our Scholastics will not say the necessity of necessary being which the mind apprehends is literally nothing, nor yet will they admit it is a real being or entity. They regard it as an *ens logicum*,

* Opusc. XLII. Cap. 1.

or as a logical relation between two terms; but relation apart from the related is inconceivable, for it is a sheer nullity. It exists and is apprehensible only in the related. Nothing exists *in abstracto*; all reality is concrete, and it is only in the concrete that things are or can be apprehended.

The Scholastics forget this, and, as they agree that only what is *ens aliquo modo* can be an object of the intellect, they clothe their abstractions with a sort of entity, and imagine them apprehensible *extra Deum*, and apart from their concretes. It is only by so doing that they can pretend that the necessity they apprehend in apprehending the contingent is distinguishable from real and necessary being. All conceivable necessity is in God, is God, for there can neither be necessity out of being, nor necessity in a non-necessary being. Necessity is in being, not in non-being. The necessity that there should be God is not any other necessity than the necessity of his own being; and the necessity of his being, which we assert when we say he is necessary being, is in him, not out of him, necessitating him to be. It is a necessity in him to be, and to be precisely what he is, and simply implies that his being is itself its sole and sufficient cause or reason of itself. When we say this or that is necessary or unnecessary, we have reference always to his Divine Essence, and the real meaning is, that this or that is or is not necessary in the eternal and immutable nature of God. God is himself, in his own essence, the eternal reason, nature, or fitness of things, of which philosophers speak, that is, in so far as it is necessary, and in his power, in so far as it is contingent. But all this is obscured by the Aristotelian logic, which places the necessary as well as the possible in some sense *extra Deum*. Indeed, an assumption of this sort runs through all Gentile philosophy. Hence the *fatum* of the Stoics, and the Destiny of the Poets, which binds alike gods and men in the invincible chain of an inexorable Necessity. Neither Greek nor Roman philosophy ever succeeds in steering wholly clear of Oriental Dualism. Pythagoras and Plato assert the eternity of matter, and place in it the origin of evil; and Aristotle finds in this same eternal matter a limitation of the power of God. The Scholastics struggle bravely against this Dualism, and to harmonize their Gentile logic with their Catholic theology, but perhaps not always with complete success. They define the pos-

sible as that in which there is no repugnance between the subject and predicate, and the impossible as that in which there is such repugnance ; but they are not uniformly careful to inform us that the subject is the Divine Essence, and that the possible or impossible is what is or is not repugnant to that, and that both have their reason, not out of God, but in the fulness and perfection of his own being. The same remarks are applicable to the necessary and the unnecessary. Not being ordinarily given as predicates of the Divine Being only, they are not seldom regarded, even by men who pass for philosophers, as predicates, either of no subject, or of an unknown subject, which is neither God nor creation, neither something nor yet nothing.

We do not, say the Scholastics, in apprehending the contingent, apprehend *ens necessarium et reale*, but the necessity there is that there be *ens necessarium et reale*. But can you apprehend the necessity of a thing which you do not apprehend? You apprehend the imperfect, but can you apprehend that it is imperfect, and that it needs something which it has not, if you have not the apprehension of the perfect in which it can find its complement? Not without conceiving the perfect, it is answered, but without apprehending the perfect. Without apprehending or knowing the perfect perfectly, we concede, but without knowing that it is, we deny. We do not pretend that our intuition of real and necessary being gives us a full and comprehensive knowledge of what it is, for our knowledge, at best, whatever its sphere or its object, is extremely imperfect, and hardly deserves the name of knowledge. We do not comprehend real and necessary being, we only apprehend it; and we apprehend it only in its relation to created existences, never in itself. We do not apprehend it at all, say the Scholastics, we apprehend only its necessity. But its necessity is not distinguishable from itself, for necessity can be apprehended only in necessary being, since the abstract apart from the concrete is a mere nullity, and no object of thought. Surely the necessity must be either something or nothing. If nothing, it is nothing, can do nothing, and nothing can be made of it. If something, it is either absolute being, or created existence, for created existence is the only medium between absolute being and nothing. It cannot be created existence, for that would imply a contradiction in terms, and because creation is, on

the part of God, a free, not a necessary act. Then it must be absolute being. Then it is God, and then whoever apprehends necessity apprehends God. Then all who accept the argument from the contingent to the necessary, since the reasoning is synthetic, not analytic, do really assume, whether they are aware of it or not, that we have in the apprehension of creature the apprehension of that which is not creature, therefore, of God, the creator. The argument from *entia contingentia* is a good argument, when properly explained, and is objectionable only when presented as an analytic argument, or as a synthesis, which adds to the subject an unknown and unapprehensible predicate.

Every thought, intuitive or reflective, is a judgment, for, as we have seen, we have and can have no apprehension which is not simultaneously apprehension of both subject and object, the mind and that which stands opposed to it and is really distinguishable from it. In every thought, as in every enunciative proposition, there are three terms, subject, predicate, and copula. The subject is *ens necessarium et reale*, real and necessary being; the predicate is *entia contingentia*, or contingent existences. The copula, then, must be the relation of the necessary and contingent. This relation, the *nexus* that unites subject and predicate, can be nothing else than the creative act of God, which produces the predicate from nothing. We know this is so, from the dogma of creation, and we know furthermore, that *entia contingentia* can exist only inasmuch as they are created, and that the act by which they are created is and must be solely the act of God, for prior to their creation they are nothing, and nothing cannot concur in making itself something. It is of the nature of contingents not to have their cause or the reason of their existence in themselves, and therefore they cannot exist separated or disjoined from the creator. Consequently, the predicate *existence* can begin or continue to exist only as really joined to the subject, real and necessary being, by the creative act of God. This act must be an *actus perdurans*; for though an existence could be conceived to have been created, it can be conceived as continuing to exist only in its continuing to be created. Suppose the creative act of God to cease, or to be suspended, with regard to any particular existence, — and we may so suppose, because the act is, on

the part of God, a free act, — that existence ceases at once; and is literally annihilated. It is only on condition, then, that the creative act is *actus perdurans*, that existences are continued, and what we call conservation is in reality only creation. So that the original and persisting relation between God and the soul, God and existences, is the relation of creator and creature. God, by his creative act, creates existences from nothing, and establishes a relation *ad extra* between them and himself. It is only on condition of the reality of such relation that thought is possible, for it is only by virtue of that relation that we exist at all, or that there is any thinker, except real and necessary being. The relation of creation is then the copula in the real order or in the judgment as the judgment of real and necessary being, and therefore its real apprehension must be the copula of the judgment regarded as ours, or else the order of cognition will not correspond to the order of things. The three terms of the judgment objectively considered are, then, Being, the subject; contingent existences, the predicate; and the creative act of being, the copula. And we may assume as our formula of thought, or *primum philosophicum*, and as the basis of all sound logic, *Ens creat existentias*, or Being creates existences.

This formula has been objected to as pantheistic, as placed first in the order of cognition when it should be last, and as being given as a philosophical when it is a theological truth, known only as supernaturally revealed. It is not easy to understand how it can be pantheistic. The essence of pantheism is in the denial of second causes or the production by the Creator of real effects *ad extra*. The formula, therefore, cannot have a pantheistic sense, unless it denies the predicate existence, or the subject apprehending as existing distinct from God and operating as second cause. This it certainly does not do, for it is given as a formula of thought, and its very purpose is to assert that the mind intuitively apprehends the subject thinking and the object thought as really united by the creative object, and this necessarily asserts the reality of the soul or subject of the intuition distinct from the object God, and its activity as second cause, for without such activity it could not think or be the subject of an intuition. The principle we proceed upon is, that the order of cognition must agree with the order of things, for we hold, with St. Thomas, that the intellect is essentially

true, and that truth is in the correspondence of the thought to the thing. We have proved that, in apprehending the object or thing, we invariably and necessarily apprehend ourselves as subject apprehending; that we can never apprehend what is not ourselves without apprehending ourselves, nor ourselves without apprehending what is not ourselves; that is, every thought affirms the subject simultaneously with the object, and the object simultaneously with the subject. The formula then no more denies the subject than the object. It expressly asserts existences distinguishable from as well as united to God by his creative act, as really placed *ad extra* by his creative act, which creates them from nothing,— the direct contradiction of pantheism, which denies that any effects are produced *ad extra*, or that there is any thing really produced distinguishable *ad extra* from God.

The charge of pantheism, we have been told, is warranted by the fact that the verb in the formula is placed in the present tense. The present tense, it is contended, expresses an action unfinished, whose effect is in the process of completion, but is not yet completed. *Ens creat existentias*, means, God is creating existences, and this means that the existences are only in the process of creation, therefore that they are only incomplete or inchoate existences. Such existences cannot act, and therefore the whole thinking activity asserted is that of God, which, as it denies the proper activity of second causes, is pantheism. But this conclusion, if possible, is not necessary. The verb is placed in the present tense, not to express the act as incomplete in relation to its proper effect, but to express the fact that the act is a present act. The act may be present and yet terminate in its complete effect. The effect is simply the extrinsic terminus of the causative act. Existences cannot be supposed to be once created, and then to be able to subsist of themselves, without the creative energy that produced them. Their conservation is their continuous creation. Being only the extrinsic terminus of the creative act, they are, if separated from it, simply nothing. They are produced and subsist only by virtue of the creative energy of that act, and the cessation of that act would be their annihilation. When I consider myself as having existed, I use the perfect tense, and say, God has created me; but when I wish to consider myself simply as existing, I say, God creates me; for he does literally create me at

this very moment, and if his creative act were not a present act to me, and did not this moment create me from nothing, I should not exist, or be an existence at all. The act of creation and conservation is the one creative act, and hence to every actual existence the creative act is necessarily a present act, and can be expressed only in the present tense. The Church indeed, as does Genesis, uses the perfect tense, and says *creavit* instead of *creat*; but because, though she expresses the same fact that the formula does, she does not express it from the same point of view, and it did not enter into her purpose in defining the dogma of creation to assert the identity of creation and conservation; and when it is not necessary to express that identity, the perfect tense must be used.

Our modern Scholastics, who imagine that they detect pantheism in the formula *Ens creat existentias*, have, we must believe, studied it rather for the purpose of finding some error in it, than of ascertaining its real meaning. Their psychological habits and prejudices very naturally dispose them against it, and the fact that they have found some of its most distinguished modern advocates among the worst enemies of the Christian religion and civilization, is not very well fitted to win their respect for it. They seem to have hastily inferred, from the fact that Gioberti — an able but a bad man — used the present tense of the verb, that he meant in his formula to represent Being simply as the immanent cause of existences, in the sense of Spinoza, who opposes *causa immanens* to *causa transiens*. Immanent cause, as thus opposed, means only a cause that operates within its own interior, without placing any real effects *ad extra*. In this sense existences are not an external creation, but effects produced by Being within its own bosom, as modes or modifications of itself, which is pure pantheism. So far as the present tense decides any thing, the creative cause asserted in the formula might be understood in this sense, and we suppose our scholastic friends do so understand it. But the character of the cause is determined by the nature, not the tense of the verb. The verb to *create*, according to all Christian usage, means to place real effects *ad extra*, and therefore can no more have the sense of Spinoza in the present than in the perfect tense. The word *existences*, from *ex-stare*, to be from another, by its own force expresses an exter-

nal effect, distinct, though, like every effect, inseparable, from its cause. Attention to the real sense of the verb to *create* and of the substantive *existences*, placed in the plural number expressly to render the idea of plurality distinct, would, we think, have removed all ambiguity occasioned by placing the verb in the present tense, and convinced our scholastic friends that no pantheistic or heterodox sense can fairly be extracted from the formula, regarded as expressing the reality apprehended in the primitive intuition.

The only point on which a reader might doubt Gioberti's orthodoxy is as to the relation of the copula of the judgment, regarded as our judgment, with the real relation of things, or copula of the judgment, regarded as the judgment of God. Thought is composed of three elements, subject, object, and their relation, the soul, God, and the relation between them. Now there can be no doubt that the relation between God and the soul in the real order is the Divine creative act; but if we say that this act is the relation in the order of cognition, we make the judgment God's judgment, not ours, and therefore fall into pantheism. Gioberti, as far as we have examined him, does not seem to us to be very clear on this point, and we are not sure that he does not identify the real relation of the intuitive subject and the intelligible object with the copula of the judgment or the form of the thought. He gives *Ens creat existentias* as his *primum philosophicum*, and calls it a Divine Judgment, and seems to represent the mind as purely passive in regard to it. If so, what is the human judgment, or what is the part of the human intellect in the formation of thought? We have no call to defend Gioberti, and even if he has erred here, it is only an error in his interpretation of the formula, not an error in the formula itself. We have not studied Gioberti's works with any great care, for we felt from the first, long before they were prohibited, that he was a dangerous man, whom it would never do to take as a master, and certainly we cannot bind ourselves to any defence of his philosophy. It seems to us that his explanation of cognition makes intuitive thought an act of God rather than of man, and that he sometimes comes very near identifying the order of cognition with the order of things. Nevertheless, we must remember that he gives *Ens creat existentias* as the ideal formula, which

with him means the formula as the intelligible object of the intuition, — not the apprehension, but that which is apprehended; and so taken, it has and can have no pantheistic sense. Whether he sufficiently distinguishes, in the fact of intuition, the intellectual action of the subject from the concurrent activity of the intelligible object in the production, not of things, but of intuition, may, perhaps, be a question, and therefore it may be a question whether he has or has not been justly accused of pantheism. But however this may be, it is certain that the formula itself, regarded as the formula of things and the reality asserted in every thought, is in no sense pantheistic.

The objection, that this formula is placed first, at the beginning of the order of cognition, instead of last, or at its conclusion, will vanish the moment we learn to distinguish between direct and reflex intuition. Nobody pretends that, in the historical development of the understanding, we commence with a reflex intuition, or a clear and distinct cognition of this formula, or that the mind is able to say to itself at the first moment of its existence, *Ens creant existentias*. All direct intuition is obscure and indistinct, and although this formula is obscurely and indistinctly apprehended from the first, we are far enough from being aware from the first of the fact. Some men never attain to a reflex intuition of it during their whole lives, and no one ever would or could attain to such intuition of it, if not taught it through the medium of language. It had been lost from the language of the Gentiles, and no Gentile philosopher ever attained to it. All the Gentile schools alike are ignorant of the fact of creation, and even for Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle there is no God the creator. Not being able to reflect on the intelligible or idea without the sensible representation of language, the formula, *as a formula of the reflective understanding*, is not attainable till it is represented in language, and a language that has not lost it. But it is represented in language, and children learn it in the Catechism, at a very tender age.

That it is a truth of theology, and known only as supernaturally revealed, we grant; but it does not therefore follow that it is not a truth of the natural order. Superintelligible and supernatural are not by any means the same. There may be truths of philosophy, that is, of the natural order, distinct from the truths of the supernatural order, or

the new creation, which we could never by our natural intellect find out, but which when revealed to us we may discover to be evident to natural reason. We do not believe any man could ever have attained to a reflex, that is, a clear and distinct cognition of the formula, without supernatural revelation, and therefore the holy Apostle tells us, "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God." Hence creation is a dogma of faith; but when revealed and represented to us in language, we find it to be really expressed in every one of our direct intuitions, and therefore it is also a truth of philosophy. All the truths of revelation are not also truths of philosophy, but some of them are, for the revelation is not restricted to the Christian mysteries, properly so called. And hence the necessity we before remarked, of adding to the demonstrative method of the Scholastics the traditional or historical method, and the impossibility of constructing a complete science of the natural order without the reflected light of supernatural theology. It is the impossibility of erecting philosophy, in our present state, into a complete and independent science even of natural things, that makes us refuse to embrace any school, or to profess any system of our own. We should as soon think of disengaging our politics or our private and social duties from our theology, as of disengaging our philosophy.

One point more and we have done. We have given as the reality apprehended in every thought, Being creates existences. Here is the basis of all logic. But there are here two errors to be guarded against. The formula as given is the formula of the real order, or the Divine judgment. All the activity it expresses is the Divine activity. It is not the cognition, but that which in cognition is cognized. In other words, it is the formula of the intelligible; but to the intelligible corresponds the intellective, to the order of things the order of cognition. What we have here to guard against, then, is placing, as to the order of cognition, the copula either wholly in the intellective or wholly in the intelligible. The former is the error of the Scholastics, and the latter is the error of the Pantheists. We have found the copula of the Divine judgment; it is the creative act of Being placing existences *ad extra*. The copula of the human judgment is the reverberation of the copula of the Divine judgment, or imitation of it by us as

second causes. But what is the *nexus* or copula which binds the human judgment to the Divine, that is, the intelligible and the intellective? The creative act of Being, says Gioberti, if we understand him; but that makes Being create the intellection, denies our intervention as second causes, and implies pantheism. The intellective, the *intellectus agens* of the Schoolmen? But that is pure Fichteism, and supposes the subject renders actual, that is, creates its object. The solution is in regarding thought as the joint product of both the intelligible and the intellect, and therefore that cognition, formally the act of the mind as second cause, is yet produced only by the active coöperation or concurrence of the intelligible, as is the case with every act of second causes. It is not the *intellectus agens* that renders the intelligible intelligible *in actu*, as the Scholastics teach, but the intelligible is itself by its own light intelligible *in actu*, and it is the concurrence of its intelligibility *in actu* with our own intellective faculty that forms the intuition. As the intelligible concurs only through its creative act, the creative act of God as the objectively concurring force of thought unites our cognition to the Divine judgment, as it does ourselves as existence to the Divine Essence. In this connection of our judgment with Divine judgment lies the explanation of all thought and of all reasoning, as well as the truthfulness of our cognitions.

The explanation of this connection itself, which involves the whole mystery of knowledge and of the whole activity of second causes, we shall not by any means attempt, for if it does not surpass the powers of the human mind, it most assuredly surpasses ours. Its explanation, however, is in the explanation of the Divine coöperation. But the reader will perceive that, in representing the intelligible as intelligible *in actu*, we reject the *intellectus agens* of the Scholastics as a created light, or participated reason, and therefore the intelligible species and phantasms. To intellectual vision as to external, there are necessary the intellect, the object, and the light. As to the purely intelligible, Being, it is intelligible *per se*, by its own light, and a mediating light distinct from the mind and the object is needed only in apprehending existences, and the light by which we see these is the same Divine light of Being, diffused over them by the Divine creative act. But as we apprehend not the purely intelligible in itself, owing to its

excess of light and our weakness, we apprehend God only in the light of his creative act, and therefore only in relation to the things he has made. But as that light proceeds from his essence, and is simply his relation *ad extra* to the things he has made, in apprehending it we do really apprehend him. We apprehend them, not by their phantasms, but by his light, which through the creative act illumines them. And thus, while we maintain that we do really apprehend him, we do not pretend any more than our scholastic friends that we apprehend him separate from the apprehension of his works.

ART. III. — *Diplomatic Correspondence of M. Hülsemann, Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, and Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, on the Koszta Case.*

THE main facts in the Koszta case, as far as publicly known, may be briefly stated. Koszta, born an Austrian subject, engaged in the late Hungarian rebellion, revolt, or revolution, and on its suppression by the united arms of Austria and Russia, fled across the frontier into Turkey, where at the instance of Austria he was confined with Kossuth and other refugees in the fortress of Kutahia, whence, after some months of imprisonment, he was liberated on condition of never setting his foot again on Ottoman territory. After his liberation, he came to this country, where he declared his intention to become a citizen, and where he remained one year and eleven months. Some time last spring he returned to Turkey, and was arrested last June at Smyrna, by the authority of the Austrian Consul-General, as an Austrian subject, and conveyed and detained on board his Imperial Majesty's brig-of-war, the *Huszar*, then lying in the port. The American authorities at the place protested against his arrest and detention, and demanded his release on the ground that he was an American citizen, or at least under American protection. The Austrian authorities not judging it proper to comply with this demand, Captain Ingraham, commanding the American sloop-of-war, the *St. Louis*, ranged his ship alongside the *Huszar*,

brought his guns to bear, and threatened to fire upon her if Koszta was not given up before a certain specified time. The matter, however, was arranged for the moment, by placing Koszta in charge of the French Consul, who agreed to detain him in his custody till disposed of by the consent of the Austrian and the American governments. He has since been liberated by consent of both parties, on the understanding of coming immediately to this country on board an American vessel.

Of the hostile attack of Captain Ingraham on the *Huszar*, Austria complains in a letter, dated the 29th of last August, addressed to our government by her Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, and demands reparation for the alleged outrage upon her flag. To this complaint and demand Mr. Secretary Marcy replies, on the part of our government, in a letter of the 26th of September last, denying the right of Austria to complain, and refusing her reparation, on the ground that Koszta, at the time of his arrest, was not an Austrian subject, but was an American citizen, or at least under American protection; that he was illegally seized and thrown into the sea by a band of ruffians, and thence picked up and illegally carried and detained on board the *Huszar*, whence Captain Ingraham was authorized by the laws of nations and of humanity to demand his release, and to use force if necessary to effect it. Such are the principal facts and points in the case, and it is clear that the main question is made by our government to turn on the nationality of Koszta at the time of his arrest.

That Koszta was born an Austrian subject is not disputed; that he was an Austrian subject down to his release from Kutahia and leaving the Ottoman dominions, must be conceded. He was, therefore, an Austrian subject at the time of his arrest at Smyrna, unless during the interval he had either by some act of his own divested himself, or by some act of Austria been divested, of that character. Mr. Secretary Marcy contends that he had been divested of it in both these ways, — that he had renounced his allegiance to Austria, and she had renounced her authority over him, denationalized him, by banishing and outlawing him.

That he had forfeited the protection of his sovereign may be true, but that he had ceased to be an Austrian

subject by any act of his own, Mr. Secretary Marcy is not at liberty to assert. We raise here no discussion on the disputed question of the right of a citizen or subject to expatriate himself, and, for the purposes of the present argument, we accept the doctrine laid down by Mr. Marcy himself, namely: "The citizen or subject, *having faithfully performed the past and the present duties resulting from his relation to the sovereign*, may at any time release himself from his obligation of allegiance, freely quit the land of his birth or adoption, seek through all countries a home, and select anywhere that which offers him the fairest prospect of happiness for himself and his posterity." This is the government's own doctrine, officially put forth, and it is bound by it. According to this doctrine, only they who have *faithfully performed the past and present duties* resulting from their relation to the sovereign, are free to expatriate themselves. That is, a man cannot renounce his allegiance in order to escape his sovereign's justice. This is decisive of the case of Koszta, so far as his ceasing to be an Austrian subject by his own act is concerned; for he was a criminal, a rebel, a fugitive from justice, one who had notoriously failed faithfully to perform his past and present duties to his sovereign. He was not, then, free to relieve himself from his obligation of allegiance, and to expatriate himself. He might withdraw himself from Austrian jurisdiction, but not from his subjection to Austrian law. Koszta, then, did not and could not, being a refugee, a fugitive from justice, cease to be an Austrian subject by his own act. But according to Mr. Secretary Marcy, he ceased to be such subject by the act of Austria, who had, as he says, banished and outlawed him. This she had done, first, by an imperial decree of the 26th of March, 1832, by which he became an "unlawful emigrant," and secondly, by consenting to and procuring his expulsion from Turkey.

By the imperial decree cited, "Austrian subjects leaving the Emperor's dominions without permission of the magistrate, and a release of Austrian citizenship, and with an intention never to return, become unlawful emigrants, and lose all their civil and political rights." This the Secretary contends is virtual outlawry; but in this we think he is mistaken; for a man deprived of all his civil and political rights may be still under the protection of what

the Roman lawyers call the *jus gentium*. This decree imposes a penalty on Austrian subjects leaving the Emperor's dominions without permission, with the view of preventing them from doing so, and not with a view, if they chose to incur it, of releasing them from their obligation of allegiance. As such release evidently did not enter into the intention of the legislators, it cannot be presumed from the nature of the penalty imposed. To deprive a citizen unjustly of all his civil and political rights is tyrannical, and undoubtedly releases him from the bond of allegiance; but it does not therefore follow that he who forfeits those rights by his unlawful acts is thereby released from his subjection. It is a maxim of law, that no man can stand upon his own wrong, and therefore no man by his own wrong-doing can free himself from any moral or civil obligation; otherwise by crime one might gain the right to commit crime with impunity, — a doctrine subversive of all morals, and of civil society itself. As the decree imposes the loss of civil and political rights as a penalty for an unlawful act, we cannot infer that it releases him who incurs it from his subjection to his prince, unless such be the expressed will of the prince himself; which in the present case evidently is not the fact.

But only they who leave the Emperor's dominions with an intention never to return incur this penalty. Nothing proves that Koszta left those dominions with any such intention. The contrary is far more probably the fact. He with Kossuth and others fled across the frontier into Turkey, as a place of temporary refuge, and, if we may believe what Kossuth, their acknowledged chief, has repeatedly declared, publicly and privately, with the intention and the hope of speedily returning. For what else did Kossuth, from whom in this matter we cannot separate Koszta, solicit "material aid" of our tender-hearted citizens, and purchase saddles and bridles, but to enable him to return, as he hoped at an early day, within the Emperor's dominions? How will you, then, bring Koszta under the operation of the imperial decree? Has Austria ever declared him to have forfeited, under that decree, all his civil and political rights? Has she enforced that decree against him? We do not understand even Mr. Secretary Marcy to maintain that Austria has actually condemned Koszta as an unlawful emigrant, and deprived him accordingly. If she has

not, the law has not been enforced against him, and he has suffered nothing by it, and even if it was intended to operate his release from his obligation of allegiance, it has not so operated. Before he can plead it in his favor, he must show that it has been enforced, or attempted to be enforced, to his damage.

Mr. Secretary Marcy argues that the position of Koszta deprived of all his civil and political rights, and not released from his subjection, would be very hard, and much worse than that of absolute alienage. Very possibly. But the loss of those rights was imposed as a penalty, and we never understood that penalties were intended to be easy. It is harder to be condemned to imprisonment for life than it is to be a simple alien; but can you thence infer that a prisoner so condemned is absolved from his allegiance? Cannot a penalty be lawfully imposed, unless compensated by a corresponding benefit conferred in incurring it? The condition of Austria would be hard, too, if Mr. Secretary Marcy's interpretation of the decree in question must be accepted. She could make no extradition treaties, because all such treaties proceed on the supposition that the fugitives from justice, though out of his jurisdiction, remain subject to their sovereign. Her subjects, guilty of a crime, would have only to cross the frontier into a neighboring state, with an intention of never returning, in order to be for ever released from their allegiance, and to be for ever, even if found in her dominions, free from her penal justice. It is singular, if such is the meaning of that decree, that France, England, and the United States, the powers that advised, perhaps forced, certainly encouraged, the Ottoman Porte not to give up the Hungarian refugees, never discovered it, and made no use of it in 1849-50. They contented themselves with informing the Porte that she was not bound by treaty to give them up; how much stronger and more to the purpose to have told her to reply, that those refugees were unlawful emigrants, and as such, by the laws of Austria herself, released from their allegiance,—that they were no longer her subjects, and she had no longer any authority over them! But they advised no such answer. Mr. Marcy was not then, we believe, in the Cabinet.

But the imperial decree Mr. Secretary Marcy cites is municipal, not international law. Austria has the sole

right to interpret her own municipal laws. She has not interpreted this law in the sense of Mr. Secretary Marcy, but has shown us plainly that, in her interpretation, it either does not apply to him at all, or if it does, it does not release him from his subjection to her authority, or deprive him of his character as her subject. She claimed his surrender to her by Turkey, as her subject; when she waived for the moment that claim, she insisted on his removal from her frontier, and his confinement at Kutahia, as her subject; and as her subject she consented to his liberation, on condition of his never setting his foot again on Ottoman territory. This is conclusive against Mr. Secretary Marcy as to the operation of the imperial decree of March, 1832, for he cannot go behind Austria's own interpretation of her own municipal laws.

The argument drawn from the imperial decree, then, it appears, must be abandoned. Then Koszta was an Austrian subject at the time of his arrest at Smyrna, unless Austria, by consenting to his release from Kutahia on certain conditions, released him from his allegiance. This, Mr. Secretary Marcy contends, was the case, for he maintains that by doing so she banished him, and lost all her authority over him. As long as the conditions of the banishment, if banishment it was, were complied with, it may be so; but banishment, unless such be the intention of the sovereign, does not absolutely, and under all circumstances, dissolve for ever all connection between the sovereign and the subject. It is usually accompanied with an alternative, and if the banished person returns he is liable to suffer it, and, though he may not resume all his original rights, there is no doubt that the sovereign resumes all his original authority, and may at his pleasure pardon or punish him. But we do not admit that, strictly speaking, Austria banished Koszta. He was liberated by her permission indeed, on the condition of leaving and never returning to Turkey; but not at her instance, or, so far as appears, by her wish. It was done at the earnest solicitation of France, Great Britain, and the United States, the friends of the Hungarian refugees. It was a permission to go into voluntary exile, rather than banishment. If it released Koszta from his subjection to Austria, it did so only conditionally, and only so long as the condition was complied with. The authority of the sovereign sur-

vived in the conditions imposed, and resumed all its original vigor when they were broken.

The condition on which Koszta was liberated, M. Hülsemann positively asserts, was, that he was "never to set his foot again on Ottoman territory." M. Hülsemann says Koszta gave a written pledge to that effect. Mr. Secretary Marcy thinks this is doubtful, but he cannot mean that it is doubtful that the condition asserted was imposed, for he contends that Austria procured his expulsion from Turkey, and argues thence that she sent him into perpetual banishment. When, therefore, without permission from Austria, he returned to Turkey last spring or summer, he broke the condition of his liberation, and necessarily fell back into his former character of a subject of his Imperial and Apostolic Majesty, who resumed at once all his original authority over him. He was, therefore, at the time of his arrest at Smyrna, an Austrian subject, as he himself confessed; for when he was asked if he was an American citizen, he replied, as our *Chargé d'Affaires ad interim* at Constantinople acknowledges, "I am a Hungarian, and I will live and die a Hungarian." If a Hungarian, an Austrian subject. Mr. Secretary Marcy would like to deny this confession, but he does not, and cannot; and he tries to neutralize its damaging effect by suggesting that there was, in Koszta's mind, a great difference between a Hungarian and an Austrian subject. But there was no difference that Koszta could entertain without disloyalty, and none at all that Mr. Secretary Marcy, in an official document, could recognize without disrespect to Austria.

The nationality of Koszta being proved to have been Austrian, at the time of his arrest, the question raised by Mr. Secretary Marcy, as to the American nationality he had acquired by having declared his intention to become an American citizen, and by having been domiciled in the country, however important and even delicate it may be in itself, becomes quite unimportant in the case before us. We are for pushing the rights of American nationality to the full extent admitted by international law. The citizens or subjects of foreign states, free to expatriate themselves, who are naturalized here according to the forms required by our laws, are clothed with a perfect American nationality, and, save as to the eligibility to the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States, stand on the same footing with natural-born citizens, have the same

rights and the same duties, and our government has the same right and the same duty to protect them, even against their former sovereign. But those citizens or subjects who have not "faithfully performed the past and the present duties resulting from their relation to the sovereign," not being free to expatriate themselves, cannot be clothed with a perfect American nationality, without a release of their allegiance by their sovereign, who may attach to the release such conditions as he judges advisable for his own safety or the peace and welfare of his subjects. If, then, Koszta, who, if released at all, was released from his obligation of allegiance only on condition of never returning to Turkey, had gone through all the forms required by our naturalization laws, he would have had no American nationality that could avail him in the Ottoman dominions against Austria. Yet, except against Austria, either in her own or the Ottoman dominions, his American nationality would have been perfect. We suppose that by no act of ours, or of his own, can a criminal or fugitive from justice be absolved from his allegiance to his sovereign, or that sovereign deprived of his authority over him.

Koszta's declaration of intention to become an American citizen did not make him one. Such a declaration of itself imparts no nationality, confers no rights, assumes no duties, and is, in respect of nationality, of no value at all, save as evidence of domicile. It may, we presume, be adduced as evidence tending to establish the *animus manendi*. Mr. Secretary Marcy is right in resting Koszta's American nationality mainly on the fact of his having acquired an American domicile. That domicile imparts a certain nationality is unquestionable, and it gives the government the right to protect the domiciled subject as an American citizen, against all the world, if it chooses, except his sovereign. But domiciled persons are still foreigners, and remain subjects of the sovereign to whom they owed allegiance before taking up their residence in a foreign country, and hence, under the mild laws of nations, they cannot be compelled to bear arms against him. But however great the nationality acquired by domicile, it is always imperfect, and can never be set up, as Mr. Secretary Marcy appears to assert, against citizenship. In every case of conflict, the former must yield to the latter. Conceding, then, that Koszta had acquired an American domi-

cile, it did not absolve him from his allegiance to Austria, nor give us the right to protect him against her authority.

But it may even be a question, if Koszta had not, by his absence from the country, lost his American domicile. Domicile is very easily lost, for it depends in great measure on intention. Mr. Secretary Marcy says he left the country on private business, intending to return immediately; but that is very difficult to prove. Supposing it to be true that such was his intention on leaving the country, he may have changed his mind afterward, and so lost his domicile. If he was found at Smyrna, making arrangements to return, that is not conclusive, for they may have been intended to deceive, and his intention may have been an afterthought, formed in consequence of events or dangers coming to his knowledge after leaving the country. The certificate of his declaration of intention to become an American citizen would, at best, only prove that at the time he made it he intended to remain in the country, but could be no evidence that he had not subsequently changed his intention, as he well might have done, and as it is fair to presume from his antecedents, his political connections, the avowed object of his party, and the events that were occurring or evidently about to occur in the East, he had done. We do not believe that there is a court in Christendom that, on the facts in the case as publicly known, would decide that at Smyrna he still retained his American domicile. If not, he had there, as deriving from domicile, no American nationality at all.

Mr. Secretary Marcy seems to be aware of this, and finally rests Koszta's American nationality on the *tezkerah*, or certificate of American nationality, granted him by the American Legation at Constantinople. That the American Legation, so far as the laws of Turkey are concerned, had the right to grant such a certificate, we do not doubt. It is a right enjoyed by the representatives of all Christian powers, in the Ottoman empire, of taking under their protection their respective countrymen, and such others of their own religion, not subjects of Turkey, as they choose to clothe with their nationality. But this is a simple conventional right, wrung by the Latin princes in past times from the Porte, and is a perfect right only as between Turkey and the party granting or receiving the certificate. It withdraws him to whom it is conceded from the Turkish juris-

diction, and places him, as against Turkey, under that of the power conceding it. But as it is a conventional right, founded on treaty, not on international law, it is, as between the Christian powers themselves, at best only analogous to the right of domicile, and therefore of no force when it comes in conflict with citizenship. Mr. Secretary Marcy considers that it places him in the same condition with a member of a trading factory in the East. The member follows the nationality of the factory. An Englishman or American, domiciled, so to speak, in a Dutch factory, is reputed a Dutchman. This is so, except as against his sovereign. As against his sovereign, his property is Dutch, but he himself remains English or American, and therefore the Dutch could not claim or protect him personally against the English or American sovereign. The *tezkereli* that Koszta received gave him in the Ottoman dominions only the rights of American nationality that he might have acquired from simple American domicile, which gave neither him nor us in regard to him any rights as against Austria, whose subject he was.

The simple fact is, that Koszta, on returning to the Ottoman dominions, was an Austrian subject, and clothed with no American nationality at all available for him or for us against Austrian authority. Mr. Secretary Marcy, no doubt, makes out a strong case of our right to protect Koszta against all the world, except against Austria, the precise point he was required to make out. Not succeeding in making out this point, his whole argument, however elaborate, able, and ingenious, falls to the ground, and however valuable his letter to M. Hülsemann may be in preparing the way for him to succeed General Pierce as President of the United States, it is worthless as an official reply to the complaint and demand of the Austrian government.

The remaining questions are now easily disposed of. Koszta being in Turkey an Austrian subject, we had no more authority over him than over any other Austrian subject, and no more right to interpose between him and his sovereign. If his arrest was illegal, the illegality was not against us or to our prejudice; it contravened no right of ours, and was a matter wholly between him and his sovereign, and we had nothing to do with the question. The illegality, if there was any, was not even against Koszta

himself, for his sovereign had, so far as he was concerned, the right to arrest and detain him. If he had not the right to arrest on Turkish territory, it was not Koszta's right that stopped him, but the territorial jurisdiction of Turkey. If the arrest was a violation of that territorial jurisdiction, as it was not a violation of it to our prejudice, it was a matter to be arranged between Austria and Turkey, without our interference. If then Koszta was arrested out of Austrian jurisdiction, as he was arrested by the authority of his lawful sovereign, we had no right to interfere by force to liberate him from Austrian custody within Austrian jurisdiction.

But we do not concede that the seizure and detention of Koszta were unlawful even as against Turkey. He was arrested and carried on board the *Huszar*, and detained there by authority of the Austrian Consul-General, "exercising," as M. Hülsemann officially asserts, "the right of jurisdiction, guarantied by treaties to the consular agents of Austria in the East, relative to their countrymen." If so, he was lawfully arrested and detained, and whether he was arrested by "ruffians" or not, is nothing to the purpose, so long as they acted under lawful authority. Our own police agents are not always gentlemen, and sometimes have been known to handle their subjects somewhat roughly; but we have never understood that therefore their arrests were illegal.

Mr. Secretary Marcy takes it upon himself to doubt the existence of the treaties alleged by Austria. This is somewhat bold, and perhaps rash. Austria officially asserts them, and Mr. Secretary Marcy cannot respectfully doubt her assertion without good reasons. Has he such reasons? What are they? As near as we can recollect, "the whole subject was discussed in 1849-50, on a demand of Austria for the surrender of the Hungarian refugees; France and England gave it as their opinion, that the Porte was not bound by treaty to give them up; Lord Palmerston, who had some portion of the treaties under his eye, thought that the most that could be made of them was, that the Porte might be required to expel them from his dominions; in fine, the refugees were not given up, and the whole civilized world justified and commended the heroic refusal."

That the whole civilized world justified and commended

the refusal, is too strong an expression. Austria and Russia, we believe, constitute a portion, and a considerable portion of the civilized world, and they did not commend or justify it, and, so far as there is any evidence on the subject before the public, it was justified and commended, out of the whole civilized world, by France, England, and the United States alone. These are indeed important nations, but they are not the whole civilized world. But that these justified and commended it, amounts to nothing; for they were known sympathizers with the Hungarian rebels, and England and the United States favored their cause, and were on the point of acknowledging the independence of Hungary, when, by the united arms of Austria and Russia, the rebellion was suppressed. Nothing is more natural than that they should use their utmost efforts to screen their friends from the penalty they had incurred. They advised Turkey to refuse, promised her their protection if she refused, and threatened her pretty loudly if she did not refuse to surrender them. They were a party concerned, at least a party acting on a foregone conclusion, and therefore are not to be taken as umpires in the case. Austria and Russia did not accept them as such, and never retracted their demands. Lord Palmerston's opinion, interested as he was to protect his Continental pets, we place on a par with Mr. Secretary Marcy's own opinion. Moreover, we are not aware that the Porte absolutely denied her obligation to surrender the refugees. Mr. Secretary Marcy cites no official declaration of hers to that effect, and as for the testimony of individual Turks, we let it pass for what it is worth. As Turkey will not admit the testimony of a Christian against a Turk, we do her no wrong if we refuse to admit the testimony of a Turk against a Christian. The fact is, the matter was not pressed to a decision; Austria generously consented, out of regard to the state of Europe at the time, and the embarrassment of the Porte, to waive for the moment her demand, on condition that the Porte undertook to remove the refugees from the frontier, and to keep them confined in the interior of Turkey. To this condition the Porte acceded, and the fact that she did so, backed as she was by France, England, and the United States, and therefore with nothing to fear from Austria, is a strong presumption that she was bound to the extent Austria asserted. Mr. Secretary Mar-

cy's reasons do not seem to us, therefore, sufficient to impugn the official veracity of Austria, or to render doubtful the existence of the treaties alleged.

The Secretary of State reasons throughout as if the laws of nations applied to Turkey and the Mahometan world as they do to the several states of Christendom. This is a great mistake. The international law of Christendom is not recognized by Mahometan states, and does not govern the mutual intercourse between them and the Christian powers. "The European law of nations," says Wheaton,* "is founded mainly upon that community of origin, manners, institutions, and religion, that distinguished the Christian nations from the Mahometan world. In respect to the mutual intercourse between the Christian and the Mahometan powers, the former have been sometimes content to take the law from the Mahometan, and in others to modify the international law of Christendom in its application to them." The Mahometan world is outside of the European law of nations. Thus the Ottoman empire was not represented in the Congress of Vienna, nor included in the system of public law established by it. It is in the eye of international law a barbarous power, and the relations of civilized nations with it, except so far as regulated by treaties, are subject to the law of force, or of what each Christian nation regards as expediency. We are not, therefore, to judge the conduct of Christian powers, in their intercourse with her, either by the international law of Christendom, or by the *jus gentium*. She acknowledges neither in relation to Christian nations, and Christian nations are bound to observe neither in relation to her. Austria, we suspect, in the absence of all treaty stipulations on the subject, would have the right, if she chose to exercise it, to pursue her offending subjects across the frontier, and to arrest them on Ottoman territory.

But without resorting to this argument, the conduct of Austria is perfectly defensible, for she really has the jurisdiction she claims. "The resident consuls of the Christian powers in Turkey, the Barbary States, and other Mahometan countries," says Wheaton,† "have civil and

* History of the Law of Nations, Part IV. sect. 27.

† Elements of International Law, Part II. Chap. II. § 11.

criminal jurisdiction over their countrymen, to the exclusion of the local magistrates and tribunals. The criminal jurisdiction is usually limited to pecuniary penalties, and in offences of a higher grade the consular functions are similar to those of a police magistrate, or *juge d'instruction*. He collects the documentary and other proofs, and sends them, together with the prisoner, home for trial." Wheaton is ample authority in the case; besides, the fact is notorious, as Mr. Secretary Marcy ought to know perfectly well. We cannot see wherefore this does not cover the whole case. Koszta was an Austrian subject, in the Ottoman dominions under Austrian authority, and was arrested and detained in custody on board the Huszar, to be sent home by authority of the Austrian consul, exercising that right of jurisdiction which the consular agents of Austria, and not only hers, but those of all the Latin powers of Europe, have relative to their respective countrymen in the East. This, as far as we can see, settles the whole question, and proves that the attack on the Austrian flag by Captain Ingraham was wholly unjustifiable, and an insult of which Austria had the right to complain, and for which our government was bound to make her suitable reparation.

We have heard it argued that this civil and criminal jurisdiction of the consular agents of the Christian powers in Turkey is limited to offences committed in the Ottoman dominions. But that is a matter between the consular agents and their own sovereign. Their sovereign is competent so to restrict their jurisdiction, and, perhaps, in general does. But Austria had not so done in the case of her Consul-General at Smyrna, as we have her own authority for asserting; and if she had, the reappearance of Koszta in Turkey, which, according to Mr. Secretary Marcy, had been inhibited to him, was itself an offence that brought him within even such restricted jurisdiction. But to suppose that any limitation of the sort is imposed by Turkish law is wholly to mistake the principle on which the consular jurisdiction within Mahometan states is founded. The populations of the East are immiscible. Foreigners from Christian nations, or what is sometimes in the East called Frankistan, are incapable of acquiring a domicile in any Mahometan country, of mingling with the body of the nation, or of becoming a recognized part of the population under the protection of the territorial laws, unless they

apostatize and make themselves Mussulmans. They are, whether travellers or traders, outside of the *lex loci*, — are outlaws, under the protection of no law, and may be put to death, shut up in prison, or reduced to slavery, for no offence but their nationality. There is for them in Turkey and other Mahometan states no *jus gentium*, no hospitality. To them Turkey is inhospitable, and absolutely barbarous, although some of our statesmen seem, of late, to have fallen very much in love with her. Nothing can be more insecure, inconvenient, and perilous, than the condition of foreigners from Frankistan in Mahometan countries; and hence the Christian powers, the Venetians and Genoese first, the other Latin powers afterwards, interposed to protect their own subjects in these countries, and, at a remote period, obtained the right to take their own countrymen, really or reputed such, under their own protection, as we have seen in the *tezkerah*, and to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over them, as we have done recently by treaty with China relative to our own countrymen in the Chinese dominions, — that is, the right of civil and criminal jurisdiction over their own subjects within Mahometan territory. The theory of the consular jurisdiction is founded on a legal fiction, similar to that which obtains in Christian states with regard to ambassadors, ministers, and other diplomatic agents. Foreigners from Frankistan are ignored by Turkish law, are reputed not to be in Turkey at all, but still in Frankistan, within the jurisdiction of their own sovereign, and which is as perfect in regard to them as if they were actually in his own dominions. This right of jurisdiction is conceded in the treaties by which Turkey agrees to receive consular agents, and follows, so far as she is concerned, as a necessary consequence of their *exequatur*. The extent of this jurisdiction, the offences of which the resident consul may take cognizance, what penalties he may inflict, &c., are determined, not by Turkish law, but by the consul's own sovereign; and therefore, as to Turkey, it makes no difference what is the offence, where it is committed, or what is the judgment rendered. Conceding, then, that Koszta's offence was committed out of the Ottoman dominions, it makes no difference, if the Austrian resident consul had from his own government authority to make the arrest, which Austria herself assures us he had.

Mr. Secretary Marcy argues, that the Austrian consul had doubts as to his jurisdiction, inasmuch as he applied to the Turkish governor for authority to arrest Koszta, which was refused. We suspect that there is some mistake here. The consul had no occasion to apply for such authority, for such authority Turkey, so far as she was concerned, had granted him in conceding him his *exequatur*. It is more probable that his application, if there was any application at all, was not for authority, but for the physical force, to make the arrest. Or it may have been for the governor himself to arrest Koszta, which he was bound to do by the pledge Turkey had given to Austria, that he should never again set his foot within her dominions. Whichever it was, it would appear that the governor had no right to refuse, for Austria, unless we have been misinformed, through her Internuncio at Constantinople, complained to the Porte of his refusal, and demanded his punishment, which demand was complied with so far as to remove him from his office. The right of the consular agents of Austria in Turkey to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction relative to their own countrymen is unquestionable; but how far Turkey is bound by special treaty to grant them the physical force necessary to exercise their jurisdiction, to make their arrests, and to execute their judgments, we are unable to say; and this we suspect was the real point in debate in 1849-50 concerning the surrender of the Hungarian refugees.

Mr. Secretary Marcy further alleges, that Captain Ingraham was justifiable on the score of humanity in making his hostile attack on the Huszar. That there may be cases where humanity, or the *jus gentium*, authorizes a party to interfere, we do not doubt; but not often among civilized powers, between sovereign and subject. There was in Koszta's case no call for such interference. An Austrian subject was arrested within Austrian jurisdiction, by Austrian authority, placed in Austrian custody, with the probability of being sent home and punished for his crimes. Here is the whole case. There was no inhumanity here, for it is for the interest of humanity that crimes, especially such crimes as were laid to Koszta's charge, should be punished. Some stress appears to have been laid on the supposed fact, that the crimes of which he was accused and had been condemned were purely political offences,

which in the eyes of many of our countrymen, as committed against Austria, were no crime at all, but meritorious acts rather; but this we believe is a mistake. The special charge against Koszta, we believe, was complicity in a stupendous robbery, or the purloining and concealing the Hungarian regalia, and the main motive of getting possession of him was not to bring him to punishment for his political offences, but to obtain from him some clew to the place where the sacred treasures were concealed. Perhaps, after his arrest, he gave the clew, and perhaps his having enabled the court to recover them is the reason why Austria has consented to his returning to this country.

The government theory of Koszta's case, it is evident from what we have proved, is untenable. Koszta was not at Smyrna, as it contends, a man without any nationality, under the simple law of nature, nor was he clothed with our nationality as against Austria, who, if she had banished him at all, had done so only on conditions, which were broken by his return to the Ottoman dominions. The most that can be said in our favor is, that he was domiciled in the United States, or was under American protection so far as the right to such protection is conferred by a *tezkerah*, a right only analogous to that of domicile. To set up domicile against citizenship is not in any case allowable, and certainly not in the case of a fugitive from justice or an escaped convict; for such a citizen or subject of a foreign state, not having faithfully performed his past and present duties to his sovereign, is incapable of absolving himself, even according to the government's own doctrine, from his allegiance, and forming new political ties. Even naturalization, without the permission of his sovereign, would not protect such a one, much less domicile. Mr. Secretary Marcy, having failed to prove that Austria had denationalized Koszta, — and she by claiming him as still her subject having proved that she had not, — cannot claim for our government the right to protect him against her without assuming that domicile overrides citizenship, which is absurd, and warranted by no writer on international law and by no decision of any court applying it. The property of a subject in or destined to the country in which a foreigner is domiciled follows, as a general rule, the domicile, and in case of war may be treated as an enemy, because it may be lawfully taxed for the support of the

war; but the domiciled subject retains his personal *status*, and in case of war is regarded by his sovereign as a friend, unless found actually consorting with the enemy, because he is held to be still his subject, though out of his jurisdiction; and the sovereign in whose dominions he resides cannot lawfully compel him to bear arms against him. He is liable to be ordered out of the country, or into the interior, or even to be imprisoned during the war by the foreign sovereign as the subject of his enemy, if it is judged expedient or necessary. To set up domicile against citizenship would, moreover, be on the part of our government a complete abandonment of all American citizens domiciled in foreign countries, and to deprive itself in all cases of all right, on the ground of American citizenship, to interpose in their behalf, or to look after their interests against the sovereign in whose dominions they reside, for it would regard them as absolutely released from all civil connection with their own country. This, perhaps, will not be regarded by our citizens abroad as the best way to fulfil the promise of President Pierce, that his government would extend its protection to every American citizen, in whatever part of the world he might be, and accords but ill with the earnestness with which we assert the rights of American nationality, when it concerns protecting foreign criminals and political incendiaries against their legitimate sovereign. It would have been not amiss for Mr. Secretary Marcy to have reflected that his doctrine has a twofold application, and may give to foreign sovereigns as much power to withdraw our citizens abroad from the protection of our government, as it gives it to withdraw their criminal subjects from their justice.

Mr. Secretary Marcy argues, that his doctrine, which allows foreign political incendiaries and criminals to come here, and, after a few months' residence, to return to their own country, on *private* (who shall prove that it is not *secret*?) business, clothed with American nationality, and protected by it from all prosecution or punishment for their previous offences, has in it nothing dangerous, because, if they should engage in any new incendiary proceedings, it would be a manifest abuse of our nationality, and prove that they fraudulently assume it. We are sorry to meet with such an argument from a veteran statesman, venerable for his years and experience, and

still more sorry to find it put forth officially by the government of our native country, whom we love as a mother, and of whose honor we are more jealous than of our own. Does so experienced a statesman need to be told, that the very presence of these political incendiaries at large, in a country they have endeavored to revolutionize, may often of itself be a grave peril, and tend to compromise the public peace? Does he need to be told, that such men work in secret, and that no little mischief may be done before they can be detected or be proved to have a hand in it? Can it, in the present state of things, fail to be dangerous to have all Europe and the East swarm with well-known revolutionists, who, under protection of American nationality, are free to go wherever they please, making their observations, collecting information for the benefit of the revolutionary party, and secretly communicating with the revolutionary committees and clubs, especially if we have such Ministers or Chargé d'Affaires at the several courts as Mr. Seymour at St. Petersburg, Mr. Soulé at Madrid, Mr. Brown at Constantinople, and Mr. O'Sullivan at Lisbon, and our ships in the ports of Europe and Asia to claim them as American citizens, and, if necessary, to protect them as such by making war on their sovereign, and compelling him, as the less of two evils, to acquiesce in the claim? It is not only dangerous, but is a gross abuse of the advantages of our position. It is incompatible with the respect which we owe to all foreign governments with which we profess to have relations of peace and amity, and exceedingly discreditable to our national character. For the peace of foreign states, for the interests of social order, for the honor of our own country and the sake of our citizens travelling or residing in the Continental states of Europe, we hope our government will not persist in the abominable doctrine which foreign radicals, refugees, robbers, thieves, cutthroats, and political incendiaries have induced it in the Koszta case to set up, and that it will hasten to retrieve its character, by retracting it, and making honorable and suitable reparation to Austria.

Even on the government's own theory of the Koszta case, the attack on the Huszar is hardly defensible. Mr. Secretary Marcy, in his reply to Mr. Hülsemann, assumes that Captain Ingraham's violation of the neutrality laws, by threatening, in a neutral port, to fire on the Huszar, if

an offence at all, was an offence only against Turkey, and is a matter to be settled between us and her, without the interference of Austria. If this principle holds in the case, it holds against as well as for us, and proves that Captain Ingraham had no right to interfere by force to liberate Koszta from his imprisonment on board the Austrian brig-of-war. The laws of nations prohibit foreign powers from fighting out their quarrels on neutral territory, or in a neutral port; they therefore make the neutral power the guardian of the neutrality laws, and responsible for their breach. If, then, Turkey suffered the neutrality laws to be violated, she having the power, as she obviously had, to prevent it, the redress of the aggrieved party lies against her. This is the principle on which we held Portugal, a neutral power, responsible for the loss of the privateer General Armstrong, captured or destroyed by a British man-of-war in one of her ports. It is the principle we have recently set up against the free city of Bremen, in a case very similar to that of Koszta. A certain Mr. Schmit, claimed by us as a naturalized citizen, was arrested by the Hanoverian police within the jurisdiction of Bremen, as a subject of the king of Hanover. We held Bremen responsible, and refused to recognize Hanover in the case. If the principle was good in the case of Mr. Schmit, why not in the case of Mr. Koszta? The reason, we suppose, is, that neither we nor Austria regard Turkey as a civilized power, and neither yield her the benefits nor expect of her the obligations of such power.

Turkey being a barbarous power, outside of the law of nations, neither party could make any account of her rights or duties in the case. Neither party, except so far as bound by treaty, could offend her, or make her responsible for any wrong received from the other party. The proper course, then, for the American authorities at Smyrna, after Koszta was actually in Austrian jurisdiction, as he was when on board the *Huszar*, whatever was the case on land, was to have protested in the name of their government against his arrest and detention; and if this did not procure his release, as Austria is a friendly power, and acknowledges herself amenable to international law, to have remitted the case to the supreme authority, to be disposed of by the diplomacy of the two nations. This would have been in accordance with the general usage in similar

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Austria, in accordance with the plans and ardent wishes of Ludwig Kossuth. Kossuth found, on his visit to the United States as the "Nation's Guest," that our people generally sympathized with him, and that perhaps a majority of them were not averse to intervening actively in his cause, if any plausible pretext for doing so could be found. But he was convinced that, however ready we were to feast him, make speeches and pass resolutions in his favor and denunciatory of Austria, we could not be induced to go to war with Austria avowedly on the principle of intervention. It was necessary, then, to obtain for us some pretext, under which the President, as in the case of Mexico, a few years since, might announce to Congress, "War exists between the Austrian empire and this republic, by act of Austria herself." No matter if the statement should be utterly false, if it could be made to appear to be true, Congress would vote an army and supplies, and the people would sustain it. It was necessary, then, to provoke Austria to the commission of some act which we could represent as a gross violation of our rights, or as a declaration of war against us. For this purpose, we doubt not, Koszta returned, or was ordered by Kossuth to return, to Turkey, and very possibly with the knowledge and approbation of our Jacobinical administration. It could very easily be foreseen that Austria would attempt to arrest him, as implicated in the abstraction and concealment of the Hungarian regalia, which she was exceedingly anxious to recover, and out of this arrest it was thought it would not be difficult to get the desired pretext for war. The whole was an artfully devised plan for inducing the United States to intervene with their physical force in favor of Kossuth and Mazzini, who had combined to establish Hungarian independence, and to expel the Austrians from Italy.

The whole difficulty, we need not doubt, grew out of our insane sympathy with the rebellious subjects of Austria, and their efforts to involve us in the contest, suspended by the Austro-Russian victories of 1849, the suppression of the Roman republic by republican France in the same year, and Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* of December, 1851. The plans of the revolutionists were well laid. They were secretly organized throughout all Western and Central Europe, but they did not choose, as in 1848, to rely wholly on

cases, and would seem to have been demanded, if not by the law, at least by the comity of nations. There was no urgency in the case. Koszta, if in any danger at all, was in no danger of immediately losing his head, for Mr. Secretary Marcy takes special care to inform us, that the danger which induced Captain Ingraham to make his hostile demonstration was simply that he would be conveyed to Trieste, within the Emperor's dominions. We had at the Emperor's court a representative to look after Koszta's interest, and it is idle to pretend that Austria would have condemned him, or punished him under a previous judgment, if we were able to make good our claim to him as an American citizen. Policy, if not a sense of justice and respect for international law, would have restrained her. Our distrust of her in this case may well be construed into a distrust of our own claim. The threat to employ force, the actual demonstration of force, for his liberation, was a rash act, extremely imprudent, and might have been attended with the most fatal consequences; and that war has not followed with Austria, we owe to her prudence or forbearance. The act was, especially when approved by Captain Ingraham's government, literally an act of war; and it can never be for the interest of any nation to intrust the war-making power to its naval officers abroad, to be used at their discretion. It is not compatible with the peace of the world that they should possess it, and we hope that the act of Captain Ingraham will never be suffered to become a precedent. If such acts are to be approved and applauded, instead of rebuked and punished, ships of war will soon be converted into corsairs, and their commanders into pirates.

As to Captain Ingraham himself, we have nothing to say. He is doubtless an honorable gentleman, as well as a brave and efficient officer; but in the present case, he mistook his duty, and suffered his zeal to get the better of his judgment. But as his government has approved his conduct, we must hold it, not him, responsible for the insult offered to the Austrian flag. He probably was not initiated into the plot, and was used as a blind tool by the revolutionists. The secret of the whole transaction it is not difficult to divine. It was not to vindicate American nationality or to protect the rights of an American citizen, but to get up, if possible, a war between this country and

Austria, in accordance with the plans and ardent wishes of Ludwig Kossuth. Kossuth found, on his visit to the United States as the "Nation's Guest," that our people generally sympathized with him, and that perhaps a majority of them were not averse to intervening actively in his cause, if any plausible pretext for doing so could be found. But he was convinced that, however ready we were to feast him, make speeches and pass resolutions in his favor and denunciatory of Austria, we could not be induced to go to war with Austria avowedly on the principle of intervention. It was necessary, then, to obtain for us some pretext, under which the President, as in the case of Mexico, a few years since, might announce to Congress, "War exists between the Austrian empire and this republic, by act of Austria herself." No matter if the statement should be utterly false, if it could be made to appear to be true, Congress would vote an army and supplies, and the people would sustain it. It was necessary, then, to provoke Austria to the commission of some act which we could represent as a gross violation of our rights, or as a declaration of war against us. For this purpose, we doubt not, Koszta returned, or was ordered by Kossuth to return, to Turkey, and very possibly with the knowledge and approbation of our Jacobinical administration. It could very easily be foreseen that Austria would attempt to arrest him, as implicated in the abstraction and concealment of the Hungarian regalia, which she was exceedingly anxious to recover, and out of this arrest it was thought it would not be difficult to get the desired pretext for war. The whole was an artfully devised plan for inducing the United States to intervene with their physical force in favor of Kossuth and Mazzini, who had combined to establish Hungarian independence, and to expel the Austrians from Italy.

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themselves. They had two powers to fear, and only two, — Austria and Russia ; and their plan was to neutralize Russia by means of Turkey, and Austria by means of a war between her and the United States. England they could count on as a friend, to back Turkey morally, perhaps physically, against Russia, because she has made it her policy to aid them in all the Continental states ever since the Congress of Laybach, and because her commercial interests as well as her East Indian possessions required her to resist the farther progress of the Russian empire. France also, it was trusted, could be gained, through jealousy of Russia, and through a desire to extend her influence in Italy, to weaken Austria, to reannex Belgium, perhaps also Savoy, and to gain the protectorate of the smaller German states, to make common cause with England against Northern and Eastern Europe. All then that was wanting was to gain this great republic, with its vast resources and overflowing treasury, to the same cause. This it was hoped to do by getting up a quarrel between us and Austria.

Austria understood the plan of her enemies, and could not be caught in the trap, and, judging from the conditions offered and accepted by our Minister at Constantinople for the release of Koszta, she has come off, so far as we are concerned, with honor, while we stand before the world in a most unenviable light. But France and England appear to have caught the bait, and the prospect now is that Europe must either succumb to the demagogues or become Cossack. To all appearances, a war between Russia and Turkey is inevitable. Hostilities, it is reported, have actually commenced, and Turkey has assembled as formidable an army as her resources admit of, officered to a great extent by renegade Austrian and Russian subjects ; and it would seem, at the time we are writing, that France and England are prepared to lend her even more than their moral influence. Thus far Kossuth and Mazzini, except with us, have apparently succeeded in their plan, and France and England are playing their game, if not in reality the ulterior game of Russia herself.

It strikes us that, if France and England are really bent, as they pretend, on maintaining the balance of power threatened or assumed to be threatened by Russia, they adopt very unwise means to effect their purpose. The real

mediating power of Europe is Austria, and whether it be the purpose to guard against the demagogues of the South and West, or the absolutism of the North and East, she should be regarded as the *point d'appui* of all the operations required. As we understand it, two dangers threaten European civilization, anarchy and despotism, the demagogues and the Cossacks, the revolutionists of the South and West, and Russia from the North and East. The Western powers, leaving out Austria, are impotent against either danger. England can keep down a revolution at home only by encouraging revolutions abroad, and France is still the hotbed of *demagogie*, and which the Emperor prevents from breaking out in open insurrection and revolution only by adopting some of the worst elements of socialistic economy. His vast expenditures on public works and modern improvements, avowedly for the purpose of giving employment to the workingmen, cannot be continued for many years without alienating from him the tax-paying classes, and when discontinued, a whole army of workmen are ready to find employment in making revolutions. The moment that the revolutionists succeed, or have a fair prospect of succeeding, in detaching Hungary and the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom from Austria, all Central Germany, and every Western dynasty, unless Russia intervenes, are at the mercy of the demagogues. On the other hand, if Austria is dismembered, and reduced to her German provinces, nothing, humanly speaking, can prevent Russia from occupying the seat of the ancient empire of the East, and ruling all Europe and Asia. Nothing can be made of that rickety old concern, the Ottoman empire, which has exhausted all her resources in her present very inadequate efforts to maintain her independence and integrity. The only safety of the Western powers is in cultivating the friendship of Austria, and in enabling her to extend and consolidate her power, so that she can rely on them, and be able to make the balance incline to the side on which she throws her weight.

If France and England, the two leading powers of the West, were sincere and earnest to maintain the balance of power, their first effort would be to detach Austria from Russia, and make it for her interest to unite with them. But this is precisely what they have neglected to do. They have both been hostile to her. They prevented her

from intervening to protect the Swiss Sonderbund in 1847, which would have prevented the terrible convulsions of the following year; they armed in 1848 all Italy against her, and prevented her from pushing her advantages as far as she lawfully might against Sardinia, who had twice made unprovoked war upon her, without a shadow of a pretext; they stirred up a rebellion against her in her own capital, and encouraged her Hungarian subjects to revolt, and compelled her to invoke the assistance of Russia; and on the reorganization of the German Diet, they protested against her entering it with her non-Germanic provinces, a measure so essential to the maintenance of the balance of power, and which could have endangered the safety of no European state. Even the French army which suppressed the Mazzinian republic was sent to Rome avowedly to maintain French influence in Italy against Austria, and it is probably maintained there for the same purpose, and perhaps also with the vain hope of ruling the Pope, and through him the Catholic populations of Europe,—a policy attempted by Napoleon the uncle, with all the success it deserved. The hostility of France and England in 1848 and 1849 drew Austria into a close alliance with Russia, and their present designs make it for her interest to continue that alliance; for if she has something to fear from Russia, she has still more to fear from them. All this we should call a blunder on their part, and its sad effects will be long felt in European politics. In the present struggle Austria will remain neutral, if permitted, and if not, she must take sides with Russia, who will gain the chief advantage.

As far as we can see, Russia, as against Turkey, is in the right. Her demands are just and reasonable, as all Western Europe has virtually decided in the Vienna note. She simply demands that her treaties with the Porte in behalf of the Christians of her communion shall be executed, and that a sufficient guaranty of their execution shall be given. There is nothing wrong in this. The Sultan pledges his word that they shall be, it is true, but that is just no security at all. All concessions in favor of Christians, whom the Turks regard as slaves and treat as dogs, are contrary to the Koran, the supreme law of every Mahometan state, and are regarded by the Turkish judges as *non avenues*. The Christian power must have an acknowl-

edged protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, or the treaties in their favor are so much waste-paper. Russia knows this, and demands the protectorate of the Christians of her communion. But this, say France and England, will give her too much control over the internal affairs of Turkey. Be it so. Why, then, not compel Turkey, their *protégé*, to emancipate all her Christian subjects, of whatever communion, to place them and their religion under the protection of the law? This would supersede the necessity of Russian interference, and take away all pretext she may have for interfering. If they will not do this, they have no right to complain of her for taking upon herself the protection of the Christians of her own communion. The Christians of the Ottoman empire have long enough been the slaves of the insolent and fanatic Turks, and religion, civilization, humanity, demands their emancipation, their elevation to the *status* of citizens, and their free and full possession of the liberty of worship, and the Western powers, if they neglect their duty in this respect, have no right to interfere to prevent Russia from doing it.

It is for the interest of Christendom, of European civilization, and of common humanity, that an end be put to the Mahometan power, and it is a scandal to find Catholic France combining with heretical and Pope-hating England to uphold it. Russia is a schismatical power, and no friend to Catholicity; but she is morally and religiously as good as Protestant England, and however we may dislike her political system, she succeeds better in winning the affections of the nations she subjugates than England does in winning the affections of those she professes to assist and for whom she really pours out her blood and her treasure. The Polish peasant has a far warmer affection for Russia, than the Spanish peasant has for England. It would no doubt be a calamity for Russia to subjugate Western Europe, but we defy her to govern it worse than England has governed Ireland and India. The predominance of Russia would no doubt injure the Catholic cause, but not more than England has injured it in Spain and Portugal, and is now injuring it in Sardinia, Sicily, and the whole Italian peninsula; or than France herself has injured it by her league with the Turks against Austria and Spain, and with the Protestants against Catholic Germany, by her Gallican-

ism, Jansenism, and infidel philosophy, her immoral literature, her Jacobinical revolutions, and by her Italian and German wars and conquests under the Republic and the Empire. But be all this as it may, Russia is better than Turkey, the Greek schism is far preferable to Mahometanism, and if the Western states cannot preserve the balance of power without uniting to uphold the standard of the Arabian impostor, they ought not to preserve it all. Russia certainly does not favor, and never has favored, radicalism or socialism, the two worst enemies the Church has to defend herself against, and that is much.

We are far from believing Russia wishes to extend her empire to Constantinople, and we do not believe her present movement was begun with any view to conquest. She wishes, no doubt, to protect, to gain to her cause, if you will, the Christian subjects of the Porte, and to supplant the influence of France and England at the court of Constantinople, to prevent them from making the Porte a bad neighbor, and the revolutionists from making her their rendezvous, and the *point d'appui* of their operations against Europe. There is nothing unreasonable in this. The Czar is only acting on the defensive, only taking a step which France and England render necessary, to protect himself and his allies. If they choose to make use of Turkey against him and his allies, as they avowedly do, what more natural than that he should seek to thwart them? If he cannot do it otherwise than by taking possession of Turkey, whom have they to blame but themselves? They cannot expect to use Turkey against him, with his acquiescence, and they must compel her to keep the peace, and suppress their *demagogie*, if they wish him to refrain from advancing to the south. At present they give him a good excuse for what he is doing, and place themselves in a wrong and in a most foolish position. If Russia does not profit by it at their expense, they may consider themselves happy.

ART. IV. — *The Power of the Pope during the Middle Ages ; or an Historical Inquiry into the Origin of the Temporal Power of the Holy See, and the Constitutional Laws of the Middle Ages, relating to the Deposition of Sovereigns, with an Introduction on the Honors and Temporal Privileges conferred on Religion and on its Ministers by the Nations of Antiquity, especially by the first Christian Emperors.* By M. GOSSELIN, Director in the Seminary of St. Sulpice, Paris. Translated by the REV. MATHEW KELLY, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. London: Dolman. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1853. 2 vols. 8vo. ~

THAT this work exhibits learning and much patient research, no one can deny, and it certainly brings together much valuable information on a large number of interesting and important questions. It enjoys a very high reputation, and is by far the best work that has been written in defence of the conduct of Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages, by an author who denies, or is unwilling to assert, the temporal authority of the Church over sovereigns by divine right. The author professes to waive the theological controversy on the subject, and perhaps does not, in just so many words, deny the theological opinion, as he calls it, which attributes to the Pope a temporal jurisdiction over sovereigns, at least indirect, by divine right ; and yet it is clear from his work that he does not hold that doctrine, and he certainly labors with extreme diligence to refute it historically. He does not, indeed, undertake to refute it from the point of view of theology, or by theological arguments ; but he does labor to bring all the weight of history against it, and for this purpose not seldom reads history backwards. We are frequently reminded, in reading his work, of our modern physicists who profess to have nothing to do with religion, and to investigate nature as simple scientific inquirers. As such, they bring out, not facts, but theories and explanations of facts utterly repugnant to revelation, and if we object in the name of religion, they gravely reply, " We deal only with science, we leave theological questions to the theologians." As if any thing can be scientifically true and theologically false, or scientifically false and theologically true ! M. Gosselin knows perfectly well that there can be no discrepancy between history and

Catholic theology, and therefore that, if he places history and any theological opinion in conflict, he necessarily assumes either that the opinion is not true, or that his history is false.

We should not like to assert that the doctrine of St. Thomas, of Bellarmine, Suarez, Du Perron, and the great majority of Catholic theologians, which attributes to the Pope, as visible head of the Church, temporal jurisdiction over sovereigns, at least indirect, by divine right, is a simple theological opinion, which may, as M. Gosselin represents, be held or rejected as the individual Catholic thinks proper. There have been some recent decisions and condemnations of Gallican works, at Rome, which may be thought to put a new face on the question, and to raise that doctrine to the rank of a *sententia Ecclesiæ* rather than of a *sententia in Ecclesia*. But however this may be, M. Gosselin, in so far as his theory excludes the temporal authority, at least indirect, of the Church, by divine right, cannot make it incumbent upon us to accept it. If he is free to assert, we are equally free to deny it. Rome has never been partial to it, and has shown, on more occasions than one, what she thinks of it. We do not believe it. We believe, we have been forced to believe, after the fullest investigation we have been able to make of the subject, the direct temporal authority of the Pope, as Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth. We do not put this forth as Catholic dogma, nor have we ever insisted on it in our pages, but we do believe Catholic dogma requires us to assert, at least, the indirect power contended for by Bellarmine and Suarez, unless we would forego our logic. Without going thus far at least, all Catholic history is to us a chaos of unintelligible facts, and Catholicity itself sinks very nearly to the level of the Greek schism, and is not much better than High-Church Anglicanism. We do not question M. Gosselin's good intentions; we do not question his honest desire to serve the cause of religion, but his book is not a little repugnant to our Catholic convictions and feelings. The liberties he takes with the language of illustrious pontiffs and distinguished doctors is startling. He does not hesitate to interpret their language in what seems to us a sense the very opposite of its plain and obvious meaning, and we feel that, if such liberty may be taken throughout, not a little in Catholic theology would lose that fixed

and certain character which it has been supposed to possess. Even according to his own concession, if he is right, Popes, Councils, doctors, and the great body of the faithful, for centuries entertained an erroneous theological opinion. A doctrine of which this can be said, or which requires so liberal a concession to the enemies of the Church, it seems to us, ought to be received with suspicion by every sincere and generous-hearted Catholic.

Without expressly denying the theological doctrine of the divine right of the Church to temporal authority, M. Gosselin contends that the temporal authority of the Popes in the Middle Ages did not originate in that doctrine, for they possessed it, he says, before that opinion, as he calls it, was known, and therefore it could not have been its source. Whether that opinion be true or false, he contends, it did not originate the title by which they held and exercised their temporal power. The title by which they really did hold and exercise it, he maintains, was the *jus publicum* of the times, the constitution and laws of Catholic states in the Middle Ages. They had a real and valid title to it *jure humano*, but not *jure divino*. That the temporal authority of the Popes in the Middle Ages was a part of the *jus publicum*, we certainly do not deny, but that it derived from the *jus publicum* we do not believe. The learned author seems to us, to use a homely illustration, to put the cart before the horse. The Pope preceded the constitution and laws of the states of the Middle Ages, and, as a matter of fact, gave law to them, instead of receiving his title from them. They received their peculiar character from him, as the Vicar of Jesus Christ. They did not spring into existence without him, and then create him supreme arbiter of temporal affairs, but were made what they were under his arbitratorship. We might as well contend that the Creator derives his authority as Universal Lord from his creatures, as that the Pope derived his temporal jurisdiction from the constitutions and laws which he dictated or inspired. The simple fact is, that the constitution and laws of Catholic states, in the Middle Ages, recognized the temporal supremacy of the Church, and conformed to it, but did not confer that supremacy. The Church has by divine right power to enact canons for the government and interests of the Church, and these canons, when enacted, bind all, sovereigns as well as subjects, and

therefore the civil authority itself, in so far as they touch it. The civil authority may or may not recognize them, but their vigor as laws remains the same in either case. The state, by refusing to recognize them, may impede their operation, but cannot annul them. It may recognize them, conform the civil law to them, or declare them, as far as they go, the law of the land; but in doing so, it only facilitates their operation, it does not give them their vigor as laws. The sovereigns in the Middle Ages did not, historically considered, confer the authority on the Pope which he exercised over them; they simply acknowledged it, and promised to obey it. In modern times most states have become pagan, and refuse to do so, just as the individual sinner refuses to recognize and obey the law of God; but this, while it obstructs the operation of the temporal authority of the Popes, does not take it away, or in the least affect their title to it. One of two things, it seems to us, must be admitted, if we have regard to the undeniable facts in the case; namely, either the Popes usurped the authority they exercised over sovereigns in the Middle Ages, or they possessed it by virtue of their title as Vicars of Jesus Christ on earth. We do not, therefore, regard M. Gosselin's theory as tenable, and we count his attempted defence of the Pope, on the ground of human right, a failure.

There is, in our judgment, but one valid defence of the Popes, in their exercise of temporal authority in the Middle Ages over sovereigns, and that is, that they possess it by divine right, or that the Pope holds that authority by virtue of his commission from Jesus Christ, as the successor of Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, and visible head of the Church. Any defence of them on a lower ground must, in our judgment, fail to meet the real points in the case, and is rather an evasion, than a fair, honest, direct, and satisfactory reply. To defend their power as an extraordinary power, or as an accident in church history, growing out of the peculiar circumstances, civil constitution, and laws of the times, now passed away, perhaps for ever, may be regarded as less likely to displease non-Catholics and to offend the sensibilities of power, than to defend it on the ground of divine right, and as inherent in the divine constitution of the Church; but even on the low ground of policy, we do not think it the wisest, in the long run.

Say what we will, we can gain little credit with those we would conciliate. Always, to their minds, will the temporal power of the Pope by divine right loom up in the distance, and always will they believe, however individual Catholics here and there may deny it, or nominally Catholic governments oppose it, that it is the real Roman Catholic doctrine, to be reasserted and acted the moment that circumstances render it prudent or expedient. We gain nothing with them but doubts of our sincerity, and we only weaken among ourselves that warm and generous devotion to the Holy Father which is due from every one of the faithful, and which is so essential to the prosperity of the Church, in her unceasing struggles with the godless powers of this world.

The excellent author, no doubt, believes that he has hit upon a theory which enables him to vindicate the conduct of the Popes and Councils of the Middle Ages, in their relations to temporal sovereigns, without incurring the odium attached to the higher ground of divine right, and this, he will pardon us for believing, is his chief motive for elaborating and defending it. He cannot be unaware, that the doctrine he rejects is the most logical, the most consonant to Catholic instincts, the most honorable to the dignity and majesty of the Papacy, or that it has undeniably the weight of authority on its side. The principal Catholic authorities are certainly in favor of the divine right, and the principal authorities which he is able to oppose to them are of parliaments, sovereigns, juriconsults, courtiers, and prelates and doctors who sustained the temporal powers in their wars against the Popes. The Gallican doctrine was, from the first, the doctrine of the courts, in opposition to that of the Vicars of Jesus Christ, and should therefore be regarded by every Catholic with suspicion? M. Gosselin cannot be ignorant of this, and therefore we must believe that he is attached to his theory principally from prudential considerations. We confess that we see nothing in his theory that can alarm the pride of power, or offend the enemies of religion. This is, no doubt, what the author has seen and felt. He professes to regard it as a recommendation of his theory, that many learned Protestants have adopted it, and he cites, under a special head, a number of Protestant authorities in its favor, winding up with a clincher from Voltaire. We see

nothing in his theory which Voltaire or any intelligent Protestant might not assent to, or even maintain, without once dreaming of becoming a Catholic; but this fact alone creates in our mind a strong presumption against it. The author seems to us to have fallen into the new snare of Satan. The latest and most approved mode of warfare against the Church is, not to denounce her as a Satanic institution, but to generate a habit of thinking and speaking of her as a simple human institution. None of her intelligent enemies sympathize with the vulgar Protestantism which calls the Church Babylon and the Pope Antichrist. They have too little religious belief, and are too cunning, for that. They speak of her under a human point of view, as a human institution, and as such adopt the language of eulogy, not of vituperation. They admire her, are struck with her profound policy, her deep knowledge of human nature, and her marvellous skill in governing the masses of the people. As a human institution, especially for the infancy of nations, they are in raptures with her, and pen occasionally magnificent paragraphs in her favor, as we see in Ranke, Macaulay, and others. As far as he goes, the simple-hearted author falls in with them, and his whole method of explaining the origin of what he calls the extraordinary power of the Popes, by representing them as obeying the impulses of the Christian populations, making them, as it were, the impersonations of the popular opinions and instincts of their times, and defending their temporal power by the pious belief of the people, the maxims and jurisprudence of the age, is in perfect harmony with the method of these modern humanizers, who will extol the Popes to the skies as men, as secular arbiters of temporal affairs, and treat with the most ineffable scorn every one of their claims as the Vicars of Jesus Christ. We wish M. Gosselin had been careful to render broader and more distinct the line of demarcation which separates him from these our ablest, subtlest, and most dangerous enemies.

M. Gosselin puts forth his theory as historical, as an induction from the historical facts in the case. We do not much like this; we have very little confidence in any inductive theory of the sort, and no man can truly represent the history till he has ascertained the theology of the Church. The doctrines of the Church are the founts of her

history; they precede and determine the facts. The Church works *more humano* by human agents indeed, but is herself superhuman, and introduces a superhuman element into all her operations. No fact in her long history can be explained, that is, adequately explained, from a purely human principle. Every explanation of an ecclesiastical fact on that principle alone is partial, and leaves out the element most essential to be considered; and, moreover, tends to give us false views of the Church, and to degrade her to the level of human sects, philosophies, and governments. But, even as an historical induction, M. Gosselin's theory does not satisfy us. We have already shown that the temporal authority of the Pope preceded the civil constitution and laws of the Middle Ages, and was exerted in determining their peculiar character. The whole current of history is against the author. He cannot adduce a single official act of Pope or Council which concedes that the temporal authority exercised was held only by a human title. All history fails to show an instance in which the Pope, in deposing a temporal sovereign, professes to do it by the authority vested in him by the pious belief of the faithful, generally received maxims, the opinion of the age, the concessions of sovereigns, or the civil constitution and public laws of Catholic states. On the contrary, he always claims to do it by the authority committed to him as the successor of the Prince of the Apostles, by the authority of his Apostolic Ministry, by the authority committed to him of binding and loosing, by the authority of Almighty God, of Jesus Christ, King of kings and Lord of lords, whose minister, though unworthy, he asserts that he is, — or some such formula, which solemnly and expressly sets forth that his authority is held by divine right, by virtue of his ministry, and exercised solely in his character of Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth. To this, we believe, there is not a single exception. Wherever the Popes cite their titles, they never, so far as we can find, cite a human title, but always a divine title. Whence is this? Did the Popes cite a false title? Were they ignorant of their own title? or was this assertion of title an empty form, meaning nothing? This is a grave matter, and this fact alone seems to us decisive against the author.

M. Gosselin feels the force of this argument, and seeks to evade it by saying that deposition was only an incidental

or indirect effect of excommunication; and as excommunication is a spiritual act, the Pope could rightly set forth that he performed it by virtue of his apostolic authority. That excommunication did in some cases work deposition may be true, but that it did in all cannot be asserted, and numerous instances may be cited of excommunication without deposition. But there are documents enough in which the Pope not only excommunicates, but solemnly deposes, a prince, and in these very documents we find that the title set forth, and the only title set forth, is that derived from his Apostolic Ministry. Never does the Pope profess to depose, any more than to excommunicate, by virtue of any other than a divine title. Whatever he does in the case, he always professes to do it by his supreme jurisdiction as the Vicar of Jesus Christ, and the successor of Peter the Prince of the Apostles. That the Popes wilfully erred, M. Gosselin cannot pretend; that they held the theological opinion which founds their power on divine right, that is, as private doctors so held, he concedes, or at least regards as highly probable. He will, then, permit us to think that, even as private doctors, the opinion of such illustrious pontiffs as St. Gregory the Seventh, Alexander the Third, Innocent the Third, Innocent the Fourth, Boniface the Eighth, St. Pius the Fifth, and Sixtus Quintus, may weigh as much in the scale as that of the learned author of the work before us. We permit ourselves to believe that these illustrious pontiffs knew the origin and ground of their title as well as he does, and that, had they even been acquainted with his theory, they would have continued to think and act as they did. We mean no disrespect to the author, but really we have no patience with this manifest irreverence and want of filial respect and devotion to the Holy See. Our Lord founded his Church on Peter, and we have no patience with those who, with good or bad intentions, are constantly laboring to undermine its foundation. We may err, but if we do, God grant it may never be in denying to the successors of the Prince of the Apostles any portion of that power which he has conferred on them. Never for one moment shall Cæsar weigh in the scale with us against Peter. Indeed, we can better endure open, avowed Protestantism itself, than stingy, narrow-minded, and frozen-hearted Gallicanism, always studying to split the difference between Peter and Cæsar, God and the Devil. It has been

a blight on religion and society wherever it has prevailed, and terrible, terrible have been the calamities it has brought upon the Christian nations of the East, upon Germany, upon France, and upon England. It is a traitor in our camp, an enemy in the guise of a friend, who damps our zeal, depresses our courage, renders us lukewarm, unfits us for all heroic deeds, and opens the gates of the citadel to the adversary. We may die, but let us die with the blessing of the Holy Father.

But we have said more of M. Gosselin and his theory than we intended. We do not like his theory; we do not believe it, and could not believe it, without violence to our whole understanding of the Catholic system of truth. The author, in principle, is a thorough-going Gallican, and, if he defends the illustrious pontiffs who have been so maligned by non-Catholics and courtiers, he does it on principles which seem to us to humiliate them, and to degrade them to the rank of mere secular princes. His theory, at first view, may have a plausible appearance, but it is illusory, like all theories invented to recommend the Church to her enemies, or to escape the odium always attached to truth by the world. In saying this, we are not ignorant that many whom we love and respect embrace that theory in part, and explain and defend by it the temporal power exercised by Popes and Councils over sovereigns in the Middle Ages. They do not, indeed, agree with M. Gosselin, in his denial that the Popes held that power by divine right, but they think it suffices to explain and defend it on the ground of human right. They agree with us as to the supremacy of the spiritual order, and the temporal jurisdiction of the Popes, but they think that all the objections of non-Catholics can be adequately and honestly answered without taking such high ground, and the ground of human right being sufficient and less offensive, it should, in prudence, be adopted, and the other doctrine be passed under the *disciplina arcana*. They therefore disapprove of the course we take, and wish we would content ourselves with more moderate views, not because we are uncatholic, but because we are imprudent, and subject Catholics to unnecessary odium.

There are those also who reason in the same way on a variety of other topics, and who regret to find us and other Catholic journalists broaching certain delicate subjects, and

bringing out doctrines which, though true enough in the abstract, are exceedingly offensive to the public, and have just now, in their judgment, no practical application. Undoubtedly Catholicity, they confess, is the only solid basis of the social fabric, and the state ought to recognize and conform to the revealed doctrines which the Church teaches; but public opinion is against it; modern states have fallen back on the simple natural law, and the Church must withdraw from the sphere of political and social action, and content herself to minister in spirituals to those who recognize her authority. It is idle to expect to realize in the political and social order the Catholic ideal. This may be a calamity; but it is, in our times, a necessity, and, however reluctantly, we must submit. Consequently, we should not suffer ourselves to reaffirm those high-toned Catholic doctrines which were current in the Middle Ages, and which were well enough when society avowed itself Catholic, but which are practically obsolete now. Society has abandoned them, and is not prepared to resume them.

We acknowledge that this objection is at least plausible, and deserves to be treated with respect. But possibly it originates in too desponding a view of society, and a certain lack of confidence in the power of Divine Truth. We do not shut our eyes to the present state of society, and we think we are not ignorant of the prevailing public opinion. Certainly we shall not succeed in realizing in all respects the Catholic ideal, or in bringing society into perfect harmony with the principles of our holy religion. Always will the Philistines dwell in the land. But, as in the case of individual sanctity, it is better, even here, to aim high than it is to aim low. He who aims only at so much virtue as will barely admit him into heaven, is in great danger of falling short of his mark. In the constitution of government, in practical legislation or administration, the rule of wisdom is to consult, not what is ideally perfect, but what here and now is practicable. We cannot go, and it is worse than useless to attempt to go, far in advance of the community. Our American society is pagan, not Christian, and by no possible legislative or administrative acts can it be made Catholic. To organize and conduct it on Catholic principles is utterly impracticable, and no Catholic statesman worthy of the name, were he in power,

would make the attempt. People must be converted to the Catholic faith before they can be organized or governed as Catholics, and conversion cannot be forced. To keep the faith when once received, may be of necessity, but to receive it is a matter of free will, which cannot be coerced. Our Lord forces, and allows his Church to force, no one to accept his bounty. He proffers it freely to all, but if any one chooses to reject it and suffer the consequences, he is free to do so. Our Lord suffers no dragooning of unbelievers into his Church; he asks the heart, the free will, a voluntary, not a forced worship.

Nevertheless, it by no means follows that the state, in the sight of God, has any more right than the individual to profess a false religion, or to be indifferent to the true; far less does it follow that society organized on uncatholic principles, and operating in opposition thereto, can long subsist or answer, even as to the natural order, the true ends of society. All society worthy to be so called, in the ancient Gentile world, was preserved by virtue of the Catholic principles it retained, after the dispersion of mankind, from the primitive revelation made to our first parents, and all Gentile society tended to complete dissolution in proportion as those principles became more and more corrupted or lost sight of. Society has been preserved in Protestant nations only by virtue of the Catholic traditions and usages which they did not reject when they broke away from the Church, and disappears in proportion as those traditions and usages lose their hold, and are exchanged for new modes of thought and new manners and customs. There is no true society, no genuine human race, no human race in its unity and integrity, out of the Catholic society or Church, as the lamented Donoso Cortés, in his profound *Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism*, demonstrates with equal truth and eloquence. The reason of this is, that man in the present decree of God is under a supernatural providence, the unbeliever no less than the believer, ordained to supernatural rewards or to supernatural punishments. The natural nowhere in human life subsists alone, and nowhere can it prosper, save as nourished with the sap of the supernatural.

We cannot make infidel governments, hardly professedly Catholic governments themselves, understand this, consequently almost everywhere the faithful, as under the Pagan

emperors of Rome, must constitute a society of their own, independent of the pagan society in the midst of which they live, complete in itself, and adequate to all social wants and necessities. This Catholic society is in the Old World the remains of a once general Catholic society; in our country it is, as under the Pagan Cæsars, the germ or nucleus of a new Catholic state. All the hopes of the Old World centre in these Catholic remnants, all the hopes of the New in this Catholic germ. It is this Catholic society sustaining itself or forming itself under overshadowing heathenism, that we must consult in our addresses and discussions. To save the non-Catholic society from continual decline and corruption is as hopeless as it was to save the Jewish state under the Roman governors, or pagan society under Nero or Diocletian. The thing is out of the question, because modern society as distinguished from the Catholic has in itself no recuperative energy, no germ of life. All society must conform to the principles of our holy religion, and spring from Catholicity as its root, or sooner or later lapse into barbarism. The living germ in all modern nations, the nucleus of all future living society, is in the Catholic portion of the population. They are the salt of the earth; they are the leaven that is to leaven the whole lump. Hence the important thing is to look to it that the salt lose not its savor, nor the leaven its virtue. If the faithful themselves become conformed, in all things not expressly of dogma and ritual, to the unbelieving world in which they live, or if no care be taken to give them juster views of society, or any truer and nobler political and social ideas, than those entertained by that world itself, little influence will they be able to exert, either in saving themselves from the fate of all anti-Catholic society, or in forming a society in accordance with the Catholic ideal.

It cannot have escaped any moderately careful observer, that, amid the political and social convulsions of modern times, the Catholic populations have themselves to a fearful extent lost the idea of Catholic society. The anti-social doctrines of the age have on all sides penetrated into the Catholic camp, and vast masses of Catholics half believe that, for all the purposes of society, government, and general civilization, Protestantism is preferable to Catholicity. Our young men grow up with this feeling, and though



they make it, in some instances, a point of honor not to desert the religion of their fathers, they look with something like envy on their Protestant companions. As a religion, they hold Protestantism in sovereign contempt, but as an instrument of civilization and worldly prosperity they almost venerate it. Nothing, it strikes us, is of more pressing importance, than to disabuse our young ambitious Catholics of this fatal illusion, and to show them, as well as the Catholic populations generally, that society has its root in those great principles which Catholics alone do or can possess in their unity and integrity, as living and life-giving principles. We must insist on this, not so much for those who are without as for those who are within. The Church cannot in these times rely on her own children. These false political doctrines and social theories, so widely diffused among us, and borrowed from and sustained by the spirit of the age, are so many impediments to the progress of religion. They prevent it from doing its work, and occasion the ruin of innumerable souls. Can it then be useless, or in any sense, unimportant, to bring out with clearness and distinctness, with earnestness and power, those very Catholic principles which stand directly opposed to these false doctrines and destructive theories?

Perhaps they who counsel reserve and moderation would not do amiss to bear in mind, that in some respects our position is also very different from that of the early Christians under the Pagan Cæsars. They could observe the discipline of the secret, we cannot; they had not a past to defend, we have. It was enough for them to unfold the political and social bearings of their faith as occasion offered for its political or social application. The Fathers under the Pagan emperors had no occasion to discuss the rights and duties of a Catholic state towards heretics and schismatics, for as yet there was no Catholic state. It was enough for them to confine themselves to the question in so far as it was then a practical question. The same remark is applicable to a large number of other grave questions. But it is not so with us. There have been and still are Catholic states, and the answers which the Church gives to all great practical questions have become historical. These answers are, in many instances, no doubt, very offensive to the spirit of the present age, and such as

the prevailing public opinion denounces; but there they stand on the page of history, and can be neither honestly nor successfully denied or explained away. What the Church has done, what she has expressly or tacitly approved in the past, that is exactly what she will do, expressly or tacitly approve in the future, if the same circumstances occur. This may be a difficulty, an embarrassment, but it will not do to shrink from it. We are responsible for the past history of the Church, in so far as she herself has acted, and to attempt to apologize for it by an appeal to the opinion of the times, or to explain it in conformity with the prevailing spirit and theories of non-Catholics, in our age, is only to weaken the reverence of the faithful for the Church, and yield the victory to her enemies. The odium we may incur should not move us. There never was a time when Catholicity was not odious to the non-Catholic world, and there never will come a time when it will not be. That world hated our Lord, and it hates his Church because it hates him. But our faith gives us the victory over the world. Always have we this consolation in the worst of times, — the truth is able to sustain itself and all who are faithful to it. It is no difficult matter to vindicate to the Catholic mind the historical answers we allude to, for they are all intrinsically just and true, and as for vindicating them to the non-Catholic mind, we can waive that. If we believe Catholicity is true, we believe non-Catholics are wrong, and can become right, and form correct judgments of Catholic things, only through conversion. We would never unnecessarily offend them, we would studiously avoid throwing any obstacles in their way, and for their sake do all in our power to bring them to a knowledge of the truth. But we shall best promote their conversion by commanding their respect, and this we shall best do by convincing them that we have nothing in the past history of our Church of which we are ashamed, or that we wish to conceal, explain away, or apologize for; and by making all our Catholics firm, frank, ingenuous, and intrepid defenders of unemasculated Catholicity.

These were the principles prescribed to us for our guidance when we commenced this Review as a Catholic Review, and on these principles we have endeavored to conduct it to the best of our ability. The age is latitudi-

narian, and thinks one religion, unless it be the Catholic, as good as another, because it believes in none. We found our Catholic laity extensively infected with a latitudinarian spirit, fraternizing with their "separated brethren," and calling upon Protestant ministers to say grace for them at their public dinners, and in presence of their own priests too, — throwing up their hands in pious horror at our illiberality, if we hinted that their liberal Protestant friends could not be saved unless they became Catholics, and most loudly applauding themselves for being liberal Catholics. We found our current Catholic literature so explaining the qualification which some theologians add to the dogma, Out of the Church there is no salvation, as to open heaven to the great mass of heretics and infidels, and to save more by the exception than the rule. Indeed, every Protestant, Anglican, Calvinist, Socinian, or Deist, of decent manners and kind feelings, was looked upon as in the way of salvation. What was our duty as a Catholic writer? We found the age clamoring for religious liberty, meaning thereby the liberty of infidelity to enslave and oppress the Church, and we found Catholics uniting in the clamor, and maintaining that every man has the natural right to be of what religion he chooses, thus denying the essential distinction between truth and falsehood, virtue and vice. Were we to be silent, and suffer a manifest error to be imbibed by our Catholic community, an error which would create serious embarrassments for our grandchildren, lest by contradicting it, and stating the truth on the subject, we might expose our religion to the censure of non-Catholics? If Catholics themselves were in no danger of being infected with the error, prudence would require us to pass it over in silence; but when we could hardly speak with a Catholic layman in the country, who would not echo the condemned doctrine of Voltaire on *Tolerance*, it was manifestly our duty to state the truth as taught by our approved Catholic theologians.

We found a very general disposition among the Catholic laity to separate religion from politics, to emancipate politics from the Christian law, to vote God out of the state, and to set up the people against the Almighty. Was this in these revolutionary times to be passed over in silence, and no effort made to arrest the tide of political atheism? We saw our Holy Father driven into exile;

we saw large numbers of nominal Catholics rejoicing at the impious usurpations of Mazzini & Co., sympathizing with the infamous assassins and parricides who, in the name of liberty and democracy, were seeking to overthrow the Papacy, and destroy the world's last hope. What was then our plain duty? Was it not to assert the supremacy of God, the jurisdiction of the spiritual power, to expose the fatal error of Gallicanism, and, as far as we could, exhibit the real position of the Papacy in the Catholic system? So we have felt, and so we have done. We have always believed it the duty of every publicist to defend the outraged truth, the truth that for the time being is the least popular, the most offensive to public opinion, therefore the most needed, and the most endangered. The popular truth, the truth which nobody questions, stands in no need of any special defence. It is the unpopular truth, as the unpopular cause, attacked by all the armies of error, and deserted by all its timid and timeserving friends, that calls for defenders, and that the Christian hero or the really brave man will make it his first duty to defend.

Certainly society in our days is far enough below the Catholic ideal, and even the Catholic populations themselves, though far above what they were fifty years ago, are by no means fully prepared for a society organized throughout and conducted on the principles of their religion. Yet bad as society now is, it is not farther removed from the Catholic standard than it was when St. Peter transferred his chair from Antioch to Rome, or than it was under Constantius, the son of Constantine, or when Odoacer placed himself on the throne of the Cæsars, and the Church is as vigorous and Catholicity inherently as living and as powerful as it was then. It is a no greater work to bring society up to the Catholic standard from where it now is, than from what it was in the days of the Apostles, or at the irruption and conquest of the barbarians. We have all the forces to work with that our Catholic ancestors had, for the Church never grows old or falls into a decline. We cannot share the despondency of the late Donoso Cortés, who seemed to think the European nations were past being recovered, and placed what hope he had for society in the army, instead of the Church's militia. As long as the Church stands, there is hope for society, for she is the medium of a constant supply of supernatural force. All she

asks is that her children offer no impediment to its operation. We see no ground for concluding that it is all over with Catholic society, or that society in the future may not be brought even nearer to the Catholic ideal than it ever was in the past. We know the world is not prepared for that ideal; even our Catholic populations are not prepared for it. But does it follow from this that they cannot be, and that no efforts should be made to prepare them for it? And shall we prepare them for it, if we do not call their attention to it, present it before them as something to be desired, to be sought, to be struggled for? Shall we prepare them for it by representing it as wholly impracticable, and by denouncing those who have the disposition and the courage to labor for it as pursuing mere abstractions, as pushing matters to extremes, as being more Catholic than Catholicity, and threatening them, if they do not desist, with an opposition from plain, sensible, honest-minded Catholics, that they will find it impossible to resist?

We have heard some very loud whispers about ultra-Catholicity, and have received some significant hints that we are ultra-Catholic. But we venture to hint, in reply, that there is and can be no such thing as ultra-Catholicity, and that the charge is absurd. Catholicity is a definite system of truth, and to be more or less than Catholic is simply not to be Catholic at all. Catholicity, so long as it continues to be Catholicity, cannot be carried to excess. It is not one system among many. It is simply the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It excludes all not itself; it recognizes no rival; it will be all or nothing. The more thoroughly we take it in, the more completely we are filled with its spirit, the more exclusively we are under the dominion of its teaching and submissive to its inspirations, the better Catholics we are, and the more powerful we are for pulling down the strongholds of error and sin. We believe the best way to convert infidels, to bring back heretics, and spread our holy religion, is to throw ourselves unreservedly upon the living body of Catholic truth, in its unity and integrity, its principles and its consequences, and to strive constantly with all our strength, through grace, to realize it in all our thoughts, words, and deeds.

Prudence is certainly a virtue, and zeal without prudence can only do harm; but we must remember that the

Church does not stand in human prudence, and it was not by human prudence, any more than by human sagacity and virtue, that the Fathers converted the world from paganism, and founded Christian society. God's ways are not our ways, and he seems to delight in bringing the schemes and plans of human wisdom to nought. His ways are always foolishness to the wise and prudent of this world. True prudence, under the gracious providence of God, is always rashness or folly in the world's estimation. Perhaps our most prudent men, who are so excessively studious to avoid giving offence, or exciting the prejudices of non-Catholics, or disturbing the equanimity of lukewarm, indolent, or cowardly Catholics, are, in a Christian sense, our most imprudent men, and the least successful in adapting their means to their end.

We are not ignorant that the course we have pursued differs from that which was some time since generally pursued in England and this country. Crushed to the earth by triumphant heresy, our English and American Catholics had lost heart and hope; they forgot their privileges as Catholics, and felt that they must, so far as society is concerned, hang down their heads and be silent. The most they dared hope was to be connived at, and permitted to hold fast to their religion for themselves, without having their throats cut, or being hung, drawn, and quartered as traitors. They hardly dreamed of making a convert, and if they heard a Protestant speak of their faith without blaspheming it, or insulting them, they were ready to fall down and kiss the hem of his garment. Everywhere Catholics felt that they were an oppressed people, and that from their oppression there was no deliverance but in death. It was a day of trial, and far be it from us to judge harshly of the policy adopted. Their silence, their meekness, their submissiveness, their perseverance, were precious in the sight of Heaven, and have brought their reward in the altered position of Catholics at the present day. But to every day its own work. The day of apology has passed away, though not the day of trial. The time has come for Catholics to feel and act as freemen of the Lord, to resume, in a bolder and more energetic spirit, the unceasing war which the Church wages against error and sin, and to go forth as Christian soldiers to attack, as well as simply to defend.

We know that the policy we insist on has its disadvantages. It excites controversy. The high-toned Catholic doctrines we contend for give great offence to the age, and create some difficulties for our friends, especially if they deem it necessary to reply to every paragraph non-Catholics may indite against them. We may sit in our closet and write and publish, and from our retired position feel no inconvenience, while we are creating serious embarrassments for those whose position and duties bring them in daily and hourly contact with embittered non-Catholics. All this we have considered, and if only non-Catholics were concerned, or if the highest-toned Catholicity were not necessary for Catholics themselves, or were not to a great extent even rejected by them, we should pursue quite a different course, and be as tame and commonplace as any one who charges us with being ultra-Catholic could desire. But it is for Catholics we write, and it is to maintain sound doctrine in all respects in their minds, and to guard them against the lying spirit of the age, the subtle and dangerous heresies to which they are everywhere now exposed, that we pursue that course which, no doubt, embarrasses many who consult only tranquillity, and to gain it half fall in with the dangerous popular political and social doctrines of the age and country.

It is not in mere wantonness that we have expressed our dislike to M. Gosselin's book. We do not attack Gallicanism, and assert the temporal authority of the Popes by divine right, for the sake of showing our courage or our indifference to public opinion. If we found in this case, as in others, merely an omission to take the higher ground, without denying that higher, stronger, and more tenable ground, we certainly should deem it our duty to be silent, for in our own country there is at present little room for its practical application. If we had not found Catholics bringing out an erroneous doctrine on religious liberty, and endeavoring to prove that Catholicity approves of religious liberty in the sense it is asserted by non-Catholics, we should not have taken up the subject. If, in refuting the error, we have been obliged to oppose to it an unpalatable truth, the fault is theirs who paraded the error, and made its denial necessary. If we have attempted to assert and vindicate authority against the licentious spirit of the age, and to defend vested rights against the wild and destructive radi-

calism of the age, it has been because we found Catholics imbibing that spirit, and hurraing for that radicalism. As the denial of the spiritual authority soon leads to a denial of the temporal, so the denial of the temporal soon leads to the denial of the spiritual. When we found democracy even by nominal Catholics embraced in that sense in which it denies all law, and asserts the right of the people, or rather of the mob, to do whatever they please, and making it criminal in us to dispute their infallibility, we felt that we must bring out the truth against them, and if scandal resulted, we were not its cause. The responsibility rests on those whose obsequiousness to the multitude made our opposition necessary.

So it is with Gallicanism. It is not even with us an abstract, but a terribly practical question. If our friend McGee, who is now doing such noble service to the good cause, had not been brought up a Gallican and taught to believe that his religion had no concern with his politics, he had never occasioned those scandals which nobody now deplores more than he does; if the brilliant T. Francis Meagher had been instructed from his youth up in the true temporal supremacy of the Church, we should not have now to seem to treat him with inhospitality, and to guard against him as the most dangerous enemy, in proportion to his influence, of his countrymen naturalized or domiciled in the United States, that we have amongst us. If in other countries, in Ireland, England, France, and especially in Lombardy and Piedmont, the youth had not been suffered to grow up with a conviction that the Pope has no temporal authority, and that politics are quite distinct from religion, we should have seen very few of the deplorable scandals which so deeply afflict every Catholic heart. In proportion as we wish to save religion and society, we must raise our voice against Gallicanism, turn to the Holy Father, and, instead of weakening his hands and saddening his heart by our denial of his plenary authority, reassert his temporal as well as spiritual prerogatives. We have no hope but in God, and God helps us only through Peter, and Peter helps us only through his successors, in whom he still lives and exercises his Apostolate. Blame not us, then, if there are scandals, but them rather whose errors, whose timidity, whose indolence or worldly-mindedness, have caused them, and made our course a painful duty.

ART. V. — *Six Months in Italy*. By GEORGE STILLMAN HILLARD. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, and Fields. 1853. 2 vols. 16mo.

Books of "Travels," "Experience" of travellers, "Pages from a Tourist's Diary," "Glances," "Sights," "Manners and Customs," and whatever else is seen through the spectacles and narrated by the pen of modern *voyageurs*, especially of the Anglo-Saxon race, have become as common as the yellow-covered literature of the day, and are as uninviting and as uninteresting, except to the morbid and the bigoted. They are seldom worthy of the least confidence, and for the most part are a mere tissue of slanders of the people visited, and of hasty, ignorant, heartless, and sweeping censures of their manners, customs, and institutions. The countries, it happens, which have the greatest attractions for tourists are Catholic. Being Catholic, every thing in them must, as a matter of course, be retrograde, *obscurantist*, and despotic in its character and tendency. This was the conclusion come to in the mind of the traveller before he started on his journey. He draws this conclusion from the teachings of the common school, and the homilies of the Protestant pulpit, and it constitutes the medium through which whatever he meets abroad is seen and judged. Here in New England, the land of colleges, academies, common schools, and Protestant illumination, we not seldom meet with gentlemen for whose judgment and liberal views on ordinary topics we entertain a very high esteem, who, whenever we happen to broach the subject of foreign Catholic institutions, express unhesitatingly opinions which outrage common sense, and, we lament to say it, common decency. Such power has the Anglo-Saxon hatred of whatever is Catholic to blind the mind and pervert the judgment of men otherwise commendable for their good sense and their good dispositions. To persons of this description, and to all others who propose to visit the Catholic countries of Europe, we recommend the diligent study of the following lesson from Mr. Hillard, and an earnest endeavor to conform to the rules it prescribes.

"To the traveller who enters Rome with any sort of preparation, — who has any thing like a due perception of its multitudinous claims upon the attention, — the first few days of his residence

there will usually be passed in a sort of bewildering indecision, endeavoring to fix upon some plan by which he may comprehend the mighty maze of interests that lies before him. Will he follow the stream of chronology, and, beginning with the morning twilight of history, come down through the kingly period, the republic, the empire, *the night of the Dark Ages*, the new dawn of power and influence in more recent times, and trace this last to its present lengthening shadows of decline,—studying each period in its monuments, binding the present to the past, and observing how each age is the parent of its successor? Or will he divide Rome into subjects, and take up painting, sculpture, architecture, separately, and resolutely exclude every thing but the matter in hand? Will he cut it up territorially, and exhaust one section before he approaches another? Will he make the circuit of the walls, and get the general contour and leading features stamped upon the mind, before he descends to particulars? While thus deliberating, accident or indolence or caprice will probably determine for him, and, in the impatience of doubt, all plans will be abandoned, and the impulse of the moment be his guide.

“It may be stated, as a general rule, that, in proportion to the stranger's susceptibility to all that is characteristic and peculiar in Rome, will be his disappointment at first. Most travellers enter Rome by the Porta del Popolo, which opens upon the spacious Piazza del Popolo, an irregular area, in which there is no very striking object, except the obelisk in the centre. In front, two twin churches, of moderate size and no great architectural merit, divide the three streets which diverge from the piazza, like three outstretched fingers from the palm of the hand. He will probably be driven only a few steps farther, to one of the hotels in the Piazza di Spagna. He will find himself surrounded with shops, coffee-houses, and lodging-houses. In fine weather, he will see stout gentlemen in drab gaiters, and fair-complexioned ladies with parasols, and superfluous flowers on their gowns. He will hear English spoken all around him. He will say to himself, ‘All this is well, but it is not Rome; it is London, or Paris, or any other metropolis. The majestic shadow of the past is not here. It is modern, comfortable, and business-like. This is what I left at home, not what I came here to see.’

“Nor will these unexpected impressions be dissipated by the first exploring expeditions which he will make in search of the ideal. The greater part of inhabited Rome is, comparatively, a modern city, occupying the once open spaces of the Campus Martius; and the most thickly peopled part of the ancient city is now inhabited only by ruins and memories. The streets of modern Rome are narrow, dark, and gloomy, without sidewalks, frequently crooked, and rarely presenting fine continuous façades

of architecture. They are not kept clean ; and, in wet weather, it requires no common resolution to walk in them. An indescribable air of mouldiness and decay haunts a large portion of them. They seem withered and wrinkled by time. The passenger, too, must keep all his wits about him, to avoid being run over ; for the Roman Jehu thinks that he has done his duty, if he gives notice of his approach by a sort of warning yell, and that, afterwards, the responsibility is yours, and not his.

“ Nor does the first aspect of most of the ruins in Rome satisfy the longings of the heart. In all probability the visitor will have formed some notion of these, or at least the most prominent of them, from engravings ; and these are rarely true. To lie like an engraving would be as good a proverbial expression as to lie like a bulletin. Not that the size, dimensions, and character of the object delineated are falsified, but liberties are taken with all that is in the immediate proximity to it. Many of the Roman ruins are thrust into unsightly neighborhoods. They are shouldered and elbowed by commonplace structures, or start out, like excrescences, from mean and inexpressive walls. They are surrounded by decay which has no dignity, and by offensive objects which are like discordant notes in a strain of music. All these are swept away by the engravers ; and the effect upon the particular object is idealizing and untrue. Every thing is smoothed, rounded, and polished. Holes are filled up, inequalities are removed, backgrounds and foregrounds are created, the crooked made straight, and all deformity erased. Hence, though there is truth enough to suggest the resemblance, there is untruth enough to excite vexatious disappointment. The image of the beautiful seems ever to be flitting before the traveller's weary steps. The light fades as he draws near, and the ‘ shining trails,’ which he has followed, go out in darkness. But let him bide his time. The Rome of the mind is not built in a day. His hour will surely come. Not suddenly, not by stormy and vehement movements, but by gentle gradations, and soft approaches, the spirit of the place will descend upon him. The unsightly and commonplace appendages will disappear, and only the beautiful and the tragic will remain. And when his mind and heart are in unison with the scene around him, a thousand happy accidents and cordial surprises lie in wait for him. Upon the Pincian Hill, on the summit of the Baths of Caracalla, under the arches of the Claudian Aqueduct, beneath the whispering pines of the Villa Pamphili Doria, influences will drop into his soul, not merely soothing and reposing, but elevating and tranquillizing, — pictures will be stamped upon the memory, which will ever shed around them the serene light of undecaying beauty, never dimmed by the disappointments, the burdens, the torpid commonplaces, and the dreary drudgeries of future years.

"But this supposes a fitting frame of mind in the traveller himself. As Rome cannot be comprehended without previous preparation, so it cannot be felt without a certain congeniality of temperament. Something of the imaginative principle,—the power of going out of one's self, and forgetting the actual in the ideal, and the present in the past,—the capacity to sympathize with the dreamer, *if not to dream*,—a willingness to be acted upon, and not to act,—these must be wrought into the being of him who would catch all the inspiration of the place. The traveller must *leave* all his notions of progress and reform at the gates, or else he will be kept in a constant state of protest and rebellion; as unfit to receive the impressions which are around him, as a lake ruffled by the storm to reflect the heavens. He must try to forget such things as a representative government, town-meetings, public schools, railways, and steam-engines. He must learn to look upon pope, cardinal, and monk, not with a Puritan scowl, but as parts of an imposing *pageant*, which he may contemplate without self-reproach, though without approving; as the man of peace may be innocently amused with the splendid evolutions of a review. He whose spirit is so restless and evanescent as to forbid repose, whose zeal for progress admits neither compromise nor delay,—he who sees, not the landscape, but the monastery which blots it, not the church, but the beggar on its steps,—he who, in the kneeling peasant, finds all idolatry and no devotion,—may have many good and great qualities, but he is out of his place in Rome. He is an exotic, and will only languish and pine in its uncongenial soil."—Vol. I. pp. 200–205..

This passage, with the exception of the words which we have marked in italics, and which are uncalled for, inexact, or unjust, is beautifully written, and is worthy of high commendation for its justice and its good sense. It states the true principle which must govern all who wish really to understand and appreciate foreign countries, and foreign manners and customs.

In Mr. Hillard, we are happy to say, we have found an honorable exception to the general run of tourists. His work, upon the whole, is good, and we claim to be a competent judge. We have followed close upon his steps wherever he went, and the effect on our own mind has been refreshing. He has led us in paths familiar to us in early life, lifted the veil from the monuments which we were accustomed to study in our vacations whilst at the university, and has brought back to our mind those pages of Pagan and Catholic classics, the perusal of which, years

ago, identified us with the past on the spot where we stood. For the first time since leaving Italy, we have breathed Italian air. His style is so natural and spontaneous, his descriptions are so accurate and eloquent, his remarks are so pertinent and ingenuous! He travels with the eye of an artist, the feelings of a man, and the manners of a gentleman. The vexations of the *gabbellieri* disembarrelling trunks, the slowness of *uffiziali* viseing passports, the awkwardness of *diligenze*, fail to disturb his good humor. How different from his English cousins! John Bull, travelling through Italy, is known at once by the coarse abuse he heaps upon the heads of officers at the frontier, of postilions, horses, and donkeys. Hence the game the Italians make of English tourists. The Lazaroni and the Contadino will distinguish the Englishman from all other foreigners by the curses he vents, and which seem to be the only Italian he has picked up in his travels; and if on returning home he publishes extracts from his diary, they will be only a mass of misunderstandings, misrepresentations, superficial speculations, and preconceived egotistical theories, like the remarks of Lady Morgan on St. Peter's chair, for which she has received such a severe and well-merited, but courteous rebuke, from his Eminence, Cardinal Wiseman, which would make any writer blush but a fanatical Protestant or a modern female novelist. By the way, Mr. Hillard himself, in speaking of St. Peter's chair, preserved at Rome, suffers two expressions to escape him which are highly objectionable. One is irreverent, and the other implies that there is imposition practised by the Catholic Church.

Mr. Hillard is a man of a good deal of philosophical insight. Small objects give him a chance for powerful and eloquent remarks, and, except perhaps in one or two cases, he never wearies his reader. He is comprehensive and lucid. His remarks about a railway spanning the Lagoon near the Queen of the Adriatic, an *artery pouring the living blood of to-day into the exhausted frame of Venice*, show a depth of thought, a quick comprehension of practical relations, and a clearness of ideas, that you will look for in vain in the generality of tourists. He is one of the very few writers on Italy with whom we are acquainted, who satisfies our Italian fastidiousness. He employs both "eye and mind" in his journey. Happily, his eye is quick, and his mind is right

in the main. It wants, however, the Catholic finish. And truly many a warm aspiration that he might be led to the bosom of the True Shepherd was spontaneously raised from our heart in reading his narrative.

We are just leaving Venice with the author; and we never before felt so loath at leaving a city in a tourist's book. The chapter on Venice was a trance of joyful moments in the wearied existence of an exile.

In these days, judicious people are unwilling to read books of travels, unless by authors who have given pledges of honesty and capacity. When we saw *Six Months in Italy* announced, we felt as after reading the *Outre-Mer* of Longfellow, or the *Glances at Europe* by Greely, that singular compound of talent, ignorance, simplicity, and impudence who edits the *New York Tribune*, till our attention was drawn to the name of the author. But we confess that we took up the first volume with more of a disposition to censure than to be pleased, and with much of that distrust which we always have of every literary work from the hands of a Protestant. Protestants loudly denounce Catholics as bigoted. Even Mr. Hillard calls Paul the Fourth "a fervid bigot," and to sustain his charge cites Ranke, a Protestant writer like himself. All Protestant writers are liberal in their strictures on popes, bishops, priests, and Catholic authors generally, for their alleged bigotry and intolerance. And yet they are themselves, though they know it not, steeped in bigotry and intolerance. There is not a hamlet, village, town, or city, in a Protestant country, that does not constantly ring with the foulest invectives against Catholics. The Protestant pulpit and rostrum teem with abuse of them, and are diligent to excite the worst passions against them. Yet do you ever hear a reprisal from the Catholic pulpit? Rarely is the word *Protestant* heard from a Catholic pulpit in this city. Our venerable Bishop never utters a word against Protestants in the cathedral, and who has ever heard of his attacking them in his excursions through his diocese? His direction to his clergy, as was that of his illustrious predecessor, is, Address yourselves to the faithful, and labor to make them good, practical Catholics. Who, again, has ever found the Catholic press indulging in a low, vulgar abuse of Protestants? Who ever finds it concerning itself with them, save to repel their attacks and refute their calumnies? It is

true, Catholic papers sometimes say severe things, and use occasionally some hard terms, but only because it is necessary to call things by their proper names, and to disabuse the public mind. The charge of bigotry or intolerance, in the sense in which Protestants understand it, is absurd, and can in no instance be sustained against Catholics. A firm and unwavering adhesion to truth is never bigotry, and a decided and unyielding opposition to error, coupled with charity to persons, is never intolerance, unless in a good sense. But take up your Protestant papers, conducted by the lights and stars of the several Protestant denominations, and you will find them, week after week, and day after day, filled with the most baseless charges and the most disgusting scurrility against Catholics. Their editors, very often clergymen, deem it quite unnecessary to conduct themselves towards Catholics as gentlemen. According to them, Catholics are the most profligate of the children of Adam. There is nothing vulgar, nothing base, nothing degrading and insulting, which they do not hold themselves at liberty to say of them. We wonder how our Protestant congregations can listen to the declamations of their pulpit orators, without having their Puritanical ears shocked. Indeed they do not. They *are* shocked, and they believe every thing, — that Papists are a people *cane pejus et angue vitandus*. If they have any sick servants who will ask for the priest to administer to their spiritual wants, they would only act in accordance with their feelings, by writing over the door of their houses, whilst the priest is on the premises, the old Latin motto, "*Vita canem*." Are not these the feelings of the great majority of Protestants? How, then, can we help looking with an eye of distrust on every thing that they may write about Catholics or Catholic countries?

But, at the same time, Protestant tourists never receive more obliging receptions, than at the hands of Catholics in Catholic countries. They are offered all opportunities and accommodations to examine whatever may prove interesting to the scholar, or useful to the artist. They are feasted at *soirées* and *conversazioni*; and they repay their Catholic hosts with base insinuations when they return home, and even with insults at the moment of receiving their kindness. The Romans will not easily forget how their Supreme Pontiff, Pio

Nono, was insulted by a late American consul and a parcel of American ladies and gentlemen (?), who were admitted to his audience. Are, then, Catholics wrong in mistrusting the books written by Protestant tourists, after returning home from their visits to Catholic countries? If such instances were few, we should not mind it. Catholics are right-minded; and we remember that in Rome a Catholic princess, the daughter of a most illustrious English earl, was severely censured by all knowing persons, for the pointed difference which she was in the habit of making between Catholic and Protestant visitors. The Catholic feeling in this respect is embodied in the example of the great Pope Gregory XVI. When called upon by the Minister of Prussia, (we believe,) the Pontiff asked him what he thought of St. Peter's. The ambassador candidly answered, that on his approaching the Basilica he felt a kind of distrust and uneasiness, such feelings of *mal essere* as he could not describe; but when he had entered the church, he felt perfectly *at ease* and happy. "Exactly," rejoined the good old man, "what we wish all dissenters to do; not to stop outside, but to come in and mix with us." If Gregory had lived to read the work of Mr. Hillard, we think he would have been gratified in reading the feeling account which he gives of his assisting at mass on Christmas Day.

We extract a portion of that account, warning our readers, however, to bear in mind that the writer is a Protestant, and, of course, that they must expect many remarks, ingenuously expressed, it is true, but still tinged with Protestant colors. To some of these remarks we will revert by and by, and point out a radical fault in the tourist's narrative.

"*Christmas at St. Peter's.*—The services in St. Peter's on Christmas day, in 1847, were attended by an immense concourse of people. . . . At an early hour on that day, I found the church already occupied by a great crowd. A double row of soldiers stretched from the entrance to the altar, around which the Pope's guards, in their fantastic uniform, like the figures in a pack of cards, were stationed; and a number of ladies sat in a sort of box on either side, dressed in black, their heads covered with veils. The foreign ambassadors were in a place appropriated to them in the tribune. Among the spectators were several in military uniforms. A handsome young Englishman, in a rich

hussar dress of scarlet and gold, attracted much attention. In a recess, above one of the great piers of the dome, a choir of male singers was stationed, whose voices, without any instrumental accompaniment, blended in complete harmony, and gave the most perfect expression to that difficult and complicated music which the Church of Rome has consecrated to the use of its high festivals. We waited some time for the advent of the Pope, but both the eye and ear were content to wait. The whole spectacle was one of animated interest and peculiar beauty. The very defects of the church — its gay, secular, and somewhat theatrical character — were, in this instance, embellishments which enhanced the splendor of the scene. The various uniforms, the rich dresses, the polished arms of the soldiery, were in unison with the marble, the stucco, the bronze, and the gilding. The impression left upon the mind was not that of sacredness; that is, not upon a mind that had been formed under Protestant and Puritan influences; but rather of a gorgeous ceremonial belonging to some 'gay religion, full of pomp and gold.' But we travel to little purpose if we carry with us the standard which is formed at home, and expect the religious sentiment to manifest itself at all times and in all places in the same manner. The Scotch Covenanter upon the hill-side, the New England Methodist at a camp-meeting, worship God in spirit and in truth; but shall we presume to say that the Italian is a formalist and a hypocrite, because his doctrine requires the aid of music, painting, and sculpture, and without visible symbols goes out like a flame without air?

"In due season the Pope appeared, seated in the 'sedia gestatoria,' a sort of capacious arm-chair, borne upon men's shoulders, flanked on either side by the enormous fan of white peacock-feathers. He was carried up the whole length of the nave, distributing his blessing with a peculiar motion of the hand, on either side, upon the kneeling congregation. It seemed by no means a comfortable mode of transportation, and the expression of his countenance was that of a man ill at ease, and sensible of the awkwardness and want of dignity of his position. His dress was of white satin, richly embroidered with gold; a costume too gaudy for daylight, and by no means so becoming as that of the cardinals, whose flowing robes of crimson and white produced the finest and richest effect. The chamberlains of the Pope, who attended on this occasion in considerable numbers, wear the dress of England in the time of Charles I., so well known in the portraits of Vandyke. It looks better in pictures than in the life, and shows so much of the person that it requires an imposing figure to carry it off. A commonplace man in such a costume looks like a knavish valet who has stolen his master's clothes.

"High Mass was said by the Pope in person, and the responses

were sung by the choir. He performed the service with an air and manner expressive of true devotion, and though I felt that there was a chasm between me and the rite which I witnessed, I followed his movements in the spirit of respect, and not of criticism. But one impressive and overpowering moment will never be forgotten. When the tinkling of the bell announced the elevation of the Host, the whole of the vast assemblage knelt or bowed their faces. The pavement was suddenly strewn with prostrate forms. A silence like that of death fell upon the church,—as if some celestial vision had passed before the living eyes, and hushed into stillness every pulse of human feeling. After a pause of a few seconds, during which every man could have heard the beating of his own heart, a band of wind instruments near the entrance, of whose presence I had not been aware, poured fourth a few sweet and solemn strains, which floated up the nave and overflowed the whole interior. The effect of this invisible music was beyond any thing I have ever heard or ever expect to hear. The air seemed stirred with the trembling of angelic wings; or, as if the gates of heaven had been opened, and a 'wandering breath' from the songs of seraphs had been borne to the earth. How fearfully and wonderfully are we made! A few sounds which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been merely a passing luxury to the ear, heard at this moment, and beneath this dome, were like a purifying wave, which, for an instant, swept over the soul, bearing away with it all the soil and stains of earth, and leaving it pure as in infancy. There was, it is true, a reflux tide; and the world displaced by the solemn strain came back with the echo; but though we 'cannot keep the heights we are competent to gain,' we are the better for the too brief exaltation.

"I noticed on this occasion another peculiarity of St. Peter's. There was an immense concourse of persons present, but there was no impression of a crowd. The church was not thronged,—not even full. There still seemed room for a nation to come in. In ordinary buildings, when they are filled to their utmost capacity, the architecture disappears, and the mind and eye are occupied only with the men and women. But St. Peter's can never be thus put down. Fill it full of human life, it would still be something greater than them all. Men, however numerous they might be, would be but appendages to its mountainous bulk. As the sky is more than the stars, and the wooded valley more than the trees, so is St. Peter's more than any amount of humanity than can be gathered within its arms."—Vol. I. pp. 229—233.

Two topics treated in Mr. Hillard's volumes have more particularly arrested our attention,—Art and Catholic worship and usages. We venture a remark or two in reference to the latter. A great merit of the author is,

that he confines himself to the impression made on his own mind, which he always endeavors to keep prepared to let what he sees have its proper effect. He really tries to have Catholic feelings, when he enters a Catholic church, or witnesses Catholic ceremonies. What a contrast between the grand Cathedral of Milan, and a Protestant meeting-house! A shrewd, calculating Yankee, intent on the "main chance," might ask, Why this waste? deplore the throwing away of so much money on a religious edifice, and think it had been much better employed in erecting cotton-mills. But our author, Yankee though he be, thinks not so. He gazes at the Cathedral with the feelings, not of an angel indeed, but of a man, and seeks to do justice to the sentiment it expresses.

"Happy are they," he says, "whose faith needs no such appliances, who feel the overshadowing presence of God alike in solitude or society, upon the mountain-top, in the market-place, in the tasteless parish church, and around the domestic hearth. But with most of us the world is too much present. Its cares engross, its pleasures intoxicate, its sorrows and disappointments oppress us. Few are the moments in which our spirits lie exposed to the highest influences, neither darkened by despair, nor giddy through self-confidence, nor influenced by earth-born passions. For natures conscious of inward struggle, of wings that are often clogged and sometimes paralyzed, these glorious structures were reared! Their walls and spaces seem yet instinct with the love and faith that laid the stones and carved the saints; and transient and soon effaced as the impressions which they leave may be, they are yet aids and allies which he who is most conscious of his weakness will be the most grateful for." — Vol. I. p. 14.

This is well expressed and kindly meant. It is, perhaps, the nearest approach to the Catholic thought which reared the grand and imposing structure, that a Protestant mind can make; yet it is infinitely removed from that thought itself. It was not the need of external helps and allies to keep devotion from going out "like a flame without air," but the spontaneous operation of devotion itself, that reared the Duomo of Milan, and St. Peter's of Rome. It was faith and love striving to make an offering to God, — to express fully what they would do if they could, to honor Him who gives life and salvation. What our author and Protestants generally regard as a wise contrivance to excite and keep alive devotion, which they place in the sensitive

affections, — not in the will, in the moral faculties of man, — is the spontaneous product of devotion, seeking to find its most fitting and worthy expression. Their mistake lies here in putting the effect for the cause, as is generally the case with them when speaking of religious matters.

Not always, however, is it the better part of our author's nature that prompts his remarks. He sometimes ventures criticisms singularly in contrast with his usual candor, good sense, and correct taste, and which are narrow-minded and petulant. We doubt if, in conversing with a Roman Catholic, he would say to his face that the *Pope's guards* at St. Peter's, *in their fantastic uniform, looked like the figures on a pack of cards.* We cannot easily pardon him this and other remarks of the kind.

"We travel," he says, "to little purpose, if we carry with us the standard which is formed at home, and expect the religious sentiment to manifest itself at all times and in all places in the same manner. The Scotch Covenanter upon the hill-side, the New England Methodist at a camp-meeting, worship God in spirit and in truth [?], but shall we presume to say that the Italian is a formalist and a hypocrite, because his devotion requires the aid of music, painting, sculpture, and without visible symbols goes out like a flame without air?"

Perhaps our author cannot understand that *religious sentiment must manifest itself at all times and in all places in the same manner*, that is, when it is true religious sentiment, the Catholic sentiment as it must be; since there can be but one Church and one faith. Little indeed must he think of that religion, which without *such aid will go out like a flame without air.* He does not see that his remark bears on all Catholics all over the world. Certainly, if his opinion be true, take from over the head of the Catholics of South Boston the splendid Gothic structure lately dedicated to the Almighty, and their devotion would *go out like a flame without air.* If he had himself a Catholic heart, he would feel that his devotion is very far from being kept up only by these external rites and props, but it is wonderfully helped by them. The more majestic the ceremonial of the Church is, the easier is it for man to feel the Divine origin of the Christian worship. In the very Catacombs, that *Roma subterranea* where the primitive Christians assembled to hear mass, unknown to the Pagans, as our Catholics did in the woods, unknown to

the mass of American Protestants, before the Declaration of Independence, Mr. Hillard may find all the profusion of ornament and pomp which were compatible with that place of worship. Those Christians who were Italians, when away from their altars, probably felt their *devotion going out like a flame without air!* And yet they left the Catacombs and the carved and gilded altars to lay their heads under the sword of the prætorian, or to let their limbs be at the mercy of a Lybian lioness. Certainly that was not a *devotion going out like a flame without air*.* We would remind the author of the answer given by Cardinal Bellarmine to a Lutheran doctor, who, at the moment that the Cardinal was stepping into his carriage, after a *Pontificale* at St. Peter's, called his attention to the large and gorgeous retinue which followed each cardinal, and asked of him: "*Istine sunt cardines Ecclesiæ?*" To which the Cardinal: "*Utique ut intelliges non humano sed divino Ecclesiam niti fundamento.*"

Let not the American who would gain credit with an Italian, or any other Catholic, for good sense and good taste, undertake to apply radical principles to Catholic forms. The modest and judicious non-Catholic would, we should suppose, be led to suspect that these forms have a higher reason and a deeper significance than may happen to be obvious to him, and that he ought, as an outsider, to distrust his own capacity to comprehend either the one or the other. There are some things which must be believed in order to be comprehended, and done from faith and love in order to be understood. It is little that he who stands outside of the Church can understand of her service, her rites and ceremonies. To him she is an enigma, and, seeing only the outside of things, they may well strike him as unmeaning and ridiculous. If he honestly undertakes to interpret them by his own ideas or experience, his

* The very place where St. Peter was accustomed to celebrate Mass, and perhaps where he first celebrated it in Rome, was in the splendid palace of the Senator Pudens. The immense wealth of Pudentiana, of Priscilla, of Valerianus and Cecilia, were lavished in erecting and decorating the places of Christian worship. The pomp of Catholic worship is not a modern invention; it is natural to that religion which alone can commemorate and repeat the celebration of the Sacrifice of the Man-God, communing with his eternal Father in the very consummation of it. Can man spare pains and expense in raising an abode, and establishing the worship of Him whose throne is in the heavens, and whose footstool is the starry firmament?

own intellectual or religious life, he will not succeed; for nothing in his own life gives him the key to their significance. The interpretation that, with the best intentions, he gives, will seldom do more than betray his ignorance, and excite the laughter of the Catholic, who forgets to pause and consider the disadvantages of his position. Protestants not seldom accuse others of ignorance, of folly, of credulity, of superstition, when the real difficulty is, that they are themselves too ignorant and superficial to be able to perceive the knowledge, the wisdom, and the reason of what they censure. Catholics can generally understand non-Catholics, because non-Catholics never go out of the sphere of simple nature, and usually confine themselves to what lies on the surface of things. Catholics are still men, and retain all of human nature. But non-Catholics, in what is peculiarly and distinctively Catholic, cannot understand Catholics, for they have that which transcends nature, and the reason, fitness, or significance of which is intelligible only to him who believes.

Mr. Hillard saw Catholic worship and Catholic practices as a gentleman, as an intelligent man, as a cultivated scholar, but he saw them, after all, as a man without faith, without the Christian revelation, — we say not as one who denies revelation, but as one who does not know it, — and he very naturally undertook to explain every thing he saw on simply human principles. He did not wish to misrepresent, he did not wish to offend, but human principles being the highest known to him, he could apply no others. But these principles being infinitely below those really at work in Catholic life, his explanations must needs be always inadequate, and not seldom false, and to the Catholic mind absurd. When Mr. Hillard confines himself simply to the external, or to the purely human sphere, his success is eminent, and we follow him with intense interest and delight; but when he attempts to go further, to penetrate to the interior of Catholic life, to speak of the relation between the exterior forms and the interior spirit of devotion, he makes as many mistakes and blunders as he utters sentences. The whole theory on which he proceeds is illusory, and betrays him at every step. We would therefore respectfully suggest, that he should omit from the future editions of his work all those passages in which he travels beyond the sphere of his own experience, and ven-

tures his explanations of Catholic worship and usages, of the fitness or propriety of which he is, as a non-Catholic, however kindly disposed, utterly unqualified to form any judgment. In speaking of these, he is out of his element, and even the generally admirable clearness of his style and the beauty of his language forsake him, as is painfully evident in his remarks on the veneration shown to the relics of St. Charles Borromeo, and on the Jesuit's church at Venice. He can hardly be ignorant that the word *Romish* sounds very much like an insult in Catholic ears, and we are a little surprised to find such a purist in language as he generally is, consenting to use so barbarous a term. *Romish* is not good English, and is as barbarous and as unfit for any thing but doggerel rhyme, as *Greekish*. The proper adjective is *Roman*, and Mr. Hillard's usually elevated, correct, and chaste style required him to use it. It was not worth his while to mar the purity of his diction for the sake of showing, what we are sure he does not feel, contempt for the Catholic religion and worship. At page 174 of the first volume, there is a touching paragraph concerning the Brethren della Misericordia of Florence; but we are very unpleasantly affected in coming suddenly upon the remark, "Such institutions are always to be remembered to the credit of the *Romish* Church." We must say the same of that exquisite passage relating the beautiful ceremony which was performed on the occasion of the recovery of a relic dear to the Catholic heart, with all "the state and splendor which the *Romish* Church can command." By the way, this same paragraph affords another proof of the justness of the advice which we give the author, to refrain from all comments on Catholic ceremonies. After describing the unusually gorgeous display of an imposing procession, he continues:—

"It is only on occasions like these, that we see and feel the whole power of the *Romish* Church, which on ordinary ceremonies seems to hold back and keep in reserve one half its resources. The most conscientious Protestant, unless he were as hard and as cold as the stones on which he stood, could not help ceasing to protest, for the moment at least; nor could he fail to feel upon his heart the benediction of waters drawn from the common stream of faith and emotion, before it had reached the dividing rock." — Vol. II. p. 190.

Why must a Protestant keep protesting? Is it lest the
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not wanting men of comprehensive minds and high and varied attainments, who understand thoroughly the present condition, resources, and wants of the empire, who know the reforms which are needed or practicable, and who have fathomed to their depth the ocean of democratic institutions and speculations. The government promotes science and education, and rewards merit with sovereign munificence, and it is not afraid of its own subjects. If it keeps on foot a large standing army, it is not to guard against internal rebellions, but to protect the state from the manoeuvres of Mazzinian and Kossuthian emissaries, and from French, English, and American excitations to insurrection and bloodshed. The humanity and forbearance of Marshal Radetski, whom his soldiers call by the endearing title of "Papa," in the late wars in Italy, will long stand a noble monument to give the lie to the alleged cruelty and violence of Austria. They who on this side of the Atlantic so loudly denounce Austria for her stupidity and tyranny, have no well-grounded facts to sustain their charges, and only echo the declamations of European radicals, who are the enemies of all government that will not remain quiet, and coolly suffer them to cut its throat, or knock it on the head.

You complain of Austria, but why not, in your superior wisdom, propose some plan of enlightening and humanizing her, if she is, as you allege, stupid and despotic? Give us not Platonic theories, Utopian dreams, but something tangible and practicable. Look at facts as they are, not as you may imagine them. What would you have Austria do? Disband her armies? Would that protect her frontiers, maintain tranquillity in her provinces, or secure the happiness of her people? What has brought back peace and security to Northern Italy, but the Austrian soldiery? Do you say her Italian government is not national? Is nationality to be found only within a particular boundary, or the limits of a language? What, then, becomes of the nationality of the United States? We would pour out our very life-blood to see Italy free, united, and happy under an Italian government, if the thing were practicable; but whoever knows the Peninsula knows that it is not. And since it is not, let us thank Heaven that there is at least one sure means of protecting the property and lives, the peace and happiness, of by far the larger part of Italian citizens.

gest to our author some very wholesome modifications. His whole paragraph (Vol. I. pp. 142, 143) on St. Philip Benizzi needs the scraping-knife. It is not true that those youngsters were making game of the Saint's appearance; and it is not true that the Saint called upon them vengeance from heaven. But history tells us that these gamblers were indulging in the most profane language, besides being addicted to criminal playing. Philip had often threatened them with the punishment that God will most assuredly inflict on all who refuse to reform and obey his laws. Sure enough, the vengeance of God ultimately fell upon them, and severely. Bible-reading people ought to see that this fact is parallel to many recorded in Holy Writ.

As to that part of the work which speaks of Art, we must reluctantly pass it over. Too much could not easily be said in praise of the tourist. He discourses admirably on the different objects he visits. He certainly has read and treasured up a great deal of artistical knowledge. His descriptions of paintings and statues indicate a heart that feels, a soul that pants after truth and God, and a mind always on the alert to improve itself. In regard to names and facts he is remarkably accurate, and surpassed by few travellers.

We cannot conclude without remarking, that we find in these volumes opinions which, though we might expect them in a work by Gavazzi or Mazzini, we did not look for in so right-minded a man as Mr. Hillard. From our general knowledge of the man, and from the side on which we have found him in our domestic controversies, we had supposed his sympathies were not where we are sorry to find them. He has evidently a deep-rooted antipathy to Austria, and represents her government as "the most stupid and unintellectual" in the world. Here he is unjust, and speaks too fast. Metternich, who for so many years was the premier of Austria, and in very difficult times too, is neither stupid nor unintellectual. Francis Joseph is neither, nor was the late lamented and amiable Prince Schwarzenburg, whose death was a calamity to all Europe. Had the Austrian government been either stupid or unintellectual, the empire would long since have been distracted and torn to pieces. Among the officers of the Austrian army, and in the ranks of the Austrian nobility and gentry, there are

not wanting men of comprehensive minds and high and varied attainments, who understand thoroughly the present condition, resources, and wants of the empire, who know the reforms which are needed or practicable, and who have fathomed to their depth the ocean of democratic institutions and speculations. The government promotes science and education, and rewards merit with sovereign munificence, and it is not afraid of its own subjects. If it keeps on foot a large standing army, it is not to guard against internal rebellions, but to protect the state from the manoeuvres of Mazzinian and Kossuthian emissaries, and from French, English, and American excitations to insurrection and bloodshed. The humanity and forbearance of Marshal Radetski, whom his soldiers call by the endearing title of "Papa," in the late wars in Italy, will long stand a noble monument to give the lie to the alleged cruelty and violence of Austria. They who on this side of the Atlantic so loudly denounce Austria for her stupidity and tyranny, have no well-grounded facts to sustain their charges, and only echo the declamations of European radicals, who are the enemies of all government that will not remain quiet, and coolly suffer them to cut its throat, or knock it on the head.

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it be with regard to the introduction of democratic institutions into Italy. Classic and poetic Italy would disappear, her glorious privilege as the home of religion, of art, and science would be sacrificed. She would lose her relish for simple, innocent amusements, her sunshiny face, and her light and joyous heart; her peasantry, all their amiable traits, their simple-mindedness, their hospitality, their animation, their bounding spirits, and their honest virtues. It would be worse for her than a Vandal, Gothic, or Hunnish invasion. Gloom would rest upon her brow, and carking care would gnaw at her heart. American institutions are not fitted for her, and she could not live under them.

No, you cannot benefit Italy by attempting to Anglicize or Americanize her institutions. Would you serve her, and make her some slight return for the instruction and pleasure you receive from visiting her classic land, permit her to retain her spiritual and ideal civilization, to devote herself to art, to science, to the elevation and embellishment of life, under the patronage of those time-honored governments which took their forms, and receive their inspiration and their institutions, from the light of the Catholic religion, and have grown up under the fostering and directing hand of the Church of God. In proportion as you weaken her faith, revive in her bosom a longing for ancient Pagan or modern English and American material civilization, purchased as it is by such a sacrifice of all the graces and charms of existence, and at so great a wear and tear of conscience, you strike at her chief glory, rob her of her birthright and her noble heritage, and render her mean, miserable, and contemptible.

Mr. Hillard must pardon us these remarks, called forth by a sort of undertone which runs through his work, and which proves that he fails to take those enlarged and philosophic views which mark the higher order of mind and the true statesman. He has not succeeded in rising superior to the prejudices of his countrymen, and has suffered himself to sympathize quite too much with those who wish to Anglicize or Americanize, in order to Protestantize, that is, Paganize, Italy. Nevertheless, we recognize in him many of the highest requisites of a successful traveller, and we are truly grateful to him for the pleasure we have derived from his elegant and attractive volumes. We

Italy are precisely those fitted to ruin her. We may judge of what Italian Reformers would do for Italy by what they have done and are doing in Piedmont. Piedmont is now the field of reform and the boasted land of progress; and yet the Piedmontese are the most miserable and worst governed portion of the population of Italy. The government is enamored of England, and any Catholic country, weaker than England, coming within the sphere of English influence, may bid farewell, humanly speaking, to all hopes of social prosperity, as Spain and Portugal know to their sorrow. English alliance and English protection are, to Catholic states, worse than their absolute conquest by a generous Catholic power. English constitutionalism is unsuitable to any Continental state, and all the reputed attempts to introduce it have produced an amount of evil difficult to calculate. Even in England herself, its working is by no means so advantageous as pretended. There is no government on earth under which greater abuses obtain than the English, especially if we include Ireland and India. There is no civilized state so grievously taxed, and no country in Christendom where the ignorance of the masses is so great, and the amount of pauperism so enormous. Mr. Hillard speaks of the dirt and filth of the Italian cities; but unless all reports are false, there is nothing in any Continental city to match the dirt and filth and squalid wretchedness to be found in the very city of London, and that, too, within a stone's throw of the town residences of her moneyed, and even of her titled aristocracy. The greatest folly and madness of which any portion of the Italian people can be accused is the apparent wish of her Piedmontese reformers to Anglicize Italy, whether as to politics or religion.

But leaving England out of view, would you attempt to reform the Italian governments after the American model? Can you do it? Are the habits, the manners, the customs, the tastes, the exterior or the interior life of the Italian people, such as demand or are suited to democratic institutions? What would be the effect of introducing monarchical and aristocratic institutions in the United States? They could not be introduced, for the whole genius, life, and energy of the people are opposed to them; and if they could be, they would prove the destruction of all that constitutes the glory and happiness of the country. So would

it be with regard to the introduction of democratic institutions into Italy. Classic and poetic Italy would disappear, her glorious privilege as the home of religion, of art, and science would be sacrificed. She would lose her relish for simple, innocent amusements, her sunshiny face, and her light and joyous heart; her peasantry, all their amiable traits, their simple-mindedness, their hospitality, their animation, their bounding spirits, and their honest virtues. It would be worse for her than a Vandal, Gothic, or Hunnish invasion. Gloom would rest upon her brow, and carking care would gnaw at her heart. American institutions are not fitted for her, and she could not live under them.

No, you cannot benefit Italy by attempting to Anglicize or Americanize her institutions. Would you serve her, and make her some slight return for the instruction and pleasure you receive from visiting her classic land, permit her to retain her spiritual and ideal civilization, to devote herself to art, to science, to the elevation and embellishment of life, under the patronage of those time-honored governments which took their forms, and receive their inspiration and their institutions, from the light of the Catholic religion, and have grown up under the fostering and directing hand of the Church of God. In proportion as you weaken her faith, revive in her bosom a longing for ancient Pagan or modern English and American material civilization, purchased as it is by such a sacrifice of all the graces and charms of existence, and at so great a wear and tear of conscience, you strike at her chief glory, rob her of her birthright and her noble heritage, and render her mean, miserable, and contemptible.

Mr. Hillard must pardon us these remarks, called forth by a sort of undertone which runs through his work, and which proves that he fails to take those enlarged and philosophic views which mark the higher order of mind and the true statesman. He has not succeeded in rising superior to the prejudices of his countrymen, and has suffered himself to sympathize quite too much with those who wish to Anglicize or Americanize, in order to Protestantize, that is, Paganize, Italy. Nevertheless, we recognize in him many of the highest requisites of a successful traveller, and we are truly grateful to him for the pleasure we have derived from his elegant and attractive volumes. We

hope that in the future editions he will render them still more acceptable to the Catholic Italian mind, by correcting those errors of taste or judgment to which we have called his attention, and omitting all comments on the reason or significance of Catholic worship and usages, which, as those of a non-Catholic, are necessarily superficial and worthless, and can only excite the grief or the derision of Italian readers. He has sinned less in this respect than most tourists whose mother tongue is English, and for that we are thankful; but yet he has sinned, and we wish him to be sinless.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Il Protestantismo e la Regola di Fede.* Par GIOVANNI PERRONE, della Compagnia di Gesu, Prof. di Teologia nel Coll. Romano. Roma, Coi Tipi della Civiltà Cattolica. 1853. 3 vols. 8vo.

WE beg Father Perrone to accept our thanks for the copy of this highly interesting and instructive work, which he has been so kind as to send us. It came too late for us to be able to render a complete account of it in our present number. We have only glanced through its pages; but the author is too well known, and his reputation too well established, to make it necessary to study carefully a new work from his pen before being able to say that it is learned, interesting, and important. Father Perrone is a man of solid learning, sound judgment, and unwearied industry. Though we have not studied his work, we have read enough of it to be convinced that it possesses rare merit, and is well adapted to meet, not only the old, but the new phases of the controversy with Protestants; and though intended more especially to meet the present Anglican efforts to Protestantize Italy, it could not fail, if translated into English, to be equally acceptable in our own country. It is one of the very best books of the kind we have, and admirably fitted to guard Catholics against the insidious efforts which are now making to seduce them from the faith, and for Catholics to put into the hands of fair-minded and thoughtful non-Catholics, to bring them, the grace of God assisting, to the knowledge of the truth. It is learned, but written in a free, easy, and popular style, with no little vivacity and force, and is very pleasant and attractive reading.

Father Perrone divides his work into three parts. In the first part, which he calls *Parte Polemico-Negativa*, he discusses and refutes the several Protestant rules of faith; in the second, *Parte Polemico-Positiva*, he states, elucidates, and triumphantly establishes the Catholic rule; and in the third, *Parte Storico-Morale*, he contrasts the moral effects of Catholicity and Protestantism, and from them confirms his condemnation of the latter, and his vindication of the former. He draws largely from Bellarmine and the Brothers Wallenburch, among the older controversialists, and Milner, Wiseman, Malou, and Newman, among the later; but he is not a mere compiler. He has digested his materials, has given them the stamp of his own mind, and presented them in an order and method of his own. He seems to us to have overlooked only one Protestant rule of faith of much importance, and that is the one adopted by the later German school,—the Biblico-historical rule, or rather that of historical development, as set forth by our Mercersburg school in its tendency towards the Church, and by the Tübingen school in its tendency towards Pantheism. The Mercersburg school is eclectic, and seeks to combine all the Protestant rules and the Catholic; the Tübingen school is also eclectic, but excludes the Catholic element. These two schools represent to-day whatever there is of life or that is lifelike in Protestantism,—the former what it has of religious aspiration, and the latter what it has of logical insight and consistency. As far as we have read, we have not found Father Perrone grappling seriously with this later form of Protestantism in either of these divisions, represented in this country in one division by Dr. Schaff, and in the other by Theodore Parker. The reason of this may be found, we presume, in the special object for which he has written his work; namely, to resist the present extraordinary efforts which are made by Protestants to Protestantize Italy. These efforts are made principally by Great Britain and the United States, in concert with the Mazzinis, the Achillis, the Gavazzis, and other Italian liberals, and Protestantism is therefore presented to the Italian mind in the form of Anglicanism, Methodism, and radicalism. It was therefore more especially under these forms that the learned author was required to meet and refute it.

The author's mode of dealing with Protestants is not precisely ours, but that may be no objection to it. He has no more mercy for Protestantism than we have, but he entertains a higher opinion of the candor and good faith of the great body of Protestants of the present day than we do. He has never been a Protestant, and lends to them more of the qualities of his own Catholic heart than we believe them entitled to. We have seen no reason to believe that it is necessary to insist with much emphasis, in their favor, on the qualification given by some of our theologians to the dogma,

Out of the Church there is no salvation; for their error is very rarely a mistake as to which is the true Church, or what it is that the true Church teaches, but the denial of the Church altogether, the absolute denial of the Holy Catholic Church, and of their obligation to believe any thing taught by any church authority whatever. We have, with the exception of individuals on their way to the Church, seldom found them either earnestly seeking for the truth, or prepared to embrace it when presented. They will believe in Mormonism, in phrenology, in spiritual rappings, in Achilli, in Gavazzi, in Mazzini, in Kossuth, in any thing sooner than in Catholicity. At least, so we have found them. Ephraim is joined to his idols, and the worship of the true God is distasteful, offensive to him. How many Protestants have we found, who, after learning our doctrine, and after having every objection they could frame to it answered, yet turn their backs on the Church, and go and seek out a woman that "hath a familiar spirit," or is a medium! We who live in the midst of Protestants think very little of their good faith and invincible ignorance. Their ignorance is crass and supine rather than invincible. Nevertheless, the kindly tone of Father Perrone towards Protestants is creditable to the goodness of his heart, and ought to win their confidence whether it does or not. We shall return to these interesting and important volumes in our Review for April next.

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2. *Demonstratio Catholica sive Tractatus de Ecclesia vera Christi et de Romano Pontifice.* Auctore P. RAPHAËLE CERCIA', Soc. Jesu, in Collegio Neapolitano Theologiæ Professore. Volumen I. Complectens Tractatum de Ecclesia Christi. Editio altera, ab ipso Auctore emendata et aucta. Neapoli: Typis Cajetani Migliaccio. 1852. 8vo. pp. 468.
 3. *Tractatus Theologici quibus præcipua Sacræ Theologiæ Capita solida apteque ad Tironum Ingenia enucleantur.* Auctore P. RAPHAËLE CERCIA', S. J. Tractatus secundus, De Romano Pontifice. Neapoli: Ex Typographia Gemelliana. 1851. 8vo. pp. 456.

THESE two volumes may be regarded as simply one work, comprising two treatises, the one on the Church, and the other on the Roman Pontiff. The author is one of the ablest and most learned members of the illustrious Society of Jesus, a society which is now so energetically and successfully laboring to rescue the Italian youth from the fatal influence of French infidelity and Anglican heresy. Both treatises are opportune, and are worthy of the high character of the author as a scholar and as a theologian. The most

fastidious Latinist will find little to offend his classical taste in their style or language. A few more such works as these, and those of Fathers Perrone and Passaglia, and the children of St. Ignatius will have regained nobly their former reputation, rank, and influence. }

4. *The Life of St. Elizabeth, of Hungary, Duchess of Thuringia.*
By the COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT. Translated by MARY
HACKETT. The Introduction translated by MRS. J. SADLIER.
New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 427.

WE have never read this work in the original, and therefore cannot judge of the fidelity of the translation; we should judge, however, that the task of translating it had been committed to competent hands, and that we have the sense and no little of the spirit and unction of Count Montalembert's French. We must complain, however, that the English into which Miss Hackett's part, especially, is translated, though in many respects very rich and beautiful, is far from correct. We wish more attention had been paid to the difference between the French idiom and our own. *Will* and *shall*, *would* and *should*, are improperly used, and in some instances so used, as to make a sense the contrary of the one intended; as in the case of the Frenchman who fell into the river, and exclaimed, "I *will* be drowned, and nobody *shall* help me out." Miss Hackett, not Mrs. Sadlier, very frequently uses the infinitive after the verb *use* without the sign *to*, and in one instance in the same sentence both with and without it. Names of persons and places, not French, are frequently given in the French form. As a general rule, the English custom is to give the names of persons and places according to the language to which they belong,—a rule too frequently violated by our Catholic translators. The typographical errors are numerous, and some not unimportant. Some portions of the press-work are such as we do not usually expect from the press of Messrs. Sadlier & Co. At page 223, a sentence breaks off in the middle, and the conclusion of the chapter is not given. These are blemishes that we cannot easily pardon in so excellent a book as this *Life of the dear St. Elizabeth*.

But notwithstanding these blemishes, due to the translators and the printers, the book is one of the most interesting, instructive, and edifying that have been produced in our times, and every Catholic will read it with devout thankfulness to Almighty God that he has been pleased to raise up, in this faithless age, a layman who can write so edifying a work. It is marked by rare learning, fine artistic skill, and correct taste, and breathes the firmest faith and the most tender piety. The author is at the level of the

noble thirteenth century, which he so loves and reverences. His work is as refreshing as springs of water in a sandy desert, and most glad are we to know that the illustrious author has returned to his monastic and historical labors, from which he was diverted for a time to defend Catholic interests and society itself in the political and legislative arena. Let every one who can read, purchase and read this beautiful Life of one of the most lovely and most favored saints that have ever been vouchsafed to hallow our earthly pilgrimage, and let no one forget daily to repeat

"Sancta Elisabetha, ora pro me."

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5. *History of the Apostolic Church : with a General Introduction to Church History.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania. Translated by EDWARD D. YEMANS. New York : Scribner. 1853. 8vo. pp. 684.

DR. SCHAFF is a German by race, birth, genius, and education, but has been for some years a resident of this country, and Professor of Theology in the German Reformed Theological Seminary at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania. He is a man of extensive learning, great mental activity, and untiring industry. The work before us is that of a scholar, and in a literary point of view is worthy of high commendation. It contains the history of the Church during the first century of our era, together with a very full General Introduction to Church History. The author is a Protestant, but as fair, candid, and faithful as a non-Catholic can be. We believe he means to be just, and he certainly is honorably distinguished from the common race of Protestant historians. Certainly no Protestant in our country has produced a work on ecclesiastical history that can be named in the same day with it, or one that contains so little to which a Catholic must object. Nevertheless, it is no history of the Church at all. The author has a theory, and his History is only a development and defence of it. His theory is that of historical development, the latest German theory on the subject, which regards the great current of Christian life as flowing from the cross, on through the Catholic Church to Luther and Calvin, and thence, in a thousand separate channels, through Protestantism, down to us, whose business it is to unite these separate streams once more in a single channel, which shall be at once both Catholic and Protestant, and yet neither, — about as absurd a theory as has ever yet been hatched in a Protestant brain. This theory, which nothing in history, philosophy, or theology supports or demands, vitiates Dr. Schaff's whole work, and renders his labors of little or

no value. No Protestant can write a reliable history of the Church, for it is only from the Catholic point of view that one can get at the meaning of the facts of history, or at the facts themselves in their integrity and real relations.

6. *The Mission of Death; a Tale of the New York Penal Laws.*
By M. T. WALWORTH. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co.
24mo. pp. 281.

THIS is a neatly printed volume from the press of Messrs. Sadlier & Co., with which, with all our fastidiousness, we have not a single fault to find. The work is well written, and is full of interest and true and noble sentiment. It is founded on the martyrdom of Father Ury, who was hung in the city of New York, in 1740, by the Protestant authorities of the time, for the crime of being a Catholic priest. It is an excellent answer to those who boast of Protestantism as favorable to religious liberty; and, while edifying to Catholics, is just the work to lend to their Protestant neighbors. We thank the author for this first offering from his pen, and trust that we shall hear from him often in the same way. He displays here the genius, the literary taste, and the Catholic spirit, that promise us a popular writer of the first class.

7. *Kate Geary; or Irish Life in London. A Tale of 1849.*
By MISS MASON. London: Dolman. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1853. 16mo. pp. 327.

WE do not know who Miss Mason is, but she has here given us a very pleasing and instructive work, marked by just feeling, good taste, and sound judgment. It is far above the level of the productions of our lady-writers generally. It is free from all exaggeration of sentiment, and shows a very nice appreciation of character, and very fine descriptive powers on the part of the writer. We have never met with a writer whose account of the vices and the virtues of the poor Irish, crowded into the dark lanes, blind courts, damp cellars, and unventilated garrets of our great cities, appears to us so just, so discriminating, and so true. She shows that, however much there may be to blame, to pity, or to excuse, there is always in these poor people still more to command our love and respect. We have no disposition to disguise the vices of the class of Irish Miss Mason describes, but we beg those who point to those vices to remember that side by side with them grow and

flourish the purest and the most saintly virtues. Seldom is it that an Irishman, however for a time he may forget or neglect the practice of his religion, ever entirely loses his faith; seldom do we find him, however hardened he has become, without some mellow spot in his heart. Then consider how much these poor people have to suffer, what privations they have to endure, and what temptations surround them, and wonder not that some fall, but that so many of them stand, and come forth from their trials unscathed. If we wanted an argument for the divinity of our religion, we could find it in those miserable courts, where the poor Irish are crowded together, living in dirt and poverty, amidst the basest and most vicious of our race. Nothing but a religion from God, bringing with it supernatural graces and supernatural consolations, could preserve any of them in such an atmosphere from moral contamination. And yet foolish Protestants imagine that the best way to relieve these poor people is to begin by depriving them of their faith! To prevent their children from growing up vicious, they would teach them to curse the religion of their fathers! This is too bad.

Miss Mason's book suggests many topics on which we should like to enlarge, especially the cleanliness and the material prosperity of Protestant cities and nations, so loudly boasted, but we have no room at present. We commend her book to the public, — to Protestants as well as Catholics.

8. *Justo Ucondono, Prince of Japan.* By PHILALETHES. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 314.

WE read this work before it was printed, and advised its publication. The line of argument adopted is, in some few instances, not precisely the one which we should prefer, but the work is able, learned, interesting, and opportune. It is not precisely a religious novel, but it has a slight story, not wholly imaginary, which serves the author as a thread on which to string his arguments for religion in general, and Catholicity in particular. These arguments the reader will find presented in a popular manner, in a style of great simplicity, clearness, and force. It is just possible to discover that the author is not writing in his mother tongue, but this rather adds to the interest of the work. We hope to be able to return to this work and to render a full account of it, and we will only add now, that there is no work in our language of moderate size, if of any size, so well adapted to the intellectual wants of a large class of our unbelieving community. As such, we thank the excellent author for his valuable present, and we doubt not it will be the

occasion of doing much good. We trust the public reception of this work will be such as to induce him to give us many more, adapted to our present wants.

9. *The Golden Manual ; being a Guide to Catholic Devotion, Public and Private.* Compiled from approved Sources. New York : D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1853.

THIS Manual of Devotion is too well known and too highly esteemed to require at our hands any thing more than a bare announcement of this new edition. It is the largest and most comprehensive Manual that we have, and it would be difficult to conceive a better one. The copy before us is elegantly printed, and richly and tastefully bound. It is a superb volume, and inferior to none we have seen issued from the American press.

10. *Life of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God ; with the History of the Devotion to her completed by the Traditions of the East, the Writings of the Fathers, and the Private History of the Jews.* Translated from the French of the ABBÉ ORSINI. By MRS. J. SADLIER. New York : D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1854. 4to.

THIS is a serial publication, of which three numbers have been issued. It is splendidly illustrated, and handsomely printed, on large, fair type, and good paper. Mrs. Sadlier's name is a sufficient guaranty for the taste and fidelity of the translation, and the approbation and recommendation of his Grace, the Archbishop of New York, are a sufficient voucher for the excellence of the work itself. It can hardly fail to quicken love and devotion to Mary, our sweet mother.

11. *The Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection.* By FATHER ALPHONSUS RODRIGUEZ, S. J. New York : Dunigan and Brother. 1853. 3 vols. 12mo.

THIS is a well-known work, and, though primarily designed for religious of the Society of Jesus, is perhaps the very best spiritual reading, for all who aim at Christian perfection, to be found in our language. Messrs. Dunigan and Brother have done well to give us a new and excellent edition of it. The translation is made

from the French of Des Marais, and is exceedingly well done, so far as the general style and language are concerned. Its English is rich, and far superior to that of the present day, but very ungrammatical. We wish the editor had ventured to revise the translation so far as to correct its errors against grammar. This would have deprived it of none of its unction, and would have saved the educated reader from some distractions. In French, the plural pronouns are to be used in direct addresses to God ; but in English, the singular. We are not sufficiently warm admirers of the French language to be willing to substitute its idioms for our own, and there is no good reason to be assigned why our English Catholic books should be filled with Gallicisms. There was formerly an excuse, when English Catholics were deprived of the advantage of being educated in their own language, in their own country ; but that excuse is no longer available. To speak or write English grammatically is, in those whose mother tongue it is, no merit ; but to do it ungrammatically, in these days of common schools, a great demerit. A large portion of our devotional and spiritual works have been translated or transferred from the French, and are full of un-English forms of expression. The translator of the work before us seems to imagine that in English the second person *you* is solemn and reverential, and *thou* light and familiar ; he has a great aversion to using the infinitive with the sign *to* after the verb *ought*, as *ought have* instead of *ought to have*. He writes *neither, or*, instead of *neither, nor*, as *neither James or John*, a manifest solecism. In fact, this form of expression is becoming quite common, and we meet it in some of our most respectable daily journals. It is common with our Western writers, and we have found it even in the *Boston Post*. We are ourselves no purist in language, but we wish our Catholic writers especially to write our language correctly. We must prove our superiority in all things commendable, whether little or great, to our non-Catholic countrymen.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1854.

ART. I.— *Uncle Jack and his Nephew: or Conversations of an Old Fogie with a "Young American."*

CONVERSATION IV.

"AT the bottom of what you say, my dear uncle, is the assumption that man's nature is corrupt, and that his natural inclinations are to evil. This is the grand error of the religious world. It was invented by the priests as the foundation of their doctrine of redemption and expiation, and, I may add, of their power and influence. If it were once admitted that nature is good, and that all its instincts and tendencies are pure and holy, there would be no place left for a priesthood; the whole fabric of superstition would fall, and man would have free scope to display his divine and deathless energies. Just see what he has done since Luther struck down the Pope, Descartes demolished the Schoolmen, and Voltaire exploded the Bible. The mind of man has taken a sudden bound, and displayed a might and a majesty never before dreamed of. New arts and sciences have sprung up, as if by magic. The heavens have been mapped; the globe has been explored, the earth forced to disclose her secrets; the minutest particle of matter has been analyzed; mind has become omnipotent over matter; and man by his inventions has annihilated time and distance, made the winds his servants and the lightnings his messengers. Commerce spreads her white sails over every ocean, manufactures flourish, science multiplies man's productive power a million-fold, wealth

unfolds her exhaustless treasures, and luxury finds its way even into the cottage of the humble peasant."

"Bravo! Bravissimo! my dear Dick. Nevertheless, let us leave these marvels of which you boast till we are at leisure to consider them, and have found some criterion by which we can determine their value. I agree with you, that, if we reject the doctrine of the Fall, and assert the purity and sanctity of all our natural propensities, instincts, and tendencies, there is no place for a priesthood, and the whole fabric of the Christian Church falls to the ground. All that is plain enough to every one with half an eye. But if the sacerdotal doctrine be an error, and Nature as pure, as holy, and as efficient for good as you pretend, there are certain facts which perhaps you would find it not easy to explain. How, indeed, would you explain the existence of that doctrine itself?"

"It was invented by the priests, and taught as the means of maintaining their existence and power."

"But priests could not invent it before they existed, and according to you there can be no priests without it. How will you explain the fact that there were priests to invent it, when, till its invention, there were and could be none?"

"Pardon me, my dear uncle; I did not use the word *priest* in its strict and proper sense. I know a *priest* is one who offers sacrifices, who really or symbolically makes an atonement or expiation by the victim he offers upon the altar, and therefore presupposes that man has fallen, and can be restored only by sacrifice. But we Protestants sometimes use the word to designate simply a public teacher, for in the strict sense we admit no priests. There may have been public teachers at a very remote period of the world's history, and among them there may have been ambitious and designing men, who naturally studied to magnify their office, and to extend and consolidate their power. These were not precisely priests before inventing the doctrine, but they became priests on its invention."

"But if human nature be pure and holy in all its instincts and tendencies, how do you explain the existence of these ambitious and designing public teachers? The world, in point of fact, is very much depraved, and men are very corrupt, as you and your party not only concede, but stoutly maintain; for you demand everywhere what you call moral, political, and social reforms. You com-

plain, in season and out of season, of tyranny and oppression, of wrongs and outrages, and that nothing in the world has hitherto gone right. Everything you see is out of joint; every individual you meet, you regard as needing to be reformed. Your whole movement proceeds on the assumption of the general prevalence of evil, and of evil so deep, so aggravated, as to excuse, nay, to demand, the application of the most violent remedies. How, with such a human nature as you assert, do you explain this terrible fact?"

"It is all the work of crafty priests and ambitious and selfish rulers, who have made it their business to keep Nature in chains, to repress its native energies, and restrain its pure and noble operations."

"But that, my dear Dick, only removes the difficulty a step further back; it by no means solves it. These crafty priests, and these ambitious and selfish rulers, with such wicked principles as you ascribe to them, whence came they? Whence originated their craft, their ambition, and their selfishness? On your own principles, they are the spontaneous products of human nature. Yet prior to them, Nature, according to you, must have been free, her operations unimpeded, and her energies unrepressed. Nature was then left to herself, and had free and full scope to display her divine instincts and her noble energies. But if Nature left free spontaneously produces crafty priests, ambitious and selfish rulers, tyrants, and aristocrats, how can you maintain that all her propensities, instincts, and tendencies are pure and holy, and that all that we need, in order to create and secure a paradise on earth, is to emancipate human nature from all restraints, and leave it to its own spontaneous and unimpeded operations? It is very easy to ascribe existing evils to bad governments, to falsely organized society, to superstition, to the craft of priests or the wickedness of rulers; but always does the same question recur, — Whence these bad governments, this falsely organized society, this superstition, this craft of priests, this wickedness of rulers? These things must have had some origin, and, according to you, could have originated only in the free, spontaneous workings of a human nature which is pure and holy, which is divine, and which, when free, always leads to pure and noble, just and holy results. Here is something, my dear Dick, which needs

explanation, — a mystery which you are required to clear up.”

“Whether there be here a mystery or not, it is no more a mystery, my dear uncle, for me than it is for you. The question in the last analysis is one which you must meet as well as I. You are no Manichean, and must explain the origin and existence of evil with a single original principle, and that a pure, holy, and divine principle. Man, according to you, when he came from the hands of his Maker, was perfect. His body was held in subjection to his soul, and his soul in subjection to the law of God. Explain to me, then, how he could sin? Do not tell me of Satan who tempted him, for Satan was himself created pure and holy, and the same question will recur as to him.”

“You mistake the point of my objection. You assert the impeccability of man by nature, and assert the sufficiency of Nature for herself. You assert that Nature tends always to her true good, and, if left to herself, will always go right, and yet are obliged to concede that she has gone wrong from the beginning. According to you, she was and always has been left to herself; for whatever has controlled or attempted to control her, you must regard as having been her own spontaneous production, therefore as natural, included in Nature, not something foreign or extrinsic to her. It is, therefore, impossible for you to explain the origin of evil, of wrong, of sin, or iniquity; for on your principles nothing could possibly go wrong. I have no difficulty of this sort to solve. Neither man nor the angels were created impeccable. They were created free, with free will, and therefore capable of obeying or disobeying, of standing or falling. When we say man was created perfect, we mean that he was perfect of his kind, perfect as man, not as God. His nature and faculties are limited, and this limitation is an imperfection of his being. Imperfect as being, and endowed with free will, he could sin and err. He was created with all his present nature, his present appetites and passions, in so far as they are natural; but they were not then morbid, as they have since become, and were held, by the supernatural grace of God, in subjection to reason, and moved only as reason, itself conformed to the will of God, moved and directed them. Having sinned, he forfeited and lost that grace; the appetites and passions then escaped from their subjection to

reason, and, operating each according to its special nature, carried away both reason and will into captivity. There was no physical change or corruption of man's nature. The nature of the appetites and passions was not altered; they only escaped from their subjection to reason and the law of God, and followed what was their original natural tendency, or what would have been their natural tendency if they had not been restrained by the gifts and graces with which man was favored. The flesh tends naturally, when left to itself, to the creature, and therefore from God. If from God, certainly from good; for God is the supreme and only good. As evil is the privation of good, so man, abandoned to his appetites and passions, to the empire of the flesh, tends continually to evil. He can, then, tend to good only in breaking the empire of the flesh, in restraining his appetites and passions, mortifying his lusts, emancipating the soul, and walking according to the spirit. A little reflection on these points must convince you that your retort is not admissible, and that, though the origin and continuance of evil are easily explained on Christian principles, they are wholly inexplicable on yours, or on the assumption of the divinity of the flesh. The very way to continue and aggravate the evils man endures is to emancipate the flesh from the restraints imposed by Christianity, and to give loose reins to appetite and passion. You and your party are, in fact, under the pretext of reforming society and improving man's earthly condition, really laboring to increase the evils now suffered; and if you could succeed, we should have only those works which St. Paul enumerates as 'the works of the flesh.'"

"You do not seem to me, Uncle Jack, to explain the doctrine of total depravity in the sense I was taught it by my old Puritan pastor."

"Very likely not. The Lutheran or Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity, or total corruption of man's nature by the Fall, is no doctrine of the Catholic Church. It is a heresy which she condemns. Man's nature at the Fall underwent no physical change, and is intrinsically what it was from the beginning. It lost no natural faculty, and received no new appetite or passion. As pure nature, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, it is what it always was, and always will be in this world. But what, you are to bear in mind is, that our nature never was intended to operate well, or

to attain to its beatitude, save as the flesh was subordinated to the spirit. On this point Christianity introduces no new law, but simply asserts what was the law from the beginning. Always was the same law necessary and obligatory, and all the difference is, that before the Fall the flesh did not rebel, and obedience required no effort, no interior struggle; but since the Fall it has become rebellious, and it is only by effort, by struggle, by a painful and unceasing interior warfare, that we can subdue it, and bring ourselves into conformity with the law of God. By the Fall we lost, with the supernatural grace which elevated us to the plane of our supernatural destiny, what theologians call the *indebita*, that is, the integrity of our nature, exemption from sickness and death, and, more especially to our present purpose, the subjection of the flesh to the spirit, or exemption from that interior conflict between inclination and duty, the flesh and the spirit, which makes our whole earthly existence one continual warfare, and originates all the tragedies of life. What was before easy is now painful; what was before done without effort is now possible only by self-violence, self-denial, mortification, interior crucifixion."

"There you are again, uncle, back in your Christian asceticism, preaching your eternal war against Nature, and anathematizing all that is sweet in our natural emotions, and ravishing in our sentiments. You will tolerate nothing that is natural. You will not permit a bird to sing, or flower to bloom. All Nature must be silent and drab-colored. No heart must be allowed to expand with joy, no fresh young love must be tasted, no sweet, intoxicating sentiments indulged."

"I understand you, Dick, but you do not understand the religion I profess. I anathematize nothing that is good, war against no pure and ennobling sentiment, and I love, even more than in my cold and stormy and heretical youth, the blithesome song of birds, and the beauty and fragrance of flowers. To the Christian, Nature is neither drab-colored nor silent. It is clothed with the beauty of its Creator, and vocal with the music of his love. Christian love purifies our sentiments, and gives them new sweetness and power. All experience proves that Christian asceticism, as forbidding as it may appear to you, is the highest wisdom, nay, the only true philosophy of life.

No life is so miserable as that of the unrestrained indulgence of our appetites and passions, which grow by indulgence, and become all the more importunate in their demands the oftener they are gratified. There is no appetite or passion of our nature that does not become morbid by indulgence, and therefore a source of torment. Heathen wisdom taught that, if we would make a man happy, we must study to moderate his desires. The philosophy of the Porch was defective, because it substituted pride for humility, and therefore the self-denial of the Stoics is not to be named with the self-denial of the Christian; but it was far superior to the philosophy of the Garden. Such is the nature of man, quarrel as you will, that he cannot attain to real good without imposing a severe restraint on his appetites and passions, without keeping them under, and maintaining in spite of them the freedom of the spirit,—that true freedom wherewith the Son of God makes us free, and which none but the true Christian ascetic ever attains to, or can even comprehend. Freedom of the flesh is the slavery of the spirit, and the emancipation of concupiscence is only another name for the subjection or slavery of reason. These, my dear Dick, are only commonplace truths; nevertheless, they lie at the foundation of all morality, of all science of virtue or beatitude, and that too whether you consider man individually or socially.”

“You may think so, uncle; but you must allow me to tell you, that not so thinks this enlightened and advanced nineteenth century. You are behind the age. We have exploded all those notions. You still talk of reason, and profess to respect logic. We have learned better. We do not respect logic; we place very little reliance on reason. The reason or intellect, the logical understanding, is a very low faculty, and, as the inspired Fourier has taught, should serve as a mere instrument of the passions, which are the springs of action; not as their master. We have passed beyond the Petrine Gospel, that of authority, attempted to be realized in your old Popish Church, fit only for women and children or the infancy of nations; we have passed beyond your Pauline Gospel, or that of the intellect, reason, or understanding, on which Luther and Calvin founded their churches, and which were fit only for a certain stage in the development of society; and we have passed on to the Johannine Gospel, the Gospel of Love, preached by St.

John, 'the beloved disciple,' which never fails, but endures for ever. We rely on the heart; we place religion in the heart, and virtue in sentiment. We seek the man who has a soul, who can feel, who has pure, lofty, warm, gushing feelings, and who is moved by their noble impulses, not by the dry deductions of logic or the cold calculations of duty. We hate that word *duty*. It freezes our blood; it dries up the juices of our hearts. Give us the man who acts from love, not duty,—who devotes himself to the sacred cause of humanity, not because commanded, not because he sees that it is reasonable, or fears that he will be damned if he does not, but from love, from the promptings of his own free, warm, and loving heart. This, dear uncle, is the Gospel of the nineteenth century, the Gospel of To-day."

"And no great novelty, after all. It was preached, in substance, by the Fifth-Monarchy Men in the seventeenth century, the Anabaptists in the sixteenth, the followers of the *Evangile Eternelle* in the fourteenth, and various sects of the Gnostics in the third. It is only a phase of Antinomianism, virtually held by all so-called Evangelical sects. It is a very old, and not a very specious, heresy. Its revival does not say much for the progress of your boasted nineteenth century."

"No matter if it is old, if it be true. Undoubtedly the advanced spirits of past ages, indeed of every age, have had glimpses, as it were a presentiment of it; but never was it generally embraced, or recognized as the authentic Gospel of the age, before our times."

"Be it so. It gives loose reins to all unlawful passions. The ministers of this Gospel, I take it, are your modern novelists, who celebrate fornication and adultery. Old-fashioned lawful love, the love of the husband for his lawful wife, or of the wife for her lawful husband, is too insipid for the taste of these modern evangelists. Duty is humdrum, what is lawful is cold and repulsive. Love, to be interesting, must be unlawful, must be forbidden, on the principle that 'forbidden fruit is sweetest,' and is pure and beautiful only as it is a violation of duty. Has not George Sand proved this? Has not Bulwer proved it? Have not countless hosts of German and French sentimentalists proved it? How complacently they dwell on an unlawful passion, and follow it through all its windings, and how

eloquently they extol its depth, its purity, its sanctity! There is no question but the greater part of your modern popular literature is written in the true spirit of your Gospel of love. That your Gospel of love is very generally embraced, and faithfully observed, may be safely concluded from the waning intellect of the age, the superficial character of its productions, and the general relaxation of morals. Your own party prove its prevalence in their war against all established authority, in their lack of common understanding, their ceaseless agitation, their violence, their despotisms, their cruelties, their assassinations, their worship of the dagger.

"But, my poor boy, why do you suffer yourself to be the dupe of words? God is Love, the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is a Gospel of love, and love — charity — is the bond of perfection, the origin, life, and end of creation. What Christian knows not that? But the love of which the Christian Gospel speaks is not the burning passion nor the watery sentimentality of your novelists and reformers. It is the love of the heart, not of the senses; the free, voluntary exercise of the rational nature, not the morbid cravings of the sensitive soul. It is the highest and purest exercise of the rational soul, and is on the part of man only another name for duty, or a true moral conformity to the law of God. The distinction you seek to set up between love and duty is founded upon the ambiguity of the word *love*, sometimes used to express a blind passion, with which one is carried away, or a simple affection of concupiscence, and sometimes an affection of the rational soul, reason and will, and therefore a free, voluntary affection. In the former sense it is irrational, involuntary, and therefore not moral. It is by resolving love into this affection of the inferior soul, making it an affection of the sensitive nature, as distinguished from the rational, that your popular authors are led to their immoral doctrine that love cannot be controlled, — that it submits to no law but the necessity of nature, and regards no considerations of duty, — that we love where we must, and that we cannot help loving where we do, or bring ourselves to love where we do not. Coupling with this the evident sanctity of love in the other sense of the word, they lay down the doctrine that even the most irregular and licentious love, if strong, if intense, is pure and holy. The wife

one with duty, or rather is the full and perfect discharge of duty. It surpasses by far in sweetness and generosity your sensitive love. What you call love, the love that laughs at duty as something dry and cold, is selfish, heartless, and cruel, for it seeks always its own gratification, and never anything else. But rational love, operating from a sense of duty, has in itself no taint of selfishness; it gives itself up entirely to its object. Your sort of love seeks to unite the object to itself; this seeks to unite itself to its object. All love is unitive, but only rational love seeks union by giving itself to the object, and making itself one with it. Sensitive love pursues its object, not for the sake of the object, but for itself; rational love seeks to possess the object for the object's sake, not for its own. The one will sacrifice itself for the object, the other will sacrifice the object for itself. What else is it to act from a sense of duty than to act from this love, which is the sacrifice of our own will, or, what is the same thing, the unification of our will with the Divine will, of which Law is the expression? Understand this, and you will see at once that duty and love coincide, are in fact one and the same; for to love rationally is to love what we ought to love, and because we *ought* to love it, and is the fulfilment of duty. There is nothing dry, cold, or forbidding in this, and it calls for and gives free scope to all the sweetest, purest, strongest, warmest, and most generous affections of our nature. Compared with the ages of faith and duty, our age is dry, cold, and heartless. We have nothing of that tender sensibility, nothing of those warm, gushing feelings, fresh from the heart, of that generous love of husband and wife, of parents and children, or that disinterested devotion to the welfare and interests of our neighbor, that we find in the old Christian romances. We have nothing of that simplicity, that freshness of feeling, that lightheartedness, that sunshine of the soul, that perpetual youth which characterized the Christian populations of the Middle Ages. Our hearts are dark and gloomy, our spirits are jaded, our faces are worn and haggard. We have no youth of the heart. Life to us is a senseless debauch, or a heavy and hateful existence. Our affections are blighted from the cradle, and we live a burden to ourselves. O, give us back the good old times of faith and duty, when reigned the soul's love, and the heart's joy gave new mel-

which they have traced thus far will not survive the honeymoon. The reason of all this is plain. The affections of the sensitive nature cannot be satisfied, and the object they crave, however worthy, is loathed as soon as possessed. They are morbid and capricious. You do not feel this truth yet, because you are young, and are just now engrossed with a passion for world-reform. The gloss of novelty has not yet worn off, and your emotions are still fresh. You have not yet learned to exclaim from the bitterness of your own experience, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas*. Yet you find no satisfaction; you find no repose; and you are hurried on, not so much by any real regard for the good of mankind, as by your own interior and unexplained uneasiness; you are moved by a craving for something you have not, for you know not what, and to be other than you are. You plunge into the work of political and social revolution as a dissipation. You will soon grow weary of it. Then you will seek to fill the void in your heart with woman's love, run a career of debauchery, and end by attempting to drown your misery in the wine-cup. Or if you recover, you will turn to Mammon, and die a miser; for avarice is the only passion that is sure to retain its power to the last."

"A sad picture, my dear uncle, and not very complimentary."

"Nevertheless, you need not doubt its fidelity. I have lived longer than you, and have had some experience. You will not believe me now, but hereafter, if God in his mercy touches your heart, you will see and own the truth of what I say. Our age is a sentimental age, and every sentimental age runs the career I have described. Sentiment distinguished from duty, and placed above it, or regarded as a higher principle of action, always runs into vice, and becomes the parent of a whole family of the most degrading and loathsome vices. Your error lies not in demanding love, but in demanding sensitive instead of rational love. Love, as an affection of the rational soul, an intelligent and voluntary affection, is something noble, something worthy to be lauded. Love in this sense is under our control, and in this sense we can love wherever it is our duty to love, and refrain from loving where and what we ought not to love. This love, the true Eros of the Greeks as distinguished from the Anteros, is always

one with duty, or rather is the full and perfect discharge of duty. It surpasses by far in sweetness and generosity your sensitive love. What you call love, the love that laughs at duty as something dry and cold, is selfish, heartless, and cruel, for it seeks always its own gratification, and never anything else. But rational love, operating from a sense of duty, has in itself no taint of selfishness; it gives itself up entirely to its object. Your sort of love seeks to unite the object to itself; this seeks to unite itself to its object. All love is unitive, but only rational love seeks union by giving itself to the object, and making itself one with it. Sensitive love pursues its object, not for the sake of the object, but for itself; rational love seeks to possess the object for the object's sake, not for its own. The one will sacrifice itself for the object, the other will sacrifice the object for itself. What else is it to act from a sense of duty than to act from this love, which is the sacrifice of our own will, or, what is the same thing, the unification of our will with the Divine will, of which Law is the expression? Understand this, and you will see at once that duty and love coincide, are in fact one and the same; for to love rationally is to love what we ought to love, and because we *ought* to love it, and is the fulfilment of duty. There is nothing dry, cold, or forbidding in this, and it calls for and gives free scope to all the sweetest, purest, strongest, warmest, and most generous affections of our nature. Compared with the ages of faith and duty, our age is dry, cold, and heartless. We have nothing of that tender sensibility, nothing of those warm, gushing feelings, fresh from the heart, of that generous love of husband and wife, of parents and children, or that disinterested devotion to the welfare and interests of our neighbor, that we find in the old Christian romances. We have nothing of that simplicity, that freshness of feeling, that lightheartedness, that sunshine of the soul, that perpetual youth which characterized the Christian populations of the Middle Ages. Our hearts are dark and gloomy, our spirits are jaded, our faces are worn and haggard. We have no youth of the heart. Life to us is a senseless debauch, or a heavy and hateful existence. Our affections are blighted from the cradle, and we live a burden to ourselves. O, give us back the good old times of faith and duty, when reigned the soul's love, and the heart's joy gave new mel-

ody to the song of birds, and new beauty and fragrance to flowers!"

CONVERSATION V.

"It seems to me, my dear uncle, that you occasionally forget yourself. In our last conversation you seemed to regret the past, and to think that our lot is cast in peculiarly evil times. Yet you had told me previously that you considered one generation about as good as another."

"You are hypercritical, Dick, and make no allowance for the imperfection of the human mind, which ordinarily considers things only under special aspects. Evils that we see impress us more than those we merely read of. And the virtues of past ages loom up in our view far larger than those which are practised half in secret in our own times. We forget the evils of the past in the contemplation of those of the present, and the virtues of the present in the contemplation of those of the past. What if, when considering the worth of past times and the evils of the present, we speak out as we feel, without stopping to see whether, if a just balance were struck, the two periods might not upon the whole appear about equal? Moreover, when I contrast the nineteenth century with the thirteenth, I am really only contrasting your Protestantism with my Catholicity. Catholicity has not changed, and real Catholics are substantially now what they were then. Some things they have lost, which I regret; others they have gained, which may, perhaps, upon a general average, compensate for what they have lost. But this age, regarded as distinct from what is purely of the Church, is Protestant, and the literature which is its exponent is non-Catholic. It is of our age in that it is non-Catholic I speak, when I contrast it with past times. It is, in so far as it has renounced reason for sentiment, rational for sensitive love, charity for philanthropy, law for rebellion, authority for anarchy, the Church for humanity, God for the Devil, that I speak of it, and tell you its real character and tendency. I wish to show you the shallow and destructive nature of the principles and maxims of this non-Catholic age, which young men, like you, mistake for truth and wisdom, and by which you are seduced from all good, and involved in misery and wretchedness."

"You speak of us, uncle, as seduced, and warn us against the fatal tendency of our principles and maxims; but you forget that the world has been governed for six thousand years on your principles and maxims, and that during all that period vice and crime, misery and wretchedness, have abounded. The whole world rises up in witness against your kings, priests, and nobilities. You have had your day and done your best; let us now have ours. We can hardly make worse work of it than you have done."

"Spoken like a philosopher of the nineteenth century, or a foolish young man, my dear Dick. If, with the principles and maxims which have formed the basis of the moral order in the past, so much iniquity has abounded, and so much misery has been suffered, what would the world have been without them? If with priests and rulers the world has been so wicked and wretched, what would it have been if it had had none? You are mistaken in supposing that the world has in the past been really governed by the principles and maxims I contend for. They have always been asserted, but they have not always been obeyed. Indeed, only a small minority of mankind have been uniformly faithful to them. Though admitted in theory, the majority have generally violated them in practice, and yielded to the seductions of the flesh, instead of walking according to the spirit. But in so far as mankind have been faithful to the principles you and your party reject, they have been virtuous, prosperous, and happy. The evils which have been done or suffered have uniformly resulted from disobedience to them, not from obedience. Your objection to the religious world is very shallow, and your excuse for yourselves is of no avail."

"But you ask me, Uncle Jack, to embrace your Church. You tell me she is the divinely constituted medium for the regeneration of man and society. You claim for her a supernatural power, and hold that her Omnipotent Founder, her Celestial Bridegroom, is always with her, to aid her in accomplishing her work. And yet I find that political and social evils have always abounded in Catholic countries. There have been in Catholic countries kings and aristocrats, tyrants and oppressors, the distinctions of noble and ignoble, and of rich and poor. The history of professedly Catholic nations presents the same monotonous picture of

vice and crime, violence and bloodshed, war and rapine, public and private misery, presented by that of heretical or infidel nations. Whence comes this, if your Church be what she professes to be? Why does she not use her power to make sovereigns rule justly? Why does she not assert the equality of all men, and compel all to live together as brothers? I listen to her magnificent promises, and my imagination, if not my heart, is captivated; I turn over the records of her history in vain to find their fulfilment."

"You are too sweeping in your assertions, my dear nephew. It is not true that you find no difference to their advantage between Catholic nations and non-Catholic nations. The immense superiority of Catholic nations over all others in all that constitutes the true wisdom and glory, the true greatness and happiness of a people, is manifest, even to-day, to every one who knows how to observe. Compare Great Britain with Italy, the United States with Austria, Turkey in Europe with Spain, or any infidel or heretical country as it now is, with what it was when it was sincerely Catholic, and you will be satisfied that, however little you may imagine the Church has done, she has infinitely surpassed all that infidelity or heresy can do. On this point I am quite at my ease. You Protestants are very untrustworthy as travellers and historians, and suffer grievously for lack of truth. You have so long and so confidently claimed the superiority for yourselves, and so long kept your eyes shut to your own defects and open to those of Catholic nations, that you are surprised if a Catholic ventures to deny that superiority. In purely material civilization, no Protestant nation has attained to anything like that of ancient Pagan Greece or Rome. And in all those points on which you claim superiority, you are surpassed by the existing Catholic nations. I concede the material or physical power of Great Britain, — a power of some fifty years' standing; but great as her power is, it is not superior to that of France, and is far inferior to that of Catholic Spain in the sixteenth century. In the arts, in moral and spiritual culture, in the morals, refinement, and temporal well-being of her operatives and peasantry, she is far below the lowest Catholic Continental state. Her industry is great, and she manufactures for the whole world. Her commerce is extensive, and lays all nations under contribution. But her commer-

cial and industrial system, while it builds up large fortunes for the few, reduces the many to a state of servile dependence and squalid poverty. It is opposed to the best temporal interests of mankind, and lays no solid foundation even for her own temporal prosperity. The duration of the greatness of all commercial and industrial nations is short, and when a people has once based its power and existence on commerce and manufactures, the day of its decline is never far distant. The territory of Great Britain can no longer support her population; she has become dependent on foreign states for her food. The growth of a new commercial or manufacturing rival, a change in the marts of the world, or the opening of new routes or channels of commerce, will be fatal to her power. Her American daughter, spanning this immense continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, will in a few years transfer the commercial capital of the world from London to New York, and wrest from her the commerce of both oceans; while Russia will monopolize the inland trade of all Northern and Upper Asia as well as of Northern Europe. France and Germany are extending their own manufactures, and driving her already from some of her best markets, while the emigration of her laboring population, going on at the rate of some three hundred thousand a year, must soon tell on her military force, and on her ability to undersell her rivals. The power of England, apparently great, cannot survive a single rude shock. We see that she herself is conscious of it, in the fear she betrayed of a French invasion a year and a half ago, and by the timid, hesitating, and ridiculous policy she has, up to the present, adopted on the Eastern question. The *materiel* of her navy, in which lies her great strength, after her power as head of the modern credit system, is great, I admit, but its *personnel* is inferior to that of France. In a general naval war, she would lose her superiority on the ocean, and Russia has proved, within the last few months, that the Continental nations are fast emancipating themselves from their dependence on her credit system. Most of her colonies hold to her by very feeble ties, and all that is necessary to wrest from her grasp her immense Indian empire, is for the native troops, who detest her, simply to disband themselves. I do not, therefore, regard Great Britain, under any point of view, as offering any justification of the arrogant pretensions of

Protestantism. I see in her no signs of permanent prosperity.

"We are a mixed Protestant, infidel, and Catholic people. The non-Catholic element, however, predominates; and owing to our vast extent of cheap and fertile lands, we are free from many of the material evils of older countries. But in real well-being, in the refinements of life, in the culture of the soul, in the higher civilization, or in true national or individual virtue and happiness, we are far below the lowest Catholic state. We can boast only of our industry. Our literature is not worth naming; our newspapers, for the most part, are a public nuisance; our common schools amount to little, and cannot be named with those of Austria; we have not a respectable library or university in the country; and the liberty we boast is merely the liberty of the mob, to govern us as it pleases. There is perhaps no people on earth that has less of moral and mental independence, or less individual freedom and manliness. We are the slaves of committees, associations, caucuses, and a public opinion formed by ignorant and fanatical and lying lecturers, preachers, newspapers, and demagogues. A man can be a free man here, and speak and act as a true man conscious of his individuality, only at the expense of becoming a Pariah, an outcast. No, my poor boy, refer not to the United States for evidence to justify the insane pretensions of self-deluded Protestantism.

"There are no other Protestant nations to be considered; for if these cannot compete with Catholic nations in real greatness, none can. But if you penetrate beneath the surface, or mingle with the mass of the people, peasants, artisans, and laborers, you will find that, in all that constitutes true domestic and individual content and enjoyment, there is a heavy balance in favor of Catholic nations. Nowhere in Catholic states do you find that abject and squalid poverty that you find in Great Britain, and even in many of our own externally thriving cities. The English operative or agricultural laborer is a mere animal beside the Italian or Spanish peasant, who never loses the sense of his manhood. The inmates of your English and American poor-houses are more than a set-off to the Italian beggars of which Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman travellers complain so loudly. Then you will look in vain through all Catholic countries for your English gin-palaces,

or for that drunkenness so common in all Protestant countries, and which, with all your temperance societies and Maine Liquor Laws, you can do so little to prevent. Ireland is no fair specimen of a Catholic nation, for the Irish state is Protestant, and the greater part of its nobility Protestant and also foreign; and yet, in proportion to her population, she consumes only about one ninth the quantity of ardent spirits consumed by Scotland, that pattern of a Protestant people. In vain, also, will you seek in Catholic countries for that general impurity which is the shame of the modern Protestant, as it was of the ancient heathen world. The crimes of Catholic nations are for the most part those which spring from sudden passion or emotion, and are crimes against persons rather than against property. You will seldom find with them those cool, deliberate crimes and frauds which prevail to such a frightful extent in all Protestant states. Among Catholics hypocrisy is a rare exception; among Protestants it is the rule. The Catholic fears God, if he fears anything, and before men he is open, free, natural, easy, independent. The Protestant has seldom the fear of God before his eyes; he sometimes fears the Devil, and generally is the slave of public opinion. If he can stand well with his public, he is contented, and he seldom looks higher. Hence he has a certain meanness and servility, which are alike foreign from true virtue and real personal independence. His morality stops with a low prudence, and a sort of external decorum. When once he shakes off his fear of public opinion, or the opinions of his friends and neighbors, he abandons himself to any vice or crime to which he finds himself attracted. The Catholic may disregard public opinion, think little of how he stands with his friends and neighbors, and still maintain his integrity, his virtue, his piety.

"Moreover, I do not deny, nor do I wish to extenuate in the least, the evils which abound and always have abounded even in Catholic states. All who know anything of history know that the Church wrought a great and marvellous change in the manners and morals and in the happiness of the people of the old Roman Empire, and that she exerted a most salutary influence on the Northern Barbarians who overthrew and supplanted it, and who have been moulded by her into the modern states of Europe. Yet I do not pretend that, even when things were best, all went as it

should in Catholic states. There was, even in what are called the ages of faith, vice, and crime, and suffering; there were tyranny and oppression, the pride and insolence of power; there were violence and outrage, wars and rapine, bad government, and terrible political and social evils. But you must bear in mind that it was not they who obeyed the Church, who accepted and uniformly acted on her principles and maxims, that caused the evils. Those tyrannical princes, kings, and emperors, like Henry the Fourth of Germany, Frederic Barbarossa, Frederic the Second, Louis of Bavaria, Philip the Fair, Henry and his son John, of England, Charles le Mauvais, and Pedro the Cruel, were not obedient, but most disobedient sons of the Church, Protestants before Luther, who made war on her and incurred her anathema. They oppressed her and their subjects in spite of her reclamations. As a general rule, the civil authority even in Catholic states has always been jealous of the ecclesiastical authority, and restricted as much as it could its free and full exercise. It has seldom shown itself willing to give the Church an open field and fair play. In modern times they have done their best to trammel her exertions and restrain her movements. Charles the Fifth, who held his office of Emperor on condition of being the protector of the Church, and especially of the Holy See, favored her enemies by his selfish policy in Germany, made war on the Pope, and took the city of Rome, which his troops sacked and occupied for nine months. The kings of the house of Bourbon, though professing great devotion to the Church, from Henry the Fourth, who was bred a Huguenot, down to the last of their race, have asserted and maintained against her the independence, and I might say the supremacy, of the temporal power. Louis the Fourteenth was more the head of the Church in France than the Pope. Wherever the Bourbon family reigned, the Church lost her freedom, and Catholic interests were sacrificed. Even Charles the Tenth learned, in the long years of his exile, nothing beyond his Bourbon traditions, and when king lost the affections of the Liberals by his Catholicity, and of Catholics by his narrow-minded Gallicanism. The house of Hapsburg, with great personal piety, for the most part, has till our own day followed the general policy of the temporal authority. Joseph the Second, in his mad zeal for reform, almost completed for

Southern and Central Germany what Luther and the princes who favored him had done for Northern Germany. The tyranny and oppression of which you complain you must attribute, not to the Church, nor to her docile and obedient, but to her indocile and disobedient children. When and where her voice has been listened to, her precepts obeyed, her principles and maxims faithfully followed, she has fulfilled all her promises, and accomplished all that you or any one else can ask. Where she has failed has been where her authority was despised and resisted; and the evils she has not redressed, and which are encountered in Catholic states, are chargeable to practical Protestantism, to the practical assertion by her disobedient children of those principles and maxims which you and your friends wish all the world to follow."

"But you evade the point of my objection, Uncle Jack. If your Church be what she professes to be, how happens it that there were so many wicked princes and other persons in her bosom? Why did she not reform them, make them good and docile Catholics? I admit all you say; but these very persons to whom you charge all the evils I find recorded in the history of Catholic nations, had all been baptized and brought up Catholics. I do not deny, but assert, their wickedness. My difficulty is, how, if the Church be as powerful for good as she pretends, and affords all the helps needed to virtue, they could be so wicked. I have read your Catholic histories of the Reformers. According to these histories, the Reformers were a set of as great rascals as ever lived, and I have no doubt of the fact. I think you fully prove it. But this relieves no difficulty. The more wicked and unprincipled you prove them, the more to my mind you prove against the Church, the more completely do you establish her inefficiency, her inability to effect what is avowedly her purpose. These Reformers had all been reared in her bosom; they had all, according to you, been regenerated in baptism, had been born again, received the gift of faith, the grace of the Sacraments, and been elevated to the plane of a supernatural destiny. They had received all your Church has to give. How, then, if she is able to fulfil her magnificent promises, could such a set of men come out of her communion, or possibly become so grossly depraved as they most undeniably were before they openly abandoned her? Here is my difficulty,

and a difficulty which you do not meet. Is not the existence of such men, or such men as the Achillis and the Gavazzis, in the bosom of your Church, a practical refutation of her claims?"

"I understood from the outset your difficulty, or the point of your objection, my dear Dick, and had no intention of evading it. The objection, though fatal to Protestantism as a religion, is in the non-Catholic mind practically the gravest objection to the Church that can be urged; and I well recollect that I found it, after having rejected Protestantism, the greatest and last obstacle in my own mind to be overcome in embracing the Church. I had lived as a man of the world, as a non-Catholic man of the world, not unfrequently lives, and had strayed far from the path of virtue, and fallen far lower than I care to state. I tried to recover myself, but I found myself too weak. I was sinking, and I had no strength to arrest my fall. I wanted help, something to breathe life into my soul, give strength to my will, and light to my understanding. The Church proffered me this help, or told me that in her Sacraments, which were channels of grace, I should find precisely what I wanted. But could I trust her? If she communicates through her Sacraments the graces she alleges, how comes it that so many who must have received these graces have lost their faith and virtue, and become the vilest and most abandoned of our race, as apostate Catholics usually are? These undeniably wicked men who had been reared in the bosom of the Church, who must have approached her Sacraments, and therefore received all needful supernatural helps, if such helps the Church has to give, were to me for a long time a real stumbling-block, for their existence seemed to me an unanswerable proof that the Church does not and cannot give the assistance which I needed and which she promises. But I became able finally to understand that my objection grew out of my Protestant and Puritan education, which had taught me that grace is irresistible and inamissible. Your difficulty is, Given the Church as the medium of supernatural grace which supernaturalizes and sanctifies, how can one of her members fall away, or lapse into iniquity and unbelief? Or how can one baptized and reared in the bosom of the Church ever be a bad Catholic and a bad man? The answer is easy. Man was created and

intended to be a free moral agent, and the Church was never intended to take away his free agency, or to deprive him of his free will. Man in the Church, as out of her, retains his free will, and therefore the faculty of obeying or of disobeying, as he elects. This free will the Church respects, and therefore, whatever assistance she renders, it must be assistance which is compatible with it. She can aid, but not compel, and the power of resistance is always retained by the Catholic. Consequently, the question, How can there be a bad Catholic? is no other than the question, How can there be a bad man, or a sinner at all? There is then no special difficulty in the case. There is only that general difficulty with regard to the origin of evil, which we have already considered and disposed of.

"You do not readily see this, because, having been reared a Protestant, you have no conception of grace that does not operate irresistibly, or of grace that aids and assists free will without superseding it. Sufficient grace that is inefficacious strikes you as an absurdity, and you relish Voltaire's ridicule of it. But grace can always be resisted. To concur with grace, indeed, demands grace, but to resist grace does not. We are always competent to do that of ourselves alone. The grace we receive in baptism imparts to us the habit of faith and justice or sanctity, but the habit is not the act either of faith or justice. It gives us, as to faith, the power to elicit the act, or actually to believe what God has revealed when duly propounded to the understanding, which is beyond our natural ability; but it does not compel us to elicit that act, and we can refuse to do so. By this refusal—a formal refusal, I mean—we lose the habit, and thus become infidels, or heretics. The point you are to bear in mind is, that the grace or gift of faith does not compel us to believe; it only gives us the power to believe, and a certain facility in believing, what God reveals and the Church teaches. We are aided, not forced by it. If we formally refuse, we lose that power and facility, and our understanding becomes darkened. We then lose, not only our love, but even our perception of the truth, as is perhaps always the case with confirmed heretics and apostates. They fall anew under the power of Satan, and become the prey to all his delusions, so that it is possible that they really persuade themselves that their errors are truths, and become

so deluded as actually to believe a lie, that, having pleasure in iniquity, they may be damned. This explains how men who have received the gift of faith may lose it, and become heretics and apostates. But generally, perhaps always, the refusal to elicit the act of faith is preceded by the loss of justice. Sanctifying grace, when no obstruction is offered on our part, places us in a state of justice, but it does not compel us to remain in that state. We are still free agents, and therefore may, instead of eliciting acts of holiness, resist the grace of God, and fall into mortal sin. By mortal sin we lose that grace, all that it gave us, and come again under the power of Satan. Thus nothing prevents the Catholic, if he chooses, from rejecting all the graces of the Sacraments, all the aid his Church affords him, and running a wild career of incredulity and iniquity. All in the Church are not of the Church. She is that Gospel net which, cast into the sea, gathered fishes of all sorts, both good and bad, and hence we find among Catholics all sorts of persons, good, bad, and indifferent. We should not therefore be surprised to find men passing for Catholics who yet have in reality no more faith than Protestants, and no more virtue than heathens. This makes nothing against the Church, if you once understand that grace does not take away free will, and is not inamissible."

"I can understand all that, but it does not remove my whole difficulty. If people can, with the Church, lose their faith and their virtue, I do not see what mighty advantage she is to mankind."

"That is chiefly because you are thinking only of good or evil in relation to the natural and temporal order, and do not at all take into the account the supernatural providence of God, and man's supernatural destiny, in the world to come; but also in some respects because you have no conception of free will. Your humanists, who worship a people-God, to use the barbarous expression of your Italian chief, have no just conception of the dignity and freedom of man. You do not, perhaps you cannot, understand the immense superiority of a being endowed with free will over a creature that acts solely from intrinsic necessity. Your highest conception of liberty is freedom from coercion, or from external restraint or compulsion. You never rise above the conception of the animal man. Man is for you only a superior sort of ani-

mal, standing at the head of the order of Mammalia, and it is only for man as an animal that in all your plans of reform you seek to provide. You recognize in him no rational soul, and you place, as you have avowed, his highest worth in his instinctive and involuntary activity. Hence you place instinctive and impulsive love above duty. With these low and grovelling conceptions of man, it is not easy for you to understand the importance which is to be attached to free will. But you would prize an homage freely and voluntarily offered you by one of your friends, more than an homage offered you through compulsion or necessity. You should know that

‘ God made thee perfect, not immutable ;
And good he made thee, but to persevere
He left it in thy power, ordained thy will
By nature free, not overruled by fate
Inextricable, or strict necessity ;
Our voluntary service he requires,
Not our necessitated ; such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find ; for how
Can hearts not free be tried whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By destiny, and can no other choose ! ’

Without free will man would not rise in the scale of being above the ox or the hog, the beaver or the ant, and virtue would not differ in principle from gravitation or chemical affinity. The freedom you talk so much about, and for which you set at defiance the laws of God and man, would be but an unmeaning word. There is freedom conceivable only for a being possessing free will, without which there is only invincible necessity. The glory of man's nature is in his free will, which is the highest expression of his rational nature, partaking at once of intellect and volition. This free will God himself respects, and never does or suffers violence to be done to it. God redeems man, and governs him as endowed with free will. The graces he confers, the aid he vouchsafes in his Church, are all granted and operate in accordance with it, and therefore may be resisted. But this does not imply that the Church is of no value. If she furnishes the aid needed to enable man to be and do what were impossible without it, you cannot say she is of no importance because a man wilfully rejects it, or refuses to avail himself of it. She does all that can be done without depriving men of their

free will, that is, without making them cease to be men. That is all that she ever promised to do, all that is or can be required of her. You have but to listen and obey, and even not that in your own strength, and the end is gained. Your objection is futile, for it is always something that help is at hand."

"Still I want something more."

"Probably you want the impossible, or the absurd."

"I want the Church, if Church I am to have, not merely to enable men to save themselves, but actually to save them."

"That is, you want the state of probation or trial should be a state of reward and beatitude. You want an order in which men can be free, do as they please, and in which they cannot go wrong, can make no mistake, commit no sin, and suffer no pain. You must go out of this world to find such an order, and seek a human nature different from ours. What you ask is incompatible with man's present state. The Church has never promised the world anything, except on condition of obedience. She teaches us the truth, tells us what is our true good, points out the way that leads to its possession, entreats us with maternal affection to walk in that way, and affords us all the helps we need in order to do so; but the act of doing it must be *our* act. She does not carry us without our concurrence, without our active assent, in spite of ourselves, and against our will. If she did, you would be among the first to cry out against her, as violating the freedom and dignity of human nature. She does all that can be done with respect for our dignity, or without violence to our free will, which would not be free will if it did or could suffer violence. This is all she has ever promised, and her promise she has always kept. If then there have been moral evils in Catholic nations, if men reared Catholics have abandoned their faith or lived as heathen, and run to fearful excesses of vice and crime, it is not owing to any weakness or inefficiency of hers, but to the perversity of their own wills, to the malice of their own hearts."

"Still I do not see, if your Church really imparts the light and strength you pretend, what could induce men enlightened and strengthened by her to abandon her, to act against her precepts, and to become vicious and criminal. They have neither ignorance nor weakness to plead in their excuse."

"That only proves the depth of their malice. You do not seem to have any conception of such a thing as malice, and you imagine that no one can do wrong against his better knowledge, unless through weakness. Hence you have no conception of sin, and in your own mind really deny its possibility. In your philosophy sin is an excusable error, an amiable weakness, a pardonable mistake, and therefore you revolt at the idea of its eternal punishment. But sin is not a mere imperfection; it is not something involuntary, but always a free, deliberate act, and, in so far as it is sin, an act of malice. The man had both the light and the strength to avoid it. It is impossible for us to estimate the degree of malice every mortal sin implies, and you will never have any adequate conception of its turpitude till you have learned at what cost the Incarnate Son of God has made satisfaction for it. You are very much mistaken in supposing that men always act as well as they are able, or know how."

"But I should suppose their knowledge and sense of their own interest would prevent their fall."

"You are a very young man, or you would not say that. Men are surely not incapable of going contrary to what they know is for their own interest, both here and hereafter. They do it every day, almost every hour."

"But if I recollect aright, your St. Thomas teaches that the good is the object of the will, and that the will is appetitive of good only."

"The will has for its object good, and wills an object only because it views it as good of some sort, I admit; but not therefore does it never will that which is not true good. St. Thomas teaches that every man naturally desires happiness, which is true; but he may will that which he knows is contrary to his happiness, not precisely because it is contrary to it, but from aversion to that which it is necessary to do in order to gain it. A man wills evil because he hates good, and to refuse what one hates has itself some reason of happiness, inasmuch as it affords a certain gratification. To contradict that which is hateful to us is always a greater or less pleasure, and nothing is more hateful to the malicious than genuine virtue, although they well know its superiority to vice, and that they would be better and happier if they were themselves virtuous. The malicious call evil good, and good evil, not from mistake, but from

sheer malice. You yourself would say, with Satan,

‘Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven.’

The perverse mind makes to itself a sort of good in its refusal to obey God. Did you never observe how Mammon works out this thought in Milton’s *Paradise Lost*? The fallen spirit would dissuade his associates from the further prosecution of the war against the Almighty, as utterly vain. They cannot ‘heaven’s Lord supreme overpower,’ and thus regain their lost glory. But

‘Suppose He should relent
And publish grace to all, on promise made
Of new subjection ; with what eyes could we
Stand in his presence humble, and receive
Strict laws imposed, to celebrate his throne
With warbled hymns, and to his Godhead sing
Forced hallelujahs ; while he lordly sits
Our envied Sovereign, and his altar breathes
Ambrosial odors and ambrosial flowers,
Our servile offerings ? This must be our task
In heaven, this our delight ; *how wearisome
Eternity so spent in worship paid
To whom we hate !* Let us not then pursue
By force impossible, by leave ordained
Unacceptable, though in heaven, our state
Of splendid vassalage, but rather seek
Our own good from ourselves, and from our own
Live to ourselves, though in this vast recess,
Free, and to none accountable, *preferring
Hard liberty before the easy yoke
Of servile pomp.* Our greatness will appear
Then most conspicuous, when great things of small,
Useful of hurtful, prosperous of adverse,
We can create ; and, in what place soe’er,
Thrive under evil, and work ease out of pain
Through labor and endurance.’

Milton had a happy knack of interpreting the thoughts of devils, for he was himself a superb rebel, and a spirit kindred to Satan. You, my dear Dick, if you will search your own heart, will find yourself sympathizing with the devilish sentiments put into the mouth of Mammon. Now Mammon knew perfectly well that he ought to love God, and that to those who do love him, what he calls “a wearisome task” is the highest bliss. But he preferred hell to heaven, because he hated God, and was too proud to submit to bear his “easy yoke.” So is it with men. The pride, the malice of their hearts is such, that to do what they will, to have their own way, and to feel that they res-

olutely refuse to acknowledge a superior, though bringing with it all the pains of hell, is a good, and for them less painful than humble submission. It is so with you, and with all the chiefs of your party. Even you, with all your gentle manners, warmth of feeling, and amiableness of disposition, can say and do say to yourself, with Satan, at this moment,

‘ All is not lost ; th’ unconquerable will
And study of revenge, immortal hate
And courage never to submit or yield,
And what is else not to be overcome ;
That glory never shall his wrath or might
Extort from me ; to bow and sue for grace
With suppliant knee, and deify his power.

That were low indeed,
That were an ignominy and shame beneath
This downfall.’

Through Satanic malice, evil is changed to good, and good to evil ; for nothing can seem a greater evil than to bow the suppliant knee and sue for grace to one we hate, and hence it is the will can be appetitive of evil without changing its nature, which is to be appetitive of good.

“ The Church, I have told you, does not take away free will ; let me say also, that baptism does not destroy concupiscence. The flesh remains after the infusion of justifying grace, and we are free, if we choose at any time to yield to its solicitations. These solicitations are not in themselves sin, and are permitted for our trial, and as occasions of merit. They are sin only by virtue of our voluntary assent to them. Catholics as well as others have these solicitations, and though they know that they ought not to assent to them, and have the power in the Sacraments to resist them, they can yield to them. They yield a little, a very little, at first ; become slightly negligent of their watch ; then they yield a little more, become a little more negligent, and less vigilant in prayer, less frequent in their approach to the Sacraments ; and then they grow weaker, yield more and more. One concession prepares the way for another, till the soul falls anew under the dominion of the flesh, and we are prepared to do its deeds of iniquity. If you had attempted to lead a truly Christian life, if you had become acquainted with the malice of the natural heart, with the operations of the

flesh, and had felt how severe is the internal combat that has to be maintained without a moment's relaxation, you would never have looked upon it as difficult for those who have been enlightened and strengthened by the grace of God, to fall away. But, after all, why speak I thus to you, who hardly believe in God, look on the Gospel with contempt, and regard the Church with the profoundest hatred? Yet let what I have said suffice to convince you that, if the Church is what she professes to be, and furnishes the helps she promises, she is, in spite of the scandals of bad Catholics, all we need for our true good here as well as hereafter."

"I cannot say that you have fully convinced me of that, my dear uncle, but you have convinced me that more may be said in defence of the Church than I had supposed, and that the evils which undeniably subsist in Catholic countries do not necessarily invalidate her claims. So much I am bound in candor to concede. Yet I cannot give up human nature, or regard its instincts and tendencies as an unsafe guide to what is best for man. Every animal is directed by its natural instincts and tendencies to its end, to its destiny, which is its good, and why not man?"

"Simply because man is something more than an animal, and was never intended to act from mere instinct or natural tendency. Here is the grand mistake which you all commit, and hence the absurdity of your famous Phalansterian maxim,—Attractions proportional to destiny. Man is an animal, if you will, but he is something more; he is a rational soul, and in him the rational morally transforms the animal. He is not to be moved and guided by natural instinct, but by reason. Instinct and natural tendency direct him only to an end that lies in the purely animal order, and he was intended for an end that lies above that order, in the rational order, an end worthy of a rational soul. To 'follow nature,' as you understand it, is the unwisest maxim that can be laid down, for you understand it to mean to follow our animal nature, as if man were a pig or an ass. The maxim is true only when applied to the rational nature, and to follow the rational nature is to subject the animal to the rational, and make it serve or conform to the end approved by reason. Here, then, comes in the necessity of self-denial, of self-restraint, or interior government, and also the necessity of Divine assistance in maintaining this government.

"Society is, as Plato teaches you, only the individual on a larger scale, and the reason of government in the bosom of the individual is the reason of government in the bosom of society. Your scheme emancipates the beast, and enslaves reason and will, that is, the man. The doctrine you oppose teaches us to emancipate reason and will—the man—from the slavery of the appetites and passions, and to subject the beast. For the same reason that the appetites and passions need to be governed in the individual in order to maintain internal freedom and peace, they need to be governed in society in order to maintain external freedom and peace. Hence, if you speak of rational freedom, you see that government, so far from being opposed to it, is its necessary condition. What you probably are aiming at, though you hardly know it, is the freedom, so to speak, of both the man and the beast, or the conciliation of the freedom or license of the appetites and passions with the freedom of reason and will. But this is not possible. One or the other must serve, and the question for you is which. Shall the man serve the beast, or the beast the man? shall the flesh rule the spirit, or the spirit the flesh? The whole question comes to this at last, and as you answer this, so will you either assert the supremacy of God or the supremacy of Satan."

ART. II.—*Analytical Investigations concerning the Credibility of the Scriptures, and of the Religious System inculcated in them; together with a Historical Exhibition of Human Conduct during the several Dispensations under which Mankind have been placed by their Creator.* By J. H. McCULLOH, M.D., Author of "Researches Philosophical and Antiquarian on America," "The Evidences of Christianity," etc. Baltimore: Waters. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

DR. McCULLOH is a genuine Protestant, and entirely free from all Catholic tendencies; but he has evidently been brought up in some one of the so-called Evangelical sects. He writes as an earnest-minded man, with serious

feelings and intentions, and with no little clearness and force of intellect. He has certainly studied hard, thought much, and has given us here one of the most considerable books, both as to bulk and contents, which Protestantism has produced in our country since the days of Edwards, Hopkins, and Dwight. It is not brilliant, but it is solid; it cannot be read as one reads a novel; but if studied with care and patience, it will be found to contain a good deal of instructive matter, and we seriously and earnestly recommend it to the attention of all our Protestant friends who still imagine that they can be Churchmen and not Catholics.

We cannot pretend to give our readers an analysis of Dr. McCulloh's book, or to submit it to a thorough review. He starts as a Protestant, with the assumption that the Bible interpreted by private judgment is the rule and the sole rule of faith, and proceeds to ascertain as well as he can what is the religious system the Scriptures actually contain, together with the credibility of the Scriptures themselves. We have no special interest in his analysis of what he supposes to be Christian doctrine, and his investigations concerning natural religion and the credibility of the sacred writers have no special value for us. His philosophy, his rule of faith, and the doctrinal results he arrives at, are not ours, and are such as we cannot by any means accept. The greater part of his well-meant and painful labor is for us worse than thrown away. But there is one point in which we take a good deal of interest. The author has naturally an honest and logical mind, and he sees, and does not hesitate to assert, that Protestants have condemned themselves by conceding that our Lord instituted a ministry of his word; and he proves very ably and very successfully, that, if they admit that our Lord did appoint or commission such ministry, they must, in order to be consistent, accept the Catholic Church, submit to her authority, and believe what she teaches. This is indeed no novel doctrine, but it is one we are very glad to see so able and so earnest-minded a Protestant labor to prove to his brethren.

Our readers know perfectly well that we have always contended that the only open questions between Catholics and Protestants are two:—1. Did our Lord found a Church with authority to teach? 2. If he did, which of the many

so-called Churches is it? The second question, Dr. McCulloh thinks, very justly, is easily answered, and indeed can hardly be a question at all. It is clear to him, as it is to us, that if our Lord established a Church, with authority to teach, which is to remain unto the consummation of the world, it is the Roman Catholic Church, and can be no other. Protestants, then, who admit that our Lord did found such a Church, are logically bound to be Catholics. He therefore joins issue with the Catholic on the first question, and boldly denies that any church, Catholic or Protestant, or ministry with authority to teach unto the end of the world, was ever divinely instituted. The commission which our Lord gave to his Apostles to go and teach all nations, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever he commanded them, and promising to be with them all days unto the consummation of the world (St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20), he restricts to the Apostles personally, and confines to that Age in which the commission was given. After the consummation of that age, he holds that there was to be no divinely appointed ministry. He says:—

“ Nearly all theologians have interpreted our Saviour's words to signify, that he gave a special commission to the Apostles as an ecclesiastical corporation, who as such were henceforth to preside over the whole body of Christian believers, and as such had authority to expound the principles of the Christian faith, to administer certain ordinances now called sacraments, and to ordain other persons to the exercise of peculiar functions, which by successive ordinations should continue them as an ecclesiastical corporation until the literal ending of the world.

“ This notion, however, of a divinely appointed clergy, or body of ecclesiastics, is opposed in the first instance by the remarkable circumstance, that the Apostles have not recognized the existence of any such corporation in any part of the New Testament. There is no plan for the organization of a clerical body laid down anywhere in the Apostolic writings, nor rules given by which they should be regulated. Neither is there a word said concerning their supposed peculiar functions. These remarkable omissions, therefore, fully justify the conclusion, that no corporation of ministers of the Gospel could have been contemplated by our Saviour as an institution pertaining to the Christian dispensation.

“ Hence, in warning his disciples against the false prophets (teachers) who would in after-time appear among them, he gave them no other instruction by which the character of these false teachers

was to be determined, but by judging of them according to *their fruits*. (Matt. vii. 15–23.) Such a rule is manifestly opposed to any notion of a divinely commissioned body of clergy, for if such an institution had been recognized by Christ, he would assuredly have referred his disciples at once to some specific test, and not have left the subject to be determined by the mere inferences of their private judgment.

“The doctrine of a divinely commissioned clergy is furthermore opposed by insuperable objections as regards the exercise of the peculiar functions ascribed to such supposed divine organization.

“A divinely appointed corporation, who by successive ordinations among themselves should preserve such an institution throughout all generations of Christians, could only contemplate two objects; *first*, that they were to teach men by divine authority what were the true principles of Christian faith and practice, and *secondly*, that they should administer the sacraments as possessing an efficacy in the fact of their clerical administration.

“But neither of these suppositions can bear a moment’s examination. In the first place, it is evident that, if an authoritative teaching of the doctrines of Christianity has been conferred on the clergy, then every individual clergyman *must be infallible in what he teaches*; for if not infallible, to what end is a divine commission given? It is a manifest absurdity to suppose that Christ should have set men apart to teach others by a divine commission, when at the same time, as being fallible, they might through personal infirmity abuse their divine commission, and thus establish error or false doctrine with authority. It is therefore essential to a divine commission to teach other men, that the teachers themselves should be individually preserved from all error.

“This dilemma was not perceived in the primitive Church until after they had recognized the doctrine that the clergy exercised their functions upon a divine commission, and the expedient to which they resorted to sustain their assumption was to claim this infallibility for the Church as an assembly of clergymen consecrated to God, and whose deliberations as such it was assumed that the Holy Spirit would not only preserve from error, but that it would furthermore lead them to the discernment of all truth.

“But it is not enough that the Church, in the abstract, is supposed to be always under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, or in other words that it is infallible, as is maintained by the Catholics. We contend, that if the clergy have a divine commission to teach, *every ecclesiastic* must be infallible, for otherwise their individual teaching may lead their hearers into all manner of error. What does it signify that the Church abstractedly be infallible, when influential clergymen are the cause of leading thousands into heresy? Arius was an ecclesiastic, Nestorius was a bishop, Euty-

chus and Pelagius were ecclesiastics, and yet by their preaching they induced thousands of men to adopt their peculiar opinions, which the greater portion of the clergy now consider to be heresies of the most dangerous kind. To say that these individuals ought to have submitted to the Church is to no purpose, for they did not submit, and thousands of men followed their teaching.

"If every clergyman is not infallible, it is perfectly nugatory to assert the existence of a divinely commissioned body of clergy, for we have no possible means of determining whether individual ecclesiastics are led by the Spirit of God or not. The supposition that a majority of them when assembled in a council will be guided into infallibility by the Holy Spirit, is utterly absurd; for we have no promise of God concerning such assemblies, and our whole experience is sufficient to convince us that truth is not to be determined by majorities. Our Saviour and his disciples were a minority, Luther and the Reformers were a minority, and so with others since. But the thing itself is so self-evident, that we need not attempt to prove it.

"It is therefore seemingly incredible that Christ could have contemplated the establishment of any organized body of clergy as possessing a divine commission to teach, for not only is no such doctrine taught in the Scriptures, but all the phenomena of ecclesiastical history are utterly irreconcilable to such an hypothesis.

"Thus, for instance, I defy the whole body of Christian ecclesiastics, Catholic and Protestant together, to tell us whether a differing reading of the Samaritan, the Hebrew, or the Septuagint, is the true reading. I challenge them to tell us whether any disputed text is true Scripture or not, otherwise than as based upon the investigations of commentators and critics, who claim no inspiration for their labors. Shall we then allow ecclesiastics to tell us they have a commission to expound the sense of the Scripture to us, when they cannot tell whether it is Scripture or not?

"If Christ had constituted his Church as an ecclesiastical corporation, we should have always found the clergy united in harmonious operation, and opposing an undivided front to the irreligious world. Sects and heresies, therefore, ought to have originated only among laymen, or persons out of the clergy, whereas the very reverse is the case, for heresies and schisms have originated essentially with the clergy only.

"The slightest acquaintance with ecclesiastical history abundantly informs us, that in all times since the advent there has been a great amount of disputes and heresies among the clergy, which it has been impossible to control or counteract by any expedient that the rulers of the Church could adopt. Councils or assemblies of clergymen have for centuries been working on this subject, but yet have never advanced any further in the disposition of the mat-

ter than to decide on the subject of controverted doctrines by a majority of votes. But such action as this is preposterous; if clergymen had a divine commission, and consequently as such influenced by the Holy Spirit, there could be no differences of opinion among them. Everywhere as individuals they would have inculcated the same principles of truth. Hence the very fact of councils or assemblies of clergymen to determine what is true Christian doctrine, is *ipso facto* proof that they have not been authorized by Jehovah *to teach mankind with authority.*"—Vol. II. pp. 155–158.

These arguments are conclusive enough against Protestants, who have only private judgment by which to determine the sense of the Holy Scriptures, although we as Catholics might demand of the author by what authority he interprets the *sæculi* of the Vulgate, or the *τοῦ αἰῶνος* of the Greek, *age*, and restricts it to the lifetime of the Apostles. The word perhaps may sometimes be translated *age*, but the word *age* itself signifies an indefinite period of time, and its duration is not determinable by the word itself. Nothing in the word restricts its meaning to the lifetime of the Apostles, or prevents us from understanding it to mean the whole period of time from the time when our Lord spoke to the end of the world, that is, what some have called the MESSIANIC AGE. It may be so extended, and we should demand of the author something more than the authority of his private judgment to prove that it does not. It might also, perhaps, be urged, that "the remarkable circumstance that the Apostles have not recognized the existence of any such corporation in any part of the New Testament," is by no means certain. As we read the New Testament, we find such corporation very distinctly recognized, and implied throughout. But even if we did not, it would not disturb us, for we hold the Church to be prior to the New Testament, and that she received her commission, her doctrines and rules, before a word of the New Testament was written; as is evident from the New Testament itself.

The learned author concludes that our Lord could have established no such corporation, because, in warning his disciples against false teachers, he gave them *no* instructions by which the character of these false teachers was to be determined, but by judging of them according to "their fruits." A careful reader of the New Testament might

doubt the accuracy of this statement, or at least be led to give to the word *fruits* a much more extensive meaning than the author gives it. St. John gives us a criterion by which we may distinguish between true and false teachers: "We are of God. He that knoweth God *heareth* us; he that is not of God *heareth* us not. *By this* we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error." (1 John iv. 1.) Here, it might be urged, the criterion by which to distinguish between true and false teachers is the fact whether they do or do not gather to the Apostolic communion, and hear the voice of the Apostolic authority, that is, of the Church.

Perhaps the Catholic would not find the author's objections to a divinely commissioned clergy absolutely unanswerable. Certainly the corporation, if divinely instituted and commissioned, must be infallible in teaching, and whatever it teaches or authorizes to be taught must be infallibly true; but it does not therefore follow necessarily, that every individual clergyman, in his individual capacity, must be infallible; for it is sufficient that he be infallible in what he teaches by authority of the body. Whether he should be individually infallible or not was a matter for the Founder of the Church to settle according to his own good pleasure, and is not a matter that we can settle by *a priori* reasoning. The body must be infallible, or else he who authorized it would become the accomplice of error, a teacher of false doctrine, which is not supposable for a moment. The individual teacher must also be infallible, and is infallible, so long as he teaches what the body has authorized him to teach; but nothing prevents him from going beyond his instructions, and undertaking, if so disposed, to teach out of his own head. The body survives, and is present by its infallible organs to correct him when he does so; and there is never any obligation resting on any one to believe him, when he presumes to teach what he is not authorized to teach. Our Lord may have wished to leave error and heresy possible with individuals in order to prove the faith and obedience of the faithful, while he made ample provision for the maintenance of the purity and integrity of his doctrine. This we hold he has done by making the corporation in its corporate capacity infallible, and by leaving it possible for individual members in their individual capacity, in which capacity they are not

authorized teachers, to err. There is no difficulty in conceiving the possibility of the infallibility of the corporation as a whole, acting officially, and the fallibility of its members, acting individually and unofficially. The notion that truth is to be determined by a plurality of voices, is one which no Catholic ever entertains. The infallibility we predicate of the Church is not predicated of human wisdom, sagacity, or virtue, but is by virtue of the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost. This assistance is granted, not to individuals in their private character, but to the body as a body acting officially according to certain prescribed rules. In a council the decision of the majority is infallible, if approved by the Pope, not because it is the decision of the majority, but because the assistance of the Holy Ghost is granted to the majority, or because he chooses to make the majority rather than the minority his organ. The ordinary infallible teacher in the Church is the Pope, who represents the whole Church, and possesses in himself the plenitude of the Apostolic authority, but the infallibility is official, not personal.

The other objections are not difficult for a Catholic to answer, but our present purpose is not to combat or refute the author. We are considering his book, not in its bearing against us, but in its bearing against those Protestants who still retain some notions of a clergy, and profess to have a divinely appointed ministry of the Christian revelation. We will therefore let the author speak still further for himself.

“This doctrine concerning the divine authority and functions of the ministers of the Gospel, was promulgated in Christendom long before the rise of the Bishop of Rome to universal authority, and of itself led inevitably to such a result. For, as it was universally conceded, during the fourth and fifth centuries, that Christ had established the clergy as an ecclesiastical corporation under the superintendence of the Apostles, so they also inferred from certain passages of Scripture that Peter had been constituted the head of the Apostolic body; and consequently, when the Bishop of Rome claimed to be Peter's successor, the doctrine of Papal supremacy as the head of the whole Christian clergy as a divinely commissioned body of men was so consistent with such a constitution of things, that it ultimately prevailed throughout the whole Western Empire by the inherent strength of such inferences.

“Though the Protestants from the time of the Reformation have

rejected the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome as the successor of the Apostle Peter, they appear to have never doubted that Christ constituted the Apostles an ecclesiastical corporation, with authority to ordain other persons as members of this body, and consequently that all ecclesiastical functions necessarily pertain to the ministers of the Gospel by the express appointment of Christ, and cannot lawfully be exercised by any other than ecclesiastically ordained persons. The Protestants therefore only differ essentially from the Church of Rome respecting the supremacy of the Pope, and in certain particulars concerning the powers of the bishops, or their identity in point of rank with presbyters. I apprehend, however, there is a much more important point to be determined on the general subject than has hitherto been properly investigated; viz. *is it an undoubted fact that Christ did constitute the Apostles an ecclesiastical corporation?* The determination of this question involves the most serious consequences, for all the claims of the clergy as a body of men consecrated by a divine appointment to perform certain functions rests ultimately on the fact whether the Apostles themselves were a corporation; for unless they were so constituted, they could not convey corporate powers to persons who succeeded them in point of time. Now every important passage that is quoted from the New Testament as implying commission, authority, or power to the clergy or ministers of the Gospel, has been deduced from words addressed expressly to the Apostles. But no one has a right to apply to the clergy at large words spoken by Christ specially to his Apostles, unless they can also show that the Apostles were a corporation, and that, as such, they communicated the powers or authority they themselves had received.

“That Christ gave certain powers to his twelve Apostles as individuals, to commence the great work of proselyting mankind, is evident from the New Testament, but that he appointed them in any sense an ecclesiastical corporation, with powers to confer a corporate authority upon those they might ordain to the ministerial function, is a doctrine that we cannot admit to be taught in the Scripture.

“In the first place, there is not a passage in the New Testament that either speaks of or implies any corporate action of the Apostles as a distinct body.

“Secondly. That there could have been no organization of the Apostles as a corporation, is evident from the statement made by Paul, who expressly tells us (Gal. i. 15, &c.) that, after his miraculous call to the Apostleship, he held no conference whatever with those who were Apostles before him, but went as a mere individual into Arabia on the work of his ministry; and not until three years after did he go up to Jerusalem, where he conferred with Peter singly, and merely mentions having seen James only of all the other Apostles.

"Thirdly. Neither did the other Apostles know during these three years that Christ had appointed Paul an Apostle with them; for it is stated expressly, in Acts ix. 26, 27, that when Paul first went up to Jerusalem, and "assayed to join himself with the disciples," they were all afraid of him, not believing him to be even a convert to Christianity, until Barnabas brought him to the other Apostles, who could only have been Peter and James, as stated above, and then declared to them that the Lord Jesus had spoken to Paul, and that he had afterwards preached boldly in his name. It seems incredible, therefore, that the Apostles were a corporation, when they did not know for three years so eminent a member of their body.

"A further series of arguments against the theory of an Apostolic corporation may be derived from the manifestly independent action of the several Apostles as so many different individuals. Thus Paul tells us (Gal. ii. 2, 6-9), that fourteen years after his conversion, when he went up to Jerusalem, he only held a private discourse with some of the more eminent of the Apostles, concerning the doctrines he preached among the Gentiles, &c. He then adds, that when the other Apostles saw that the Gospel to the heathen was committed to him, as the Gospel of the Jews was to Peter (i. e. by the evident intention of Christ), they gave him the right hand of fellowship, &c., and then they severally departed on the work of their ministry as mere individuals unconnected with any corporate dependence on each other.

"In further support of this view of the individual action of the different Apostles, we remark that Paul in the greater number of his Epistles associates with himself in the address, Timothy, Sylvanus, or Sosthenes, who were his ordinary attendants on his missionary excursions. In other Epistles he writes in his own name, and never uses any expression as implying the concurrent authority of an Apostolic corporation. It is the same with Peter, James, and John; they each write as individuals only. These facts are altogether inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Apostles constituted a corporation.

"But we can place our objections to the common notions on this subject in a still stronger light, by showing from the clearest inferences, that, notwithstanding the plausibility of the assumptions that have been inferred from Acts i. 3, &c., that Christ, neither at that time, nor on any other occasion, could have possibly given the Apostles any direct or explicit instructions, whereby they could have determined by corporate authority either the faith or practice of the general body of Christian believers.

"Thus, for instance, Christ could not have given them any instruction as to what order of things they were to establish among the Gentile nations, for it is abundantly clear that the Apostles did

not even comprehend they were to preach to the heathen, until *ten or eleven years after Christ's ascension*, when Peter had his vision and interview with Cornelius, as related in Acts x., and for which intercourse with a Gentile he was actually censured by his Christian brethren (Acts xi. 3), until he justified himself by relating the whole circumstance, and the miraculous testimony of the Holy Spirit that ensued.

"As the Apostles were thus evidently without any express instructions concerning the Gentiles, so we can show it to have been the same case as regarded the Jewish people; for it is evident that Christ could not have taught the Apostles in positive terms that they were to dispense with the observance of the Mosaic institutions concerning *circumcision*, and the use of clean or unclean food; for if he had thus instructed them, they never would have held a conference *twenty-two years after the ascension*, to determine this matter among themselves. (Acts xv.) Surely, if Christ had left them any systematic instructions respecting ecclesiastical institutions or observances, they would have said so at once, instead of making this subject a matter of debate upon which the sense of the whole church-membership was literally taken.

"A still stronger proof that Christ could not have given the Apostles any formal instruction as to any peculiar organization of the Christian Church, is evident in the fact, that, *thirty years after the ascension*, the Apostles and the whole Church at Jerusalem were unaware that the Mosaic institutions had been abrogated by the coming of Jesus Christ. Paul in his individual capacity had correctly inferred this, but the others had not; for when he made his last visit to Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 20), the '*Apostle James and all the elders*' informed him that the Christian society there had heard that he (Paul) had taught the Jews among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, &c. But, said they, as you perceive there '*are many thousands of Jews that believe*' (i. e. who are Christians), '*who are all zealous for the law*' (i. e. for the observance of the law of Moses); therefore, to induce them to understand that the report they have heard concerning your teaching is unfounded, '*and that thou thyself walkest orderly and keepest the law,*' now be at the expense of purifying four of our *Christian brethren* who have taken a (Nazarite) vow upon them according to the law of Moses, &c.

"From this statement it is abundantly clear that no constitution or organization of the Christian Church had been previously appointed by Christ, for had such been the case, it is utterly incredible that the Apostles, James, our Lord's brother, and the whole body of Christians at Jerusalem, should persist in a zealous observance of the institutions of Moses, instead of adopting the system that our clergy assume Christ himself had appointed at least thirty years before this time.

“ The notion, therefore, that Christ established a formal constitution for his Church, which was to be carried out into effectual operation by an organized clergy, possessing those peculiar ecclesiastical powers that the great body of professing Christians presume was conferred upon them, is totally irreconcilable with the statements made above ; which show the Apostles themselves were wholly uninstructed as to the extensive character of the Christian dispensation, beyond proclaiming to the world as mere witnesses what they had heard or seen respecting the personal ministry and history of Christ. It therefore follows conclusively, that any communications made by Christ to the Apostles, whether before or after his resurrection, could only have been directed to the establishment in their minds of certain particulars concerning himself as being the Messiah, which they were to testify to mankind, as is indeed plainly intimated in Acts i. 8, ‘ *Ye shall be witnesses unto me,*’ &c., but which instruction was wholly unaccompanied by any special enactments or directions as to the mode by which they were to dispose of those who should be the converts of their future ministry.” — Vol. II. pp. 161 – 165.

We should like to see a Protestant who rejects the Catholic Church, and therefore Catholic traditions, reply to this reasoning, and show us how, with the Bible alone, and no clew to its meaning but that furnished by grammar and lexicon, an honest and fair-minded inquirer can come to a more rational conclusion, unsound as we Catholics certainly know it to be. This is a grave matter for Protestants. Here is a writer of no mean ability, whose piety and learning they cannot question, who tells them plainly that, if they intend to be Bible Christians, they must give up even *their* church notions, and abandon, not only priests, but even divinely called and appointed ministers. Even the vocation of the Protestant parsons is endangered, and they are proved to be mere pretenders, on an authority which they hold or profess to hold to be final. They have here a serious work to do to defend themselves. And what is more, if they prove that there may be ministers of Christ, by proving, in opposition to Dr. McCulloh, that our Lord did institute a ministry for all time, they must then concede that they are not Christian ministers, because they are not Catholic priests. Dr. McCulloh is cruel to the Protestant ministers. They cannot be a divinely appointed ministry, if Christ instituted no ministry ; and if he did institute a ministry, they are not his ministers, because the ministry he instituted, if any, is that of the Roman Cath-

olic Church. Here is a cruel dilemma for our poor Episcopalian and Presbyterian ministers, and one out of which there is, as far as we can see, no logical escape for them.

The author having established, as he supposes, that the commonly received doctrine of a "Holy Catholic Church" founded by Christ, and to be protected by him until the end of time, is a delusion, proceeds to sketch the rise and progress of what he regards as the errors of Catholicity, under the general heads of *Developments of the Roman Empire*, and *Developments of Christianity under the Papacy*. Of what he advances under these two heads we have nothing more to say at present, than that he detects all the tendencies which have developed in the Papal Church at so early a date as the second century, when many of those who had been instructed by the Apostles were still living, and he is quite sure that those who accept the Church as it was in the second, third, and fourth centuries, will never be able to justify their dissent from the Roman Catholic Church in the sixteenth century. This was our opinion as a Protestant, only we went farther and included also the *first* century, for we felt that we could not denounce the Papal Church as false and corrupt without charging the Apostles themselves with grossly erroneous church views. It is absurd to suppose that the early Christians, instructed by the Apostles themselves and their immediate successors, could have introduced a church theory and organization wholly repugnant to that which they had received from the Apostles. If we concede the Catholic tendencies of the Church in the second century, and grant the Catholic Church to be their legitimate development, we must, as Dr. Newman has unanswerably proved, concede them to the first, and then either concede the Catholic to be the Apostolic Church, or stoutly maintain that the Apostles themselves misapprehended the teachings of their Divine Master, and founded an institution directly opposed to what he intended. We of course do not admit the theory of development, either as advocated by Dr. Newman or as set forth by our author, for in her essential constitution and doctrine we hold the Church was complete from the commencement, and the only development there has been or could be is extrinsic, or development by way of external application or realization. But Dr. Newman has certainly proved unanswerably, as against those Protestants who contend that what they call the

Papal Church is a corruption of the primitive Christianity, that, if you concede it to be the legitimate development of the principles and tendencies of the Church in any subsequent age, you must concede it to be the legitimate development of the principles and tendencies of the foregoing age, and therefore in the end that it is really and truly Apostolic. Dr. McCulloh cannot concede that the Church is the development of the principles and tendencies of the Christian community in the second century, and deny its legitimacy, without arraigning the Apostles themselves, and perhaps not without even calling in question the infallibility of the Divine Founder of our religion. The fact is, the Papistic tendencies manifest themselves quite too early to suit even Dr. McCulloh's purpose. He can point to no moment of history when the Christian Church did not recognize a body of divinely appointed teachers, ordained and commissioned by the authority of a continuous corporation of teachers, reaching back to the Apostles, under the presidency of Peter. It was always the sentiment of the Christian community, that no one could take upon himself the Christian ministry, unless called of God as was Aaron. Orders and mission were at the earliest date deemed essential, and at no moment do we find that community regarding it as an error to suppose that our Lord appointed an authoritative ministry of his word, or that a man was free to take upon himself this ministry by virtue of a mere internal call, without the ordination and commission of the regular external authority. The doctrine as to church organization contended for by our author is not laid down in the New Testament, even if it be granted that it does not expressly teach the opposite doctrine; and it certainly never has been either in theory or in practice that of the Church, at any period of her history.

This undeniable fact compels Dr. McCulloh, if he insists in regarding our Church as a corruption, to maintain that even the Apostles themselves corrupted the doctrine and intentions of their Master. If he maintains that, he is afloat, and must abandon Christianity itself, for he knows nothing of our Lord and his doctrines but what he derives through his Apostles. If they erred, if they corrupted his doctrine, intentionally or unintentionally, he has no certain knowledge on the subject, and no means whatever, with or without the Bible, of determining what was or was

not the real doctrine of our Lord. We saw and felt this during our Protestant days, and hence the question with us was, first, Church or No Church, and then, the Roman Catholic Church or No Christianity. We commenced our career as a Protestant minister on the ground occupied by our author; we denied that our Lord had instituted any church at all, or had instituted any divinely commissioned ministry of his word, to be perpetuated as a corporation of divinely commissioned pastors and teachers. We took thus the ground of No-churchism, and when we used the word *Church*, we meant by it only a voluntary association for mutual improvement and edification, organized and governed in such manner as its members judged best. But we soon found that, if we went thus far, we must go farther, for the reasoning by which we had been led to deny the Church in the Catholic sense compelled us to deny the infallibility of the Apostles and the inspiration of the Scriptures, that is, to deny Christianity itself as a supernaturally revealed religion. If, to escape this conclusion, we undertook to assert a divinely commissioned ministry, or proper Church principles, we could not, without violence to the clearest deductions of logic and to the best attested facts of history, stop short of the Roman Catholic Church. It was then, not only either Rome or No Church, but either Rome or No Christianity. And let us say what we will, the real conviction of the great mass of the intelligent men of our age is the same. Some few, like our Puseyite and Mercersburg friends, try to reconcile church ideas with the rejection of Rome, or Christianity with the denial of Catholicity, but their success is very slight. The great body of men who think, really, though sometimes half unconsciously, identify Christianity and Catholicity, and though perhaps wishing there were a religion they could embrace, yet find themselves without any religious belief at all.

But our intention was not to refute Dr. McCulloh's doctrine. What he says of the "Developments of Christianity under the Papacy" shows him to be but slightly versed in ecclesiastical history, and to have studied it, so far as he has studied it at all, in very unreliable works. In treating what he calls the "Developments of Christianity under Protestantism," he is less unsuccessful, and deserves to be read by every Protestant. We let him speak again for himself.

"The common belief of Protestants is, that Luther, Calvin, and other Reformers, as being raised up by the providence of God to effect the Reformation, did, under the influences of his Spirit, republish the true and undoubted principles of Christian truth, so that those who follow their doctrinal expositions in faithful sincerity shall certainly attain to the everlasting salvation offered in the Gospel.

"But however grateful such belief may be to the respective followers of Luther and Calvin, the fact of their having been guided by the influences of the Holy Spirit in promulgating the absolute principles of Christian truth is met with the formidable objection, that these eminent Reformers did not advocate a common system of Christian doctrine. Since this fact is notorious, it is impossible we can admit the Holy Spirit acted upon them to any such end, for if it had, then certainly Luther, Zwingle, and Calvin would have harmonized entirely in their expositions.

"But so little did Luther or Calvin comprehend the amount of corruptions existing in the Church, that they never contemplated doing any thing further than purifying it from the corruptions supposed to have been introduced by Papal authority. These Reformers never doubted that a HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH had been instituted by Christ, which under ecclesiastical ministrations was to endure until the ending of the world. Hence, as being completely bewildered with this ancient corruption of Christianity, they thought their work would be perfected if they could put the Church into the condition she was before the domination of the Popes, or, in other words, if they could re-establish her such as she was before the fifth or sixth centuries after Christ. They therefore adhered to all the dogmata and fundamentals of theological belief taught by the Church prior to those times, with as much reverence as the Catholics, and only differed from them by having taken a stand upon the ground, that the Bishop of Rome, or Pope, had usurped his authority in the Church after the seventh century, through which means he had introduced great abuses and corruptions, and that a reformation, i. e. a purification of the Church, was now necessary, in order to remove all those objectionable doctrines, institutions, or practices, that had ensued through Papal usurpation. The Reformers therefore considered themselves engaged only in the laudable work of purifying the Holy Catholic Church from any blemishes that had been unjustifiably introduced into her divine organization after the lapse of five or six centuries." — Vol. II. pp. 381, 382.

Here, according to the author, was the fundamental error of Protestantism. It retained the conception of the HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH.

"As the action of the various ecclesiastics who led the Reformation was thus individual and independent of each other, the necessary consequence was, that some of them went much further than others in their reforms, and dissensions immediately ensued between them as to the propriety of the courses they had taken. Others, again, began to doubt, and then to teach some modification of those doctrines of the Church which had previously been received as Christian truths by the Reformers as well as the Catholics. These conflicting opinions soon gave rise to the formation of parties, characterized by certain peculiarities of opinion that in some instances were almost as odious to other portions of the Reformers, as even the ancient doctrines of the Catholic Church. Thus Luther and Carlostadt soon assumed a hostile position to each other respecting certain particulars of observance and doctrines, while Zwingle's opinion concerning the Lord's Supper so wholly alienated Luther from him and his followers, that an entire separation ultimately took place between them. Infant baptism, which both Luther and Zwingle regarded as an institution of Christ, was utterly rejected by a large number of persons who adopted the principles of the Reformation, and who would have constituted a party among the Reformers fully as powerful as either the followers of Luther or Zwingle, had not the friends of the Reformation been frightened by the proceeding of a sect, who, though without any connection between their insane conduct and the question of infant baptism, had very early filled Europe with dread and aversion to the very name of Baptists.

"All these various causes of distraction arose among the first Reformers in consequence of their adhering to the doctrine of a Holy Catholic Church, which they considered had embodied in itself whatever had been taught by Christ or the Apostles. They indeed also taught that the obligations of Christianity were to be ascertained only from the Scripture, and that the consciences of men owed no allegiance on religious subjects to either Popes or Councils. But then they unfortunately did not discern that they themselves had acquired all their theological notions through Popes and Councils, and that what is to be regarded as having been taught in the Scriptures are only those particulars that have been distinctly announced to the consciences of mankind as matters of express revelation, and that inferences or deductions from incidental passages of Scripture are of no importance or obligation whatever.

"Hence, though the Protestant Reformers rejected whatever doctrine, institution, or practice they supposed had been introduced into the Church through Papal usurpation, yet under the delusion that the Holy Catholic Church was an institution of Christ, they gave full credence to any doctrine, institution, or practice of

Christianity, that had been recognized in the Church in the ages preceding the domination of the Bishops of Rome over Christendom. That they could fall into such delusion seems wonderful, since every reader of ecclesiastical history ought to have been aware, that it was only from the corruptions of Christianity in a preceding age, that the usurpation of the Bishops of Rome could have taken place at all; for the Popes only attained to their position through the power of opinion, although they might be sustained in that position by the civil arm after their spiritual authority had become recognized.

“ But in consequence of this gross oversight, when the Reformers first undertook, after their secession from the Church of Rome, to draw up expositions of Christian doctrine and institutions, as exhibiting to the world what they taught, or which were to serve as guidance and instructions to their followers; instead of constructing these formularies upon the simplicity of the teachings set forth in the New Testament, the Reformers allowed themselves to be led astray by the authority of Athanasius, Augustine, and others, whom they regarded as the champions of Christian orthodoxy, and correct exponents of the doctrines taught by the Apostles. Thus the Reformers threw Christianity into systematic forms based upon those presumptuous views of the nature, attributes, or providence of Jehovah, that had been advocated by the earlier Fathers in their doctrines concerning the Trinity, Original Sin, Preventing Grace, the Holy Catholic Church, the power of the sacraments in conferring grace, &c., which were wholly irreconcilable with the simplicity of things as inculcated by the Apostles in the New Testament. Their conduct in this respect was still more inexcusable, since a brief examination of the earlier Fathers ought to have convinced the Reformers, that it was impossible to restrict their testimony to any consistent exposition contrary to the Romish faith; for these very Fathers were all of them quoted by the Catholics to prove the truth of the doctrines advocated by them. This egregious mistake concerning the value of the writings of the Fathers has been very slowly perceived by Protestants, for even at this day they are absurdly quoted in partial extracts against Romish theology, whereas there are fully thrice as many other passages in their works that oppose any Protestant interpretation. The truth is, the Fathers of the second, third, and fourth centuries lived during the earlier periods of Christian corruption, and hence, before it attained its consummation, their testimony exhibits the works of a state of transition, whose tendency to what was afterwards fully elaborated in the doctrines and institutions of the Roman Catholic Church cannot be mistaken by any candid reader of modern times.

“ As we have already shown what was the doctrine of the Catholic Church concerning the fundamental truths of Christianity, the

priesthood, and the sacraments, at the time of the outbreak of the Reformation; so, when the Reformers seceded from the Catholic Church, these particulars, at least in theory, were still impressed on their minds, however much they considered them to have been vitiated by Papal influences during their long domination over the Christian world. When they, therefore, undertook to perfect the Reformation by the correction of preceding abuses and corruptions, two plans of operations were suggested to them. Luther, and the large majority of his followers, were in favor of retaining every part of the old Catholic doctrine and institutions that were *not contradictory to the Scripture*. Zwingle, on the contrary, in the true spirit of Christianity, contended that the Reformation should be effected *by rejecting every portion of the doctrine, institution, and practice of the Catholic Church, THAT WAS NOT EXPRESSLY SUSTAINED BY SCRIPTURE AUTHORITY.*" — Vol. II. pp. 382 – 385.

The fact is, according to the author, Protestantism has always been too Popish, and also the slave of the civil power.

"In those countries where Protestantism was firmly rooted, the only alternative of kings and nobles was to obtain the control of the Protestant churches, so as to prevent any further expansion of Protestant opinions. This measure was accomplished very adroitly, with the concurrence of the Protestants themselves, by taking either the adherents of Luther and Calvin under royal protection, according as they were most numerous or powerful, and then most rigidly prohibiting any one from preaching any other doctrines than those expressly recognized by these celebrated Reformers. If the king was a Lutheran, he required all the ministers and people of his dominion to give a solemn adhesion to the Augsburg Confession. If he was a Calvinist, they were required to give their entire assent to the doctrines contained in Calvin's Institutes. To all such clergymen small stipends, protection, and patronage were exclusively extended, to the great satisfaction of both ministers and people of the favored denomination, who thus saw their theological opponents either silenced or forced to leave the country. Even the pious and devout rejoiced in such a condition of things, in which they thought they saw the ancient prophecy fulfilled (Isaiah xlix. 23) in which kings had become nursing fathers to the Church.

"Under these delusive influences, NATIONAL CHURCHES were established in the several Protestant governments of Europe, and the Reformation was thus arrested and stereotyped in the imperfect attempts of the earliest Reformers to purify Christianity from the corruptions that had continually accumulated on it from the very first century after Christ, and which still preserve, though with diminished importance, a large amount of some of the most presumptuous doctrines of the Romish faith." — Vol. II. p. 390.

The author certainly understands perfectly well that Protestantism in its essential spirit can allow no authority in matters of religion, and we gather from his book that he is sufficiently logical to deny, with the denial of the Church, all dogmatic Christianity. All belief as distinguished from science or knowledge is assent on authority, and the moment that all authority to dogmatize is denied, you must, to be consistent, deny all dogmas, and therefore all belief properly so called. In so far as you reject the Holy Catholic Church, you necessarily reject all Christian doctrines. Doctrines imply a teacher, and if there is no teacher, there can be no doctrine. Hence, in rejecting the divinely appointed ministry, Dr. McCulloh not obscurely rejects all Christian belief, and resolves Christianity into mere sentiment or vague opinion, which no one is bound, under pain of making God a liar, to believe. This is in accordance with what is at present the manifest tendency of Protestantism throughout the world. The Gospel is supposed to contain no system of doctrines; indeed, not to have been addressed to the understanding at all, but to the heart, to the affections only, and to be not dogma, but a spirit, an influence, which may coalesce with any doctrine, and effect its purpose even without any doctrine at all. Protestantism demands no *credo*, and considers it Antichristian to insist on any articles of faith. This is as it should be. Because, denying that our Lord instituted a ministry of his word, or that he provided for the infallible preservation and teaching of any articles of faith, it is perfectly consistent and in character to conclude that he made no belief in such articles necessary.

It would be well, however, for our Protestant friends to bear in mind, that our Lord addressed his Gospel to man such as he is, and in it made provision for his actual wants. The Gospel is unquestionably addressed to the heart, and a mere intellectual assent to its truths is by no means sufficient. A belief which is not perfected by love will by no means suffice for salvation. But the heart addressed by the Gospel is not the mere sensitive heart; it is the rational heart, which moves only as enlightened by the understanding. The Gospel, to meet even its wants, must illumine the understanding as well as move the affections. It is spirit, it is influence; it is also doctrine and precept. The simple intellectual contemplation of the doctrine or

the precept does not of course generate the spirit or the influence, as Rationalists would have us believe. This is done through the medium of the Sacraments, received with a believing heart. So without the word, the doctrine, the spirit or the influence is not obtained, and consequently the tendency to reject Christianity as addressed to the understanding is equally a tendency to reject it as a spirit or an influence intended to operate upon the heart.

Yet we see no help for Protestantism. It must reject all authoritative teaching, or belie its own nature, and to reject all authoritative teaching is to reject Christianity as doctrine, therefore all articles and dogmas of faith as such. To do this is in its necessary effect to reject the whole Gospel, or at least to render it a matter of no importance. The Reformers, we may well believe, did not see whither they tended, but it is clear to-day that the movement was essentially a movement in behalf of the laity against the clergy, and involved as its vital principle the rejection of the priesthood, and the reduction of the sacerdotal order to the level of the laical. Misinterpreting a text of the New Testament, it asserted all Christians to be kings and priests; that is, contended that under the Gospel there can be legitimately kings and priests only in the sense in which every believer is a king and priest, which was, as we saw practically verified in the Anabaptists, those true and consistent Protestants, at once the rejection of the Church and the State, or civil society, and the introduction of absolute individualism, or pure anarchy, both civil and spiritual. The practical submission of Protestants to their ministers and their civil rulers has always been an inconsequence in their system, and hence they always look upon all authority as of the nature of despotism or tyranny, and, as far as it goes, at war with liberty. Their great argument against our Church is not that her doctrine is false, but that she professes to teach by authority, and therefore enslaves and brutalizes the mind. They look upon Catholics as slaves, deprived of all mental freedom, because we are bound to believe what she teaches. This is because they cannot understand how liberty and authority can be harmonized, or how what is assumed by the one is not so much taken from the other. How, then, can they recognize a divinely constituted Church, commissioned to teach and govern them in all things pertaining to their salvation? The

moment they admit the conception of such a Church, or recognize the least regularly transmitted authority in their ministers, they must either deny logic or become Catholics. So the real question for them is always Catholicity or No Church and no clergy, and this question is virtually the question, Catholicity or No Christianity, and therefore no religion.

ART. III. — *The Metropolitan Magazine*. Edited by J. V. HUNTINGTON. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. Monthly. February and March, 1854. *Temporal Power of the Popes*.

WE regret the retirement from the editorial department of *The Metropolitan Magazine* of the Rev. Dr. White, a most worthy divine, for whom we have a high personal esteem and affection, and to whom our Catholic literature is under far greater obligations than have as yet been generally acknowledged. We are glad, however, to learn that his place is to be supplied by Dr. J. V. Huntington, a distinguished literary gentleman, a convert from Episcopalianism, and well known as the author of *Lady Alice*, *Alban*, and *The Forest*. Under his editorial management, the *Magazine*, our only monthly periodical, will no doubt sustain its reputation, and not unlikely become even more popular, if not more useful.

The two numbers published since the accession of the new editor present an agreeable variety, and seem in general well adapted to the tastes and capacities of that numerous class of readers who want something more than the newspaper and something less than the quarterly review. We think, however, that we detect in the editor an intention of combining in his periodical the characteristics of a review with those of a magazine. We doubt the propriety of such combination in the present state of our Catholic public, as we do the combination of theological discussions and glowing love scenes in a work of fiction. We also are sorry that he should have judged it necessary to place the very first number of his *Magazine* in an attitude apparently of hostility to our *Review*. There is

room enough for his periodical without displacing ours, and we do not think that to wage a controversy with a Catholic periodical so well known and so long established as ours, is the best way either to win laurels for himself or to contribute to the edification of the Catholic community. He may indeed, by so doing, diminish in some degree the influence of our labors with the carnal Jews of the age, but he will not unlikely impair in the same or a greater degree his own influence with the stanch friends of our holy religion.

In the numbers for both February and March we are assailed with great warmth and vigor, and, as we think, very unnecessarily; for we are not aware of having in our discussion transcended the legitimate limits of a Catholic reviewer, or brought out any peculiar system or opinion of our own, whether in metaphysics or in theology. The opinions assailed we hold in common with the greatest and most approved Catholic doctors, and they are undeniably such as we may hold without any impeachment of our orthodoxy. If we have erred at all, it has been in claiming too much for the spiritual order, and in placing Peter too far above Cæsar. An error of this sort, if error it be, in these days of statolatry, carnal Judaism, and political atheism, is not likely to do much harm, or to gain any very alarming popularity. It is far safer to err on the side of the spiritual than on the side of the temporal, and in exaggerating the powers of the Church, than in exaggerating those of the State. The temporal as distinguished from the spiritual has all the passions and inclinations of human nature in its fallen state to support it, and is never in danger of being unduly depressed; the spiritual is always opposed by them, and can sustain itself only in overcoming and subduing them. If a writer of good intentions and acknowledged orthodoxy, in defending the prerogatives of the spiritual order, should happen to go even a little too far, if such a thing be possible; the scandal is far less than that which must result from the attempt, by public controversy, to bring him back within more moderate limits. The *Metropolitan*, by attacking us, has the appearance, in the popular mind at least, of taking the side of the temporal against the spiritual, of the State against the Church, of Cæsar against Peter, the people against God. The practical effect of its protest against us will not stop with a

simple protest against what it regards as our ultraism, but will go farther, give aid and countenance to all the adherents of political atheism, and strengthen that fatal tendency of all modern society to rebel against God, which it, we presume, deploras no less than we, and to arrest which our Review has labored with all the force we could give it, ever since it became a Catholic review. In exciting a controversy and arming popular prejudice against us, the *Metropolitan*, we must think, has judged unwisely, and can hardly fail to do harm.

We could not and would not say this, if we were or could be accused of heterodoxy, of bringing out novelties of our own, or of broaching subjects prohibited to a Catholic reviewer. But nothing of this is or can be pretended. No one accuses us of heterodoxy, and the *Metropolitan* itself hardly goes even so far as to question the truth of the opinions it finds fault with us for having set forth; for it does not even attempt to discuss them on their merits. The real purport of the charge against us is that we go too far,—not that we are uncatholic, but that we are too Catholic; not that we are heterodox, but that we are too orthodox. The opinions which we are assailed for defending, it is conceded, are not against faith, or in any sense incompatible with sound Catholic doctrine; and it cannot be denied that they have been and still are held by the great body of theologians most esteemed at Rome for their orthodoxy. No doubt Rome has tolerated the opinion held by the *Metropolitan*, but no one will pretend that it is the opinion which she favors, or that her sympathies are not with the doctrine we defend. She has never uttered a word in favor of the opinion espoused by the *Metropolitan*. Not a syllable in any official document from the Holy See can be tortured into an approbation of it; and the *Metropolitan* itself concedes that the language of the Popes on several occasions may seem to imply, and perhaps does imply, the doctrine we contend for. It finds its opinion supported chiefly by temporal princes, jurisconsults, bureaucrats, courtiers, demagogues, and those theologians who, in the contests between the temporal and the spiritual powers, sided with the temporal, and sustained Cæsar against Peter, or who have found themselves so situated that it was necessary, in order to escape the wrath of Cæsar and to practise their religion without having their throats cut,

to go as far as they possibly could in restricting the Papal prerogatives; and the most that it can pretend is, that the language of the Sovereign Pontiffs, Councils, and doctors *may* be explained in a sense not absolutely repugnant to its doctrine. This is evident from M. Gosselin's book. In order to be able to maintain the opinion contrary to ours, its advocates have a host of documents to explain away, while we have nothing of the sort to do; for it must be conceded that the more obvious and natural sense of the documents in the case is in our favor. No author was ever placed on the *Index* for asserting the indirect temporal power of the Popes, and yet Sixtus Quintus placed even Bellarmine on the *Index*, for denying their direct, and maintaining *only* their indirect, temporal authority. The presumptions throughout are unquestionably on our side, and if suspicion attaches to either opinion, it certainly is not to ours. It is they who take the contrary opinion that have the labor of vindicating their orthodoxy, not we. Such being undeniably the state of the case, and the doctrine we have defended being unquestionably the one more directly opposed to the fundamental errors of our times, we cannot think that the *Metropolitan* was doing a service to the cause of sound doctrine by entering the lists against us, and treating us almost as if we were committing some grievous sin against religion, or some outrageous crime against the peace and welfare of society.

But however this may be, we assure our respectable contemporary that we shall enter into no controversy with it, either in the field of metaphysics or in that of theology. We have other things to do, and we are persuaded that we can employ our time and our pages more to the advantage of truth and to the edification of Catholics in some other way. The matters on which it assails us we think we have sufficiently discussed, and we can now foresee nothing that will make it our duty to discuss them further. If the article directed against us in the *Metropolitan* for March last, on the Temporal Power of the Popes, had treated the subject so as to have permitted us, with justice to our friends or without discredit to the cause we defend, to remain silent, we should have passed it by without a word of comment. Such, indeed, was our intention, on learning that it was to appear, and we expressed as much to those who spoke of it to us. But on reading it, and taking the

advice of those we usually consult in such matters, we have felt it our duty, not to offer a formal reply to it, which might provoke a rejoinder, but to make some explanatory remarks on the state of the question, the real doctrine we have endeavored to defend, and the bearing of that doctrine on the great controversies in which Catholics in our times are engaged.

The article we refer to professes to controvert the doctrine of our Review regarding the temporal power of the Popes. The question, it must be understood, is not a question as to what is or is not Catholic dogma on the subject, although in our opinion it is not very remotely connected with faith. The question, as taken up and presented by the *Metropolitan*, lies, it is assumed, outside of faith, and is an open question. Its opinion is tolerated, and we cannot call it heretical in maintaining it, although we may think that the logical consequences of that opinion, if carried out, would be repugnant to Catholic dogma. On the other hand, we are certainly free to hold and defend our opinion, as an opinion, though not as Catholic dogma; for we cannot assert that the precise point made against us has been decided in our favor, or decided at all. The *Metropolitan* proves—saving some late condemnations of books at Rome, of the exact sense of which we are not fully informed and are not competent to speak—that its opinion is tolerated, and therefore that one may, if he see proper, hold and defend it,—a fact we have never denied. We have said that we believe Catholic dogma requires us to maintain at least the *indirect* temporal authority of the Popes, or to forswear our logic; by which we evidently mean, not that it is Catholic dogma, but a strict logical deduction from it. This may be the case, and yet one who denies it not be a heretic; for the Church does not hold a man to be a heretic because he happens to be a poor logician. These explanations will suffice to show that the question pertains not to the department of faith, but to that of opinion, in which both parties are, or at least are conceded to be, free, and therefore each opinion is to be accepted or rejected on its merits.

We regret that the *Metropolitan* has not seen proper to discuss the question it raises on its intrinsic merits. It states what it supposes to be our doctrine, and then shows that the contrary doctrine extensively prevails and

is deeply rooted in several portions—the best portions, it says—of the Church. We do not see what this has to do with the case. If by this it was intended to prove that the doctrine contrary to ours can be held by Catholics without falling under the censure of the Church, it was quite superfluous, for that we have never denied, but have conceded time and again, and even in the last number of our Review. If it is adduced to prove that the opinion ought not to be controverted, it is not conclusive; for if the opinion be unsound and of dangerous tendency, as we hold and are free to maintain, it would be a good reason for discussing and endeavoring to refute it. They are popular, not unpopular errors, that are most necessary to be controverted. If it is adduced to prove that the opinion is a *sententia Ecclesie*, it proves too much; for it is conceded that we are free to oppose it, and can hold and defend the contrary doctrine without incurring any suspicion of not being rigidly orthodox. The *Metropolitan* contends that, seeing the doctrine is so widely held and so deeply rooted, and has even been incorporated into the oaths taken by the Irish and English bishops, with the knowledge and silence of the Holy See, we cannot now controvert it without bringing a reproach against Rome for having tolerated it, and charging her with culpable remissness for not having condemned it. This argument, if anything, would prove too much, for it would prove that the opinion is not controvertible, and that we are not free to advocate the contrary doctrine, which cannot be pretended. The principle implied would moreover stop all discussion of opinions tolerated, or not condemned, by Rome. By what right, then, does the *Metropolitan* discuss and controvert ours? Has not Rome always tolerated diversity of opinions among Catholics on matters not of faith? And is she to be charged with negligence or remissness, because she does not judge it proper to thunder her anathemas against every error not immediately against faith, that happens to obtain among Catholics? If we had maintained that the opinion we oppose is immediately against faith, and therefore a heresy, the reasoning of the *Metropolitan* would have been conclusive; but as we have done no such thing, we see not with what propriety it can be adduced against us. We regret, therefore, that the *Metropolitan*, since it judged it necessary to discuss the subject,

did not enter into its intrinsic merits, and forbear to urge those extrinsic considerations, which, however effectual they may be in bringing the weight of popular prejudice to bear against us, really decide nothing one way or the other as to the subject-matter in dispute.

The *Metropolitan* does not, moreover, give a fair and adequate statement of the real question we have been discussing. It takes an incident of the main question for the main question itself. Its readers, unless they have also read and studied us, can form only an erroneous conception of the question as it lies in our mind, or as we have ourselves presented it. It writes as if it felt we were doing immense injury to the cause of religion, and as if it was manifestly its duty to avail itself of the most ready means in its power to arrest us. Its object does not appear to have been to enlighten us, to correct our alleged errors, or to elucidate and settle the question raised, but at any rate to stop us, not from hostility to us personally, we readily and cheerfully concede, but from a most praiseworthy desire to silence an enemy to the Catholic cause, or at least to neutralize his influence. Now we do not believe that we are such an enemy, nor that the case was so urgent, that time might not have been taken to have done justice both to our views and to the subject itself. We had, we humbly submit, a right, if we were to be opposed at all, to insist that it should be done with fairness to our views, and also to the questions involved. The writer seems to us to have taken unnecessary alarm. He gives his readers the impression, that we have been engaged in discussing the temporal power of the Popes as a simple isolated question, and that we have wantonly, without rhyme or reason, revived an old, exploded theory, generally abandoned by all Catholic theologians, and perhaps by Rome herself, and defended in our days by only here and there an individual, of questionable orthodoxy or soundness of judgment, and in so doing have provoked an entirely useless controversy, and one which can have only the most unpleasant results. Will it be permitted us to say, this is not a fair and adequate statement of the case?

We have asserted the indirect temporal power of the Popes by divine right, we grant; but not as an isolated point, nor in the sense nor on the principles the *Metropolitan* induces its readers to suppose. It was not fair, we must

think, to take our doctrine from a brief article in our last Review, the principal object of which was not, as our contemporary alleges, to discuss that doctrine, but to reply to an objection that had been often insinuated against us, of going too far, or of being ultra in some of our views. The doctrine we stated in that article had been almost from the first the doctrine of our Review, and had been discussed in its extent and limitations in three elaborate articles expressly devoted to it in our volume for 1853. The statements in the article in our last number should, it seems to us, have been taken in the sense, and with the qualifications, which we had previously given, especially in the three articles referred to. If this had been done, it would have been clear, we think, that the discussion of the deposing power is not treated by us as an isolated, or as anything more than an incidental question; that we touched upon it only as connected with our general doctrine as to the relation of the two orders, temporal and spiritual; and that, properly speaking, our Review has never claimed or defended any temporal or civil power or jurisdiction at all for the Pope out of the Ecclesiastical States. All the power our Review has ever claimed or defended for the Pope is that which we maintain is inherent in the spiritual order by the fact that it is the spiritual order, in the Church as representative of that order on earth, and in the Pope as supreme visible head of the Church. If this had been attended to, it would have been seen that with us the real question regards not the deposing power as such, but the rights and powers of the spiritual in relation to the temporal.

The question which we have all along been discussing, and which in one form or other is almost the only question discussed in our Review, is precisely this question as to the relation of the two orders, the rights and powers of the spiritual order in relation to the temporal, and of the Church, as the representative of the spiritual, in face of the State, the representative of the temporal. We have never confounded the two orders, never merged one in the other, or denied the substantive existence of either; we have simply asserted that the temporal exists not for its own sake, but for the spiritual, and that the spiritual order is by its own nature supreme over the temporal. In this we do not deny the temporal, or make the spiritual tem-

poral. We do not deny the existence of man when we maintain that he exists for God only; nor do we make God human when we assert his supreme authority over man. If the temporal is for the spiritual, if the spiritual is supreme over the temporal, if the Church represents the authority of the spiritual, and if the Pope be the supreme head of the Church by divine right, as all Catholics, we suppose, must hold, then the Pope must have supreme authority over the temporal order, and therefore the power to judge princes in temporals, not indeed precisely as temporals, but as spirituals. This is the doctrine we have maintained. Here we take the liberty to cite, for the consideration of the *Metropolitan*, a few paragraphs from our Review for January, 1853:—

“But let us not be supposed to insist on a doctrine which we do not. We contend not here for the doctrine, that the State holds from God only through the Church, although we should be loath to deny even that doctrine, since it has high authority in its favor; we stop with the doctrine of Bellarmine and Suarez, that the temporal prince holds his authority from God through the people or the community, and therefore concede, as we have always conceded, that the people, where there is no existing legitimate government, are the medial origin of government. But the people, even on this ground, are not the ultimate source of power, and do not give to civil government its right to govern, for *non est potestas, nisi a Deo*; they are only the medium of its constitution, not the fountain of its rights. The government when constituted has immediately from God its authority or right to govern, and consequently holds immediately under his law, and for the end that law prescribes. That end, as we have seen, is the Christian end, the ultimate end of man. The government then, whether regal or popular, holds its authority on condition that it exercises all its powers in obedience to the law of Christ for that end, and, of course, forfeits its rights whenever it neglects or violates this condition. The powers of government are a sacred trust, and must be exercised according to the conditions of the trust; to violate these conditions is, then, to forfeit the trust, and to lose the powers it confers. We must say this, unless we accept Oriental despotism, and contend for the inamissibility of power; that is, that the prince, let him do what he pleases, tyrannize and oppress as he may, never loses his right to reign,—a doctrine which cannot be consistently maintained by any Englishman who boasts of his glorious Revolution of 1688, or by any American who on each succeeding Fourth of July reads with patriotic pride the Declaration of Independence by the Congress of 1776.

"Now, although we do not say that the Church commissions the State, or imposes the conditions on which it holds its right to govern, yet as it holds under the law of Christ, and on conditions imposed by that law, we do say that she, as the guardian and judge of that law, must have the power to take cognizance of the state, and to judge whether it does or does not conform to the conditions of its trust, and to pronounce sentence accordingly; which sentence ought to have immediate practical execution in the temporal order, and the temporal power that resists it is not only faithless to its trust, but guilty of direct rebellion against God, the only real Sovereign, Fountain of all law, and Source of all rights in the temporal order as in the spiritual. She must have the right to take cognizance of the fidelity of subjects, since they are bound to obey the legitimate prince for conscience' sake; and therefore of the manner in which princes discharge their duties to their subjects, and to judge and to declare whether they have or have not forfeited their trusts, and lost their right to reign or to command the obedience of their subjects. The deposing power, then, is inherent in her as the spiritual authority, as the guardian and judge of the law under which kings and emperors hold their crowns, and have the right to reign; for *in deposing a sovereign, absolving his subjects from their allegiance, and authorizing them to proceed to the choice of a new sovereign, she does but apply the law of Christ to a particular case, and judicially declare what is already true by that law. She only declares that the forfeiture has occurred, and that subjects are released from their oath of fidelity, who are already released by the law of God.*

"This power which we claim here for the Church over temporals is not itself *precisely a temporal power*. We are indeed not at liberty to assert that the Church has no temporal authority, for that she has no temporal authority, direct or indirect, is a condemned proposition, — condemned, if we are not mistaken, by our present Holy Father, in his condemnation of the work on Canon Law by Professor Nuytz of Turin, — and we have seen that she has even direct temporal authority by divine right; but the power we are now asserting, *though a power over temporals, is itself, strictly speaking, a spiritual power, held by a spiritual person, and exerted for a spiritual end.* The temporal order by its own nature, or by the fact that it exists in the present decree of God only for an end not in its own order, is subjected to the spiritual, and consequently every question that does or can arise in the temporal order *is indirectly a spiritual question, and within the jurisdiction of the Church as the spiritual authority, and therefore of the Pope, who, as supreme chief of the Church, possesses that authority in all its plenitude.* The Pope, then, even by virtue of his spiritual authority, has the power to judge all temporal ques-

tions, if not precisely as temporal, yet as spiritual, — for all temporal questions are to be decided by their relation to the spiritual, — and therefore has the right to pronounce sentence of deposition against any sovereign when required by the good of the spiritual order.

“No Christian can or will deny that whatever we do, — whether we sing or pray, eat or drink, wake or sleep, assist at public worship or pursue our own domestic avocations, whether we act in a private or in a public capacity, — we are bound to do it from conscience, and for the glory of God, for whom we are created, and who is our supreme good, as well as the Supreme Good in itself. The Church, as the spiritual power, has jurisdiction in all matters that touch our consciences, the law, the glory of God, or our supreme good. Then she has jurisdiction over all our lives, and all our acts. Does the law of God prescribe our duty to temporal sovereigns? Does it prescribe the duty of sovereigns to their subjects? We have seen that it does. Can we neglect our duty to sovereigns, or they their duty to us, with a good conscience, or without sin? Of course not. If sovereigns play the tyrant, if they become cruel, oppressive, governing their subjects iniquitously for selfish ends, do they or do they not violate the law of God, and forfeit their rights? If you are not a base despot or a vile slave, you must say they do. If the Church is the spiritual power, with the right to declare the law of Christ for all men and nations, can any act of the State in contravention of her canons be regarded as a law? The most vulgar common-sense answers, that it cannot. Tell us then, even supposing the Church to have only spiritual power, what question can come up between man and man, between sovereign and sovereign, between subject and sovereign, or sovereign and subject, that does not come within the legitimate jurisdiction of the Church, and on which she has not by divine right the power to pronounce a judicial sentence? None? Then the power she exercised over sovereigns in the Middle Ages was not a usurpation, was not derived from the concession of princes or the consent of the people, but was and is hers by divine right; and whoso resists it rebels against the King of kings and Lord of lords. This is the ground on which we defend the power exercised over sovereigns by Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages.” — Third Series, Vol. I. pp. 46 – 49.

Now here is the doctrine, and the whole doctrine, of our Review on the subject. Is there anything in it to which a good Catholic can reasonably object? If we mistake not, the *Metropolitan* itself concedes it all, for it asserts (p. 115) that every Christian admits “the subordination of temporal things to spiritual things,” and the obligation of

kings, as well as others, even in their official acts, to be guided by the law of God as expounded by the Church, and to be subject to her censures when they disregard it." What more in reality have we ourselves insisted on? And what was the necessity of raising an outcry against us? But we have asserted the deposing power, by divine right, which the *Metropolitan* denies. If it will give us credit for understanding and meaning what we say, it will perhaps find that it imagines even here a difference which is apparent, not real. The deposing power, as we have explained it, is the right of the Pope as supreme head of the Church to judge whether the State "does or does not conform to the conditions of its trust, and to pronounce sentence accordingly; which sentence *ought* to have immediate practical effect." Can the *Metropolitan* say what it does without going as far? We beg permission here to cite a passage from our Review for last July, on this point, and which possibly the *Metropolitan* has overlooked:—

"We do not, indeed, claim for the Church in relation to the temporal authority the right to make the law, for God himself, and he only, makes the law; but we do claim for her the right to declare and apply his law to kings and princes, states and empires, as well as to individuals, in public as well as in private matters. The Church, of course, has no right to depose a legitimate prince, that is, a prince who has the right to reign, or to absolve his subjects from their allegiance, for she has no right to do wrong or to violate the law of God, and we are not at liberty to suppose that she ever does, ever will, or ever can, for she is holy and infallible by virtue of the indwelling and assistance of the Holy Ghost; but she has the right to judge who has or has not, according to the law of God, the right to reign, — whether the prince has by his infidelity, his misdeeds, his tyranny and oppression, forfeited his trust, and lost his right to the allegiance of his subjects, and therefore whether they are still held to their allegiance or are released from it by the law of God. If she have the right to judge, she has the right to pronounce judgment, and order its execution; therefore, to pronounce sentence of deposition upon the prince who has forfeited his right to reign, and to declare his subjects absolved from their allegiance to him, and free to elect themselves a new sovereign.

"*She has the right, we say, to pronounce sentence*, but whether the sentence shall be carried into effect or not in the temporal order depends, in point of fact, on that order itself; not because she has no authority over the temporal power, but because she has no temporal arms with which to enforce the execution of her sentence.

She bears indeed the temporal sword, but it was not the will of her Spouse that she should wield it with her own hands. She ordinarily exercises it only by the hands of the laity, and she has only spiritual means by which to compel them to exercise it according to her orders. So, however extensive her authority, or full her right over the temporal power, she depends solely on the faith and conscience of her children for its practical assertion beyond the sphere of the spiritual order. It is this fact, we apprehend, that has led so many to misconceive and to misstate her authority in regard to temporal sovereigns, and it is the misapprehension of this fact that usually so alarms Cæsar and his ministers. God respects in all men the free will of man, and forces no man into the Church or into heaven against his free will. There is no one who cannot, if he chooses, resist Divine grace, disobey the law of God, and lose his soul. God will have none but a free-will offering, none but a voluntary service, although those who reject his offers, refuse to serve him, and disobey his commands, do so at their own peril, and must suffer the consequences. So he has not willed that his Church should with her own hands wield the temporal sword, and has left the nations, not the right, but the ability, to resist her judgments, and to refuse to execute her decrees. If their faith and conscience will not lead them to execute her sentence, when that sentence requires the exercise of physical force, she can herself do no more, and the responsibility rests with them. Her practical power over temporal affairs is therefore restricted to that which is yielded her by the faith and piety of the faithful, although her right, her authority, is supreme and universal. If her children are uninstructed as to this right, if they grow up with the persuasion that she has no authority over temporals, and that her power is restricted to teaching the Catechism and administering the Sacraments, she will be able to exert little or no power over temporal governments, and her children, as in the French Revolution, will too often be found siding with the State against her, and rushing headlong into heresy and schism, to the ruin of the State and the perdition of their own souls. Nevertheless, her authority, her right remains; and not unfrequently her heavenly Spouse in a mysterious manner intervenes to vindicate it, and to carry her sentence into effect, as we saw surprisingly manifested in the case of the Emperor Napoleon the First. Schismatic Russia, heretical England and Prussia, and even infidel Turkey, were made in the providence of God instruments for the execution of her decrees, and inflicting merited chastisement on the persecutor of her Sovereign Pontiff. Napoleon laughed at the idea of an excommunication of a sovereign by the Pope in the nineteenth century, and asked, sneeringly, if the old man expected that the thunders of the Church would cause the muskets to fall from the hands of his

soldiers. He had his answer on his retreat from Moscow, when the muskets did literally drop from their hands.

"This power which we claim for the Church over temporal sovereigns and their subjects is neither more nor less than the simple power of the keys. Bossuet, indeed, in the first of the Four Articles, denies that kings and princes can be deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance by the power of the keys, and maintains that these give the Pope no right in civil and temporal affairs; but in this he clearly places himself in opposition to some of the greatest and most holy Pontiffs that have ever sat in the chair of Peter. St. Gregory the Seventh expressly deduces his right to depose princes and absolve their subjects from the power of the keys, and the authority of this Pontiff, canonized by the Church, is greater than that of Bossuet, or even the whole thirty-four French bishops who made the Gallican Declaration of 1682. Bossuet also is easily refuted by the reason of the case, unless he can, as he cannot, adduce a decision of authority, disclaiming the power in question. Popes have claimed it, have exercised it, and have never disclaimed it. They have uniformly deduced it from the power of the keys, and none have ever denied it. We have, we think, then, the right to insist that the power of the keys is unrestricted, or without other limitations than such as are imposed by its own nature. Our Lord says to Peter, 'I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven.' (St. Matthew xvi. 19.) Here is conferred all the authority of the kingdom, and the authority of the Pope as the successor of Peter therefore has no other restrictions than those of the kingdom of heaven itself; and that authority, we have shown over and over again, by its own nature extends over the whole temporal order. This is evident, too, from the very purpose of our Lord in setting up his kingdom, that is, the Church, on the earth. He set up his kingdom on the earth to rule over the kingdoms of this world, and to make them the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. In giving the keys of this kingdom to Peter, he must from the nature of the case have given him through them all the powers necessary to accomplish that purpose; for he who imposes the end necessarily confers the right to use all the means necessary to effect it.

"The king or prince holds either under the law of nature or the revealed law of God, and of course is bound to conform to the law under which he holds. If you say he holds under the revealed law, there is no controversy between us, for there is no question with any Catholic that the Church has supreme jurisdiction in every case that does or can arise under that law. If then you mean to oppose us, you must say that he holds under the law of nature,

which is what all those who take the ground of Bossuet do say. The question then is, Has the Church, or has she not, supreme judicial authority in all cases that do or can arise under the law of nature? Has she, or has she not, the right to take cognizance of offences against the natural law, as distinguished from the revealed law? To a certain extent she certainly has, as every Catholic does and must concede. *She does not, she cannot, indeed, abrogate the natural law, nor modify any of its essential provisions; but natural morality is no less within her jurisdiction than super-natural morality.* She takes cognizance in her tribunals of offences against natural justice, as well as of offences against faith and the Sacraments, *for they are equally offences against God*, and offences against the natural law are accounted offences even of a deeper dye than those against the positive law. In the process of canonization, evidence is first taken with regard to the cardinal virtues, and if the candidate is found deficient in these, the inquiry stops and the case is dismissed. Obedience to the natural law lies at the foundation of all virtue, and where that is wanting, neither faith nor the Sacraments will avail us. If we have violated natural justice, we must make restitution before we can receive absolution. Certainly the Church has jurisdiction of cases under the natural law, as every one who has learned the Catechism, heard an instruction from the pulpit, or been to confession, must concede.

"If the Church has jurisdiction in some cases under the natural law, she must have in all cases, unless some cases be specially excepted by God himself, and expressly reserved to another tribunal. No such cases can be alleged. There are reserved cases, as from a priest to the bishop, and from the bishop to the Pope, but none from the Supreme Pontiff himself. The Church, then, has supreme jurisdiction in all cases which do or can arise under the natural as well as the revealed law. The question then comes up, Are kings and princes bound by the natural law, that is, bound in their government of their subjects to observe the law of nature? They most assuredly are, if they hold under that law, and *a fortiori* if they hold under the revealed law, which presupposes and confirms the natural law. That law is the ground of their rights and the rule of their duties, and if they violate it, and rule unjustly, tyrannically, oppressively, they sin, and sin against God, for the natural law is law, is obligatory, only inasmuch as it is the law of God, or a transcript of the eternal law. Of that sin the Church may take cognizance as of any other sin, and bind or loose those guilty of it according to her own judgment in the case. If the sin is one that forfeits their power, according to the law of nature, and there is no evidence of repentance, and every reason to believe that it will be persisted in, she has the right to bind them, and to declare judicially that they have no longer the right to reign, and that their

subjects are no longer bound to obey them ; that is, to depose them, declare the throne vacant, and to absolve their subjects from their allegiance and declare them free to elect a new sovereign, for in all this she does only declare a simple fact. In doing this, it is clear that she only exercises the power of the keys, of binding and loosing, and that, if she could not do thus much, there would be a class of sins that exclude from heaven of which she could take no cognizance, and to which she could apply no remedy."— Ibid. pp. 301 – 305.

The doctrine we insist on is that the prince incurs deposition, not by the will or legislation of the Church, but by virtue of the natural law, or the law of God, under which he holds, and that the deposing power of the Pope is simply judicial and declarative. What he does is to declare and apply the law of God to the particular case, and what he decides is the spiritual question involved, and therefore in doing it he transcends not the limits of his spiritual functions. The power of the Pope in regard to princes is limited by the law of God, but of that law he is the guardian and judge for states as well as individuals, and therefore has the right to judge of its infractions by princes as well as by subjects, and both are bound by his judgment, and *ought* to give practical effect to his sentence ; but if they refuse, the Pope uses only spiritual arms to compel them, for he has no other. He can pronounce the sentence of forfeiture, and declare subjects absolved, but practically there his power ordinarily ends. Here is all our Review has ever contended for, and we should like to know how a good Catholic, save at the expense of his logic, can say less.

We have never maintained for the Popes temporal and civil jurisdiction, properly so called, out of the Ecclesiastical States, and though we would not, we could, consistently with the doctrine of our Review, take the oath taken by the English and Irish bishops as cited by the *Metropolitan*. We recognize, as we have always said, the substantive existence of the State as distinct from the Church, though not its absolute independence of the spiritual authority. It depends on the Church in the sense that the Church is its superior, and defines its powers, and interprets for it the law under which it holds, and to which it is amenable in its acts. In all other respects it is independent. There is therefore nothing in our views to frighten people with the bugbear of theocracy. We recog-

nize in the State the same liberty and independence of action that we do in the individual in matters of private and domestic economy. Within the limits of the moral law, as interpreted and applied by the Church, it is free to do as it pleases. We claim no authority for the Pope to interfere with the constitution of a state not repugnant to the Divine law, or to disturb the rights or relations of property as settled by the same law. He has the right to judge whether an individual, public or private, acquires and holds property unjustly, and if so, as supreme director of conscience, he has the right to order restitution to be made to the rightful lord, but he has no right to appropriate it to himself. He no more than we can go into the White House at Washington and take President Pierce's new carpet, and he is as much subject to the law of God, revealed and natural, as the lowest of his spiritual children. His power is a power to declare and protect right, not to violate it; to direct its observance by all men and nations, not to disregard it or to abrogate it.

There is in all the reasoning against our doctrine, it seems to us, an ill-concealed distrust of the spiritual power, or a secret fear that, if we concede it the supremacy, it will tyrannize over or oppress the temporal. They who oppose us seem to imagine that it is necessary for the safety of the temporal order, and to be able to prevent or resist the encroachments or usurpations of the Church, "the rapacity of Popes and insolence of Churchmen," to maintain the entire separation of the two orders, and to assert the full freedom and independence in temporals of the civil authority. What, if your doctrine be true, we are asked, is the protection of the State against the encroachments of the Church? What is to prevent the ecclesiastical power from invading the civil, and appropriating to itself the functions of the temporal prince? The secret of their opposition seems to be the conviction that it is necessary for the protection of civil society to have some temporal barrier to the lawless ambition of the Sovereign Pontiffs. But there is nothing in the history of the Popes, from St. Peter to the reigning Pontiff, to warrant this distrust. Instances of weakness, of not resisting with sufficient promptness, energy, and firmness the ambition of Cæsar, may possibly be found on the part of some few of the Sovereign Pontiffs, but none of ambition to extend their states, or of en-

encroachment upon the civil rights of temporal princes. The encroachments have always come from the other side, and the ambition to be guarded against has always been that of the temporal power, never that of the Papal. This distrust, moreover, is very disrespectful to the Holy See, and even to our Lord himself. The Church represents the divine order on earth, and the Papacy was instituted by our Lord to introduce a divine element into the government of human affairs. It is absurd to suppose that he would or could leave this element a prey to all human passions, and make it necessary to clothe the temporal authority with power to resist it, and keep it in its place, or to prevent it from becoming a usurper and playing the tyrant. This distrust conceals all the venom of Protestantism, and needs only to be developed to justify Luther and Calvin in their war on the Papacy. The *Metropolitan* agrees with us in condemning, though, as we think, if it has anything to oppose to us, very inconsistently, the Four Articles of the French Clergy in 1682, and therefore must concede that the Pope cannot err in declaring or interpreting the law, whether for private individuals or states and empires, and also that his judgment, as supreme director of conscience, in applying the law to any particular case, is final and without appeal. It should therefore, it strikes us, understand that the Papacy is by its very nature the surest and safest depository of right, and guardian and protector of justice, that Almighty God has given us. Instead of distrusting the Pope, and seeking in the State a counterpoise to his ambition and a safeguard against his injustice, we turn to him to learn what in such case is justice, and to obtain protection against the tyranny of princes and the injustice of states; for it is precisely his mission, given him by God himself, to declare what is just and right, and to use all his power to make it prevail. Does the *Metropolitan* fear the unlimited power of God? Does it ask for a power in the inferior court to revise and reverse the judgments of the superior? Does it ask other guaranty than the Divine commission, that the judgment of the supreme court, the court of final appeal, is not contrary to law and justice? If not, why distrust the ecclesiastical power, and assert the State as its limitation? As a Catholic, it has the pledge of God himself for the Church and the Papacy, both in teaching and judging: — “Going, teach all nations,

.... teaching them to observe all things that I have commanded you; for behold I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world." Our security is this *Ego vobiscum*, and it is security enough. Is there not in the partisans of the opinion opposed to us a slight tendency to overlook this *Ego vobiscum*, and to think and reason of the spiritual or Papal power as if it stood on the same line with the temporal or civil power? Moreover, in the contests between the two powers, is there an instance in which the *Metropolitan* dares assert that the temporal power was in the right, and the spiritual power in the wrong? And is it not evident to every careful reader of history, that the temporal prince has asserted the independence of his order or the rights of the State, not in the interests of justice, but in those of his ambition, — not to resist "Papal aggressions," but to justify his own? Why, then, distrust the spiritual, and confide in the temporal? The Popes by their office are expounders and guardians of justice, and we must doubt the protection and assistance promised by God to his Church in order to doubt them in the discharge of their proper functions; and what are their proper functions, they, not the temporal princes, are the judges. The supreme court determines its own jurisdiction and that of all inferior tribunals.

Perhaps the opposition manifested to us arises from not duly considering what it is we understand by the deposing power. The *Metropolitan* expressly objects to the inamissibility of power asserted by Bossuet, and therefore admits that sovereign princes may forfeit their powers, and be lawfully deposed. Thus far, it cannot object to our doctrine. But who has the right to judge of their forfeiture, and to declare them deposed? The people? That is absurd and anarchical. The people as subjects cannot, without the denial of the first principle of all government, judge their sovereign, and the people, considered in their sovereign capacity, are the State, and the party to be judged. That a sovereign may be legally deposed, without anarchy, without revolution, it is necessary that there be a court above both sovereign and people, that has jurisdiction and may take cognizance of the case, and apply to it the law of God which governs it. This court, we hold, is by divine right the Pope. But his functions in the case are purely judicial, that of declaring and applying the law, and pronouncing its sentence. When the sentence of deposition is

pronounced, the tyrant we regard as deposed, for he is so in law, although he may still as a matter of fact sit upon his throne, and exercise the sovereign power. The *Metropolitan* seems to understand, by the deposing power, the power to execute as well as to pronounce sentence. But, as we have asserted and defended it, it extends simply to this judicial deposition, or pronouncing the sentence of the law. The execution of the sentence is another matter, which we have never maintained depended on the Pope. Here we beg attention to a distinction we suggested in our Review for January, 1853, when discussing the subject *in extenso* : —

“ It strikes us that the advocates of this popular theory, which concedes the human, but denies the divine, right of the Church over sovereigns, confound two things which are very distinguishable, namely, the origin and ground of the power in question, and the conditions of its practical temporal or civil consequences. As a matter of fact, this power was in accordance with the public law and the generally received maxims of Christendom in the Middle Ages, and had it not been so, its exercise would not and could not have had direct practical effects in the civil order. To its practical efficacy in temporals, the consent of sovereigns and of the people was indispensable. The Church is herself a spiritual kingdom, and her powers are in their origin and nature spiritual, and to be exercised always for a spiritual end. Her exercise of these powers has not *per se* temporal consequences in the temporal order, because she is not herself the temporal power, and has not in herself the material force requisite to give it temporal effect, and cannot, as a fact, obtain it without the consent of the prince, royal, aristocratic, or popular. She might without the maxims and public law of the Middle Ages have performed all the acts she did in regard to temporal sovereigns, and they would have had their spiritual effect, but no temporal or civil effects. In a country like ours, for example, excommunication has only spiritual consequences, because the civil law does not recognize it. The excommunicated person loses none of his civil rights, and stands before the civil law or the State precisely as if no sentence of excommunication had been pronounced against him. Marriage, invalid by the canon law, yet not contrary to the civil law, is invalid here only in the eyes of the Church, and loses none of its civil rights or effects. The excommunication and deposition by the Pope of a sovereign of England would, as the English law now stands, work no civil consequences, because the law of the realm does not recognize such excommunication and deposition, and makes none of the civil rights or prerogatives of the sovereign depend on his

being in the communion of the Catholic Church. And this, too, whether the sovereign be a Catholic or a Protestant. Yet were her present gracious Majesty to become reconciled to the Church, she would forfeit her crown, because the civil law incapacitates all but Protestants, of some sort, from wearing it, as before Elizabeth it incapacitated all but Catholics. As a fact, then, the canons of the Church can have civil consequences only on condition that the prince recognizes them as the law of the land. Hence the Church can never secure to her decrees, sentences, or canons, their proper civil effects against, or without the consent of, temporal sovereigns. Like consequences would not now generally follow acts like those of the Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages, because now in most states the civil law does not recognize them, and would treat them as *non avenue*. The civil law in our times concedes to the acts of the spiritual authority no civil efficacy, and therefore their direct consequences are all confined to the spiritual order. We grant, then, that, as a matter of fact, the Church is dependent on the consent of the people for the civil consequences of her power over temporal princes, and in this sense and thus far we agree with the advocates of the theory in question.

“But not therefore does it follow that the power formerly exercised by Popes and Councils over sovereigns in temporals is derived from the concessions of princes and the consent of the people, from human law and the generally received maxims of the age. It by no means follows, from anything of this sort, that princes or people have the right before God to prevent the power from having its civil consequences, or that the power itself is not of divine origin, and inherent in the Church as the spiritual authority. A man may, if he chooses to incur eternal damnation, reject or blaspheme the Church, but that does not prove that he has the right to do so. Princes and people may refuse to recognize as law the canons of the Church, and proceed as if no such canons existed; but that does not prove that they can do so without wrong, or without incurring the wrath of Heaven. The Church may, in fact, depend on the will of sovereigns or civil enactments for the civil efficacy of her canons, and yet have a divine right over sovereigns in temporals as well as in spirituals. Because the public law and the maxims generally received by nations have, in this respect, been changed in modern times, we cannot say that they have been rightfully changed, that civilization, freedom, and virtue have profited by the change, or that the Popes have lost, far less abandoned, the power they formerly exercised over temporal affairs. They may not assert the power now, because now it cannot be exercised with its proper temporal consequences; but because they do not now assert it, we are not to conclude that they do not now possess it, or that they do not hold it by divine right.” — pp. 31–34.

As the judicial act in the case is a spiritual act, since it concerns conscience, we see not how it can be denied that the Pope, as the spiritual power, has inherently the right to perform it; and being a spiritual act, we claim for the Pope only spiritual jurisdiction in asserting it for him. As to his power to go further, and carry the sentence into execution by physical force, if requisite, as distinguished from spiritual censures, we have contended that practically he has it not. Yet that he has the abstract right we should be loath to deny, as long as we remember the crusades preached and authorized by the Sovereign Pontiffs against the Saracens and Turks. The Popes in these crusades certainly assumed with regard to infidels a power which is, it seems to us, tantamount to the assertion of the right to dispossess *de facto* princes whom the law of God forbids to reign, and even to destroy them and their adherents if they refuse to submit, when required for the interests of religion. It was not by virtue of the civil constitution of Christian states, nor in the name of *acquired* rights, nor in the interests of the temporal order, that the Popes preached these crusades, and for so many centuries labored to rouse up all Christendom to repel the infidel hordes, but in the name of religion, and in the interests of the spiritual order. The history of the Church is before the world, and we must be careful how we assume a position that makes that history on the part of the Sovereign Pontiffs for a long series of ages only a perpetual succession of scandals. Nevertheless, without either asserting or denying the power in question, we have limited ourselves simply to the assertion of the judicial power in the case of the Pope, whose judicial sentence of course will be regarded as binding only by the faithful.

We have already said enough to show that the fears of some that we merge the State in the Church, and recognize no substantive existence in the civil order as distinct from the ecclesiastical, are purely imaginary; but we will cite a passage from our last Review, which may be regarded as the key to our whole doctrine on the subject. We are speaking of the differences between the two philosophical schools tolerated by the Church. "These matters of difference lie in that sphere where the Church wills us to be free, and where, as long as we advance nothing immediately against faith, or that tends immediately to

weaken its defences, she leaves us to follow our own reason and will, as she does in *political or domestic economy*. Her authority is full and universal as representing the Divine authority on earth, but her uniform practice is to leave men in philosophy, in *government*, in *social and domestic economy*, all the freedom compatible with the end for which she has been instituted." * Here is asserted the principle, and it applies to every department of human life. The temporal government has all the freedom and independence that the individual has in the management of his private and domestic affairs, and no more. This is the doctrine of our *Review*, and we think it will be hard for a Catholic, as such, to maintain a doctrine more liberal to Cæsar.

To pretend that we have revived the controversy concerning the indirect temporal power of the Popes, strikes us as unjust and ungenerous. By the indirect temporal power of the Popes, we understand their power, as Vicars of Jesus Christ on earth, over temporals, in the respect that temporals have a spiritual character and are related to eternal salvation. In asserting this power, we assert two things: first, that all temporal things have a moral and spiritual relation; and second, that of this relation the Pope is under God the supreme judge and governor; — two things which, as we have learned Catholicity, no good Catholic can deny, save at the expense of his logic. But both of these things are denied by our age, and in order to meet the errors of the day — errors which the *Metropolitan*, we are sure, will agree with us *are* errors — we are obliged to reassert and defend them. The great practical errors of our times are, that religion has nothing to do with politics, or that men in their political action are entirely independent of the spiritual order; and that the State is the supreme judge for itself of what is for the temporal welfare of its subjects, and, in seeking it, may go with or against the spiritual power, as it judges proper. These errors can be refuted, and their terrible effects counteracted, only by asserting against them the fact that no human act is, strictly speaking, morally indifferent, — that all human acts, in whatever order performed, have a moral character, and by that character pertain to the spiritual order and come

* January, 1854, p. 32.

within the jurisdiction of the spiritual power; and as the temporal is by the law of God subordinated to the spiritual, the Pope, as the supreme representative of the spiritual, is the superior of the temporal prince, against whom the temporal prince has no right, under any pretext of promoting the temporal good of his states or his subjects, to attempt an act of hostility. Either, then, we were to be silent against the great practical errors of our times, or we were to take part in the controversy they provoked. The controversy was not raised by us, but was raised by the partisans of the errors of the day.

The *Metropolitan*, we are sure, is as much opposed to modern revolutionism as we are, and yet we have shown that modern revolutionism is all involved in, and flows as a logical consequence from, the Four Articles; and that the murder—we may say, with Pius the Sixth of glorious memory, the *martyrdom*—of Louis the Sixteenth by the Convention, was but the legitimate conclusion of the Assembly of 1682. How were we, then, to refute modern revolutionism without attacking Gallicanism, and showing its radical unsoundness? To the disposition to restrict the Papal authority, and to assert the independence of the civil order in face of the spiritual, as manifested by the Byzantine court, the Suabian Emperors of Germany, the Plantagenets of England, and Philip the Fair, Charles the Fifth, and Louis the Twelfth, of France, we have traced historically and logically the rise of Protestantism, and the extent and disastrous consequences of Luther's rebellion, effected principally by and in the interest of temporal princes and nobles. How were we then to oppose Protestantism, which has nearly abandoned whatever theological pretension it originally put forth, and become little more than a system of anti-Papal politics, without discussing the relations of the two powers, and asserting the supremacy of the Papal authority by divine right? We saw the Italian patriots, under cover of the independence of the temporal order, laboring to Protestantize Italy, and carrying away large masses of the population by pretending that they opposed the Pope only in temporals, and had no intention of questioning his power in spirituals. How were we to meet them but by asserting the authority of the Pope in temporals as well as in spirituals, by virtue of the fact that the temporal is subordinated to the spiritual, and therefore

that to war against the Pope in the temporal order is really to war against his spiritual supremacy? Is there any effectual way of refuting an error, but by opposing to it and defending against it the truth which contradicts it?

We cheerfully recognize the learning, the research, and the value, in relation to a special question, of M. Gosselin's work, but his theory cannot answer our purpose, and is indeed in our way. On that theory we can defend particular acts of certain great and illustrious Pontiffs from the charge of usurping power which has been preferred against them, but not that general supremacy of the spiritual order, and of the Pope as its chief, which seems to be possessed, and which certainly is demanded by the exigencies of the times. Supposing the authority of the Pope over temporal princes to rest only on a merely human basis, to be held only *ex jure humano*, we degrade the Pope, in the sense it is necessary to assert his superiority, to the rank of a temporal prince, who may be opposed as any other prince without prejudice to Catholicity, and indirectly favor the error of the human and popular origin of power, against which every friend to religion and society has now to wage an unrelenting war. If the question had fallen into the past, and had ceased to be in our day and country a practical question, we might well have been content with M. Gosselin's theory. But such was not the case. The real question was never a more seriously practical question than at this moment, as any one may know who has attended to recent events in Great Britain, Holland, Piedmont, Baden, and New Granada, or has studied the doctrines of Mazzini, Kossuth, and the Red Republicans throughout Europe and the United States. In this or that locality there may be no especial call for the discussion, and nowhere can it be discussed without unpleasant consequences; but we conduct our Review with reference to the general state of the Catholic world, not with reference to a particular American diocese; and no discussion, save of superannuated questions, which have ceased to interest the passions of men, can be ever presented without unpleasant consequences, which one would wish to avoid if it were possible.

In former times it was necessary to discuss the question in relation to the pretensions of temporal princes. It is still necessary to do it in the same relation, as is evident from the refusal of the present Emperor of France to

abandon the infamous Organic Articles of his uncle, annexed, against the protestations of Rome, to the Concordat of 1802, and by the recent doings of nominally Catholic princes and governments in Piedmont, Baden, and New Granada. All the difficulties encountered by the Holy See in Catholic countries grow out of the assumption by the State of independence in face of the ecclesiastical power, and the want of a clear apprehension on the part of the faithful of the real relation of the two powers. If it is once conceded that the Church may be lawfully resisted in her demand by the State, or that there is a sphere in which the Church has no right to declare the law for the State, or in which the State may disregard the judgment of the Church, the minds of the faithful will to a great extent be confused, and at a loss to decide where the line of demarcation between the two powers is to be drawn. They can rely on neither the Church nor the State, and will be as if they had no infallible teacher and guide. If it is assumed that each judges and defines its own powers, how is the simple Catholic to know to which his obedience is due? The *Metropolitan* concedes that the State is under obligation to conform to the law of God as expounded by the Church, but suppose the State does not, what is the subject to do? Obey the Church? Very good. But suppose the question is of a mixed nature, and that the State declares that it is one over which it has supreme jurisdiction, and the Church none. If the State is the judge of its own powers, independent in temporals, and free to decide for itself what are temporals, what then is the simple loyal subject and would-be good Catholic to do? Still follow the Church? Then you contradict yourself, and deny the very independence of the State which you contend for against us, and assume the very doctrine we maintain. Why, then, we ask again, raise an outcry against us? If you say, follow the State, you set up private judgment against the Church, and fall into the fundamental error of Protestantism, besides asserting the principle of civil despotism.

The same doctrine which was formerly put forth by the German lawyers in behalf of the German Kaisers, by Edward the Third of England and the Court party, by Philip the Fair and more lately by Louis the Fourteenth, the Regent Orleans, and the Parliaments of France, is now put

forth on behalf of the people, as we have made quite clear in the subsequent article, as well as elsewhere. On this same doctrine the Church is attacked in Italy, and in every country where modern radicalism or Red Republicanism has gained a footing. Your modern democracy, as it calls itself, which burst forth in 1848 with such destructive fury in almost every capital in Europe, and threatened to engulf all modern civilization in irretrievable ruin, only transfers to what is termed the people—that is, the demagogues—the rights and powers claimed under Pagan Rome for the Emperors, and in most modern states by courtiers for the monarch. The Pagan Cæsars claimed, and by their Pagan subjects were admitted, to be at once emperors, pontiffs, and gods; and it was because they resisted the claim of being pontiffs and gods, that the early Christians were persecuted throughout the Roman Empire, and led like sheep to the slaughter. The demagogues of our day put forth the same claim for the people. According to them, the people are the Emperor, the Pontiff Maximus, and God. They array popular sovereignty against the spiritual authority in temporals of the Church, and make war on Catholicity in the name of democracy. Hence the old struggle of the Church with the temporal order is renewed in our days, with this difference only, that she has the people, or rather the demagogues, now for her opponents, instead of kings and emperors alone.

This false democracy, this blasphemous deification of the people, is not confined simply to those born and bred outside of the Church. Not a few of the principal leaders and wire-pullers of the movement in behalf of what we call political atheism are or were nominal Catholics; and they justify themselves and impose on the faithful by appealing to that very independence and autonomy of the temporal order which the *Metropolitan* asserts, if it asserts anything, against us. If we undertake to oppose them in the name of the Church, they tell us that the Church has nothing to say on the subject, for she has no right to go out of the purely spiritual order, and they are moving only in the temporal order, entirely independent of her authority. How, with the doctrine that denies the indirect temporal authority of the Church by divine right, or the authority of the Church over temporals in that they have a moral character and relations, is it possible to refute these ene-

mies of God and man? Their doctrine seems to them, and to us, only a legitimate conclusion from that traditional doctrine of the courts against Rome which we are arraigned for having denied. Now are we to yield to these demagogues, and concede that the Church leaves them free to profess their political atheism without impeachment of their orthodoxy? or are we to resist them, and show the faithful the innate falsity of their doctrine, and its utter incompatibility with Catholicity? The former, we presume, will not be pretended. Then how in the world are we to do the latter without engaging in the controversy the *Metropolitan* so earnestly deprecates?

The doctrine we oppose was bad enough when put forth in behalf of kings, but it is much worse when it is put forth in behalf of the people, that is, the demagogues. It has done and is doing in our own day immense injury. The Holy Father has time and again denounced it, at least in principle, as it seems to us, and at his suggestion the Jesuits established their periodical, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, to oppose it. No attentive reader of that periodical can, it seems to us, pretend that the controversy is discountenanced at Rome. It may not there assume the precise form that it does in our pages, because there no Catholic professedly defends the Church, in relation to the authority we claim for her, on the ground it has been customary to defend her in Great Britain and this country. It has been customary here to deny in the most positive terms all authority of the Pope in temporals *ex jure divino*, and to indulge in no little abuse of the Sovereign Pontiff hypothetically. We have read in Catholic journals, and heard from the rostrum, and even from the pulpit, expressions with regard to buckling on one's knapsack and shouldering one's musket, and marching against the Pope, in case he should do so or so, that have made our blood run cold, — expressions which we should hardly have ventured on ourselves even when a Protestant. The writers or speakers knew very well that the case they supposed could never occur, and that therefore they were safe; but they little considered, we must believe, the impression they conveyed, or the effect they were producing on the minds of the simple Catholic public, or that they were teaching, or at least favoring, that very doctrine of courtiers and demagogues which creates so many difficulties for the Holy See, and which apparently

justifies the non-Catholic world in their war against the Papacy. The Papacy is the one grand object of attack, because it is well understood that without the Papacy the Church is not a kingdom, cannot be the kingdom of God on earth, and must sink to the level of the sects. It has seemed to us, therefore, that the true Catholic should apply himself specially to the assertion and defence of the rights and powers of the Papacy. Our Lord founded his Church on Peter, and if we assert, or leave to be asserted without contradiction, a power in the State that in any contingency may lawfully war against Peter in his successors, we deprive ourselves of all power to assert the independence of the Church, and to maintain true religious freedom. The controversy has been forced upon us, therefore, by the denial, public as well as private, of what we suppose to be the rightful supremacy of Peter. Blame not us for the controversy. Let the adherents of the opposite opinion as well as the partisans of political atheism remain silent, and we will remain silent too; but as long as they are assiduous in inculcating their opinions, and let slip no opportunity of directly or indirectly denying ours, it can be hardly fair to forbid us to speak, since our opinion is at least as free and as defensible as theirs.

It is a great mistake, in our judgment, to represent the doctrine we advocate as an exploded theory, and as defended in our days only by men of questionable orthodoxy or mental soundness. This is going, we think, a little too far. It was held and defended by La Mennais, it is true; but it was also held and defended, if we are not in error, by the elder Görres and the illustrious Count de Maistre. We find it brilliantly defended by that influential journal, *L'Univers*, and in the main by the *Dublin Tablet* and *La Civiltà Cattolica*. It is asserted to the full extent, and on the same ground that we assert it, by his Eminence the present Cardinal Archbishop of Rheims, in his *Théologie Dogmatique*, and is stated and taken by Padre Cercià, in his *Tractatus de Romano Pontifice*, published at Naples in 1851, as unquestioned and unquestionable, and adduced as an unanswerable reason why the Pope should not be subject to any temporal power, but should have an independent principality, and the *status* of an independent and sovereign prince. Moreover, the Abbé Rohrbacher, a doctor of theology and a most learned French theologian, defends it

throughout his *Universal History of the Catholic Church*, the second edition of which has just been completed, under the eye and with the express encouragement of Rome. Indeed, we had supposed that there was throughout the whole Catholic world a decided reaction, since the disastrous effects of the old French Revolution, against Gallicanism, and in favor of Ultramontanism, and we had supposed that we were ourselves only obeying the common tendency of the Catholic *renaissance* of the nineteenth century.

The *Metropolitan* does us injustice in alleging that we, in our defence of ourselves against the charge of going too far, accuse those who deny or fail to assert the doctrine for which we contend of a want of courage to resist popular errors. That there are persons whom the *Metropolitan* is bound to respect, who, though they agree with us in our theology, yet doubt the wisdom or prudence of agitating certain questions which we have discussed, we have the very best possible reasons for asserting. We can well understand that they may do so, without any suspicion of lack of zeal or of courage, for it is a question on which men equally eminent, equally firm and bold, may honestly come to different conclusions, and we should not dare on our own judgment alone to act in opposition to the wishes of those who regard us, though sound in our theology, yet imprudent in the line of policy we have adopted. We have not adopted that line of policy rashly, nor on our own personal convictions alone. It was prescribed to us in the beginning, and we believe it has met with very general approbation from the American hierarchy. Its object was to impart a freer and more elevated tone to Catholic thought and discussion, and to abandon the tone of apology, and put those who objected to the Church and her doctrines, or to the Papacy and its prerogatives, on their defence. Its intention was, instead of laboring to explain away as far as possible the doctrines most offensive to non-Catholics or lukewarm Catholics, or to answer objections drawn from ecclesiastical history on a low ground, to bring out those doctrines in their strongest form, and to assume the highest Catholic ground of defence. That this course had not been previously adopted in this country was admitted, and it was admitted also that the circumstances previously existing neither required nor warranted it, because, as

long as the Catholic body was small, the main object to be aimed at was their defence against non-Catholics, and the formation of the public sentiment of the Catholic community was only a secondary consideration. But it was thought, when we were called to our present post, that Catholic questions might and should be henceforth discussed among us in reference not so much to the non-Catholic as to the Catholic community, for it was believed that the higher the tone of Catholics, the more salutary would be their public influence in checking the destructive radicalism of the country, and the more advantageous would it be in the long run to the cause of Catholic truth. Change of circumstances, it was believed by our advisers, demanded and authorized a change of policy, without, however, implying any censure upon the previous policy for its time, or upon those who adopted or adhered to it. No doubt, in adopting a new line of policy, as had been done in France and Germany, and copying after the old Fathers of the primitive centuries, we were liable to be misapprehended at first, and to be thought imprudent by such as did not watch narrowly the signs of the times. That we should excite fears and encounter opposition in the ranks of our friends was to be expected; but strong in the purity of our motives, and sustained by those who had but to open their lips to secure our silence or to change our course, we felt prepared for it. That there has been and is an honest difference of opinion among Catholics as to the wisdom of our course, we do not conceal from ourselves, and have no wish to deny; but we have been far more deeply affected by the cordial and generous support we have received from the great body of the Bishops and Clergy, than we have been by the occasional dissatisfaction which individuals have expressed. They who know us personally know that our natural disposition is mild and conciliatory, and that nothing but deep conviction and what we regard as the stern demands of duty could lead us ever to write or publish anything that would excite unpleasant feelings in any one. No doubt, some whom we sincerely respect honestly think we go too far; others no less respectable and high in authority think differently, as the following extract from a very kind letter, sent us, since our last issue, by a most holy man and illustrious prelate, late a sojourner at Rome, may testify:—

"You do *not* go too far, I tell you. Your writings are useful to all; — to good Catholics, whom they enlighten and confirm; to tepid and lax Catholics, whom they stimulate and put to shame; and to Protestants themselves, whom they confound and frighten. Then I tell you again that you do *not* go to far. *Tales ambio defensores veritatis.* Therefore I never cease to pray God to preserve you, and to continue to assist you in your labors."

We trust the Right Reverend author will forgive us for making use of his kind encouragement in our defence, and our readers will pardon us the vanity of publishing what is too complimentary to ourselves. Such a letter from one who but slightly knows us, save through our Review, is at least a fair offset to the protest of the *Metropolitan*.

We have endeavored in these remarks to present fairly and honestly the real question we have discussed, the real doctrine we have put forth, and its intimate relations with the great practical controversies of the day. We hope we have said nothing to provoke a rejoinder. It will be seen, that, whatever private opinion we may have hinted or refrained from denying, the power we have insisted on for the Popes is not properly a temporal power or civil jurisdiction, which would imply that the Pope is the temporal lord, Cæsar as well as Pope, but a spiritual power supreme over temporals, on their spiritual side, and for a spiritual end. But it is the Pope as the spiritual power, not the prince, that draws the line between the spiritual and the temporal, and decides authoritatively for conscience where the one begins and the other ends. To deny this, is to subordinate the Church to the State, or at least to leave conscience without a guide; to admit it, is to admit all that we insist on. The *Metropolitan* virtually does admit it, as we have seen, and therefore it has no real ground of opposition to us, and has vehemently protested against us, we must believe, in consequence of having misapprehended us. There can be no further occasion of misapprehending us, and therefore no further occasion, we trust, of controverting us.

- ART. IV. — 1. *Il Protestantismo e la Regola di Fede*. Per GIOVANNI PERRONE, della Compagnia di Gesù, Prof. di Teologia nel Coll. Romano. 3 vol. Roma: Coi Tipi della Civiltà Cattolica. 1853.
2. *Demonstratio Catholica, sive Tractatus de Ecclesia vera Christi, et de Romano Pontifice*. Auctore PADRE RAPHAEL CERCIA', Soc. Jesu, in Coll. Neapolitano Theol. Prof. 2 vol. Neapoli. 1852.
3. *Fatti atroci dello Spirito demagogico negli Stati Romani*. Racconto estratto da' Processi originali. Firenze. 1853.
4. *North British Review*. November, 1853. Art. II.
5. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. Anno quinto. 1854.
6. *The American and Foreign Christian Union*. January — March, 1854.
7. *Del Rinascimento Civile d' Italia*. Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. Torino. 1851.
8. *Roma e il Mondo*. Per NICCOLO TONMASEO. Capolago. 1851.
9. *Il Professore Nuytz ai suoi concittadini*. Torino. 1851.
10. *I Valdesi; ossia i Cristiani Cattolici secondo la Chiesa Primitiva*. Per AMEDEO BERT. Torino. 1849.
11. *Fra Dolcino, and his Times*. By L. MARIOTTI. London. 1853.
12. *Lectures of Gavazzi*. New York. 1853.
13. *Lectures of Torricelli*. Dartmouth. 1854.

THERE are some twenty or thirty other books which we might notice in connection with those whose titles are given at the head of this article, but *multitudine rerum obruamur!* We are not astonished at the state of things which has made so many good books about Italy either useful or necessary, and so many bad books profitable to their authors; but we cannot conceal our regret that such a state of things exists.

The work of Father Perrone is the best work that this illustrious master has yet given us, not excepting even his text-book of dogmatic theology, which is so well known to the world of scholars, not less because of its intrinsic merits than because of the *imprimatur* which it received from the very lips of the great Pontiff, Gregory the Sixteenth. Perrone's theology, like the philosophical works of Dmow-

ski, successfully undergo a test which most students will admit to be somewhat severe.

"Sudet multum, frustra que laboret,
Ausus idem."

They have been submitted to another test, which may safely be regarded as a severe one. The student who consults them, and turns aside to other modern authors, is more than content to return to them. We do not know that a compliment more gracious than this can be given to an author.

Yet we are disposed to regard this new work, *Protestantism and the Rule of Faith*, as the book upon which the reputation of Father Perrone will ultimately rest. It is a work which Italy and the world needed, and if it be read by all honest men who love Italy, the purpose of the author will have been accomplished. We wish that one of our Catholic publishers would cause this book to be translated and given to the public. God bless the man who will do it!

The work of Padre Cercia' is a new treatise on a subject which would be old if the Roman Catholic Church could be other than what she is,—a being ever ancient, ever new. In his two volumes, Padre Cercia' gives two somewhat original treatises on the Church and the Roman Pontiff. When so many excellent treatises on these two subjects, or rather this one subject under two different aspects, are in existence, why ask the world to read a new book upon the same topic? The scholar who may read these two volumes will understand the reason. If he be also an attentive observer of the march of events in Italy, he will say that Padre Cercia', like Padre Perrone, has given to Italy and to the world a book which was not written one day too soon. We hope that the illustrious author will give to the world a complete course of dogmatic theology. His work, with those of Perrone and Passaglia, proves that the race of theologians has not degenerated in our day, and that the nineteenth century need not, so far as its masters of theology are concerned, fear a comparison even with the sixteenth. Truly, our age needs great masters as much as the age of the so-called Reformation needed them, perhaps more so. The change which has taken place in the method of applying the same principles to the errors of succeeding times, is an interesting subject

of study. Persons who are yet unable to form a decided opinion with reference to the doctrine of development, if such persons are yet to be found, would discover in that change of method a solution of their difficulties.

The Atrocious Acts of the Demagogues in the Roman States, is a most welcome contribution to the increasing mass of documents which will some years hence serve the historian of what we suppose will be called the Italian Thirty Years' War, which began with the Roman attempt at a revolution in 1830, and which is not likely to end before 1860. This book is in one volume only, and a translation of it would be of great service to the people, not excepting Protestants, who are in sore need of correct information concerning Italian events from 1846 to 1852.

There is, assuredly, a portentous movement in progress, and Italy is deeply concerned in it. The difficulty under which most persons labor, who are at all interested in Italian affairs, is, that it is not easy to form an accurate conception of the nature and end of that movement. There are several points connected with it which deserve the earnest consideration of all persons in any way interested in the fate of Italy, and there are few men in Christendom who are not.

The first point is this. The pressure upon Italy is not from within, but from without. That is to say, the movement in Italy towards what is sometimes called, by way of a jest, we suppose, Italian Independence, or Nationality, is not an *Italian* movement. If it were, it would have succeeded years, nay, ages ago. It is true that Italy has more than once, during the period embraced in modern history, seen a Cola di Rienzi or a Giuseppe Mazzini imitate the conduct of a Count Robert, and sit for a moment in the place of the Emperor. Italy has seen adventurers who, though supported by less than a tenth of the people, and those not of the most reputable class, succeeded in establishing a reign of terror, and in causing the mass of persons who get their opinions from the newspapers to believe that their reign of terror was a reign of the whole people. It may be asked, how a handful of men can obtain power against the known will of the mass of the nation, and use that power, if not with the strength of an angel, at least with the will of a demon. Such a thing, it is thought, could not be done in America.

Such a thing will become quite possible in America, before many years shall have passed away. New York, and a few other cities, begin already to betray evidences of the existence of a power which is variously described as being above, below, behind, or beyond the law, and which seriously calls itself omnipotent. It is a power wielded chiefly for evil, and by less than a tenth of the inhabitants. It is wielded by self-elected and irresponsible men. We refer to persons aggregated to secret societies. Many, perhaps most, of these individuals, who boast that they hold in their hands the destiny of our cities, if not of our country, are men who, five years ago, were busily engaged in the work of pulling to pieces the framework of civilized society in their respective countries beyond the Atlantic, and who, as some one very truly, though somewhat coarsely, says, have been ejected upon American ground by the overburdened stomach of Europe. They can hardly speak our language, and they love not our institutions, which, indeed, some of the more fool-hardy among them have doomed, at least on paper and in speeches, to no very remote destruction. Certain events which have recently occurred in New York, Cincinnati, and elsewhere, would seem to indicate that these men have determined to test their ability to override the laws, to defy the magistracy, and to play ~~the~~ despot over the masses of good citizens. It has been said—we trust that the report will turn out to be untrue—that the chief magistrate of one of our cities, at a time when the secret societies avowed their purpose of breaking the laws, declared that the power lodged in his hands was not strong enough to prevent a riot or to punish the rioters. It would also appear that these enemies of civilization regard themselves as strong enough even to punish those magistrates who try to enforce the laws against them. If these things be true, and we fear that they are, the country is in danger, and it may not be long before the American people will judge it necessary to adopt the old expedient of electing a man *qui videat ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*. The power possessed by a secret body to cause terror is very great, when the association is formed to revolutionize the government, or otherwise change the framework of society. For no one knows how many persons are thus leagued together, when or where they meet, what they will do next, or who at their secret meetings may have been doomed to

die by the hand of the assassin. One hundred men, formed into a society of the Mazzinian order, can do an amount of mischief which five thousand men who would openly undertake the same work could never do.

It is easy, then, to understand why a few men, not one tenth of the population, can bring about results so terrible to Italy. Italians, moreover, have degenerated not a little, for it is many centuries since the country received an infusion of fresh blood from the North. Italians of the present day are no longer capable of asserting the *Primacy* of their glorious country, unless it be in well-written and ingenious essays.

It is to be noted that one necessary consequence of that cardinal doctrine of political and social atheism,—the doctrine of the solidarity of peoples,—is to prevent the very end which the demagogues so loudly profess to be the nearest to their hearts. That end is the independence, the autonomy, of each people; or, as Kossuth is wont to express it, the sovereign right of each nation to manage its own concerns without the help of strangers. Error, of whatever kind, not only contains, but actually plants, the seeds of its own destruction. So, in the Hungarian rebellion, Poles or other foreigners were excellent Magyars, and some of them even evinced a disposition to assume the entire conduct of the rebellion,—for Polish purposes, of course. It is well known that this Polish and foreign intervention in the Magyar rebellion was one of the causes which hastened the fall of Kossuth, himself a naturalized Slovak. So in Rome, the leaders of the revolution and the soldiers who oppressed the inhabitants and fought against the French were mostly strangers. Very few Romans aided or encouraged the adventurers from the other Italian States in their kind efforts to relieve the Romans from the cares of that republic, which was said in all official documents to be the creation, and therefore the exclusive property, of the Roman people.

The outside pressure upon Italy, through the secret societies of Germany, France, and Switzerland, and the supreme Revolutionary Committee at London, was therefore very great. It was an essential feature in the plan of Mazzini, who, from a safe distance, managed the various wires, to keep the people in a state of terror. This was done by occasional assassinations, which were so skilfully contrived

that no man could tell whose turn would come next. It was also done by spreading reports of an insurrection which, as the people were taught to believe, might at any moment burst into a blaze. Mazzini would also transmit an order for all his followers to adopt a certain practice;—as, for example, when the liberals abandoned, by his order, and for a few days, the public use of cigars, the appearance of a lighted cigar in the streets was a signal for riot. The agents of Mazzini would also collect money from peaceable persons in this wise. The agent would say to the citizen: "Sir, the republic needs money. I am here to receive it in the name of the republic. If you freely contribute,—and, observe, we ask only free gifts,—you, your family, particularly your daughters, will be safe from harm. But if you refuse, we cannot answer for the conduct of our soldiers, should they chance to pass through your town."

But these are not the only sources of pressure from without upon unhappy Italy. The Protestant government of England has for many years professed to feel a lively interest in Italian affairs. And England, when under a Whig administration, always gave extraordinary evidence of her solicitude lest Italy might become too strong or prosperous. She has always evinced the same anxiety concerning the state of Portugal and Spain, and her deep interest for the well-being of those two countries has led her, at various times, to interfere in the settlement of their affairs. The consequence has been that Portugal is ruined, and Spain was brought almost to the brink of ruin. The purposes of England in exhibiting herself to the states of Italy as a mediator, a spy, a revolutionist, or a party in a domestic quarrel, were chiefly two. Belgium has been called the battle-ground, and Italy the play-ground of Europe, with the understanding that the play-ground might, at any moment, be changed into a battle-ground; and, accordingly, this change has been made many times,—too many for the peace of Italy. She was the ball tossed, now to Spain, then to France, and again to Germany. The possession by a foreign power of a portion of Italy has, for the last twelve centuries,—one might say for the last twenty,—been regarded as a treasure of the very last importance. It has been repeatedly demonstrated, *per modum facti*, that the foreign power which is the strongest or

the most influential in Italy, turns out in the end to be the most strong or influential in Christendom. Now, setting aside all speculations with reference to the causes of this fact, — Catholics can easily conceive what they are, — it is not difficult to understand that the fact itself is of great political importance. We think that we have elsewhere observed that the attentive watcher of European events will find herein a key to the recent movements of Austria and France in Central Italy, and which have baffled the penetration of most writers for the secular press, — not a very far-sighted class of men, it must be confessed. Increased political influence, however gained, or from whatever source derived, is, in these times, when the balance of power in Europe is so easily disturbed, more than ever coveted by the English government.

But England has another reason for watching every event which occurs in Italy with a sleepless eye. She is a Protestant nation, and she has not forgotten the Bull of St. Pius the Fifth against Elizabeth. Formerly as a government and by political action, more recently as a multitude and by civil and social action, she has endeavored to persuade the world that the Papacy is an antiquated institution, which has lost its meaning, and which should be preserved, if preserved at all, as a now harmless curiosity to be kept in a museum as a relic of less enlightened times. She has expended no little labor and treasure to make the Papal Chair what she would have the world believe it to be. Since the day when that Bull was fulminated, she has suffered much, in her person, in her character, and in her possessions. She has undergone the horrors of two revolutions; one of her kings lost his head, two were exiled; her old constitution is lost; her royalty is but a good painting, which is prized and kept in repair simply because of its age and its likeness, which is so accurate as to look like life; her old nobility, four or five families excepted, is extinct; her House of Commons is gradually, but surely, becoming radical; her government is made and unmade by the "Irish Brigade," a body which, if it were *one*, would be in a position to redress the wrongs of three centuries of misrule in Ireland; her squirarchy is now little more than a name; her farmers are so few that the agricultural interest can be safely neglected in Parliament; her common people are poor, without work, without loyalty, without

religion, and without God. Given all these evils, — given a people who are poor and are growing poorer, a people badly fed, clothed, and lodged, — and given the accursed urban, or factory system, which we too have adopted in America, and which points, as truly as the needle to the pole, to hunger, cold, and homelessness for too many, — and given a people without God, that is, without religion and loyalty, — it is easy to say what the result will be. In a purely secular sense, there are statesmen left in England, although these, too, have degenerated, as they have in most other countries, from similar causes. The best proof that there are yet statesmen in England is, that England still lives. Nevertheless, a system based upon expediency, however exquisitely managed, cannot live always.

Only God knows the extent of the connection between the Bull of St. Pius the Fifth, and the peculiar, not seldom unaccountable, difficulties under which England has labored since the beginning of the seventeenth century. Her singular uneasiness with reference to the movements of Rome, her formerly cruel, latterly inoperative laws against Catholicity, her anxious scrutiny of Italian affairs, her steady refusal to open direct diplomatic relations with Rome, and her recent laws against the free exercise of religion in England and Ireland, seem to indicate that she believes in the power and majesty of Rome, and in the efficacy of a Papal Bull, even if it be almost three hundred years old, to an extent which she is unwilling to acknowledge, even to herself. She has at least a latent suspicion that she has not yet reached the last Amen of the Papal anathema. And she is by no means reassured when she sees that Pope Pius the Ninth, in the middle of the nineteenth century, when St. Peter, as the Gentiles say, has lost all his power and scarcely retains the shadow of it, quietly, and as if it were the commonest matter of course, exercises his Apostolical authority, not only in Holland and Baden, but in England and Ireland, with as much determination and success as if this were the thirteenth century, and as if he were an Alexander the Third. Indeed, no Pope, since the time of the great Council of Lateran, has asserted the Papal prerogatives oftener, or more energetically, than has Pius the Ninth. Hence the agents of England, both recognized and secret, have not ceased these three centuries to watch everything and to report every-

thing. Despatches from Italy have ever been among the most interesting to the Cabinet. No amount of labor or treasure was ever spared in order that Italy might continue to be, what Bonaparte called her, — a geographical expression, — a multitude of discordant nationalities. And England commonly regarded the priests as Roman emissaries, who might suddenly kindle in England a fire with the everlasting Bull of Pius the Fifth. That Bull is never mentioned by her, but she has never forgotten it. Hence, at almost stated intervals, the government either yields to the popular fury, or creates one against what it chooses, strangely enough, to call "Papal Aggression," and she gravely enacts laws against it which appear to attain their object when enacted, inasmuch as the excitement attending their discussion and passage scarcely endures until they are registered on the statute-book, there to remain a dead letter, evidencing in the nation periodical fits of insane suspicion and alarm. During the first half of the time that has elapsed since the so-called Reformation, the Catholics were disfranchised and the priests hanged, not because they believed in transubstantiation, but because they believed in Rome. Subsequently, the government, by slow and cautious steps, has permitted most of the penal laws to become a dead letter, and has restored to the Catholics a large, although not a full and equal, portion of their rights as British subjects. The priests were no longer hanged, but they were invited to swear an oath conceived in terms which saved, it was thought, both the spiritual supremacy of the Pope and the temporal rights of the sovereign. The Holy See permits this oath to be taken yet. Of course, it is religiously observed. The government, however, sometimes relapses into fits of doubt respecting the intentions of the Holy Father, and seems, at times, to be in the act of considering the propriety of a return to violent proscription. The numerous conversions, the establishment of the hierarchy, the creation of a Cardinal of England, the condemnation of the Colleges, and the holding of Synods, by no means tend to reassure her, for they demonstrate that the Papacy is neither dead nor sleeping, and that the reigning Pontiff has taken up the song of St. Pius the Fifth. With her political eye, then, England watches every movement of the Holy See with suspicion and alarm.

And she glares at Rome with another restless eye,—that of Exeter Hall. Periodically, the men and women of England who profess to be alarmed at the growth of Popery meet, either in person or by proxy, at Exeter Hall, to make or hear speeches, collect money, and pass resolutions signifying that a power which was dead long ago still lives,—is more vigorous than ever; that more money is needed to insure its destruction; and that it, although dead for many years, in some inexplicable way gives such portentous evidences of life as to make the most worldly powerful nations stand on their guard, as if menaced by the most frequent thunderbolts of heaven. Not many years since, a World's Convention was held in London. Men, chiefly ministers, assembled from the fragments of the Protestant world. The avowed purpose of the gathering was, to discuss the present condition and prospects of Christianity; but the call for the meeting, the character of the persons who guided it, the tone of the speeches delivered, and the subsequent conduct of the leaders, afford abundant evidence concerning the nature and purposes of the assemblage. It was called a World's Convention for two reasons. Delegates were expected from every country of at least the civilized world. Then the object of the Convention was worldly; worldly motives of action were proposed, worldly means, such as gold, falsehood, and secret societies, were advocated, and the prince of this world, who is the Devil, was evidently the guiding or master spirit of the Convention. The human and visible agents were certain British and American Protestant ministers, together with a few representatives of Protestantism on the Continent, and a handful of unhappy apostates. About twenty ministers, three or four of them American, and the rest Englishmen or Scotchmen, and a few titled laymen, together with a handful of Continental representatives, conducted the business of the Convention to what was supposed to be a successful conclusion. The prayers offered for the downfall of Rome were so loud and long, that only the description which our Lord gives of the loud, long, and always public prayers of the Pharisees, enables us to understand the possibility that the gentlemen of the World's Convention were whitened sepulchres. The resolutions offered, supported by prayer, songs, and speeches, were substantially these:—

I. The Man of Sin, that is, the Papacy, is dead.

II. He died long ago.

III. If he be not dead, he should die.

IV. He never gave more unequivocal signs of vigorous, immortal life, than he does at this moment.

V. Therefore, *Resolved*, That we will kill him.

The contradiction which is somewhat apparent in the first four resolutions was supposed to be covered by the verbiage which speakers at meetings of this class seem to affect, and by the enthusiasm evoked during the speeches delivered in favor of the resolution whose real substance we have given under number five. An ample apology for the contradiction was supposed to be found in the fact, that as Protestantism, *qua* Protestantism, that is, regarded as an anti-Catholic association, must from its very nature present the spectacle of an attempted unison of contradictories, the only course to be pursued by the enemies of the Church is to hide, if possible, the contradictions by making strong appeals to the passions, inasmuch as these, when aroused, will not listen to argument, and are not at all moved even by the most absurd contradictories, provided these be put forward in their favor.

We have made especial mention of this World's Convention, because it proposes to do no small share of the work which is now in contemplation with reference to the Italian Peninsula. That work is, to erect a PROTESTANT ITALY. Before we close, we shall give our views touching this Quixotic work. Meanwhile, let us observe that the originators and leaders of that Convention, and the men who have formed themselves into a sort of permanent committee to conduct the movement to a successful termination, — this being the downfall of the Papal Chair, — are by no means the silly fanatics which their five resolutions, their published discourses, and their newspaper articles would lead one to suppose them to be. The Convention was like most mass meetings of which we read in the journals. As a general rule, and therefore admitting exceptions, these conventions are got up by shrewd persons, who have a purpose to be gained, and who take care that no inconvenient person shall know what that purpose is. Hence, at all these mass meetings, one cannot but observe that the officers and speakers are carefully selected, and the resolutions and speeches dictated or prepared

days, sometimes even weeks, before the date of the meeting, by the authors of the movement, of whom perhaps few are present, perhaps not one. Let an unsafe person attempt to address the meeting, or let some one stand up and try to speak who is not in the secret of the managers, and who supposes, in his innocence, that a public meeting affords an opportunity for the free expression of thought, and he will find that some obstacle, to him inexplicable, prevents him from disturbing the preëstablished harmony of the meeting. It was so at the World's Convention at London. A number of shrewd enemies of St. Peter — of whom not many permitted their names to be used in the course of the discussion, and not all of them even in the call for the Convention — quietly arranged the preliminaries, the course which the Convention was to adopt, the method to be pursued, the means to be used, and the ends to be proposed, of which one was avowed and the other secret, that is to say, not published to the world. The former was to promote the union of all the so-called Evangelical Christians, for purposes which might be voted common to all Evangelical sects. Some ministers, of different nations, not esteemed Evangelical, bore a part in the proceedings. The managers wanted them, and the real test of Evangelical doctrine, so far as the Convention was concerned, was hatred to Catholicity. The secret purpose of the authors of this movement was to unite, if possible, the scattered fragments of the ruined Protestant world against the Pope as a temporal sovereign.

We earnestly recommend, to all persons who think or say that "we go too far" in the essays which have appeared in this Review concerning the basis of what is called the temporal power of the Pope, an attentive consideration of the plan of operations which the shrewd managers of the World's Convention proposed to themselves. They intended to make what some of them called a "grand, combined movement to destroy the Papacy." It appeared to the more far-sighted among them that Protestantism, if it made no movement in its own defence, would after not many years be incapable of resistance. It also appeared to them that Europe was not far from the verge of a general revolution, in which the temporal sovereignty of the Pope would share the common danger. They were not deceived in their expectation, although it is due to them to say, that

their labor had some influence in the accomplishment of their prediction. Now these Protestant leaders, self-elected in the first instance, but afterwards recognized as leaders by the Protestant world, had agreed upon a formula, — a generative proposition from which the principles flowed which were to regulate their action. It was, that the destruction of the temporal power of the Pope is, *in these times*, equivalent to the destruction of his spiritual authority, or, at least, to such a diminution of it as will render the Papacy no longer a power worth mention.

We do not, of course, intend to discuss this proposition, because every Catholic knows that the Pope, when he is in prison, or in exile, is perhaps more powerful than when he reigns securely in the Vatican. This thing has been tested three times within the memory of men now living. But we cannot expect Protestants, most of whom are unbaptized, and the rest of whom have renounced the obligations implied in their baptism, to understand these things. Flesh and blood did not reveal unto Peter the divinity of Christ, and flesh and blood cannot reveal unto man the gifts which were bestowed upon Peter by Christ. Only God, our Father in heaven, can reveal them. The Protestant reasons humanly, in the strict theological sense of the word, and in 1843–48 the intelligent Protestant who knew how to read the signs of the times, who had even some suspicion of the real state of society in Europe, who was either a member of the secret societies, or knew anything about them, and who, from whatever cause, hated Catholicity, could not be convicted of false logic, if, from a human point of view, he regarded the destruction of the temporal power of the Pope as a not remote event, which would bring as an almost necessary, certainly a very probable consequence, the downfall of the Pope as a spiritual sovereign, or at least such a diminution of the exercise of his spiritual power as would leave him a personage of perhaps not more consequence than an ordinary bishop, perhaps of less, — perhaps of as little as the heretical Patriarch of Constantinople.

We do not say, nor do we wish to intimate, that either principles or consequences like these are defended or proposed by such Catholics as are disposed to assert that we “go too far” in our treatment of questions with which the authority of St. Peter, in things commonly called temporal,

is concerned. We merely wish to say, that in this matter there are two points of contact between Catholics who herein disagree with us, and the European leaders of the *Avvenire*, whether Continental or of the London World's Convention. One of those points is, that both parties agree in assigning a temporal origin to the authority which all the Popes have exercised, from St. Peter, who made deacons the administrators of temporal goods, to Pius the Ninth, who firmly and successfully maintains the authority of St. Peter, even in non-Catholic countries, like England, Holland, and Prussia. But both parties being agreed upon the principle that the Pope holds all the temporal influence which he ever exercised, in his own States or in other countries, not by divine, but by purely human right, the Protestant party proceeds to push this principle to its legitimate consequences. It is to be noted that the Protestant does not recognize any distinction, so far as principle is concerned, between the temporal authority of the Pope in his own States and any temporal influence he may have exercised in other countries. So he argues that what is given by free human concession may be taken back by the same authority. Any court or power can reverse its own decrees, and in this case both parties contend that the question is one of human right. It must not be forgotten that the motives of the two parties are not the same. Our friends wish to get rid of a difficulty which disturbs them, because it appears to them irreconcilable with certain facts of ecclesiastical history, because they think that the state of the question between the Church and the world does not demand the discussion, and because they are persuaded that its agitation will not be likely to subserve the interests of the Church. The motive of the Protestant party is to establish clearly the assumed fact of the purely human origin of the temporal power of the Pope, however and wherever wielded, directly or indirectly, in order that the downfall of his spiritual supremacy may be accomplished; for, as we have already remarked, the Protestant supposes that the two powers are united in the Pope as truly as body and soul are united in man, and that the day which witnesses the destruction of his temporal authority will see his spiritual sceptre fall from his hands; and then, after eighteen centuries of warfare, the enemies of St. Peter can proclaim to the world

that Christ has failed in his promises, and that there is no longer a Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church to disturb the guilty peace of the world.

We also wished to observe, in passing, that the other point of contact between the two parties, which we mentioned but now, is this. The objections to the doctrines which we have defended in this Review are couched in moderate and courteous terms. But, by way of experiment, let the principles and main positions, setting aside the consequences, be faithfully translated into Exeter-Hall English, and our belief is, that what is called in the newspapers "a most effective anti-Popery speech," equal to those received with favor in anti-Catholic circles, will be the result.

It must be confessed that the authors of the more recent outside pressure upon Italy have arranged their plans with considerable skill. We have chosen to designate them as the managers of the movement of which the World's Convention was an exposition, because they hold the scattered threads which, as they hope, will unite in a rope strong enough, if not to destroy the visible head of the Church, at least to bind him for a thousand years. It would seem now to be absolutely certain, that all the elements of outside pressure upon Italy which we have enumerated, including the political influence of the Protestant courts, are directed to causing the Italian mountain to bring forth an Italian Protestant nation. *Ridiculus mus*. Gioberti failed to do it upon what he called a Papal basis, and the authors of the new movement are trying to do it upon a Protestant basis. We need not waste a paragraph in adducing proof that the new conspirators against the peace of Italy care little for the Pope, as a mere Italian prince. In this respect, the only charge which they have to prefer against him is simply that he is a king, as well as a pontiff. For most Protestants who profess to hate Catholicity with a peculiar hatred are radicals, and hence they say that monarchy is an intrinsically evil institution. But some of the more influential men in the anti-Catholic army live in countries over which kings yet rule, or appear to rule, and a broad declaration of their sentiments in this respect might be productive of inconvenient results to themselves, at the present time. But the Pope, considered as a mere temporal prince, gives them as little uneasiness as Tuscany, Naples, or any

other third-rate power. They steadily bear in mind the following argument:—The existence of the Catholic Church depends upon the primacy of Peter. The primacy of Peter would be extinct if the temporal authority which he exercises, or claims the right to exercise, in his own States and in other countries, were overturned. Deprive him of his temporal authority, whether at home or abroad, and the problem of ages will have been solved,—the Catholic Church will be reduced at least to our level,—it will have become a sect.

The leaders of this movement reason badly, because the well-being of the Church does not necessarily depend upon the possession of temporal sovereignty on the part of her visible head. Her existence depends upon the promises of Christ. But, granting their premises, they pursue their end in a logical manner. They are not men even of what Protestants call vital religion. They are politicians, socialists, believers in progress, and in the innate goodness and perfectibility of human nature. They are sturdy advocates of the popular delusions of the day, called reform movements, partly because they are popular, and partly because the perfection of human nature which they seek seems to recede as they advance, while the innate goodness of human nature is contradicted by ever-recurring facts which are too numerous and strong for them to deny, or even to ignore. Hence, like a dying man abandoned by his physicians, they catch at the straws,—the remedies proposed by the quacks of the political and social world for the cure of ills which no human power can even relieve.

These men propose, as remedies for all the diseases of human nature, Atheism,—that is, utter indifference in matters of religion, every man being accountable, in the last analysis, to himself only, for his belief or unbelief,—Atheism in politics, Atheism in social life, and in all things which are or may be objects of human activity. The atheism which they propose to establish is by no means bald; it is clothed in a dress which enables it to pass in the world under the name of Progressive Christianity. We do not here call in question the worldly sincerity of these men. They propose to deal with the triple problem of the causes, the nature, and the duration of evil in the world,—problems as old as the fallen world itself. Their Protestantism—which, viewed in this respect, is Panthe-

ism — enables them to take it for granted that the political, social, and religious evils which afflict the world can be removed, so that the progress which is necessary to the perfection of human nature may be unobstructed, and the human race may enjoy a millennium, long promised, always deferred, but now, apparently, — thanks to Protestantism, the Bible, Steam, Electricity, and other modern earth-renovating agents, — nearer to mankind than ever before.

But these gentlemen complain that the Pope meets them everywhere, and disturbs their operations. He meets them unexpectedly, thwarts their best-arranged plans, which, they say, must have succeeded were it not for Papal interference or aggression. A great and powerful state, like England, seems herein to be in the Papal presence on a level with the most petty sovereignty, and Pius the Ninth, in establishing the hierarchy, in the creation of a Cardinal of England, in the condemnation of the government colleges, and in the convocation of synods, exercises the rights of his chair as resolutely in England as he would in his own dominions. Distance is, or appears to be, no bar to the action of the Holy See. Plots, conspiracies, combined movements, — some of them very extensive, all of them displaying considerable ingenuity, and not a few of them so exquisitely contrived that failure was regarded as almost impossible, — have been from time to time organized against St. Peter's chair, yet some invisible but stronger hand has invariably crushed the movement at the very moment when all human appearances were in its favor. What Catholic, when Pius the Sixth, and afterwards Pius the Seventh, were in prison, and when, still later, Pius the Ninth was obliged to abandon Rome, — when the dominion of their States had passed into the hands of strangers and demagogues, and when Infidelity at last seemed about to sit in the holy places, — did not fear that the abomination of desolation, for so many ages predicted, had commenced its reign over the fallen world? What Protestant did not, on each of those three occasions, regard the final destruction of the Papacy as an event which had become a portion of history?

It is strange that the enemies of the Holy See can learn nothing from past reverses. Only in this thing it appears that experience is of no avail to them. Since the erection of the Apostolic Chair at Rome by St. Peter, to the time

when Mazzini, after years of patient and skilful plotting, found himself the master of the destinies of Rome, as he and his friends expressed it, a hundred times has the same drama—in some respects a comedy, in others a dark tragedy—been enacted under the shadow of the Capitol, in the presence of the ruins of ancient Rome, and of the living monuments of the faith which is a sun never setting, although it may be for the moment eclipsed, and the results of the hundred conspiracies have been so nearly the same that the story of one tells the fortunes of all. Yet the conspirators have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. They are like the angry waves of the ocean, which beat against an everlasting rock, and cover it with the white spray. The foaming waters, like furious demons, dash themselves against the strong castle which is built upon the rock. The looker-on sees at times only mountains of waters lashed to madness, and he says to himself, "Surely, the rock is torn from its foundation, and the castle is destroyed." But the waters presently retire, and the rock and the castle stand, as they have stood for ages, a monument of the strength of God's promises against the combined assaults of the naturally most powerful created agents. Then says the baffled enemy, "Let us try undermining and gunpowder." Accordingly, he converts the underground into a mine; he lays in a great store of powder, and he applies the torch. The by-stander hears a loud noise, he sees much smoke, and presently the air is filled with fragments, and the by-stander says to himself, "Surely, the rock is blown to atoms, and the castle is in ruins." The smoke clears away, and the rock and the castle stand as firmly as ever. The fragments which darkened the air were the bodies of the plotting miners, who died by the infernal machinery which they had contrived for the destruction of the House built upon a rock.

We have already called attention to the fact, both in this and in other articles, that the dispute between the Church and the world assumes various phases, according to the varying exigencies of the times, and the forms which error may elect as a covering to her fleshless bones. The principles which lie at the bottom of the difference are always the same, the Church insisting upon the supremacy of God over man, of heaven over earth, and of the soul over the body, while the world reverses each of these require-

ments. Within our memory, when Catholics were not numerous in America, the dispute chiefly ranged within the confines of dogmatic theology. But within the few last years, our enemies have ceased to make Catholic theology a special object of attack. There is therefore no particular reason why we should stand either on the aggressive or on the defensive, so far as this field is concerned. Some few, who do not perceive that our opponents have abandoned this method of assault, continue the warfare in the old style,—from the force of habit, we suppose. The cause of this change of tactics on the part of our adversaries is the same cause which has compelled them to modify their plan of attack now four times since the establishment of the Church. Once, when Paganism found that Christianity had left to it only empty temples, and that its very existence was in danger. Again, when the Cæsars found that they were likely to fail, as they did fail, in reducing the Church to the condition of a slave of the State. Next, when the aristocracy herein proposed to follow the example of the kings, and to make the Church the slave of the world. Finally, in our own day, when the people, the demagogues, demand the Church as a bondsman to themselves. The complete separation of politics from religion, the independence of politics, or, finally, the subserviency of religion to human institutions,—which three principles, involving the two extremes of Pantheism and Manicheism, are reducible always to one, the supremacy of the world over the Church,—were insisted upon at each of the four epochs which we have named in the history of the warfare between the Church and the world, and the contest was never more earnest, and never assumed a less merely theological aspect, than now. There is not a single department of life, or an object of human activity, from the highest to the lowest sphere, in which this antagonism is not fully visible. It is true that Catholic theology, like all other Catholic things, institutions, or principles, is attacked, but the assaults are few and weak. Our enemies have no objection—indeed they would be glad—to compound with us, by letting us believe in Transubstantiation, and in every dogma proposed by the Council of Trent, and in the barely spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, we permitting them to explain his spiritual jurisdiction in their own sense. But they insist that we renounce at once, fully and

for ever, all adherence to the temporal power of the Pope, whether direct or indirect. Here all Catholics must join issue with them, for it turns out that they ask for nothing less than such a reduction of the Papal prerogatives as would deprive the Church of a head, and leave him in the condition of an Anglican bishop. Catholics cannot deprive the Pope of those prerogatives, and they will not; the Church and the Pope cannot and will not, for they were given by Christ,—they are the unalienable ornaments of his Spouse. It turns out, then, that the adversary asks that the Church shall descend to the level of a sect. And, as he also demands that, in every department of human activity, the world shall be supreme over the Church, it turns out at last that our opponent desires the Church to give up the contest which Christ began against the world, and to permit Paganism, her first and her last enemy, to rule the world once more. We Catholics have discovered, for the fourth time since the morning of Pentecost, that the Church is a republic,—a kingdom. *Christus instituit Ecclesiam suam tanquam bene, recteque ordinatam rempublicam*, is the generative formula of canon law, and we are disposed to believe that those Catholics who have almost forgotten that the Church is a kingdom, and who are therefore in the habit of conceding positions which practically leave the whole field in the possession of the non-Catholic world, are persons who do not think much of the necessity or even the utility of the canon law.

The Church is a kingdom in one age as truly as in another, but the world changes its forms of error, and so the Church's assertion of herself as a kingdom is more apparent at certain times, according to the relations subsisting between that assertion and the errors current in the world. Sometimes Catholics are so few and so weak, that the assertion causes rather amusement than alarm. Dogmatical discussions are then more common. So, when Peter, at the head of the Apostles, announced to the people the truths which the Church has continued to announce to them through every age, the people, not aware that a new kingdom was that morning proclaimed, laughed at the preacher, and said, "These men are drunk with new wine!" St. Paul, when he preached the same thing to the people of Athens, was received in an equally contemptuous manner. But in each of the four epochs of which

we have spoken,—in which the struggle of the Church, first against Paganism, then against the Emperors, next against the aristocracy, and finally against the demagogues, seemed likely to end in her exaltation, and in the downfall of her enemies, as it did in the three preceding epochs, and as it must in this last,—all her adversaries begin to oppose her as a power, a kingdom, and the contest takes what, in a philosophical sense, is called a political aspect. That is precisely the state of the controversy now. The fourth epoch opened in Europe towards the close of the last century, soon after the demoralization of the people by Protestantism, and soon after the more shrewd non-Catholics began to perceive that the Church was preparing, for the fourth time, to face the world in her character as a kingdom,—the birth of political atheism requiring this assertion on her part. Here, in America, we are beginning to find ourselves engaged in the same field, the contest having become naturalized upon American soil. The great emigration, our close intercourse with Europe, and the galvanized march of events, have hastened this result.

Take away the king, and the kingdom disappears. If the Church be a kingdom,—and it is of faith that she is,—then the Pope is king. His kingdom is a spiritual one, it is true. It is not of this world, yet it is in this world. Every human act comes, or should come, in one way or another, within its spiritual jurisdiction. Yet, as every human act is done by men *in* this world, and is therefore a temporal act, it follows that the jurisdiction exercised by the Church must exert some influence upon human affairs, whether those of private or of public men,—of families or of states. The Church commands the temporal to be subservient to the spiritual order, the world commands the contrary. The world finds the Church everywhere in its way; it finds that the Church is a kingdom, that the Pope is king, and so the cry is renewed, Away with him! Crucify him! We will have no king but Cæsar! The Cæsar chosen by the people never failed to destroy their city and to sell them into slavery.

The schismatical Patriarch of Constantinople, the Grand Lama of Thibet, the Emperor of Japan, the King of Siam, and some other potentates, put forth extravagant pretensions, and everybody laughs at them and at their pretensions. Not so with the Pope. From the day when

St. Peter erected his chair at Rome to the present year of grace, the feeling of the world against the Pope has ever been too serious to admit of other than feigned ridicule. Hatred and fear have been the passions constantly alive. What other feelings, speaking in a worldly point of view, can an enemy of the Church have when he sees a Papal excommunication followed by the downfall and exile of Napoleon, — a jubilee proclaimed from the Vatican followed by the fall of Espartero? What other feelings can a proud English Protestant have, when he hears that the old, unarmed priest of the Vatican has spoken a few simple, but authoritative words, and presently, in the face of contrary laws enacted by what is left of Protestant England, a cardinal and a hierarchy appear, synods are held, and universities, supported by all the patronage of the government, wither under the Papal malediction? What must a Russian say, who sees his Emperor, after having been received everywhere as if he were a demigod, receive for the first, and perhaps for the last time in his life, a stern rebuke from that glorious old Pope of happy memory, Gregory the Sixteenth? If the Pope had adopted, or would adopt, on these and hundreds of the like occasions, merely words of advice, perhaps the non-Catholic would be less surely confounded. But he speaks in tones of command, as one having authority from God to declare the law. This authoritative tone of the Pope, — the fact that he is, in a temporal point of view, almost helpless, — the annoying circumstance that he meets the non-Catholic world at every turn, and the portentous truth that his spiritual decrees are, sooner or later, sure of their purpose, cause non-Catholics to congregate together in favor of the prince of this world, and against the Lord and against his Christ. It is wonderful that, after so much, so long, and so bitter an experience, they cannot learn to look up, and see the Lord who sitteth in the heavens laughing them to scorn.

These considerations will serve to show how opportune, in a Protestant point of view, was the World's Convention, to which we make special allusion in this article, because the scattered threads of Protestant opposition to Rome were reunited in this singular assembly. We have already observed that its shrewd leaders cared little for Protestantism, considered as a religious system. Their opposition to the Papacy was political, and came from the

fact that the Church is a kingdom, existing everywhere, and everywhere in a state of warfare with the spirit of the age, including what one of the monks cited at the head of this article calls the symbols of the civilization of the nineteenth century, — steam, electricity, and the press. Yet, as there are still many Protestants who are rich, and willing to contribute much money for the downfall of Catholicity, and as Protestantism continues to be a fashionable name, and, like the fabled tent, capable of being stretched so as to cover an indefinite number of objects, it was resolved to continue the warfare against the Pope under the name of Protestantism. The consent of the secret societies, headed by Mazzini and others, to coöperate with the leaders of the Convention, and the understanding that the Protestant governments would also afford aid in every possible way, served to increase, not only the hopes, but the strength and the means, of the so-called reverend conspirators. The downfall of the Pope, as a temporal prince, let us repeat, was regarded by them as absolutely necessary, because they suppose that his spiritual sovereignty would not long survive his extinction as a temporal prince. It is easy to see why the Italian secret societies, under Mazzini, were ready to coöperate with them. Indeed, through the indiscretion of some American members of the Convention, it became suspected that the idea of this “religious congress” was a creation of Mazzini. It is also easy to conceive why the Protestant governments resolved to give the movement all possible secret support. They had either endured “Papal aggressions,” or they were afraid of them. Then it was most convenient to reunite the scattered wires of opposition into one Protestant rope, which, it was hoped, would be strong enough to accomplish upon the Holy See the purposes of the leaders of the World’s Convention. In this, as in previous articles, we have designated the World as the adversary of the Lord, and of his Christ. The name chosen by the conspirators — the “World’s Convention” — was significant. Opportunely for them, it happened that the new Northern descent upon Italy proposed by them was certain to be received with favor by the disjointed fragments of the Protestant world. Protestantism, like the apple of Sodom, yet concealed ashes under the appearance of healthy fruit. It is Atheism, and its secular leaders have for some time openly

advised the people of its true nature, but only a few of its clerical leaders have ventured so far. Theodore Parker, Henry W. Beecher, and a few others, have, and the result of their frankness would seem to prove that the Protestant world is nearly ripe for an open declaration of Atheism. But it is not yet, and the gentlemen of the World's Convention seized the eleventh hour of Protestantism for a last stand against the Papacy, and in behalf of the unhappy spirit of the age. Hence, the extraordinary efforts of the Protestant leaders to circulate corrupted Bibles, tracts, and anti-Catholic publications in Italy. Money, even by millions, is subscribed, sometimes freely, oftener by extortion, to defray the expenses of the movement. And there are certain cries which are popular,—we need not say why, for they come from the depths of the corrupt spirit of the age, and those depths were dug and walled in by Protestantism;—such cries as a free Bible, a free press, liberty of speech, freedom of thought, liberty of worship. The poor, unemployed, ignorant, and atheistical populace of England, where these cries were always fashionable, can tell how little the ideas represented by these cries has accrued to the ruined laboring classes, to which Protestantism is a perhaps unwilling, but cruel enemy. For she, the synthesis of contradictions, declares ignorance, misery, and poverty, created by herself, to be crimes.

The managers of the World's Convention, having decided that the exigencies of the *world* required an anti-Papal movement, and having, by the means already explained, succeeded in making their body a *quasi* centre of operations,—having obtained the aid of Protestant governments, of the secret societies, and of the Italian malecontents, and being assured of the active sympathy and a goodly share of the money of the Protestant world,—determined to make the movement against the Pope an almost strictly political one. They became members of the Mazzini league. Most of the conspirators were ministers, and hence the extraordinary exhibitions which, during the last few years, have been given in favor of Mazzini, Kossuth, Gavazzi, and persons of that sort, from certain Protestant pulpits, may be appreciated at their proper value. Some of the reverend orators seem to be in downright earnest. Perhaps they hold Hungarian and Italian bonds. We know that some of them do.

We have described the outside pressure upon the Peninsula. It was very great, and, considering the historical weakness of Italy, it appeared to the conspirators to be irresistible. It is time to inquire into the ability of Italy to resist the pressure.

Nearly all the publications which we have cited at the head of this article are partly devoted to the examination of this important question. Some of them — the work of the illustrious Perrone, the *Fatti Atroci*, the work of Tommaseo, the memoir of Fra Dolcino, the *Rimovamento* of the unhappy Gioberti — make it the direct subject of their investigations. The *Civiltà* gives at least one article monthly on this topic. Among the books which we have not named, and which treat the question directly, we may name an essay by Count Mamiani, who in 1848 was forced by the revolutionary party upon his Holiness as Secretary of State, and a treatise by the Piedmontese Marquis d' Azeglio, both writers of considerable note. It is not to be supposed that so many and such important movements could be made or proposed in foreign countries, and especially in England, without attracting the notice of Italians, and creating among them much curious speculation. Accordingly, as we observed in the beginning of this article, the number of books which have been written upon Italian affairs since 1848 is very great. No country in the world has had its history for the last five years so profusely discussed, illustrated, and narrated from every religious, political, and social point of view, by men born on the soil.

Italy has before her two momentous problems concerning her destiny, and both press for a speedy and reasonable solution. One of them, the most important, regards the call which the fragments of Protestantism, temporarily bound together by the usual tie, have published to Italy and to the world. It is, that Italy abolish the Papacy and declare herself a Protestant nation. This *invito sagro* with the negative sign is discussed in Italian circles, but too contemptuously to afford to the managers of the World's Convention the slightest hope of success. We will describe the result of Italian action with reference to this call of the sinking Protestant world a little farther on. The other problem relates to the internal condition and the future state of Italy.

We have heretofore written somewhat concerning this

last topic, and the grave condition of the Peninsula will probably suggest appropriate matter for future papers. We will content ourselves here with a short review of the course of events which have transpired since our last essay upon Italian affairs. When Charles Albert, at the beginning of the unfortunate campaign which cost him his kingdom and his life, said, *L' Italia farà da se*, he expressed an idea which has been a *locus communis* for demagogues these fifteen hundred, perhaps we might say these three thousand years. And all men who have made Italy a subject of study, all those who love or who hate that beautiful country, all who have thought to any purpose, good or evil, concerning her, have discussed the question whether Italy ever can "do for herself," — whether history will ever tell of an Italian nation. The number of men who have wasted or lost their lives in trying to solve this problem is almost beyond belief. The question of Irish unity is by no means so hopeless as this. And there is Italy, exhibiting to the world the same spectacle of a number of jarring states which might form one powerful nation, which she has exhibited to the world these twenty-five centuries or more, with a few apparently exceptional intervals. It is probable that the tribes, or petty states into which Italy was divided during the thousand years preceding the permanent establishment of the first Roman Republic, were as hopelessly divided as the States are now. At the present time they are sufficiently discordant, but their existing discord is harmony when compared with the domestic quarrels which, at various times, and never more notably than during the century before the pontificate of St. Gregory the Seventh, and after that of the great Pope Boniface the Eighth, disturbed the precarious truce of the Italian States. They have occasionally formed leagues, for the accomplishment of particular ends; but the league did not always subsist until the proposed end was gained. It has often occurred to Italian statesmen, that a federal league, differing in no essential point from our American compact, might be formed in Italy. It has been proposed, tried, and found wanting, and the trial has been made more than once. In the ancient monuments of Italy there are traces — not sufficiently distinct, however, to warrant any other than a professed anti-quarian to form an opinion reflexly certain — that Italy was united twice, though not for a long time, before the

union which was brought about by the Roman arms. The ubiquitous Celts seem to have been the authors of those unions, if such there were. Barbarians of the North descended in swarms upon Italy, and established a sort of peace,— *solitudinem fecerunt, pacem appellanere*. The Latin Emperors enabled the Peninsula to present at least the appearance of unity until the fall of the Western Empire; and the Greek Cæsars, after that event, and by the aid of the Popes, succeeded in preserving the shade of Italian unity, until their inveterate determination to exalt heresy, to crush the Chair of St. Peter, and to set up in its stead the fallen patriarchate of Constantinople, compelled the Holy See to take into its own hands the government of what was left of the Empire in Italy, and to create, at the proper time, a new Western Empire. The unity of Italy never ceased to be a problem to the Western Emperors, particularly after they declared war against St. Peter's Chair, which made them,— a war that endured many years, and ended with the fall of the Franconian Cæsars, crushed by the anathema of the Holy See, and with the election, under the auspices of the Pope, of better men in their stead. Since the last reorganization of the Empire, the German Cæsars have never lost sight of the problem of Italian unity, and not one of them has solved it. No *stranger* ever solved it. The Pagan Republic and Empire made Italy present the appearance of one people, but the internal causes of dissension were always in operation, and the one Italian nation was only an integral part of an empire which embraced the world, and, in the language of the poet, made a city of that which was once the universe. The Popes have done more to present to the world the spectacle of one Italian nation, than all the powers, native or foreign, that have watched, toiled, and fought to that end these two thousand years. This result was not directly intended by the Holy See, though, of course, not excluded from its design. It is always true that the kingdom of God is not of this world, but Italy herein found it to be true, that he who seeks first the kingdom of God has all other things added to him. Italy was never so glorious as when the Pope was her temporal Lord. At no other time did she or could she bid defiance to the Cæsars, who had degenerated into schismatical tyrants. If Italy offer a prayer for her only once discovered nationality, she should

pray for the return of a Pope Alexander Third. The unhappy Gioberti, speculating upon these facts, offered, as his plan for the erection of a United Italy, a federal union not dissimilar to the American, each State remaining sovereign, under the supreme moderatorship of the Pope. He was insincere, and he regarded the Holy See as a sort of temporal means for the regeneration of Italy. He was a worldly man, and his plans, by a strange perversion of his own principles, involved the subordination of the spiritual to the temporal. He staked all, even his soul; he failed and died.

Napoleon said that Italy is a geographical expression. The *mot* is severe, but all history, with the exception which we have noted, confirms the judgment of Bonaparte. It is not to be supposed that the Italians of our own day are ignorant of the history of the attempts to establish Italian nationality. They draw different conclusions from the same premises, according to the stand-point of each, but they do not deny the premises. Hence, there is every shade of opinion in Italy with reference to Italian nationality. Some ask for one republic. But each large city claims to be the capital. All the cities are jealous of the pretensions of Rome in this respect. They are weary of hearing her named the Eternal City. Rome, on the other hand, will not listen to the claims of the other cities. And they, if the pretensions of Rome were set aside, would never yield the hope which is cherished by each of them, of becoming the capital city of all Italy, — perhaps of Europe, — perhaps of the world, — for the idea of the Italian primacy is deeply engraven in the Italian heart. Gioberti expressed the idea, but he clothed it in an impossible dress.

Other Italian public men ask for a group of independent republics, to be multiplied to an indefinite extent, and to be connected by no other tie than a common language and geographical name. This is a return to the old state of Italy in her worst times, when an arrow could scarcely be shot from any point without falling into hostile territory. Others ask for a federal republic. Some would have one Italian kingdom, governed by an Italian prince. Others accept the idea of a kingdom, but demand a foreign prince. There are Italians who recommend a partition of Italy between Sardinia, Rome, and Naples. This proposition is amended by others, who wish to add Tuscany to the Italian

powers. A further amendment is suggested, which is, that Genoa, Venice, and Pisa may once more be made free cities. Other Italian cities, with knife in hand, loudly press their claim to be also free cities. Then there are not wanting Italians who look upon this field of discord with an eye of resolute despair, and say that an extension of Austrian dominion over the entire Peninsula is the only thing which can save Italy.

This is, assuredly, a state of things which affords no contradiction to the bitter sarcasm of Bonaparte, and no hope for an Italian nation. The Italians who were not satisfied with the old condition of affairs never had a clearer field of operations than in 1848. The noble old man, Radetski, it is true, proved himself to be the best general of our times, but even he could scarcely have restored the *status quo* in Lombardy had he not been negatively aided by the treachery of the republicans against Charles Albert, and the utterly hopeless quarrels of the revolutionists among themselves.

Let no one suppose that the jarring factions which we have mentioned represented *Italy*. The PEOPLE were satisfied with the existing state of things, and with such changes as their rulers might freely make. The persons whose war of words and discordant plans we have described, were not a tenth of the inhabitants of Italy. They represented the demagogues and the political atheism of the Peninsula. They spoke in the name of the people,—demagogues always do,—but their voice was the voice of the secret societies. The only man who could, with an appearance of right, claim to represent any portion of Italy, was Charles Albert. He was a legitimate sovereign.

Mazzini was quite aware, while he was planning the revolution of 1848, that the quarrels of his associates, instruments, and allies from the different states of Italy, would make the chances of the struggle militate against him, notwithstanding the terrors of his secret organization. He, as well as any man living, knows that the revolutionists of Italy are not strong enough to accomplish their purposes. He knows full well the meaning of the phrase that "Italy is a geographical expression." Aid, therefore, must come from without. There was no time for the infusion of new blood into the veins of Italy, and the secret societies of the Continent, although powerful helpers, and necessary to his plans, were not strong enough to insure victory to the flag

of the republic. Besides, national antipathies, and a too grasping disposition on their part, might, to a certain extent, make their aid less valuable. Men, money, and arms, from quarters where sympathy for the movement was felt, were not to be refused; but this was not yet enough. There remained the sympathy of the scattered fragments of the Protestant world for the revolution, on the ground that it would be likely to dethrone their everlasting enemy, the Pope of Rome, and perhaps to destroy him utterly. Rome is the only city in the world which can boast that heresy was never openly preached within its walls. Could not this glory be taken from her by the strong arm? The *dissecta membra* of Protestantism can be at a moment's warning temporarily united for one purpose,—that of “putting down the Pope.” It was decided between Mazzini and the Protestant leaders, on both sides of the Atlantic, that the attempt should be made, and the World's Convention at London was the result. Mazzini, on his part, agreed to open Italy, and, above all, Rome, to Protestantism, to prosecute the work of the Duchess Renée of Ferrara, and to make, if not Luther, Calvin, and Wesley, at least Savonarola, Arnold of Brescia, Sarpi, and Peter Waldo, the patron saints of regenerated Italy. He promised to apply the principles of the purest democracy of the nineteenth century to the religious concerns of Europe, and, as soon as the new republic was inaugurated, he promised to call a second World's Convention at Rome, to decide, upon democratic principles, what the future religion of the world should be.

It is easy to conceive that the Protestant leaders, especially those from England and America, were filled with enthusiasm at the news of a prospect so pleasant to them. They promised to collect money, to agitate, to call meetings, to engage the whole Protestant world in the work, to spare no effort whereby Protestant governments, and even that of the United States, might be induced to aid the movement, if not actively, at least passively, by sending ambassadors, or secretaries, or consuls, or at least secret agents,—Lord Mintos and Dudley Manns. How well and how faithfully the Protestant leaders performed their part of the contract is known to the world. The New York Address to the Holy Father was an exquisitely conceived part of their plan. They labored so zealously, and with so much

worldly prudence, that not a few Catholic public men, on both sides of the Atlantic, were beguiled. Most Catholics are now awakened, but there are yet among us a few worshippers of Mazzini. The events of the next five years will undeceive them, if they be honest men. In view of the fidelity with which the Protestant leaders fulfilled their promises to Mazzini,—we symbolize “Young Italy” under the name of Mazzini, its self-created, and therefore inane soul,—we cannot wonder at the tempest of baffled rage which they have raised since the reaction of 1849. It is no comfort to them to know that the Church has gained much in the Catholic countries which were the theatre of revolution in 1848; that her assertion of Apostolical authority, of herself as a kingdom founded upon a rock, was never more stern and successful than during the last five years; and that Pius the Ninth has in several Protestant countries, and three times in England, asserted the supremacy of the Church over the temporal order, and has in every instance used not in vain his spiritual sword. A survey of the field shows to even the most common observer, that the only party or body which has lost nothing, and gained anything by the revolution, is the Church. Why should not the heathen rage?

It seems probable that Mazzini intended to fulfil his part of the contract. But he could not foresee the triumphs of the king at Naples, or the suppression of the insurrection of June in Paris, and the return of the Bonaparte dynasty; neither could he foretell the entry of the Russian into Hungary. The Lord, whom Mazzini had determined to depose upon earth, sat in the heavens, and laughed the conspirators to scorn. Mazzini, however, and the Protestant leaders, have by no means receded from the contract. A new revolution is in course of preparation,—the Reds announce their revolutions as theatrical managers announce their plays,—and the same means are to be adopted as in 1846–48. The prospect of a general war emboldens them to hope for a greater measure of success than fell to their lot in 1849. Russia is to be kept so busy by England,—perhaps France and Turkey,—that she will have enough to do in attending to her own affairs, and Austria will not have her aid in the suppression of a new Hungarian insurrection. Austria is truly regarded by the conspirators as the great secular barrier against the Red Republic, and it

is supposed that the combined Magyar and Italian movements, aided, of course, by England and the Protestant world, and at least not resisted by France, will prove strong enough to accomplish the ruin of the house of Hapsburg-Lorraine. The Protestant leaders, on their part, demand the head of St. Peter, and Mazzini has promised it. Both parties will this time move every agent in *their* world to accomplish their purpose, and so a Protestant Italy is regarded by some as somewhat more than an empty name for the Italy of the next half-century.

Accordingly, as we have intimated, and as an examination of most of the books cited at the head of this article will show, the question of a Protestant Italy engages the attention of all men who regard the affairs of the Peninsula with any degree of interest. The feeling with reference to it singularly varies. It is undeniable that, from a human point of view, the prospect of a Protestant Italy does not look very dismal. Mazzini, being an Italian of Catholic antecedents, has as hearty a contempt for Protestantism as any man can have. But the assistance of the Protestant world is to him an absolute necessity, and he must at least feign to meet its longing for revenge. His victims, among the loyal people of Italy, will not be sacrificed to Protestantism, but to the evil genius of Young Italy. The Protestant world looks forward to the result of the movement with anxiety and guilty hope. The PEOPLE of Italy learn with unconcealed horror that Protestantism, which has proved hardly less fatal to the interests of the European populations than Mahometanism has proved to the East, is about to make a new descent upon Italy. Better a new descent of the barbarians of the North. The *Civiltà Cattolica*, Father Perrone, the author of the *Fatti Atroci*, and other standard-bearers of the true Italian people, have demonstrated to the world that Italy cannot be a Protestant nation. A contemporary cited at the head of this article, and who appears to have looked into this matter with considerable earnestness, gives it as his opinion that the chief hope of a Protestant Italy lies, as it has lain these three centuries, in the Waldenses of Piedmont. Truly the hope is very small. Great efforts are made to convince the Protestant world that the Waldenses are becoming formidable; but there is no room for fear on this head. With the exception of a newspaper and a meeting-

house, established by the permission of the government of Turin, as a state trick to intimidate the Pope, the Waldenses are what they always were, a little band of fanatics who can harm only themselves. It is true that they are aware that the hope of the Protestant world points to them as efficient agents in the coming "regeneration of Italy," and they may, in consequence, be drawn into an active participation with the plots of Mazzini and company. Indeed, their leaders are compromised; but the poor people, as is usual in such cases, will be the sufferers.

The writers who profess to represent the views of the liberal party view this Protestant aggression upon Italy with scarcely disguised contempt. Tommaseo, with other authors of the same school, and even Gioberti, contend that Protestantism is a weed which can never grow in Italy. In all their plans for political, civil, and social reform, they assume as a condition of Italian regeneration that Italy must continue to be a Catholic nation. Only a few of the more virulent among the radicals dissent herein from their liberal brethren, and these, like Mazzini, call in the Protestants as a last, desperate means for the success of the revolution. "Drowning men catch at straws." If the Italian *Rinnovamento* come to pass through the aid of Satan and Protestantism, and if Protestantism be emboldened thereby to begin its operations in Italy, and if the revolutionary leaders succeed in the inauguration of a new Babylonish captivity,—the exile of the Pope for a few years,—the demagogues will have no mercy upon their Protestant allies. If Protestantism be rooted in the land, the Italy of to-day, certainly the Papal portion of it, will for the first time know what despotism means. It is easy to conceive what will become of the Protestant allies of Mazzini. The liberals hate "*lo straniero*," even when a Catholic. If a Protestant, they use him as an instrument, and then throw him aside as a worthless tool. It is strange that Protestants have not learned the alphabet of the history of Italy.

Tommaseo, Gioberti, and all the writers of that party whom we have consulted, ask for the abolition of the exercise of what they call the temporal power of the Pope, leaving with him the theoretical rights which their Italian logic does not permit them to controvert *directly*. They admit principles which immediately establish this right;

but when they are permitted to define the spiritual prerogatives of the Pope, they insist, with the utmost earnestness, upon the preservation to Italy of the Apostolic Chair. It is a curious, though not a wonderful, thing.

It is said by some that the Italian populations have a Celtic basis, and, as the Celt is not easily inclined to make radical changes in his institutions, so the Italian clings to those things which seemed good to his fathers. However this may be, we are not disposed to lose sight of the fact that Rome, like Jerusalem, lives her life under an especial providence of God, and our certainty that Mazzini cannot in the end prevail is founded upon the evidences of that providence, which are so abundant in the history of the everlasting contest between the Church and the World. Possibly, the Italian liberals unconsciously recognize this thing. Then all the real even human glory of Italy is inseparably connected with the presence of St. Peter upon Italian ground. His departure is the signal for the commencement of temporal ruin. His is the oldest sovereignty of Europe, and even the Italian radicals have not ceased to regard *lo straniero*, whether Teuton or Saxon, as a barbarian, or to repeat with pride the history of the days when the successor of Peter was the acknowledged king of kings on earth. Nor do they look without secret pride upon the manifestations of Papal power which Pius the Ninth, notwithstanding the opposition of the Protestant world, sends forth with the same holy and imperturbable confidence as if the hand of the great time-measurer of centuries had been moved back to the Middle Ages. What a miserable thing Protestantism must be, exclaims the scoffing Italian, if it cannot withstand the Rome of the nineteenth century! How can it help us, when it cannot help itself? However, our space fails us, and we must reserve the further consideration of this branch of the subject for a future occasion.

ART. V. — *Mercersburg Quarterly Review*. Chambersburg, Pa. January, 1854.

THE revival of Catholicity in Germany and Great Britain, and its diffusion by means of immigration and conversion in this country, together with its partial emancipation from the State in France, Austria, and Spain, have produced no little effect on the Protestant mind, and no little commotion in the Protestant camp. It is evident that there has been, since the commencement of the present century, a decided reaction in favor of Catholicity, and large numbers in all countries have felt that the only refuge from infidelity, anarchy, and licentiousness is in a hearty and speedy return to the bosom of the Catholic Church. Intelligent and earnest-minded Protestants have become convinced, that, unless they can find, outside of the present Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, some ground on which they can stand different from that of vulgar Protestantism, they have no alternative but either to become Catholics or to rush forward into absolute infidelity. Some have sought this ground in a further development and extension of the principle of private judgment; some have sought it in a further limitation of that principle, and in the assertion along with it of the authority of tradition; and others have sought it in the assertion of what may be called historical development. The first class are rationalists, and deny all religion as distinguished from simple human philosophy, such as Unitarians, German Neologists, and the American Transcendentalists. The second class follow what is called a "Romanizing tendency," and are best known under the name of Puseyites. The last class accept the Catholic Church down to the sixteenth century, and assert Protestantism as its legitimate historical development and continuation. With these are to be ranked the later German and our own Mercersburg Protestant theologians.

The first and second classes have been sufficiently refuted in our own pages and elsewhere. The Rationalists are really rejecters of Christianity, and cannot with any justice claim to be regarded as Christians. They have fallen below the ancient Pagan philosophers. The Puseyites approach too near to the Church to be good Protestants, and yet not near enough to be even so much as bad Catholics. They are inconsistent and double-tongued, theologically considered, and need not detain us a moment. But the third class have not yet, at least in this country, been formally met and refuted. A few remarks, therefore, on their distinctive principle will perhaps not be ill-timed, or unacceptable to our readers.

The chiefs of this school in the United States are Dr. John W. Nevin and Dr. Philip Schaff, the former a native American, the latter a native of Germany. Both are members of the German

Reformed Church, both are men of rare attainments, and Dr. Nevin especially is a man of great ability and earnestness, and as a scholar, as a logician, and as an original and vigorous writer, inferior to no Protestant divine in the country. His papers in the *Mercersburg Review* on *Early Christianity* and *St. Cyprian* are masterpieces of their kind, and indicate a mind of the first order. For both of these gentlemen we entertain a very high personal esteem, and shall very much regret if, in what we may say of their peculiar hypothesis, there should be anything to wound their feelings, or to give them in any degree personal offence.

The hypothesis they put forward as the only ground on which Protestantism can be defended as a religion is, that it is the historical development and vital continuation of the Church of the ages preceding the so-called Reformation. The following, from an article by Dr. Nevin in the last number of the *Mercersburg Review*, will place our readers in possession of the general position of the school.

"The whole case is plain enough. The Christianity of the second, third, and fourth centuries, we say, was progressively of the same general order throughout the entire Christian world, and in this character it differed altogether from modern Protestantism, and led fairly and directly towards the Roman Catholic system of the Middle Ages. In proof of this simply historical assertion, we point to facts. It is purely a question of history in the first place, to be either granted or denied as the truth of facts may seem to require. Is the general proposition true as a historical fact, or is it not? If not, let this be shown by proper evidence. But if it be true, what then? Must it be ignored or overlooked? No honest Protestant certainly will say that. We are bound to look it firmly in the face; and when the question is then asked, *How is this fact to be construed over against the claims of Protestantism?* it should be felt to be one that is entitled to some open and manly answer. There are now but two general ways in which to dispose of the matter consistently with these claims. We may treat the Church of the first ages after the time of the Apostles as a wholesale falsification of Christianity in its proper Apostolical form, and so make the truth of Protestantism to consist in its being a new edition altogether of what was then so short-lived in the beginning; or we may allow a true continuation of the primitive life of Christianity in the early Church, according to the article in the Creed, and make Protestantism then to agree with it in some way of historical derivation, answerable to the law of growth in the natural world, by which all differences shall be resolved into outward accident and form merely, whilst the inward substance is taken to be always the same. One or the other of these methods we must adopt for the solution of the question in hand, or else fall into downright obscurantism of the most pitiful sort. The first method, however, is only another name for infidelity, denying as it does practically the existence of the Church and the authority of the Creed. The case then shuts the cause of Protestantism up to the other view, as the only one by which its pretensions can be consistently maintained without treason to Christianity. This is the general conclusion of our argument in the articles of the '*Mercersburg Review*' on the Early Church. The argument itself proposes no particular theory or scheme, for the construction

of such a historical genesis as the case is shown to demand. It merely urges the necessity of some scheme of the sort, if Protestantism is to be upheld at all. That, however, is at once much. It implies, in the first place, a true succession of Christianity in the Catholic Church, in spite of all corruptions, not only from the first century to the sixth, but from the sixth century also to the sixteenth. This makes the Church an object of respect through all ages. And in the second place, it requires that Protestantism shall not be taken to be such a rupture with the Catholic Church, as excludes the idea of a strictly historical continuity of being between what Christianity is now in the one form and what it was before in the other. When it comes to such wholesale negation and contradiction, the true idea of Protestantism is gone, and we have only unhistorical radicalism in its place. Protestantism *must* be historical, to be true. To say that it is not the continuation of the previous life of the Church, of one substance though not of one form with what this was in all past ages, is at once to pronounce it Antichristian and false." — pp. 109–111.

How Protestantism can be a true historical development and continuation of the Catholicity of the ages preceding that of the Reformers, Dr. Nevin, unhappily, does not tell us. On this point no member of the school, whether in this country or in Germany, affords us any light. The school prove, and beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil, that Protestantism, if Christian, must be such development and continuation; but that it is or that it can be justly so regarded, they do not prove, or even attempt to prove. But if they mean to continue Protestants, or to maintain Protestantism in any respect as a form of Christianity, this is precisely the point they must prove; and unless they do prove it, they cannot safely remain in their present position. As they acknowledge the Church in communion with the See of Rome was, prior to the Reformation, the Christian Church, in which circulated the true Christian life, and as they confess that Protestantism, as to its form at least, is something different from that Church, it is incumbent on them to prove that it is identical in substance, in order to justify themselves in remaining outside of the present Catholic Church, which as to form, if in no other respect, is undeniably the continuation of the primitive and mediæval Church. The Catholic Church, or Church in communion with the See of Rome, is presumptively, at least, the true continuation of the Christian Church that preceded Luther. It is identically that Church in polity, in organization, in constitution, in name, in doctrine, in orders, and in general discipline. It has maintained the succession unbroken, and is now, as Dr. Nevin has unanswerably proved, what the Christian Church was in the time of Cyprian, and in the Apostolic age. The presumption, then, certainly is, that she is the true historical continuation of the Christian Church, and that it is in her communion, not outside of it, that continues to circulate the true Christian life. The presumption, then, is against Protestantism, and before one can justify himself in remaining a Protestant, he must overcome that presumption by

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the current of Christian life has ceased to circulate in that Church, and now actually flows in Protestant channels. The question is momentous, and must press with terrible weight upon every serious-minded Protestant, who is really in earnest to be united by a living union to Christ as his living head.

We suppose it will be conceded that the life of Christ is one and indivisible, and therefore unites all who live it in one living and compact body; and as men in this life are not disembodied spirits, but spirit united to body, it must unite all who live it in one external as well as internal communion. Undoubtedly, a man may be in the external communion of the Church without living the life of Christ, but all philosophy and theology impugn the notion that one can live his life out of that communion. To suppose it would lead us back to the heresy of the Docetæ, or at least render the assumption of a real body by our Lord quite unnecessary and without motive. One of two things, then: either we must assume that Protestantism is the true continuation of the Christian life, and thus deny that life to the Catholic communion, or we must assert it for the Catholic Church and deny it to the Protestant sects. No doubt it seems a hard case to unchristianize all the Protestant sects, and to deny to Protestants all Christian life, or real union through that life with Christ, the only Redeemer and Saviour; but it is a still harder case to deny it to the Catholic communion, for the number of individuals to be declared out of the pale of the Christian Church, or to be unchristianized, in the latter case, is immensely greater than in the former. It will not do to divide Christ, or to pretend that his life flows alike in the Catholic communion and in the Protestant. To pretend the latter would be fatal to the very hypothesis in question, for Protestantism would, in that case, be no more a development and continuation of it than Catholicity. The life would continue to flow on in the Catholic Church as before, and the most that could be said would be that Protestantism as well as Catholicity continues the Christian life, not that it is its true historical development and continuation, as the hypothesis asserts.

Moreover, the general theory of development that underlies the hypothesis, stands greatly in need of being proved. It assumes that the human race is in a state of continuous development or progress; that human life is simply evolution; thus confounding first and final causes, or rather, losing sight of proper final causes altogether, which at bottom conceals a purely pantheistic thought. With this general theory of human progress or evolution the school connects that of a continuous development or evolution of Christianity. Always does it regard Christianity as something to be developed and perfected, never simply as a law to be accepted and obeyed. Through all Protestantism, as it is now developed, runs

the conception, either that Christianity was imperfect as originally given, and needs to be perfected, completed, by human thought and virtue, or else that it ought to vary and adapt itself to the variations and changes of time and place. In the latter case, Protestantism will not have Christianity introduce a fixed and permanent, therefore a divine, element into human affairs, but insists that the law shall be itself variable, and vary according to the ever-varying notions, passions, and caprices of those placed under it. In the former case, it confounds making and promulgating the law with knowledge of the law and obedience to it, or the perfection of the law with the perfection that results to individual life and character from knowing and obeying it. The fundamental error is in the assumption of legislative power by the creature, which involves the seminal principle of Atheism, as we have so often labored to demonstrate. There may be development and progress in our individual knowledge of the Christian religion, and conformity to it; but there can be none, effected by second causes, in that religion itself, for it is wholly a Divine creation, and wholly a Divine law. It can be changed, modified, developed, only by God himself. We therefore cannot accept the Mercersburg theory of development. All historical development, be it more or less, is in relation to the Final Cause, not to the First Cause, and is a progress in attaining to the end for which man has been created, not a progress in his own being or powers as a creature, as a second cause, or in the divinely instituted means of gaining that end.

But waiving all this, we cannot concede that Protestantism is in any sense the historical development and continuation of the Catholic Church which preceded it. Development must continue and unfold the subject developed. What is in the development must have been previously in the subject, as the blossom is in the bud, as the bud in the germ, or the germ in the seed, otherwise it is not, as Dr. Newman has well shown, a development, but a corruption. Now take the Catholic system as presented by the Church in any age prior to the sixteenth century, and tell us of what in that system Protestantism is the development and continuation. Do you say it is the development and continuation of the hidden life of Christ? That is a simple assertion, which is neither proved nor susceptible of proof. But if there is any one thing that indicates the presence of the life of Christ, it is unity. The natural and invariable tendency of that life is to unite all who live it in one body. It is undeniably charity, and charity is love, and all love is unitive, and therefore whoever truly loves seeks by that fact to become one with the object of his love. Charity unites all who have it with Christ their head, and with one another as members of his body. If Protestantism were a development and continuation of the divine life of Christ, we should see it tending everywhere to unity, as

governed by the unitive spirit of love or charity. But instead of this, we see the very reverse. The whole history of Protestantism, from the first, proves that its innate tendency is to diversity, to disunion, to separation. Hence, hardly had it begun its career before it split into hostile sects, and the number of its sects has been constantly increasing through every period of its duration. Dr. Nevin has in the *Mercersburg Review* shown conclusively the incompatibility of the "sect system" with Christianity. But this system is clearly inseparable from Protestantism. How, then, pretend for a moment that Protestantism develops and continues the life of Christ?

Protestantism does not, assuredly, develop and continue the Catholic Church of preceding ages as a polity, for it was avowedly in this respect a complete rupture with it, and that Church as a polity is certainly continued by the present Catholic Church. Protestantism separated from the Catholic polity, denied and shook off its authority. It denounced the Pope as Antichrist, the Church as the whore of Babylon, and formed, or organized as it could, new ecclesiastical polities, after diverse and contradictory models, for itself. It certainly, then, was no development and continuation of the old Christian Church as a polity, and is undeniably a multitude of separate and diverse external bodies. This, if the Church of Christ be a polity at all, is fatal to the hypothesis under consideration.

Will you tell us that it is a development and continuation of the Church as doctrine? A denial is a rupture, not a development and continuation, and under the head of doctrine Protestantism simply denies doctrines previously held by the Church. There is not a single doctrine or dogma of the old Church that it has developed, or continued, in so far as it has anything peculiar to itself. In so far as it differs from the primitive, the mediæval, or the present Church in doctrine, it differs solely by denial, that is, by an open rupture with the acknowledged Christian Church. The Christian Church taught and teaches that man is justified by faith, that is, faith perfected by charity, *fides formata*, and therefore by faith and works, not by faith alone, without works. Has Protestantism developed and continued this doctrine? Not at all. It has simply denied the necessity of good works, and asserted that we are justified by faith alone,—the *fides informis* of the Schoolmen. Here is a rupture, not a development; for there is no doctrine or principle ever held by the Church of which justification by faith alone, without charity or good works, is or can be an element or seminal principle, and a doctrine which had not its element or seminal principle in the preceding Church can in no sense be called a development or continuation of it.

Take the sacramental principle. Has Protestantism developed and continued that? Everybody knows that it began by denying

five Sacraments out of seven, mutilated the two it professed to retain, and obscured, if it did not expressly deny, the sacramental principle itself. Here, if anything, it was a rupture with the old Church, not its development or continuation. So of penitential works, indulgences, purgatory, prayers for the dead, invocation of the saints, the worship of Mary, &c. Protestantism simply broke with the past, and failed entirely to develop and continue it. So we might go on to the end of the chapter; but it is unnecessary. Some things held by the old Church, Protestantism did not at first reject, but in no case has it developed and continued under a developed form any principle or tendency of the Christian Church which preceded it. In point of fact, it never professed to do anything of the sort. It did not profess to be a development and continuation of the Church subsisting from the Apostles down to the sixteenth century. It avowedly broke with that Church, and assumed that it had apostatized, and for eight hundred years, some said a thousand, and others twelve hundred years, had been an adulterous Church, the synagogue of Satan, and no true Church of Christ at all. It professed to go back of that Church, and to revive primitive Christianity free from what it called Papal corruptions.

Nothing is more certain, than that what Dr. Nevin stigmatizes and refutes as *Puritanism* is true and genuine Protestantism; and nothing is more evident to us, than that, if Protestantism can be sustained only on the Mercersburg hypothesis, it cannot be sustained at all. Protestants themselves see it, and hence the charge of *Romanizing* which they bring against its advocates. If you concede that the true historical continuation of Christianity down to the sixteenth century was in the Church in communion with the See of Rome, you must concede that it is so down to the present moment. Never after such a concession will you be able to oust the Catholic Church, or put your Protestantism in possession.

We suspect this hypothesis is seized upon mainly as an expedient, and as the only conceivable one, to save the Christian character of Protestantism. Its authors or inventors think the Reformers must have had some good reason for their rupture with Rome, and feel that they ought not to pronounce a sentence of condemnation on their fathers by deserting the Reformation and returning to the Church it sought to destroy. They therefore seek some expedient for justifying the Protestant movement in the sixteenth century. It is no easy matter for men who have been brought up Protestants, and have been accustomed from their childhood to hear the Reformation spoken of as the most glorious event in the annals of the human race, to make up their minds to pronounce it entirely wrong from the beginning, without a single excuse or palliation. Then to look upon our own friends and relations, the many eminent men and amiable people who at least have displayed many

noble qualities and lofty virtues in the natural order, whom we have associated with or from infancy been taught to love and revere, as strangers to the supernatural life of Christ, aliens from the Christian commonwealth, is painful and revolting to our natural sympathies and affections, and naturally leads us, though far enough from being satisfied with Protestantism as it is, to seek out some hypothesis which will save us from this painful necessity. Moreover, we have heard so much said against the Church of Rome, we find so much that is inexplicable in her history, and so much among her children that is scandalous, that we feel a strong aversion to recognizing her as the Church of Christ, and are prepared to grasp eagerly at any plausible pretext for not accepting her. Most, if not all of us, who have come from Protestantism into the Church, have taken the step with reluctance, have delayed taking it as long as we could, and have wished that we could feel ourselves justified in not taking it at all. It is an unknown land to us, and we fear that we shall encounter terrible monsters there; and without the grace of God overcoming our prejudices, and giving us more than a natural courage, we never could take the resolution to sever ourselves from our whole past, and form new and untried relations. All these considerations no doubt weigh with the chiefs of the school, conceal from their eyes the unsoundness of their hypothesis, and lead them to attach a weight to it which it certainly does not possess, and which, if they were less anxious to find it true, they certainly could not attach to it.

Our Mercersburg friends seem to us also to deceive themselves by taking certain principles and tendencies which they find among Catholics in the Middle Ages, for principles and tendencies of the Christian Church herself, or, if they prefer, the Christian religion. There is no question that Protestantism is a development and continuation of principles and tendencies which may be detected in mediæval history. The Reformers invented nothing; they only developed and continued a movement which had commenced long before them. But the question to be settled is, Were these true Christian principles and tendencies? In reading Dr. Schaff's work on the *Protestant Principle*, we find him assuming throughout that every principle and tendency subsequently accepted, developed, and continued by Protestantism was a sound Christian principle and a good tendency. But this begs the question. Nay, this is an inconsistency, for he concedes that the mediæval Church was the true Christian Church, and these principles and tendencies were undeniably repudiated by her; and therefore to develop and continue them was anything but to develop and continue the Catholic Church or the Christian religion.

Over against the city of God stands, and from the Fall has stood, the city of the world, of which Satan is the prince. Between

these two cities there is, has been, and to the end of time will be, unrelenting war. This war on the part of Satan is not prosecuted on fair and honorable principles, but is carried on by stratagem, by cunning, and by fraud. In open warfare he knows perfectly well that he can gain only a shameful defeat. He can hope for a temporary success only by gaining, through deception, partisans within the Church herself. Hence, he has always labored to insinuate into the minds of Catholics the principles and maxims of the city of the world; and hence, we find always among Catholics a larger or smaller number of individuals governed by uncatholic principles and tendencies. As time goes on, these principles and tendencies are developed and become heresies, which the Church anathematizes, expelling at the same time from her communion those persons who are mad enough obstinately to adhere to them. Now it is certain, historically, that the principles and tendencies of which Protestantism is the development and continuation are of this sort, not by any means the development and continuation of the principles and tendencies of the Christian religion, or of such as were approved by the Christian Church, or pertain to the city of God. The Church, which it is conceded represented Christianity, always opposed them, and they may all be proved to have their seat in the corrupt or fallen nature of man. If, then, we accept the Catholic Church down to the sixteenth century as the historical expression and continuation of Christianity, we are precluded from maintaining that Protestantism is the historical development and continuation of the Christian religion. It should be regarded rather as the development and realization of the corrupt nature of man, of the maxims, principles, and tendencies of the world, than of Christianity or the city of God.

We insist on this point, because it is precisely in mistaking the developments of human nature, or the principles and tendencies of human nature, struggling against the principles and maxims of the city of God, that our Mercersburg friends seem to themselves to obtain some sort of support for their hypothesis. Regarding these developments as the natural and proper developments of Christianity, or as the developments effected in Christians by Christianity, they call them Christian, and pronounce whatever they find in the Church at any time opposed to them, Antichristian, or a corruption. Nothing can be more false or injurious to the Gospel. Yet they are led to it by their theory of development, which supposes that Christianity, though in some sense objectively given to man, was given only in germ, imperfect, incomplete, to be perfected, completed by a development, and not so much by a development of it as an objective system as a development of human nature, or rather of human life, effected by it. They are thus able to assert developments in a good sense, and are led, whenever they see dawning

among Christians a principle or tendency not hitherto generally received and acted on as Christian, instead of suspecting or rejecting it as the principle of a new, or the revival of the principle of an old heresy, to hail it as the commencement of a new and important progress in Christian truth. But as this principle has not its root in the preëxisting Christian system, it can be no development of Christian truth, nor of Christian life, and can, at best, be only a development of our natural life as withdrawn from the influence of the Christian religion, and therefore of human life as under the dominion of Satan. Men do not, in this world, live a purely natural life, or a life of pure and simple nature. We are under a supernatural providence, and either through grace rise to God by supernatural virtue, or through the malice of the Devil sink to hell by a more than natural wickedness. In other words, man in this life is habitually under the dominion, either, through grace, of Christ, or, through fallen nature, of Satan. All those principles or tendencies followed by us, which are repugnant to Christianity as at any time received, are, properly speaking, Satanic, and consequently their development can in no sense be regarded either as a development of Christian truth or of Christian life, either as a development of Christian doctrine or as a development effected by it.

The great error of the German Developmentists lies in their not drawing a clear and distinct line between the Divine activity and the human, and in their blending the two activities in some degree into one. They do not properly distinguish between subjective and objective. Their aim is, no doubt, to assert the supremacy of God and the autonomy of man, but they attempt to assert human autonomy and the Divine supremacy in a sense in which one necessarily denies the other. The autonomy of man is in his free will, to which no violence is ever suffered to be done; but the Divine Legislator imposes the law to which man is morally bound to conform, and in accordance with which man is morally obliged, not physically forced, to exercise his own autonomy. Our friends overlook this fact, and, while they do not deny the law imposed by Almighty God, they seek to find the reason of its obligation in human autonomy, and not in God himself, and thus confound acceptance of law and obedience to it by a free moral agent, with making and enjoining the law itself, claiming thus what is properly the office of God, the sovereign Legislator, for man himself. They shrink from saying in just so many words, Let God command and man obey, or, Thy will, O God, be done, not mine. Always, unconsciously to themselves, no doubt, are they more or less under the influence of the Satanic temptation, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," that is, ye shall be your own masters, and the law unto yourselves, and not bound to receive it from a superior, or, at least, not till you have, *proprio motu*, assented to it, and enacted it for yourselves.

Further back still lies in their minds an error with regard to creation. We do not accuse them of formally denying the creative act of God, but they regard it rather as the act of the Divine Intellect and Essence than of the Divine Will. Creation is in their system rather the evolution of the Eternal Being according to the laws of his own infinite intelligence, than an act of the free will of God, — a clean production by his infinite liberty from nothing. In order to assert creation at all, in any proper sense of the term, it is necessary to assert it as the free act of God, and therefore as an act of will, free not only from coercion, but also from intrinsic necessity. But referring creation to God as being and intelligence, rather than to God as will, or free activity, they naturally regard — nay, are compelled to regard — human life as an evolution of the human being and as a development of human intelligence. It is always a becoming, *das Werden*, and consequently ceases in so far as it ceases to be progressive. The end of human living is therefore progress, or the continuous development of intelligence and growth or evolution of being. The human being is like one of our American cities, never finished. Nature is not completed in the original act of creation, but tends always to complete itself. This is the grand error of nearly all the later German and French philosophy. It supposes that our legitimate activity consists in developing and augmenting and completing our nature or our being, or in growing into God, instead of making it consist in the exercise of our activity in fulfilment of a moral law. Man's work is to make man, to complete his own being and faculties, instead of using the being and faculties God has given him to fulfil the purpose for which he has been created. Thus the end of man is to carry on and complete his own creation, that is, carry on and complete the creative work of the Almighty.

The same principle, or a parallel principle, is applied to Christianity. The work of man in regard to it is to develop and complete it, to finish the work commenced by the Almighty of making a religion, not the work of believing and obeying or practising the religion which God has given him. All Protestant thought, not devoted to the destruction of all religion, is employed in making, constructing, or completing religion, and so busy are Protestants in this work, that they have no leisure or heart to practise religion. The error lies in claiming for man a share in creation, or, as we have often said, placing the activity of man on the same line and in the cycle with the creative activity of God. Let our friends understand this; let them understand that in the first place nature is not a *becoming*, but is become, is completed, and that religion objectively considered is finished, and Christianity perfected, by the Author and Finisher of our faith, and they will at once see that their doctrine of development is no better than a blasphemous dream. They will

then understand that the Christian religion is not a product of human life, but is the element of that life, and must be possessed in its perfection as the condition of living that life ; for the Christian life is not a life developed in us or evolved from us, but a life generated or begotten in us by Christ our Redeemer.

We would suggest also to our friends of the Mercersburg school to inquire into their present tendency. They see, admit, and prove the present unsatisfactory state of Protestantism. They believe or profess to believe that the Protestant Reformation was necessary to carry on the legitimate development of the Christianity of the preceding ages ; but they regard the present as a transitional state. They do not believe that Protestantism as a dogmatic religion was in its origin, or is now in any of its forms, an adequate statement of Christian faith and theology. They look upon themselves, not as having found, but as about to find, what they want. Now there are two things to which we would call attention. First, following the anti-Catholic impulse originally given to the Reformation, Protestants have fallen into the sect system and vulgar Protestantism, which the Mercersburg school is resolute to condemn as unchristian ; and, second, just in proportion as they follow the tendency they contend for, and recede from this vulgar Protestantism, do they approach, not a new form of Christianity, but that old Catholic form against which the Reformers protested. These are two pregnant facts. They should, it seems to us, excite a doubt whether there is any middle ground, and create a suspicion that the form they are seeking, and the higher theology they are craving, are identically the Catholic religion, and not to be realized out of it. Dr. Nevin, in his war against what he calls Puritanism, has found himself, no doubt to his surprise and alarm, approaching what he still persists in calling Romanism. In a less degree, or at a greater distance, the same is true of Dr. Schaff. Both seem to have confidence in the Catholicizing school of Germany, but can either of them deny that all they call progress in this school consists precisely in its approach to Catholicity, to our own Church ? Is it not probable, then, that their progress, continued till it has attained the last results of the new movement, would carry them into the bosom of that Church ? They may, indeed, deny their own doctrine, and suddenly and violently interrupt their progress ; but if they concede, as they do, that they have not arrived at the goal, and if they are going, as they contend, in the right direction, and if they continue on, we see not well how they can avoid entering the Catholic communion. They might, then, it seems to us, very reasonably conclude that their labor is unnecessary, that the higher and truer theology which they seek, and which they concede that they have not as yet found, is already constructed for them, and they have nothing to do but humbly submit to it.

But our space admonishes us that we must close. We beg the serious attention of our friends to these few considerations, which we have made in no captious or controversial spirit. We know how hard it is for a man who has been bred a Protestant, and has been accustomed to look for the truth in some development of Protestantism, to change, and bring himself to look for it in that Church which he has hitherto despised or hated. But we hope they will continue on, and that our Catholic friends will not forget to besiege Heaven with prayers for their conversion.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *A Brief Sketch of the History of the Catholic Church on the Island of New York.* By the Rev. J. R. BAILEY. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1853. 16mo. pp. 156.

THE only fault we have to find with this sketch is that it is too brief, and does not give us so full a history of Catholicity in the commercial metropolis of our country as we could wish. Still, as a contribution to the Church history of the United States, it is of very great value, for, as far as it goes, it is perfectly reliable. The situation of the author, as secretary to the Archbishop of New York, gave him access to the most authentic sources of information, and his high character is a sufficient warrant that he has used them with scrupulous fidelity. We hope that he will find leisure, in his new and elevated position as Bishop of Newark, New Jersey, to continue his sketches, and to give us some account of the rise and progress of our holy religion in his new diocese, where it has had to contend with Presbyterianism of the bluest sort. The early and present history of Catholicity in the United States is a striking commentary on the *present* pretensions of Protestants, that Protestantism is the friend of civil and religious liberty, and proves that in the mouths of Protestants generally religious liberty means very little but the liberty to deny the Catholic religion and oppress its adherents. Dr. Bailey's work proves, moreover, that all the bigotry and intolerance of the country were not confined to our own Puritan fathers. When the true history of the country shall have been written, it will be seen that the Presbyterians of the Middle States and the Episcopalians of Virginia had as large a portion of the true Protestant spirit as the Congregationalists of New England. Even at the present day, New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati are far more than Boston the seats of the anti-Catholic movement, and of unmitigated Protestantism, although Boston is bad enough. Of all the different Protestant denominations that emigrated to this Western world, the Congregationalists offend us the least, and come the nearest to commanding our respect. We do not deny, and we do not wish to extenuate, their faults, but we have no sympathy with the disposition which we find among even our Catholic friends to single them out as peculiarly censurable for their bigotry and intolerance. Bigoted and intolerant they certainly were, as all Protestants must be; but

they were not more so than their Protestant brethren of other names. But since they have admitted the secret society of Know-Nothings among them, and are rapidly becoming affiliated to it, we cannot say what they may not be in a few years. Already have the Know-Nothings obtained the government of our principal cities and towns, and they will have the State, most likely next year, and perhaps in two years the Union, when undoubtedly a vigorous effort will be made to disfranchise Catholics, and to proscribe the Catholic religion. A bitter and most cruel persecution of Catholics in the name of civil and religious liberty is undoubtedly in preparation, and it will go hard but the *people*, so called, will prove their ability to rival the old Pagan Cæsars, or the Protestant princes of the sixteenth century.

2. *Sketches of the Early Catholic Missions of Kentucky; from their Commencement in 1787, to the Jubilee of 1826-27.* By M. J. SPALDING, D.D. Louisville: Webb & Brother. 1844. 16mo. pp. 306.

We notice this work by Dr. Spalding, the learned and zealous Bishop of Louisville, to urge its Right Reverend author to favor the public with a new edition of it, as it is now out of print. It is full of deep and thrilling interest to all Catholics, and gives us an account of the early labors and struggles of our missionaries in Kentucky and adjoining States, which it is profitable for us to read. In most of the towns in the Northern and Middle States Catholicity is chiefly indebted for its origin and growth to the later immigration of Catholics from Europe, and, if naturalized, is not nationalized. It has something of a foreign accent, and seems not to have as yet become an integral element in the life of the nation. It appears almost as an exotic. It is not so much so in Kentucky, or in Missouri, and one must visit those two States, as well as Maryland, the fruitful mother of American Catholicity, to be aware of the strength and importance of the American Catholic element. This element is far larger and stronger than in our section of the Union is commonly supposed. They who suppose the Church in this country is composed only of immigrants from Ireland, and their descendants, are grossly mistaken. Irishmen and the descendants of Irishmen unquestionably make up the majority of the Catholic population of the country, but they by no means constitute the whole of it. Besides the American portion, there is a very considerable number of French origin, and most excellent Catholics too; there are also some of Spanish origin and descent, and there is a large and increasing body of German Catholics, of whom our English Catholic papers seldom take any notice. In Buffalo, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, and numerous other places, they equal, if they do not outnumber, the Irish and English Catholics. The immigration the last year from Germany into the United States exceeded the immigration from Ireland, and he would form a very inadequate estimate of the strength of Catholicity in this country who should leave out the German element. There is no more peaceable, industrious, thriving, and exemplary portion of our population than the Catholic Germans. They have built some of the best churches amongst us, and they almost invariably sustain at their own expense a school in connection with their churches, where their children receive a thorough common-school education in both German and English. We have been

greatly edified and encouraged by the intercourse we have lately had with our German brethren in several cities and places which we have visited, and we are sorry that the intercourse between Catholics speaking the English language and the German Catholics in our country is not more frequent, and of a more intimate and affectionate nature.

We speak of the *Catholic* Germans, not of the *Freimänner* or infidel Germans. These infidel Germans are bad enough, we concede, but in the late riots which they have excited, or in which they have taken part, in several of our cities, they are not more censurable than those Protestants or infidel Americans who sympathize with them, and tacitly, if not expressly, encourage them, and without whose sympathy and encouragement they would never dare make these attacks upon Catholics and Catholic feeling which they have made during the last five or six months. The blame of those attacks must not be all thrown upon the Germans, whom shrewd and cunning Yankees use as their tools.

But we have wandered from our purpose. We beg Dr. Spalding to give us a new edition of his admirable *Sketches*. The work is little known at the East, and we wish all our Catholics to read it. It has nothing to offend any nationality, but it will show that American Catholicity has a history, and will tend to help on that fusion of all foreign nationalities into one American nationality, which is in some sense necessary in order to enable Catholics to feel at home here, and to have that moral weight in the American community to which their increasing numbers, wealth, and general intelligence entitle them. We are at least two millions and a half, but it is certain that we have nothing of that moral weight in the American community that, for instance, the one million and a half of Protestants out of thirty-six millions have in France. In this city we are about one half the population, but where is our moral weight, our moral influence, or the thought or the action of our community? We can gain influence only in proportion as we become fused, as it were, into one American nationality, and become able to think, and to feel, and to speak of ourselves as Americans. Our proudest distinction is that we are Catholics, and after that it should be that we are Americans. We do not like the distinction of German Americans, or Irish Americans. We are fellow-Catholics; let us study to be fellow-countrymen. There is here a work for Catholics, and their first lesson is to learn that they can be American without ceasing to be Catholic, and without becoming radicals, or running into extreme democracy. We wish our friend of the *American Celt*, whose aim is so just, would address his countrymen settled or naturalized here more from the point of view of American, and less from that of Irish nationality. There is an American nationality here of vast strength, which has a remarkable absorbing force, and you cannot supplant it, or sustain against it for any great length of time any foreign nationality. The sooner this is understood, the better will it be for the interests of Catholics and of Catholicity. Immigrants must not regard themselves as mere colonists here from Ireland or Germany. They must feel that they are an integral part of our population, and that the United States are a nation, an independent nation, with a constitution and laws of its own, and living and developing its own national life.

3. *The Jew of Verona: an Historical Tale of the Italian Revolutions of 1846-49.* From the second revised Italian Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE shall refer to this work hereafter, and we notice it now only to commend it to the serious attention of all who would understand the late Italian revolutions. It has little of romance but its form. The work is substantially historical, and reliable. The author shows well the working of the secret societies, but perhaps he would have given us a more adequate view of the causes which produced those revolutions if he had entered more fully into the foreign policy and rivalries of the French and English courts. The author does not seem to us to have entered sufficiently into the philosophy of his subject, nor to have considered it enough in its relations to the general politics of Europe. It is the defect that we often notice in the otherwise able and excellent *La Civiltà Cattolica*, in which this work originally appeared. It may be that it is not thought advisable to enter much into such questions, in works published at Rome, and if so, we have nothing to say. However, *The Jew of Verona* is a most important work, and we wish every Catholic and every Protestant in the country to read it.

4. *Practical Piety, set forth by ST. FRANCIS OF SALES.* First American Edition. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1853. pp. 360.

WE need not say one word in favor of this admirable work on Practical Piety. The simple fact that it consists of selections from the letters and discourses of St. Francis of Sales, Prince Bishop of Geneva, who personally reconciled seventy-two thousand Calvinists to the Church, says all and more than it would be in our power to say. We saw lately the notice of a church dedicated to God under the patronage of this great Saint. We hope that many more will be, for he is peculiarly the Saint whose patronage should be invoked in a Calvinistic country like ours, and in which his daughters, the Sisters of the Visitation, are doing so much for female education.

5. *The Mission Book: a Manual of Instructions and Prayers, adapted to preserve the Fruits of the Mission.* Drawn chiefly from the Works of ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI. Published under the Direction of the Fathers of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. New York: Cozzana & Co. 1853. pp. 539.

THIS is an excellent Manual of Instructions and Prayers, well adapted to its purpose. For ourselves, personally, we feel a deep interest in it, on account of the excellent ecclesiastic in whose name the copyright is secured, a very dear friend of ours before either of us had found our way into the Church, and none the less dear now that we can both feel ourselves members of the same mystical body of Christ.

6. *The Cross and the Shamrock, or How to defend the Faith; an Irish-American Catholic Tale of Real Life, descriptive of the Temptations, Sufferings, Trials, and Triumphs of the Children of St. Patrick, in the Great Republic of Washington. A Book for the Entertainment and Special Instruction of the Catholic Male and Female Servants of the United States.* Written by a Missionary Priest. Boston: Donahoe. 1853. 12mo. pp. 264.

THE Reverend author of this book has very well described its character in its title, which is by no means remarkable for its brevity. The work cannot be praised for its refined literary taste, nor for its artistic skill; but it is original, fresh, vigorous, and marked here and there by a passage of rare beauty and true pathos. It could have been written by nobody but an Irish missionary priest, and one in whom nearly all contradictions meet. But it has evidently been written for a good purpose, and, though in style and language not pleasing to a fastidious taste, can hardly fail to be deeply interesting and profitable to the important class for whom it is specially designed. The author is in earnest, and has written out of a full and overflowing heart. For ourselves, we wish he had mingled his lights and shades with a little more care. His Irish characters are saints, and his Yankee characters natural-born devils. This is carrying the matter a little beyond the limits of romance. We have known some Irishmen, Irish Catholics too, who were not precisely saints, and we have known Yankees that were deficient in none of those virtues which are possible outside of the Church. The misfortune of the Yankees is not that they are Yankees, but that they are not Catholics, and we do not think it the best way to win them to the Church, for Catholics to vituperate them, and to show themselves insensible to their many noble qualities as a people. They yield to no people on the earth in the Gentile virtues. We regret these invidious appeals to national prejudices, and we think it a poor policy to attempt to make nationality our principal reliance, especially in a country like ours, for the preservation of Catholicity. It is all very fine to tell our children that they must adhere to the Church because it was the religion of their fathers, but if a similar argument had been addressed by the Apostles and Fathers to the Pagan world, they had made few converts, and if we ourselves had listened to it, we should have remained in the ranks of Protestantism, where we were born and reared. Irish nationality cannot be preserved for any great length of time on American ground. It is greatly enfeebled in the second generation, and counts for nothing in the third. We may or may not regret it, but we cannot help it. The great thing, therefore, it seems to us, is to study how we can prevent a change of nationality in our Catholic immigrants from involving, as it has heretofore done to a lamentable extent, a change of religion. It seems to us that our children need to be instructed and trained to be Catholics, because the Catholic Church is God's Church, out of which no one can ever be saved, and not because the Church is American, German, French, or Irish. They need, in a country like ours, where the dominant nationality is non-Catholic, to be early taught that Catholicity is free from and superior to all nationalities, a kingdom or a commonwealth in itself, which overrides all others. The children of Irish parents very naturally fall into the American habits of thought and action, and soon learn to look with a sort of aversion on what, without offence, we may call *Irishism*, or to wish to get rid of it, as a supposed obstacle to their

success in life. If they have not at a very early age been taught to distinguish between the nationality and the religion of their parents, they will be very likely to throw off both together. The training which answered its purpose in Ireland, where not to be Catholic is to be anti-national, will not operate so well here, where Catholicity has hardly become nationalized. We think, therefore, with all deference to the excellent missionary priest, who has given us the "Cross and Shamrock," that the intense Irishism of his book, however respectable it may be in itself, and its intense anti-Americanism, however naturally provoked, are not precisely the sort of thing most needed in this country. We wish he had omitted the *Shamrock*, and spoken of the characters he saw proper to introduce simply as Catholics and non-Catholics, not as Irish Catholics and Yankees. This constant appeal to a foreign nationality is one of the causes that gave rise to the Native-American party, which in its origin was only accidentally anti-Catholic, whatever it may be now. Where a large number of voters can be addressed as *Irish* Americans, or as German Americans, and brought to the polls by appeals addressed to their foreign nationality and deep love of their mother country, it is not strange that a Native-American party should spring up; and when it happens that a large portion of these voters are Catholics, it is not strange that the bigots should seize upon the strong American feeling opposed to them, and endeavor to make the Native-American party an anti-Catholic party, which they will succeed only the better in doing if Irish Catholic books and papers indulge in ridicule, sarcasm, and vituperation in respect to it. What we here say may possibly be set down to our own Americanism, and want of sympathy with Irish nationality; if so, we cannot help it. In becoming a Catholic, we came under no obligation to change our nationality, and we have thus far proved that we could be a Catholic without ceasing to be an American. Our sympathy with the Irish is religious, not national; in their character of Catholics, not in that of Irishmen. An Irish infidel like John Mitchell, or an Irish radical like Thomas F. Meagher, is no more nor less to us than any other infidel or radical. As a Catholic editor, we do not suppose we are bound to pay either any peculiar respect because he happens to be Irish, and a disgrace to Ireland. In so far as the Irish are Catholic, or their interests here or in Ireland are bound up with those of Catholicity, they may count on our sympathy and support as far as our feeble abilities go; but beyond that, they are to us in the same category with other races of mankind, neither better nor worse for being Irish. We have warm friends among the Irish. So we have amongst the Germans, the Italians, the Belgians, the Hollanders, the Swiss, the French, the English, and our own countrymen, and we love them all, and try to return their friendship without thinking of what race they belong to, or in what country they first saw the light. We have our own nationality, which is Anglo-American, and we are neither proud nor ashamed of it. We do not think that in the eyes of God we are either the better or the worse for it. If we go to heaven, it will be through the merits of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of all men; and if we are sent to the other place, it will not be as an Anglo-American, but as a sinner, as a bad Catholic, and a rebel against God.

7. *All for Jesus; or the Easy Ways of Divine Love.* By F. W. FAVOR, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 432.

THIS is the first American from the second London edition of a most admirable ascetic work adapted to the wants of seculars. It needs no commendation from us. The author's name is itself a high guaranty of its merits, and if a stronger were needed, we have it in the approbation of its republication by the illustrious Archbishop of Baltimore. Whoever reads it will at least be quickened and induced to try "the easy ways of Divine Love."

8. *Sketches of the Irish Bar.* By the Right Honorable RICHARD LALOR SHEIL, M. P. With Memoirs and Notes, by R. SHELTON MACKENZIE, D.C.L. New York: Redfield. 1854. 2 vols. 16mo.

WE have not read these "Sketches," and are not competent to speak of the Editor's Notes, but the work is very highly esteemed, and we are sure that Sketches of the Irish Bar by such a writer as Richard Lalor Sheil cannot fail to be both instructive and amusing. We intend reading it, and when we have read it, we may make it the subject of some comments.

The Black Warrior Case, and the Eastern Question.—The seizure of the American steamer Black Warrior, by the Spanish authorities at Havana, for an alleged violation of the revenue laws, is regarded by those of our countrymen who covet the possession of Cuba as a gross insult to our flag, and made the occasion of inflaming the passions of our people against Spain. It has called forth a message from the President to Congress of a very menacing character, and which proves that the government are quite willing to avail themselves of the slightest pretext for taking possession of Cuba by force. As yet we have seen only the statement of one side, and that the side of the injured party, and the Secretary of State has in his office evidence enough that such statements are seldom worthy of the least reliance. There is no need of excitement on the subject. If the Cuban authorities have wrongly confiscated the steamer and cargo, Spain, having every interest and wish to be on friendly terms with us, will no doubt make us ample satisfaction; and it does not become a great nation like us to manifest any extraordinary indignation at the supposed insult to our flag. We are powerful enough to bear real insults without losing our temper or flying into a passion. We should study to lose our air of a *parvenu*, and to acquire the calm dignity of a great people, conscious of its position and not afraid of being jostled out of it.

But there may be more in this matter than meets the eye. It seems now fully certain, that France and England will actually go to war with Russia, to decide whether she or they shall control the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, under the pretence of maintaining its independence and integrity. Between Turkey and Russia we have personally very little preference, and if the war could be, as it should have been, confined to those two powers, without involving other nations, we should take very little interest in the contest. Our anxiety from the first has been for Austria, whose central position fits her to be the grand mediating power of Europe. She is the pivot of the European system, and let her be weakened in favor either of Russia or of France, that system is broken up, and there is henceforth nothing but despotism and anarchy to be looked for

in the Old World. We thought we saw in the proceedings of France a renewal, under her new dynasty, of her old hereditary policy of a league with the Turk for the abasement of Austria, while in those of England we saw only an attempt to Protestantize the East to please Exeter Hall, and to secure commercial advantages to please Manchester. The pretence of either, that it intervenes to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman dominions, is too absurd to deceive any one passably informed on the subject. The Sultan is not, and never can be again, an independent sovereign, except in name; and if not under the influence of Russia, he must be under that of France or England, or of the two united. But if it be true that Austria has partially adopted the policy of the Western powers, and by so doing is able to protect herself against the revolutionists in Italy and Hungary, and is secured from a French invasion, we are not very averse to seeing the war go on, for we have no wish to see any further extension of the Russian power in Europe.

But France and England are bound to Spain by a solemn treaty to protect her in the possession of Cuba against the United States, and therefore, if we can succeed in getting up a pretext for seizing that island by force, we are likely to find ourselves in alliance with Russia, in a war against the western European powers. The alliance between France and England, an alliance as avowedly against us as against Russia, is by no party here regarded with favor, for it touches our national honor, and any attempt of the two powers to interfere with any of our projects would arm the whole population of the country against them, and throw the whole force of the Republic in the coming struggle on the side of Russia. There is amongst us a strong feeling of hostility to Austria, but the feeling towards Russia in the party in power is, and always has been, friendly. The Czar has his warmest admirers among our leading Democrats. The radicals among us are friendly to France, but hostile to her government, and a large portion of our population are burning for an opportunity to fight Great Britain. A war on the side of Russia against France and England, which would enable us to annex the Spanish, French, and English West Indies, and the rest of Mexico, and thus extend the "area of freedom," would be exceedingly popular in this country, and would make the fortune of the administration that could bring it about. The Irish party here would favor it, from their hatred of England, and because they imagine it would give them an opportunity of doing something for Ireland, in which, however, they would most likely be deceived; for Great Britain, we think, will find in her war against Russia nowhere more loyal supporters than in Ireland.

If, then, the government can get out of the Black Warrior case a pretext for attacking Spain, it is likely to make the Eastern in part a Western question, and to make the Western as well as the Eastern continent a theatre of the war. The war, if fully entered on, is likely to become universal, and not to be terminated in a single campaign. The war fever is up, and all appearances indicate that we are on the eve of a war the like of which has hardly, if ever, been known. We dread it, for all parties will lose by it, and the balance of power, instead of being preserved, will be lost. The unwise thing Spain ever did was forming a treaty with France and England against the United States. It will hasten the event it was intended to guard against, and France and England will find that their intimate alliance will secure them the hostility of Russia and the United States, the two great and growing powers of the world, and ultimately their united hostility, since Lord Clarendon has had the indiscretion to hint that the alliance looks to Western as well as to Eastern affairs.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1854.

ART. I. — *Uncle Jack and his Nephew; or Conversations of an Old Fogie with a "Young American."*

CONVERSATION IX.

"I AM far from being as hostile to the Catholic religion as you suppose, my dear uncle; I am quite willing to tolerate it as explained by Gallicans, for, so explained, it can never interfere with the power or action of the temporal authority. We Protestants have no wish to step in between a man and his God, and we recognize the right of every one to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. As long as your Church confines herself to purely spiritual matters, to preaching her doctrines and administering her sacraments to those who choose to adhere to her communion, as Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandum contended she should, we are required by our doctrine of religious liberty to tolerate her; but not when she claims to be a government, a kingdom set up on the earth, superior to the temporal power, and to have authority, even indirect, over the whole temporal order. She thus becomes political as well as religious, and her existence is incompatible with the distinct existence and the autonomy of the State. She then must be regarded either as an *imperium in imperio*, or as being at once, indistinctly, both Church and State. She absorbs the temporal in the spiritual, and leaves no State standing. It is not against Catholicity, but against Ultramontanism, which pushes the Papal power to a sort of univer-

sal monarchy, that we make war, and as Gallicans make war also against that, we have no hostility to them, and are naturally drawn into a friendly alliance with them.

"Even Gallicans, my dear Dick, repudiate, or profess to repudiate, the heresy of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandum, and will not consider themselves honored by the preferences of 'Young America.'"

"You do us less than justice, and are very imprudent. You certainly wish to convert us; but how can you hope to do it without beginning by conciliating us?"

"I certainly wish your conversion to the Church, not that of the Church to you. I wish to treat you as men, who have the full possession of your natural faculties, and have no wish to begin by giving you sugar-plums, or a dose of chloroform. What I want is, that you should embrace the truth as God has revealed it, and submit yourselves to the authority which he has instituted for your government. I have no wish to aggregate you to the external communion of the Church without any change in your present moral dispositions and beliefs or no-beliefs. To profit by the Church you must be of her communion, not merely in it. The real question is, not what will best conciliate non-Catholics, but what is the Church which God has instituted, and the truth she teaches? If God has really established his Church as a governing as well as a teaching Church, with coercive as well as simply directive power, to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to spiritual and eternal good, the only real end for which, in hac providentia, they exist, you must accept her in that character, or otherwise you do not accept her at all.

"Even your Gallican friends, though in my judgment they assert principles which, if logically carried out, would result in the Marsilian heresy, assert, in common with the Papists, that the Church is a government, a kingdom set up on the earth and clothed with authority to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to salvation, and they could not be Catholics if they did not. The difference between them and Ultramontanes, or, as I prefer to say, *Papists*, does not consist in the formal assertion by the one, and the formal denial by the other, of the Church as a kingdom or government, but in regard to the relation in which they respectively suppose she stands to the State.

The difference may be collected from the charges which they bring each against the other. The Gallican charges the Papist with absorbing the State, or making the Church herself the State; the Papist charges the Gallican with subordinating, in principle, the spiritual to the temporal, which would lead to the assertion of man as God, or of the two governments as absolutely distinct, separate, and independent in regard to each other, which involves the Manichæan Dualism."

"But that last charge might be easily repelled. Why might not the Gallican reply, that the one and the same God has established two governments, each independent and supreme in its own order, — the Church for the government of spirituals, and the State for the government of temporals?"

"Because he would thus assert only what the Papist himself concedes. The Papist even asserts and maintains as strenuously as the Gallican, that God has instituted two distinct governments for human society, each holding all its powers from him, and each independent and supreme in its own order, as Pope Gelasius says in his Letter to the Emperor Anastasius. The difference between the Gallican and the Papist is not here, and the Gallican, to have something to oppose to the Papist, must go further, and assert each government to be independent and supreme in relation to the other, and therefore, either that the State in certain matters has spiritual jurisdiction, which is a manifest denial of the principle he contends for, or else that the temporal is separate from the spiritual and independent of it, which is Manicheism."

"I do not see that. You concede the two governments; how, then, can you maintain that the assertion of the independence of each involves the Manichæan Dualism?"

"I concede, nay, I assert, two distinct governments, each independent and supreme in its own order, but as bearing that relation one to the other which naturally exists between the spiritual and the temporal. The temporal order represented by the State is naturally subordinated to the spiritual order represented by the Church. The spiritual stands for the Divine, for God the Creator, and the temporal for the creature; and the creature in the very nature of things is and cannot but be subordinated to the creator. As the creature is subordinated to the creator,

so must the temporal be subordinated to the spiritual, and therefore the temporal authority to the spiritual authority, or the State to the Church. So reasons the Papist. Now this the Gallican must either concede or deny. If he concedes it, and still asserts the absolute independence and supremacy of the State, he must claim for the State, in itself and independently of the Church, the authority to direct temporals to spiritual and eternal good, to which by the law of God they are all to be referred, which is to contradict himself and to claim for the State, *pro tanto* at least, spiritual authority, and to deny the independence and supremacy of the Church in all things spiritual. If, on the other hand, he denies the natural subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, he must assert its independence of God. Then he must maintain that it is not God's creature; and then, that it has had another origin than God, and depends on a principle independent of him, therefore on another principle, external and independent, than that on which the spiritual order depends. Therefore there must have been two original, eternal, distinct, and independent principles, which, as I understand it, is precisely the Manichean Dualism.

"The Gallican has no tendency to Manicheism in that he simply asserts two distinct orders, one spiritual, the other temporal, or two distinct governments, each independent and supreme in its own order. He so tends only when he asserts their mutual independence in regard to each other, and denies the subordination, not in excellence and dignity alone, but in authority also, of the temporal to the spiritual. What I regard as the error of the Gallican arises from a disregard of the natural relation of the two orders. Temporals are naturally subordinated to the spiritual, as the body to the soul, and are always to be referred to a spiritual end. This is as true under the natural as under the revealed law. In the natural order as well as in the supernatural, God is the final cause, and man is morally bound to refer all his actions to him as to their ultimate end; therefore to an end not temporal, but spiritual. The revealed law does not abrogate the natural law, but presupposes and confirms it. All theologians agree that man is bound by the law of nature to worship God, and even to worship him according to the requirements of a supernaturally revealed law, if God gives such a law, as

soon as it is promulgated and sufficiently made known. God can, unquestionably, establish two powers for the government of human society; but these two powers must have the same relation to one another that is borne by the two orders which they respectively represent.

"The mistake is not in regarding the two orders as distinct, for that they are; but in regarding them as separate, for that they are not. All spirituals in this world have temporal relations, and all temporals have spiritual relations, inasmuch as they are and must be related to a spiritual end. To govern temporals in their relation to this spiritual end is necessarily a spiritual function, and if you claim it for the State, you claim for the State, up to a certain point, spiritual jurisdiction, which all Catholic theologians, so far as I am aware, agree in denying. They are unanimous, I believe, in asserting, that, under the New Law, the State has no spiritual jurisdiction whatever. Either, then, the Gallican must, in violation of the principles he professes to concede, and which as a Catholic he must hold, suffer the temporal government to exercise spiritual functions, or with the Papist extend the authority of the Church over temporals *in the respect in which they are to be referred to a spiritual end*, or, as theologians say, to spiritual and eternal good."

"But as you say that all temporals have spiritual relations, under your doctrine the power of the Church would extend to everything, and you would claim for her all the functions of government, both spiritual and temporal. She would thus be the only real government of society, would absorb the State and leave it no autonomy. Here is the objection which both Gallicans and we Protestants bring against you, and unless you can show that it is unfounded, you must stand condemned."

"I understand you. The Papist, as I have told you, asserts two distinct orders, one spiritual and the other temporal, and two distinct governments, one the Church and the other the State, each independent and supreme in its own order, for governing them. Therefore he says, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's.'"

"Wherein, then, do you differ from the Gallicans?"

"In nothing, if they consistently carry out one set of their principles; but when they do not, we differ from

them in the respect that, while we assert the independence and supremacy of the State in its own order, we deny its independence and supremacy in relation to the spiritual order. In relation to that order, we hold that it is subordinate and dependent."

"But you seem to me now to contradict yourself. After having asserted the independence and supremacy of the State in its own order, now you assert its subordination and dependence in regard to the spiritual order."

"Things are not always what they seem to those who understand them not. I assert that the State is independent and supreme in its own order, by which I mean that in the temporal order, which is its own order, the State has no superior, and holds its powers from no other,—the only sense in which any man, not an atheist, can pretend that the State is independent and supreme. The State holds its powers from God, for *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, therefore depends on him, is subject to his law, and of course, in relation to Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, is not independent and supreme. If we would not fall into absolute political atheism, the sense in which we must understand the independence and supremacy of the State is, as Suarez defines it, that it holds from no other and has no superior in its own order, while in relation to another and superior order it is subordinate and dependent. 'Quia vero felicitas temporalis, et civilis ad spiritualem, et æternam referenda est, ideo fieri potest, ut materia ipsa potestatis civilis aliter dirigenda, et gubernanda sit in ordine ad spirituale bonum quam sola civilis ratio postulare videatur. Et tunc quamvis temporalis princeps, ejusque potestas in suis actibus *directe* non pendeat ab alia potestate ejusdem ordinis et quæ eundem finem tantum respiciat, nihilominus fieri potest, ut necesse sit, ipsum dirigi, adjuvari, vel co-rigi in sua materia superiori potestate gubernante homines in ordine ad excellentiorem finem, et æternum.'"^{*}

"The contradiction you imagine does not exist, because the independence and supremacy of the State denied are not in the same order with the independence and supremacy asserted. Even the authority of the spiritual over the

^{*} *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Lib. III. Cap. V.

temporal, which I assert, is only *indirect*, and the dependence of the State on the Church is not direct, that is, for the sake of temporals as such, or as directed to a subordinate and temporal end, as Suarez says in continuation of the passage I have just cited: ‘*Illa dependentia vocatur indirecta, quia illa superior potestas circa temporalia non propter se, aut propter se, sed quasi indirecte et propter aliud interdum versatur.*’”

“But, my dear uncle, this distinction Gallicans will tell you is of no value. If the spiritual power extends to the government of the whole temporal order, it evidently matters nothing in what respect this is done, or by what name it is called. It is the substantial claim that is important. The title or classification of the power is of no consequence: —

‘A rose

By any other name will smell as sweet.’

“Not by the name of skunk’s cabbage, I am inclined to believe, Shakespeare to the contrary notwithstanding. But the Gallican, if he goes so far as to say this, forgets his philosophy.”

“That is severe.”

“None too severe, if he should express himself in the sense you suppose. Suarez believes, as we have seen, the distinction very real, and he is as high authority as any Gallican or *quasi* Gallican you can cite. Even you yourself ought to be ashamed to bring forward such an objection, either as your own or another’s. What, indeed, is its assumption? It is, that to assert the plenary authority of the Church over temporals in the respect that they are *not* temporals, but spirituals, that is, in the respect that they are related to a spiritual end, is identically the same thing as to assert her plenary authority over them in every respect. Authority governing a matter in relation to one end is authority to govern it in relation to every end! The objection itself denies all distinction between the temporal order and the spiritual, for it proceeds on the assumption, that to govern temporals in relation to a spiritual end is the same thing as to govern them in relation to a temporal end, which can be true only on the supposition that the spiritual and the temporal are identical.

“The assertion of the authority of the Church over

temporals in the respect that they are spiritually related, is simply her authority to direct and govern them as to their morality. No Catholic, unless carried away by the heat of controversy or a mistimed zeal, will pretend that the Church has not, under God, plenary authority with regard to the morality of all human actions, whether of states or of individuals. This Pope Innocent the Third, in his Letter to Philip Augustus, king of France, very distinctly asserts. 'We do not intend,' he says, 'to judge of the fee; that belongs to the king of France. But we have the right to judge of the sin, and it is our duty to exercise it against the offender, be he who he may.' *Non intendimus judicare de feudo, sed decernere de peccato, cujus ad nos pertinet sine dubitatione censura, quam in quemlibet exercere possumus, et debemus.** Here is the distinction I contend for, since the Holy Pontiff, while he disclaims all intention of judging the temporality, as related to a temporal end, claims it as his right and his duty to judge it in the respect that it is related to a spiritual end.

"But this is perhaps too old an authority. Take, then, a recent authority, a living authority, the illustrious Cardinal Gousset, Archbishop of Rheims, a man highly esteemed at Rome, and venerated through all France. He teaches in his *Observations sur le Premier Article de la Declaration de 1682*, if I understand him, the very doctrine I contend for, and I will ask you to listen to what he says:—

"This article begins by laying it down that "St. Peter and his successors, that the Church herself, has received power from God only over spiritual things and concerning salvation, and not over things temporal and civil," and proceeds to prove it by Scripture. But no Pope, no Catholic doctor, has ever denied the real distinction between the spiritual power and the temporal, nor their independence in what pertains respectively to their own sphere. The Church intervenes in respect to the acts of a government only when those acts are contrary to justice, to morality, or to religion; even then she intervenes only in her quality of interpreter of the Divine laws, natural and positive, and as governor or director [*régulatrice*] of what has a relation to conscience, to eternal salvation, and consequently to the spiritual order. It was quite unnecessary to remind us that the *kingdom* of Christ is not of this

* Apud Suarez, *Ibid.*, Cap. XXIII.

world, or rather that it *does not come from this world*, for it has for its mission to govern the things of this world only in the order of salvation, *Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo*; — quite unnecessary to remind us, that we are to “render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s, and to God the things which are God’s”; that “every soul must be submissive to the higher powers”; that there is “no power but from God”; and that “whoso resists the power, resists the ordination of God.” This has never been disputed in the Church of Jesus Christ. Assuredly the Christian world had not awaited the Declaration of 1682, drawn up by order of Louis Quatorze, to know the sense of the Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul.

“After having cited the Holy Scriptures, the Assembly adds: “We therefore declare, that kings and sovereigns are subjected by the order of God to no ecclesiastical power in things temporal; that they cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by the authority of the keys of the Church, nor their subjects be absolved from their oath of allegiance.” This consequence, which does not appear to be deduced from the principles set forth, that is, from the distinction between the two powers consecrated by Scripture, consists of two parts. The first is, that “kings and sovereigns are subjected by the order of God to no ecclesiastical authority in things temporal.” This proposition taken literally and in all its extent is false and erroneous, and cannot be maintained without falling into the error of the modern innovators, which reduces the power of the Church to acts purely spiritual and internal; which destroys entirely her authority. *A Catholic can never admit that they who govern a kingdom or a republic are subject to no ecclesiastical authority in temporals.* In point of fact, the exercise of the civil power is itself only a series of moral actions, and sovereigns may commit offences against morality in those actions which regard the government of the State, as well as in their private actions. Now in *all these actions*, which for the most part have for their object temporal things, they are, if Christians, subjected to the Church, — *not by reason of the relation of these actions to temporal well-being, but by reason of their relation to eternal happiness.* [Here is the precise distinction which you ridicule, and sneer at me for making.] What! cannot the Church attempt, when she judges it expedient, to arrest by spiritual pains the tyrant who oppresses his people? Who dare make it a crime in St. Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, that he forbade the Emperor Theodosius to enter the church, and subjected him to public penance for the massacre at Thessalonica, which he had ordered? But let us hasten rather to acknowledge a defect in the compilation of the article, than to ascribe to the bishops of the Assembly of 1682 sentiments which they did not hold. Bossuet, who drew up the Declaration, says

himself, in the discourse which he pronounced at the opening of the Assembly, "*All is subjected to the keys, all, both kings and peoples.*"

"The second part of the conclusion is, that "kings and sovereigns cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by the keys of the Church, nor their subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance." We remark here, that the Popes have never pretended to possess as to temporals any other than a spiritual power, and they have used that spiritual power only in favor and on the demand of the people oppressed by the tyranny of their sovereign. Never have they claimed temporal jurisdiction [*un droit réel*] over the temporality of kings, which has so many times been falsely laid to their charge. A pretext for rendering them odious was desired, and this was chosen. "There is no argument," says Fénelon, "by which critics have excited a more violent hatred against the authority of the Apostolic See, than those which they draw from the Bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface the Eighth. They allege that this Pope has defined in that Bull, that the Sovereign Pontiff in his quality of universal monarch may give or take away the kingdoms of the earth at his will. But Boniface himself, against whom this accusation is brought on account of his difficulties with Philip the Fair, justifies himself in a discourse before the Consistory, and says: "These forty years we have been versed in the laws, and have known that there exist two powers ordained of God. Who then can believe that such a folly, such a madness, ever entered our head?" The Cardinals also, in a letter written from Anagni to the dukes, counts, and nobility of France, justify the Pope in these words: "We wish you to hold for certain that the Sovereign Pontiff, our lord, has never written to the said king that he must be subjected to him in the temporal of his kingdom, or that he holds his kingdom from him."

"Gerson certainly cannot be accused of exaggerating the rights of the Papal power; and yet he has expressed himself in the same sense. Here are his words: "It must not be said that kings and princes hold their lands and heritage from the Church, in such sense that the Pope has over them a civil and judicial jurisdiction, as some falsely accuse Boniface the Eighth of having meant. However, all men, princes and others, are subjected to the Pope in so far as they abuse their jurisdiction, or use their temporalities and their sovereignty against the divine and natural law, and this superior power of the Pope may be called directive and ordinative, rather than civil and judicial, — *et potest superioritas illa nominari potestas directiva et ordinativa potius quam civilis et juridica.*" *

* *Sermo de Pace et Unione Græcorum*, Consid. V.

“ ‘Indeed, as Fénelon again says, “It was a received principle among Catholic nations, and profoundly engraved in their hearts, that the supreme power could be confided only to a Catholic, and that it was a law, or condition of the (tacit) compact between the people and their prince, that they were bound to obey him only inasmuch as he should himself obey the Catholic religion. In virtue of this law, all thought that the nation was absolved from its oath of fidelity, when in contempt of this fact the prince turned against religion.” Yet, lest they might be misled by an illusion, and wishing, besides, to avoid the horrors of civil war, they recurred to the Pope, — the legitimate interpreter of the oath, which is a religious act, and of all pacts considered in their relations to morality and conscience. “Thus,” adds the immortal Archbishop of Cambray, “the Church does not deprive or institute lay princes; she simply responds to the people who consult her on a matter which by reason of the oath and the compact touches conscience,” — *Itaque Ecclesia neque destituebat neque instituebat laicos principes, sed tantum consulentibus gentibus respondebat quid ratione contractus et sacramenti conscientiam attineret*; adducing afterwards the example of the first General Council of Lyons, in regard to these words of Innocent the Fourth, who declared the Emperor Frederic the Second had forfeited the Empire: “*We declare that all those who were bound to him by the oath of fidelity,*” &c. The same eminent prelate remarks, that it is as if the Pontiff had said, “We declare the Emperor, on account of his crimes and impiety, unworthy to govern a Catholic people.” This is in fact what this Pontiff did say himself; — *Propter suas iniquitates a Deo ne regnet vel imperet est abjectus; suis ligatum peccatis et abjectum, omnique honore vel dignitate privatum a Domino ostendimus, denuntiamus, ac nihilominus sententiando pronuntiamus.*

“ ‘In fine, the first of the Four Articles terminates by the declaration, that the doctrine which it expresses “is necessary to the public tranquillity, and not less advantageous to the Church than to the State; and that it ought to be inviolably followed as conformed to the Word of God, the tradition of the holy Fathers, and the example of the Saints.” Aside from the anathema from which the Assembly should have abstained, it is impossible to condemn, in a manner more express, not merely the opinion of the doctors who do not happen to think with the authors of the Declaration, but also the acts of the Popes and Councils who have believed that subjects may be released from their oath of allegiance to princes when they abuse their power, or when the common good of a nation imperatively demands a change of dynasty or of government.

“ ‘It is said that the doctrine contained in the first Article is necessary to the public tranquillity and the good of the State; but of two things, one: either the supreme power once acquired is

inamissible, or it is not. The former hypothesis, although maintained by some Gallican authors, is evidently untenable; it is anti-social, absurd, revolting; no, we can never admit that a prince, whoever he may be, may use or abuse the lives and property of his subjects with impunity. In the latter case, who is to pronounce on the differences which may arise between the people and the depositaries of power? Force, you say. But what is there not to fear from the prince, or from the people, when either reigns only in the name of the law of the strongest? As it regards kings, can they seriously believe their crowns in danger, because the Vicar of Jesus Christ recalls them to their duties and to their oaths? There is no middle course. It is necessary, either that they be absolutely independent in the exercise of their power, which can be asserted, after God, only of the Church, because she has, and she only, the promises of God himself; or, renouncing the intervention of the spiritual power, that they depend on their subjects. But, in this latter case, what is to be expected? Bossuet, who drew up the article in question, shall answer. "It is clearer than the light of day," says he, "that, if it is necessary to compare the two opinions, that which subjects temporal sovereigns to the Pope (in the sense we have just explained it), and that which subjects their power to the people, in whom predominate passion, caprice, ignorance, and wrath, the latter would be unquestionably the most to be deprecated. Experience has shown this in our own age, which has offered us among those who have abandoned their sovereigns to the caprices of the multitude more and more tragical examples against the persons of kings, than can be found during six or seven hundred years among the nations who on this point have recognized the authority of Rome." We cite this passage from Bossuet, simply to show, in view of the impossibility of asserting the absolute independence of sovereigns or those who govern, that Louis the Fourteenth had no cause for provoking the Declaration of 1682, and that the bishops of France had no reason for conceding him what he asked.'" *

"I have listened, my dear uncle, with both my ears; but I do not see any practical difference between the doctrines of Cardinal Gousset and that of M. Gosselin, which I understand you to reject."

"It shows that my distinction between governing temporals in the respect that they are spiritually related, and governing them as related to a temporal end, has high authority. The difference, moreover, is very obvious, as well as important. M. Gosselin contends that the power exercised over temporal sovereigns by the Popes was a

concession made to them by Catholic princes and nations; the illustrious Cardinal holds it to be spiritual, within the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the Sovereign Pontiff; a power which he holds and exercises, not as temporal sovereign, or as sovereign in temporals, but as the Vicar of Jesus Christ; therefore *jure divino*, and not, as M. Gosselin maintains, if I understand him, simply *jure humano*."

"But the Cardinal does not sustain you in your doctrine, as to the deposing power, for he cites with approbation Fénelon, who denies that the Pope either deprives or institutes lay princes."

"As supreme temporal lord, or by virtue of an act of his own will, at his own pleasure, agreed; but as the interpreter and judge of the law under which the prince holds and to which he is bound to conform, he does not deny it, but in effect asserts it. The doctrine of Fénelon is, that the Pope cannot deprive or institute a lay prince by an act of his own will and pleasure; and that he can only declare a prince deprived, when he is so by the law under which the prince holds; and then it is not the Pope who deprives him, but the law, of which the Pope is simply the divinely appointed minister, or judge. The Pope has no proper civil jurisdiction, and can intervene in reference to the action of the temporal government only when a moral or spiritual question arises, and there is a reason under the divine and natural laws for his intervention in his quality of Sovereign Pontiff, or as the Vicar of Jesus Christ. This is the sense in which, I understand Fénelon, and as he concedes that the Pope may as *spiritual* sovereign declare a prince fallen from his dignity, and his subjects absolved from their allegiance, he evidently concedes the deposing power in the only sense in which I or my friend of Brownson's Review have ever asserted it. His Eminence, Cardinal Gousset, certainly goes as far, as is evident from the principles he establishes in his remarks on the first part of the first Article of the Declaration of 1682, and in his claiming for the Pope the authority to pronounce judgment in the case of disputes between the people and their temporal sovereign."

"After all, the Cardinal asserts only a directive and ordinative authority in regard to temporal sovereigns, as Gerson does; and if you go no further, what more do you assert than the directive power conceded by M. Gosselin and his school?"

"That the words cited from Gerson are as strong as the Cardinal would prefer may be doubted, for they are the words of an opponent, and cited as a concession; but, however that may be, he evidently holds it to be a real and effective power. Whether I assert more or not than M. Gosselin conceded by the *potestas directiva*, depends on how much or how little he understands by it, and that I am not able to determine. When he opposes it to the indirect authority asserted by Bellarmine and Suarez, he seems to make it simply directive, merely advisory and monitory; but when he has to explain away the letters of St. Gregory the Seventh, the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface the Eighth, and certain tough passages from St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, and other high authorities, he seems to mean by it almost, if not quite, as much as I contend for. If this directive power be merely advisory and monitory, it would be no more than might be exercised by any bishop, priest, or even layman, any one of whom has the right to advise, exhort, entreat, or admonish the temporal authority; and I have often done as much myself, though without much effect, I confess. The power, to be a real, effective power, must be coercive as well as directive, and every Catholic must concede that the Church has a coercive power, and therefore with regard to kings and princes, in spirituals, or temporals in the respect that they are related or to be referred to a spiritual end. The denial of all coercive power to the Church is a step beyond the heresy of Marsilius of Padua, for he conceded, it is said, that the Church might coerce even princes with spiritual pains and censures, but was declared a heretic because he denied to her the right to go further. Kings and princes are as much subject to the authority of the Church as private persons, and, as Cardinal Gousset maintains, in their public as well as in their private acts; and she must have the same power of coercing them that she has of coercing others, and in their public as well as in their private capacity, unless, which cannot be done, some rule be pleaded exempting them. Hence Suarez asks three questions: 'Prima est, An summus Pontifex personas regum et principum temporalium habeat sibi *spiritualiter* subjectas? Secunda, An Pontifex habeat sibi subjectam non solum personam regis, sed etiam ejus potestatem temporalem, quantumvis supremam, ita ut possit illius actus præcipiendo dirigere, exi-

gere, supplere, vel impedire? Tertia his consequens est; An Pontifex ratione suæ spiritualis potestatis possit, Christianos principes non solum dirigere præcipiendo, sed etiam cogere *puniendo, etiam usque ad regni privationem, si opus fuerit?*''*

"Suarez answers at full length these three questions in the affirmative. The last question is the one on which the principal controversy hinges; and the affirmative answer to this, he says, flows as a logical consequence from the affirmative answer to the other two.

"'Quia vis directiva sine coactiva inefficax est, teste Philosopho; † ergo si Pontifex habet potestatem directivam in principes temporales, etiam habet coactivam si justæ directione per legem vel præceptum obedire noluerint. Probatur consequentia, nam quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt et optime instituta; ergo si Pontifici dedit potestatem directivam, dedit coactivam, quoniam institutio aliter facta esset imperfecta, et inefficax. Unde contraria ratione docent Theologi non habere Ecclesiam potestatem actus mere internos præcipiendi, quia de illis iudicium ferre non potest, et consequenter neque pro illis pœnam imponere, quod ad vim coactivam pertinet, ut author est D. Thomas.‡ Ergo a converso, cum Pontifex possit imperando efficaciter dirigere potestatem temporalem in actibus suis, potest etiam cogere, et punire principes sibi non obtemperantes in iis quæ juste præcipit.' §

"Suarez, Doctor Eximius, is at least respectable authority, especially when backed by Cardinal Bellarmine, and the practice of the Church in every age. Father Perrone maintains as of Catholic faith the proposition, '*Ecclesia divinitus accepit potestatem independentem atque supremam sancienti per leges exteriorem disciplinam, cogen-dique fideles ad earum observationem, et coercendi salutaribus pœnis devios et contumaces.*'

"Pope John the Twenty-second says, in his condemnation of the third heretical assertion of Marsilius of Padua, and John of Jandūm, that 'Christian emperors acknowledge that, instead of being judges of the Pontiff, *they are judged by him.*' These heretics maintained as their fifth assertion, that 'neither the Pope nor the whole Church together can punish any person, however wicked he may

* *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Lib. III. Cap. 21.

† *Ethic.*, Lib. X. Cap. ult.

‡ *Primæ Secundæ*, Q. 91, A. 4, et 100, A. 9.

§ *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Lib. III. Cap. 23.

be, with a coactive punishment, without the authorization of the Emperor.' The same Pope condemns this as a heresy, and says, that 'it is contrary to the doctrine of the Gospel, for our Lord said to Peter, Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven. Now not merely those who are willing are bound, but also and chiefly those who are unwilling. Moreover, the Church has the power of constraining by excommunication, which excludes not merely from the Sacraments, but also from the society of the faithful. Peter did not wait for the consent of the Emperor to strike Ananias and Saphira with death, nor Paul to smite Elymas with blindness, or to deliver over the incestuous Corinthian to Satan for the destruction of the flesh and the salvation of his soul. Hear also the same Apostle saying to the Corinthians: "What will you? Shall I come to you with a rod, or in charity, and in the spirit of kindness?" In which he very expressly assumes that he has a coactive power. He assumes the same when he writes, "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God (that is to say, given by God) to the destruction of fortresses, subverting counsels, and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God. . . . *We have in readiness wherewith to punish all disobedience.*" Whence it is evident that Paul received a power, even a coactive power, not from the Emperor, but from God.'*

"I could cite authorities without number to the same effect, but authorities are nothing to Young America. I will only add, that the point is one that a Catholic cannot deny; for the contrary is a condemned heresy, as the following from the constitution *Auctorem Fidei* of Pius the Sixth, condemning the pseudo Synod of Pistoja, sufficiently establishes. I will read you Titles IV. and V. of this constitution.

" IV.

"*Propositio, affirmans abusum fore auctoritatis Ecclesiæ transferendo illam ultra limites doctrinæ ac morum et eam extendendo ad res exteriores, et per vim exigendo id quod pendet a persuasione et corde, tum etiam, multo minus ad eam pertinere, exigere per vim exteriorum subjectionem suis decretis; quatenus indeterminatis illis*

* Rohrbacher, *Histoire Univ. de l'Eglise Cath.*, Tom. XX. pp. 124, 125.

verbis *extendendo ad res exteriores*, notet velut abusum auctoritatis Ecclesiæ, usum ejus potestatis acceptæ a Deo, qua usi sunt et ipsimet Apostoli in disciplina exteriori constituenda et sancienda, **HERETICA.**

“ V.

“ Quæ parte insinuat, Ecclesiam non habere auctoritatem subjectionis suis decretis exigendæ aliter quam per media quæ pendent a persuasionem; quatenus intendat Ecclesiam *non habere collatam sibi a Deo potestatem non solum dirigendi per consilia et suasiones, sed etiam jubendi per leges, ac devios contumacesque exteriori judicio ac salubribus pœnis coercendi atque cogendi*; ex. Bened. XIV. in Brevi *Ad assidue*, anni 1755, primatis, Archiepiscopis et Episcopis regni Poloniæ, *inducens in systema alias damnatum ut hæreticum.*”

“ But in proving that, you do not prove that the Pope may, even according to Catholic doctrine, deprive temporal princes of their authority.”

“ I prove by it, first, that the authority conceded to the Church by the institution of Christ is not simply directive, but also coercive; that is, she has authority to enforce *in foro externo* obedience to her decrees by ‘salubribus pœnis.’ I prove by it, in the second place, that, if temporal princes, as to the morality of their public as well as their private acts, come within her ordinary spiritual jurisdiction, she has with regard to them not merely a directive, but also her ordinary coactive or coercive power, and therefore may *de jure divino* judge and punish them, according to the nature or magnitude of their offence. This is all I had to prove. If temporal princes in the government of their estates are exempted from the obligation to conform to the divine and natural law, and therefore as to the morality of their acts from the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the Church, it is for those who so contend that they are to prove it. I say with Bossuet, *Tout est soumis aux clefs de Pierre, tout, ROIS et peuples.*”

“ But would not a Catholic remind you that there is a distinction between the internal court and the external court of the Church, and that these two are not coextensive in their jurisdiction?”

“ He must think me a novice indeed, if he thinks it necessary to remind me of so well known a distinction. Of course she does not and cannot *in foro externo* take cognizance of private sins, secret sins, or internal acts,

which come to her knowledge only in the confessional; but public sins, open and public offences, and especially such as by their very nature are public, fall necessarily within the jurisdiction of the external court. Such certainly are the public acts of public powers, which, if judged at all as public acts, must be judged *in foro externo*. Therefore the distinction, though very real and very important, has no application to the case before us."

"But why then has your friend, the editor of *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, labored to prove that the Church may judge temporal princes in their public acts, by proving that she has authority over all temporals, at least so far as they are spiritually related?"

"My friend, I presume, is able to answer for himself, and I do not pretend to know his secret reasons. I suppose, however, that in his articles on this subject his main design has been to prove the extent and superiority, not in dignity only, but also in authority, of the spiritual order, and the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, and therefore to the Church as the representative of the spiritual on earth. I suppose his real purpose has been to refute that pernicious maxim, so popular in our days, that 'Religion has nothing to do with politics,' by showing that it has something and a great deal to do with them, because all our acts are to be referred to a spiritual end. If this be so, then politics, as related to such end, as to their morality, necessarily fall under the authority of religion and within the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the Church. As incidental to this main purpose, not as an incident of a still vaster power, as some have interpreted it, he treated the power of the Church with regard to temporal princes, and showed, that, if the power of the Church extended to all temporals in that they are related to a spiritual end, it must extend to princes in their public as well as in their private acts, and that she must have the same power of spiritual jurisdiction over them that she has over private persons, and therefore the same right to judge and punish them, without troubling himself with the irrelevant question, from his point of view, whether it was to be *in foro interno* or *in foro externo*. He did not fall into the sad blunder of concluding, from the fact that she takes cognizance of all offences against natural and positive law *in foro interno*, or the tribunal of penance, that she can

take cognizance of all *in foro externo*. From the fact that *in foro interno* she takes cognizance of all offences, he concluded that her spiritual authority as judge extends to all, and from the fact that it extends to all, he concluded that it extends to offences of temporal princes, on the principle that the whole includes the parts, and therefore that she had authority to judge and punish them according to the nature of their offences, *in foro externo* when their offences were of a public and external character, and could be reached only by a public sentence, and *in foro interno* when they were not. The doctrine I contend for is the very moderate doctrine which is contained in the passages I have read you from Suarez and the Cardinal Archbishop of Rheims, — a doctrine which it is certainly lawful to hold and in a lawful manner to defend, and which it is in my judgment absolutely necessary to defend, if we would defend in any satisfactory manner the teachings of the great Catholic doctors of past times and the uniform practice of the Church in all ages. There are, however, different points of view from which the doctrine may be defended. We may defend it with a view of vindicating the Church from the charge of absorbing the State, as I am now doing, or it may be defended in opposition to those who assert formal or virtual political atheism, as is apparently the case with the editor of Brownson's Review; that is, either as an explanation or an apologetic defence of the claims of the Church in relation to the State, or as the assertion of the positive rights of the spiritual in relation to the temporal. The language used, and the form of the statements made, will, although the doctrine remains the same, vary not a little as one or the other of these points of view is adopted by the writer, and those who write from the latter will almost invariably seem, to those who are intent only on the former, to go too far. The one wishes to make the rights and prerogatives of the Church fully accepted by her children, who seem to him in danger of forgetting them; the other wishes to persuade the enemies of the Church that they may very safely tolerate her, notwithstanding the claims which in this respect have been put forth for her. The former would vindicate her power, because it is practically needed; the latter would disarm prejudice, and relieve the Church of the odium cast upon her by her enemies. Both, I apprehend, are governed by

proper motives. Either is a good object, but in seeking either exclusively there is danger. The apologist, in his zeal to explain away an offensive doctrine, may obscure in the minds of the faithful, perhaps even in his own, the truth itself, and though not killing faith may render it weak and sickly, — a result which I think has at times followed the attempt to manage the susceptibilities of Cæsar. On the other hand, the Papist, in his zeal to bring out in all their clearness, distinctness, and strength the rights and prerogatives of the Church, and therefore of the Pope as her visible head, may, if not on his guard, give gratuitous offence, and excite unnecessary hostility against the Papacy. Yet what he aims at doing is necessary to be done, and if he does his best not to be gratuitously offensive, he cannot be justly censured.

“ My friend, the editor of *Brownson's Review*, evidently believes that, in these times, it is more necessary to assert the authority of the Church in regard to temporals, in order to lead back the age to morality in politics, than it is to labor to explain away that authority, or to make it appear as a matter of small moment; although, if attentively read and understood, I think it will be found that he sufficiently qualifies his strong statements, and qualifies them as far as possible without wholly defeating his purpose. The misfortune is, that his readers, overlooking or disapproving the object he has specially in view, being themselves chiefly anxious, it may be, to disarm prejudice, pay no attention to the explanations and qualifications he never fails to offer, so far as I am aware, and which, if duly considered, would quiet the most susceptible among his Catholic brethren.

“ For my own part, I agree with him in both his doctrine and his policy. Moreover, as a Catholic, I believe my Church one in time as well as in space; her honor in any past age is as near and as dear to me as her honor in the present. I cannot concede that she modifies her doctrines as time proceeds, that she does not know her powers as well in one age as in another, or that her practice in any age can be held by a Catholic as reprehensible, or as justifiable only by the opinions of the times. I do not believe that Rome has ever abandoned a doctrine which she has once held or favored, or that she has ever disavowed a spiritual claim which she has ever once insisted upon.

The history of the Church is before the world, and must be accepted in what is unpopular to-day as well as in what is popular. While, therefore, I concede, nay, contend, that the State is independent and supreme, in the sense that it has no superior and holds from no other, in its own order, I shall insist that it is subordinate and dependent in relation to the spiritual power."*

CONVERSATION X.

"What you have said, my dear uncle, may, for aught I know, suffice for the question concerning the temporal authority of the Church, as between you and your Gallican brethren, but that does not suffice for me: I prefer the views of the Gallicans to those of the Papists, because I think them more liberal, more advanced, and approaching

* We have been blamed for bringing out this doctrine, which we are told is now defended by no Catholic theologian, and is abandoned even by Rome. But we have not been the first or the only one in recent times to insist on it. The doctrine as we defend it, as we have repeatedly explained it, is distinctly set forth in the extract which "Uncle Jack" has introduced from the learned and highly esteemed *Théologie Dogmatique* of the illustrious Cardinal Archbishop of Rheims, the firm supporter of that decidedly Papistical journal, *L'Univers Catholique*. It is also set forth in that truly Catholic work, *Histoire Universelle de l'Eglise Catholique*, by the learned and able Abbé Rohrbacher, a Doctor in Theology of the University of Louvain. It is the central doctrine of that remarkable work, and we may almost say that the History was written expressly for the purpose of illustrating and defending it; it appears prominently in nearly every one of the twenty-nine volumes of which the work consists, and the author lets no opportunity pass of bringing it out, or of combating the contrary doctrine. It was under the inspiration of this History, by a living author, and the second and revised edition of which was completed only last year, that we wrote our articles on the relations of the two powers, and in which we have done nothing more than to reproduce its doctrine and reasoning. In what estimation this work is held at Rome may be gathered from the *Preface* to the first volume of the second edition, an extract from which we subjoin.

"A more precious encouragement still," says the author, "is that of the learned and illustrious Cardinal Mai, Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, to which the Universal History of the Catholic Church had been denounced in a series of attacks by a journal of Liege, which had begun by commending it. The Marquis de Narp, whom all the Catholics of France know and esteem, wrote, therefore, from Rome, on the 6th of February, 1846: 'I have also been to see Cardinal Mai, the most important of all, because he presides over the Congregation of the Index. He received me in a manner still more affable. "I am acquainted," said he to me, "with the whole affair. The denunciations have been sent to me. I have read all,

Protestantism; but whether they or Papists are the truer Catholics is to me a matter of perfect indifference. What I want is, that you should show that the authority you claim for the Church does not destroy the autonomy of the State, and absorb the civil power in the spiritual."

"I have done that already."

"You have asserted it, but you have not shown it to my satisfaction."

"Bear in mind, then, that the power which I assert for the Church over temporals is spiritual, not temporal. I claim for her no temporal or civil jurisdiction. The power which I maintain for the Sovereign Pontiff, as Vicar of Jesus Christ, or by the institution of Christ, does not lie in the same order with the civil power. The prince does not hold from him as suzerain, and is not accountable to him as lord paramount in the temporal order. The Papal

and have found nothing that merits the least blame in the work of the respectable Abbé, whom we highly esteem (*que nous vénérons*). Tell him, from me, not to be disquieted; that I have written to the Bishop of Liege that these chicaneries must be put a stop to. Tell him to be of good courage so as to complete his work, of which we feel all the importance. I will read the new pieces you bring me, but repeat to him that he need not feel any uneasiness, and that he may communicate with the Bishop of Liege, whom, I have reason to believe, he will find equally well disposed." M. le Marquis de Narp wrote again from Rome, the 16th of February, 1847: 'Cardinal Mai has spoken to me with the same interest of the great and admirable work of our dear Abbé Rohrbacher. "I continue to read it," said he to me. "Will it be soon completed?" I believe it is nearly finished. "So much the better," he added. "He ought now to experience no longer any opposition, for I have written to the Bishop of Liege to put a stop to it, and to come to an understanding with him. We have not up to the present found a word in it to blame." Will your Eminence authorize me to say that to him? "Yes, that he may feel no inquietude." He has for some time wished to make known the encouraging words which your Eminence has spoken in his favor. "He may do it," said he to me.' Such were the kind expressions of Cardinal Mai, Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, which we have been authorized to publish."

We do not pretend that this is a warrant that there is no error or inaccurate statement in the Abbé Rohrbacher's History, but it seems to us highly improbable that the illustrious Cardinal Mai, in his position, would or could have expressed himself in such terms of a work in which the doctrine in question holds so prominent a place, if that doctrine was disapproved at Rome, or its assertion and defence by Catholic writers discountenanced. We do, therefore, regard this favor shown by the Prefect of the Congregation of the Index to that History as very good evidence that the doctrine is in no bad repute at Rome, and that her sentiment is with us rather than with those who oppose us for holding and maintaining it.

— EDITOR OF THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

power is not a temporal power or jurisdiction over the temporal of princes and states, but simply a spiritual jurisdiction. Temporals have a twofold relation; the one to a temporal end, — terrestrial happiness; the other to a spiritual end, — celestial and eternal beatitude. The Church has jurisdiction over them only under the latter relation; the State, only under the former. Under their relation to the temporal end, the State has independent and supreme jurisdiction, and is therefore independent and supreme in its own order. Consequently, my doctrine does not destroy the autonomy of the State or absorb it in the Church."

"But you subordinate the State to the Church, not in dignity and rank only, but also in authority."

"Certainly I do; but subordination and identity, in my philosophy, belong to different categories. Man is subordinated to God, and owes him submission in all things. Has man therefore no autonomy? Is he absorbed in God, or is God by this fact declared to be man? Of course not, for man in obeying acts from his own centre, and it is he, with the Divine concurrence, that acts in the obedience, not God. Does my learned nephew need to be told that where there is identity there is and can be no subordination, for nothing can be subordinated to itself? The assertion of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual necessarily implies that the two powers are distinct. Moreover, even when the Church intervenes in temporals, according to the doctrine I am defending, she does not intervene directly; she intervenes indirectly, through the civil power, by directing it to refer them to the spiritual end. It is it, not she, that so refers them."

"Still, as you extend her jurisdiction to all temporals, I cannot see what you leave for the State to do but the bidding of the Church."

"Even if as you suppose, since I admit that the State holds from no other and has no superior in its own order, and therefore that none but it can do what the Church bids it do in that order, I should neither absorb it in the Church nor destroy its autonomy in temporals. But you forget that I claim for the Church no temporal jurisdiction over the temporal, I claim for her only spiritual jurisdiction."

"So you constantly repeat, but as you confess that it extends to all acts of man in the temporal order, as

well as in the spiritual, I cannot see what difference it makes. What difference does it make whether you *call* her jurisdiction spiritual or temporal, since it is precisely of the same extent, and covers the same acts, in either case?"

"If the difference were only a difference in name, it would amount to nothing. I suppose I am capable of understanding so much. As you put the case, it can make no difference in the world whether you call it the one or the other, and you might have presumed that I could know as much without your telling me. You might, I should suppose, have concluded, when you found me insisting with so much emphasis on the distinction, that it had for me a real significance, although a significance not apparent to you. It is not always safe to infer that a man is a fool, because we fail to catch his sense. I have already told you over and over again, that temporals have a twofold relation, the one to temporal good, and the other to spiritual good. If, after the example of most Protestants, I were to identify the Church with the State, I should be obliged to say that the State has jurisdiction of temporals under both of these relations; if, as you suppose, I identified the State with the Church, and claimed for her real temporal authority over the temporal, I should subject temporals under both of these relations to the Papal power. Now it so happens that I do neither. When, therefore, I tell you that I defend for the Church only a spiritual jurisdiction, your conclusion ought to be that I defend for her jurisdiction in regard to temporals only in the respect that they are related or to be referred to a spiritual end. The distinction is real, not merely verbal, as you suppose, and necessarily implies a real distinction between the two powers.

"To make this plain to the dullest understanding, suppose a prince holds that it is for the temporal prosperity of his subjects that a railroad be constructed from his capital to the seaboard. Now if the Church had temporal jurisdiction, she could say to him, No, you shall construct a canal, not a railroad; or, You shall construct neither; but as the construction of either is not *per se* contrary to the law of God, if she is assumed to have only spiritual jurisdiction she has nothing to say on the subject, and the prince, possessing in his own right the temporal

power, may or may not authorize the construction of either a railroad or canal, or both; as he judges best for the good of his subjects. If I claimed temporal or civil jurisdiction for the Pope, I should hold that Congress ought to consult him on the question of authorizing or constructing a railroad to the Pacific; but as I claim for him only spiritual jurisdiction, I do no such thing. But suppose the prince authorizes a company to take the land owned by private individuals for their railroad, without either their consent or making them any compensation. Here the Church would have the right to step in and say, Stop there, my dear son; you cannot do that, for it violates the right of property, and is contrary to justice, to spiritual good. Here is a fair illustration of the distinction of the two powers. The State judges supremely of the railroad as to temporal good, and the Church as to spiritual good. So of any act of the government. The Church has jurisdiction of it in its spiritual relation, because in that relation it is spiritual, and necessarily falls within the jurisdiction of the spiritual power; she has not jurisdiction of it in its temporal relation, because she has only spiritual jurisdiction.

“ If you are debarred by no previous contract or duty, you may be a farmer, a sailor, a soldier, a lawyer, a physician, a merchant, a mechanic, according to your taste, inclination, or judgment, marry or not marry, as you regard it most for your temporal good, for none of these things are unlawful or forbidden by the law of God. The Church here may advise you, but has not authority to command you. But suppose you to take it into your head to pursue the profession of a gambler, a pickpocket, a pirate, or a highwayman, all of which are forbidden by the law of God, she would have a right to intervene and prohibit you, and, if you refused to desist, to call upon the secular government to compel you to desist. It is the same in regard to the State. If the State should make unprovoked war on its neighbors, pursue towards them a course of constant and unprovoked aggression to their serious injury, endangering their independence and existence, or should make war on religion and humanity, and oppress its subjects, she would by virtue of her spiritual jurisdiction have the right to summon it before her tribunals, because in all these spiritual good is impugned, and the law of God is violated. The question is not solely a temporal, but also a

spiritual question, and as a spiritual question it comes within the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts.

"Your mistake arises from not considering that, though distinct, the spiritual and the temporal are not separate or separable in this life, any more than soul and body. You reason, and so do my Gallican friends, as if the two orders existed apart, and as if the Church could point to one class of things and say to the State, These are spiritual, touch them not; and the State to another class of things and say to the Church, These are temporals, exclusively within my domain, touch them not, on your peril. But such is not the case. Man is composed of soul and body, and lives, and must live, as long as a denizen of this world, a twofold life, the one in relation to temporal good, and the other in relation to spiritual good. Every act he does or can perform has relation to both ends, is under one aspect spiritual and under the other temporal. No individual act of man, we are taught by the theologians, is morally indifferent, and the most purely spiritual acts we can perform, such as prayer, meditation, religious vows, &c., have temporal relations and a bearing more or less direct, more or less remote, on the temporal welfare of individuals and nations. So it happens that often the two powers, though distinct, are concerned with the same matters, but under diverse relations. Hence it is impossible, not to distinguish, indeed, but to separate the matter of the two powers, so that they may act apart, in not only distinct, but entirely separate, spheres. The two orders are in nature interlaced, run the one into the other, and are in reciprocal commerce with each other, as the soul and body of man, and nothing affects the one without in some measure affecting the other. God has therefore established for Christian society two governments, and ordained their mutual harmony and coöperation. It is impossible to conceive the perfect government of society without the two powers, or without coöperation and mutual concert, as the Church not obscurely insinuates in calling her arrangements with temporal powers *Concordats*. The errors to be avoided are, on the one hand, the *unity* or identity of Church and State, an error to which Protestantism almost universally tends, and, on the other, the *isolation* of Church and State, to which Gallicanism tends, when it does not tend to the subjection of the Church to the State. For the complete

and normal government of society, you must have the *con-currence* of Church and State, that is, their harmonious coöperation, the Church governing all things in the respect that they are spiritual, and the State temporal things in the respect that they are only temporal. This, if I understand it, is the Catholic doctrine, and of course supposes the State to be Catholic and animated by the Catholic faith and spirit. The State, on this supposition, would give civil effect to the canon law, and the Church would give her consent to all reasonable measures proposed by the State for the temporal good of the community. Thus each discharging its proper functions, both would move on in harmony, for the common good, temporal and spiritual, of society."

"But if the two governments are equally necessary to the government of society according to the Divine ordination, why do you assert that the State is subordinate to the Church?"

"Because the temporal by the law of God is subordinated to the spiritual, and because the State, which represents the former, cannot but be *de jure* subordinated to the Church, in case she represents the latter. I do it also, because otherwise I must practically subject the Church to the State. As all human acts have temporal relations, the absolute independence of the State in regard to the spiritual power would give it authority, under pretext of governing the temporality of temporals, to extend its power over the whole spiritual order. The State might think that monastic vows, celibacy, religious houses, and such like things, affecting as they certainly do questions of political economy, are incompatible with the temporal good of the community, and so it would, under pretence of governing the temporality, proceed to forbid them; it might be annoyed by the number of holidays instituted by the spiritual power, and proceed to suppress them, as we have lately seen in the kingdom of Sardinia; it may take it into its head that it is contrary to its dignity and the welfare of the empire to allow the Church to have the supreme control of ecclesiastical seminaries, or the bishops and clergy within its dominions to have a free correspondence with the spiritual Chief of the Church, and therefore forbid all communication with Rome except through the secular administration; and proceed to place

the ecclesiastical seminaries under the control of the State, as did Joseph the Second of Germany ; it may regard the spiritual dependence of the State on a power whose chief does not happen to reside within its dominions as contrary to its temporal dignity and independence, and therefore separate the national Church from the centre of unity, as did Henry the Eighth and the Parliament of England in the sixteenth century, as Louis the Fourteenth seemed for a moment disposed to do in the seventeenth, and as the French people actually did by their Constitutional Church in the eighteenth ; it may allege, that to acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the Pope is incompatible with loyalty to the republic, and therefore forbid the possession and observance of the Catholic religion within its dominions, as you and your rightly-named Know-Nothing friends are attempting to do here, and as was long done in every Protestant state in Europe. If you will believe English history, the devout English government did never fine, imprison, exile, massacre, or hang at Tyburn, Catholics as Catholics, but only as traitors to the throne. If we may believe its apologists, it always respected religious liberty, and has persecuted Catholics only because, being Catholics, they could not but be traitors. Moreover, the government may say, that holding and professing such views as yours, my dear Dick, is incompatible with the temporal welfare of the State, which I think is perfectly true, and for that reason forbid you to hold them, and subject you to pains and penalties if you publish them. If we allow it to be independent in face of the spiritual power, as all these things certainly have temporal relations, we cannot deny its right to govern them as it pleases, and therefore we necessarily subordinate their spiritual relations to their temporal relations, and thus the spiritual to the temporal, which, in principle, is the subordination of the soul to the body, eternity to time, God to man."

"But I might retort, and say, since you extend her authority over all human acts, that the Church might, under pretence of governing spirituals, appropriate to herself the whole government of temporals ; and this seems to be what is supposed by some to be the necessary result of the views of your friend, the editor of *Brownson's Review*."

"We have seen what would result, nay, what has resulted and is every day resulting, from the assertion that

the temporal power is independent of the spiritual. See now what would result, if we asserted the mutual independence of both powers. The Church says, and says truly, that all these things ordered or forbidden by the State are spirituals; the State says, and says truly, that they all are temporals, for they all have a temporal relation; both are independent, each of the other; each is equally supreme, and each commands the contradictory of the other. Here is a decided conflict of rights and duties. Two coequal authorities, both from God, commanding contradictory things! Tell me which I am to obey, since to obey both is impossible, or how I can with a good conscience disobey either? Here is a very grave practical difficulty, and every man of common sense knows that it can be removed only by denying the relation of equality between the two powers, and asserting the subordination of the one in authority, as well as in excellence, rank, or dignity, to the other. You Protestants subordinate the spiritual to the temporal; we Catholics subordinate the temporal to the spiritual. One or the other must be done, and nobody with any just claims to a religious apprehension can doubt which is the true course."

"But you have not yet met my objection."

"The Church claiming only spiritual jurisdiction, and knowing precisely and infallibly where the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal lies, neither will nor can encroach on the domain of the State."

"What security have you of that, when you hold the State to be subordinate to her?"

"When the question is asked by a Catholic, I answer, I have the security of the fact that she is God's Church, and is indorsed by him, which is as good security, I think, as there is to be given, or as any reasonable man can ask. If the question be asked by a non-Catholic, I answer, that I claim for her the presumption of innocence till guilt is proved. In eighteen centuries she has never in a single instance encroached on the domain of the temporal, and if she has not in that long period, it is not likely that she will in any future time. In return, I remind you that, if you do not subordinate the State to her, you must subordinate her to the State. What security have you to give me that the State will never encroach on the domain of the spiritual? I am as much entitled to security for the good be-

havior of the State, as you are to security for the good behavior of the Church, and you cannot offer me the guaranty of past good behavior, or the presumption of innocence till guilt is proved, for unhappily the guilt is but too notorious, and proofs of innocence, I think, are not forthcoming. The encroachments of the temporal on the spiritual have been with the State the rule, and its submission the exception. You need not attempt an answer, for there is no answer to be given. To avoid the conflict of rights and duties, and to solve the difficulties on both sides, we must assert both Church and State indeed, but the State in subordination to the Church, — the temporal in subordination to the spiritual, not the spiritual to the temporal; for the temporal is *for* the spiritual, and by the law of God is to be referred to a spiritual end. Both moving on in harmony, with this subordination, that is, the Church as the superior and the State as the inferior, things will go on as God intended, and this is what the Church always teaches us. With the Church alone, society would want its executive arm; with the State alone, it would want morality, and we should have civil despotism; without either, we should have both spiritual and temporal anarchy, what you revolutionists are laboring to introduce. With both moving harmoniously and in mutual concert, or, if I may so speak, reciprocal commerce, you have both spiritual and temporal order, peace of conscience, and freedom of action. Here would be no absorption of the State by the Church, nor of the Church by the State. Both would be retained, as distinct, though not hostile or separate powers, each operating according to its own constitution, and fulfilling its own mission in its own order."

"But that doctrine presupposes the State to be Catholic, as well as the Church."

"Undoubtedly. I cannot understand how there can be perfect harmony and concert of action between the two powers where one is of one religion and the other of another or of none, and as a Catholic I cannot, of course, believe that the government of society is normal and complete unless both powers are Catholic. I certainly hold that the State ought to be Catholic, for a nation should profess the true religion collectively as well as individually."

"However, the State here is not Catholic."

"So much the worse."

"That may or may not be; but it is not, and is not likely to be, in either your day or mine."

"That is probably true. Really Catholic governments were never very plenty, and there is a decided scarcity of them now."

"But how will your doctrine apply where the State is not Catholic?"

"It remains the same *de jure*, but *de facto*, so far as the State is concerned, is inapplicable."

"What will you do in such case?"

"What the early Christians did under Pagan Rome, adhere to our religion, practise it in all respects so far as the State permits, and die for it where she does not. We have nothing else for it. We submit to what is inevitable, use our freedom so far as the State does not restrain it, and where it attempts to restrain it, we adhere to and defend our faith as martyrs and confessors. If the State leaves us free, exacts nothing of us contrary to our religion, and only refuses to profess it or to give us positive aid, we can get along very well, and shall make no complaint. But this is aside from the real question. You wish me to prove that the Church does not absorb the State or destroy its autonomy. I have shown that it does not, and that the State, where Catholic, has, to say the least, nothing to apprehend from her. This is all that the objection requires me to prove. If the Church does not endanger the State where the State is Catholic, it certainly does not where it is non-Catholic."

"To this last consideration I beg you to attend. Where the State is not Catholic, and the majority, as with us, are strongly anti-Catholic, Catholics are the only party in danger. Their rights may be denied, their liberty infringed, and their consciences oppressed; but the State, the political order, has nothing to fear from them, because it holds them at its mercy. However Ultramontane our views, we cannot in this country, and Rome cannot, since she can act on the American public only through us, take possession of the government and through it oppress the non-Catholic majority. We are less than one in ten of the whole population; a large portion of us are poor foreigners, strangers, some to the language, and the majority to the manners and customs, of the country, without material, moral, or political weight in the community, unable even to protect

our own rights and legitimate interests. Any measure we should oppose as peculiarly hostile to us as Catholics would be fastened upon the country by an overwhelming majority, and any measure we should support as favorable to us would for that reason, if for no other, be defeated by a majority equally overwhelming. We are, save on election-days, treated, even though native-born, with a few individual exceptions, as aliens, as Pariahs, and the slaves at the South are treated with more consideration than the Irish Catholic laborers in the Northern and Middle States. Any appeal we might make to public opinion, to the justice of the country, would be treated with contempt. Associations may be formed against us all over the Union ; we may be insulted, hooted, mobbed in our own houses, or shot down in the streets by armed ruffians, led on by jail-birds and the dregs of American and European society, all with impunity. The local authorities seldom interfere, and when they interfere, it is invariably against us, and to arrest only us, the assailed and wronged party. What more ridiculous, more disgraceful to your own manhood, than to pretend to fear our getting possession of the government, or that we and our religion are at present menacing to American independence and republicanism. Out upon such cowardice, or rather such malice and hypocrisy."

"Of course, my dear uncle, we do not fear your present strength. The prudent man foreseeth the evil, and guardeth against the danger. It is the prospective danger we fear, what with your Ultramontanism you will do when you become the majority and have possession of the government."

"I have shown you that you have nothing to fear then, for the State and the Church, since the State is republican, will move on in harmony, for the common good, temporal and spiritual, of American society."

CONVERSATION XI.

"What you have heretofore said, my dear uncle, may quiet the apprehensions of a Catholic, but you must concede that it offers no adequate security to us Protestants. The Catholic majority may take care of themselves, conceded ; but what protection will there be for the Protestant minority under dominant Romanism ?"

"At the very worst, as good a protection as the Catholic minority has in a Protestant state, under a non-Catholic majority, or dominant Protestantism."

"I think not, for Protestants recognize the rights of conscience, and assert religious liberty; Catholics do not."

"You are joking, Dick. That Protestants profess religious liberty may be true, but I have yet to learn that they ever practise it. Individual Protestants have written ably in defence of religious liberty, and our own country has incorporated it into her institutions and laws; but no Protestant state, no Protestant community, has ever yet been known to practise religious liberty in regard to Catholics. You and your friends understand by religious liberty simply the liberty to deny Catholicity and to oppress Catholic conscience. What are you trying to do in this country at this moment? Do you not in the name of religious liberty seek to deprive us of our civil rights on account of our faith? Do you not proclaim it from Maine to Florida, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, that the profession of the Catholic religion is incompatible with loyalty to the Republic; that no Catholic can be an American citizen; that every Catholic should be disfranchised, killed, or driven from the country? Have you not a secret organization all over the Union, called 'Know-Nothings,' 'Know-Some-things,' 'United Americans,' 'Guard of Liberty,' or something else, whose avowed object is the extermination of Catholics, or the suppression of the Catholic religion in this country, and who either have, or are struggling to have, the entire government, national, State, and municipal, at their command, to be wielded expressly against Catholics? Are you not doing all in your power to exasperate Catholics, to get up riots in every quarter where they are numerous, for the express purpose of obtaining a pretext for shooting them down? You know perfectly well that it is so, and you know that your professions of religious liberty are a mere mask for carrying on the meanest and most cruel persecution against Catholics that history records. Here is the sort of protection the Catholic minority receives from an American Protestant majority. It must go hard if a Protestant minority cannot find as desirable a protection under a Catholic majority, in a Catholic state."

"Did the Huguenots find any better protection in Catholic France, under Louis the Fourteenth?"

"Perhaps not, for Louis the Fourteenth was one of your friends, — a thorough-going Gallican, very nearly a Protestant, — and at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was at war with the Holy See, and on the eve, as it seemed, of following the example of Henry the Eighth of England, and converting the Church in France into a snug little national church, with himself as sovereign pontiff. This is a case which I might cite against you, but not one which you may cite against me; for you have expressed your sympathy with Gallicans, and have acknowledged that you can tolerate Gallicanism. It is only Ultramontaniam, you tell me, that you oppose."

"Do you mean to say that Louis the Fourteenth did not dragoon the poor Huguenots in obedience to Rome?"

"Certainly I do. His revocation of the Edict of Nantes and his persecution of Protestants occurred precisely during the period of his quarrel with the Holy See, and while he acted in defiance of Rome, and would have scorned to obey any of her orders. Mr. Weiss, a Protestant writer of great ability, who has just given us an admirable history of the French Protestant refugees, contends that religion had little or nothing to do with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the persecution of Protestants, and that the king acted from political and social motives. The Protestants formed, as it were, a distinct people, in the bosom of French society, a sort of foreign colony, planted on French soil, and he was unwilling to tolerate them, as your friends the Know-Nothings are unwilling to tolerate Catholic foreigners here. He wished to have the whole population of France form one homogeneous society, and attempted to suppress the Huguenots for their social rather than their religious differences. This is no doubt a just view of the case, and proves that Gallicans and Protestants approach even more nearly in their practice than in their doctrines. If Louis had been a good Papist, he would have consulted the Holy Father, who would have told him to keep the faith he had sworn, and to labor for the conversion of the Huguenots by peaceful missionaries, not by armed soldiers; that even a lawful end may be gained only by lawful means."

"After all, that persecution by Louis the Fourteenth only proves that Gallicans cannot escape the infection of Rome, and can in reality no more be trusted than Papists."

"I have never said they could, and have never believed that those who take up with Gallicanism on the ground of its being less offensive to you than Ultramontaniam gain anything, even on the score of simple policy. I believe it is as prudent to be Papists as Gallicans, providing Gallicans retain the Catholic faith. But you have no right to say that it was Roman *infection* that led the Gallican king to do what he did. He acted on his own responsibility, and in the spirit of his favorite maxim, *L'état, c'est moi*, which would be the maxim of every prince, if your doctrine of the absolute independence of the State were accepted.

"You Protestants have of late years made such loud professions of religious liberty, that I am not certain but you have really persuaded yourselves that you are not its most deadly enemies. There never was, if it really be so, a grosser delusion. There is not a word of truth in your professions, nor so much as the shadow of truth. There is not a country on earth where you are in the ascendancy in which you treat the Catholic minority as having equal liberty with yourselves. I need but refer you to England, the model Protestant country. Where in all history will you find anything blacker than her treatment of Catholics? Read her penal code against English Catholics, those loyal descendants of English heroes, who refused to desert the religion of their fathers and of their fathers' God at the bidding of Henry, the wife-slayer, and of his godly daughter Elizabeth. If not satisfied, cross the Channel, and examine the penal laws of Ireland, and the blessed effects of Protestant ascendancy on the warm-hearted and loyal Catholic population of the sister island."

"But that is all done away with now. We have granted Catholic emancipation."

"That is to say, at a moment when Protestant fervor abated, you took off from the backs of the Catholic minority a part of the burden which Protestant zeal and Protestant bigotry had imposed upon them. But dare you say that the Catholic religion is free in Great Britain and Ireland?"

"Yes, so far as compatible with the maintenance of the Protestant religion for the State."

"That is, so far as it does not interfere with your Protestantism and your Protestantism is free to maintain every-

where its ascendancy! The English government tolerates Catholicity just so far as it cannot help it, or just so far as it believes its Protestantism has nothing to apprehend from it, and no further. In no Protestant state are Catholics placed on an equal footing with Protestants, before what in fact is the governing power. Where was the protection of Catholics in the Gordon riots? Where was it in the late whirlwind of excitement in England occasioned by Lord John Russell's famous letter to the Anglican Bishop of Durham? In God, where it always is, and nowhere else."

"It was where the protection of the Protestant minority is in Tuscany and Spain."

"I was not aware that in either of those countries there was any Protestant minority. All that I have seen proved against the Grand Duke of Tuscany is, that he did not choose to permit the emissaries of Exeter Hall to stir up disorder and sedition among his subjects. I have never heard that he disturbed Protestants, residents in his dominions, in the free and full exercise of their religion, in case they conformed to the laws of the land. As to Spain, I have not heard of her interfering with the conscience of Protestants."

"She denies Protestants burial."

"In consecrated ground, very likely."

"But she will not allow them to be buried at all."

"That, begging my nephew's pardon, is not true. What she refused was the pomp and parade of a public funeral, a thing required by no Protestant conscience whatever; and that she forbids for a temporal reason, on the ground that it might cause a breach of the peace. You can find no fault with this, for you assert the competence of the State in spirituals, so far at least as they affect temporals. Catholic funerals with processions are forbidden by the British government, and the right which that government demanded for foreign Protestants in Spain, she denies to her own Catholic subjects at home."

"But, according to your account, we Protestants are a cruel, persecuting, hypocritical set."

"You are, according to me, just what your history for three hundred years, written in the blood of Catholics, proves you to be; that is to say, when you follow your religion, which I am happy to own is not always the case. You are very nearly as bad as you are in the habit of rep-

resenting us poor Papists. Just recall the manner in which your anti-Popery lecturers, editors, and pamphleteers speak of us and our religion, the hard names they call us, the foul-mouthed declamation they indulge in against us, the crimes, the dishonesty, the perfidy, they lay to our charge, the indignation, the spite, the venom, they vent on all occasions against us and Romanism as they call it, and then think what we must be if what they say is true, and in what estimation we must hold them, knowing as we do that what they say is false. You never rebuke them, you gloat over their filthy columns, and yet your blood is up, and you think yourselves mightily ill-used, if we just remind you that 'all is not gold that glitters,' and that you are yourselves no better than you should be. Your history is written, and you have writ yourselves down — what you are. Protestantism, you need not be told, was conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity, and it has always, at least with our blessed Anglo-Saxon race, maintained the honor of its birth."

"But if you think our Protestantism so horrible, how could you, if you had the power to prevent it, suffer it to be professed in a state under your government?"

"If carried away by my human zeal, and unrestrained by my religion, I could not. Here learn the security that a Protestant minority would have in a Catholic state under a sovereign who is really a Papist, — a security that I would not dare promise from a Gallican monarch. The mode in which a state shall deal with heretics is a spiritual question. A Papist monarch will be guided by the Pope, and therefore by his religion, in dealing with them. No doubt such a sovereign would grieve to find a portion of his subjects Protestants, but his religion would tell him that he can use only lawful means for the suppression of their Protestantism. Their Protestantism is a mortal sin, no doubt, but there are a thousand mortal sins which the temporal monarch must so far as he is concerned tolerate, and not undertake to punish, — which he must leave to the spiritual physician, and to the spiritual authority. There are many evils in this world that authority cannot prevent, cannot cure, and which it must tolerate. Heresy is to be dealt with as other sins, and heretics as other sinners. The temporal authority must be guided in its action by the Church, which always acts on the principle that 'the Son of

Man came to save souls, not to destroy them.' What she seeks is the salvation, not the destruction, of the sinner. Here, whether you believe it or not, here, in the maternal spirit of the Holy Catholic Church, is your best security, and as a matter of fact Rome has always been remarkable for her mildness, and her forbearance towards all classes of sinners. When kings and princes would call down fire from heaven to consume the adversaries of her Heavenly Spouse, she has always rebuked them, and told them that they knew not 'what manner of spirit they were of.'"

"That may do to tell the Papist, but believing your Church to be nothing better in relation to the temporal than the 'Mystery of Iniquity' or the 'Man of Sin,' it will not do for me."

"That is your fault, not mine, and I have no consolation to offer you but your own prediction, that the State will not become Catholic in your day or mine, if ever; and till then we are the party who need security, not you. When that time comes, if it ever come, the Catholic majority, being Catholics, will have nothing to fear. As for the Protestant minority, if a Protestant minority remain, they will at least have as ample security as the Catholic minority have now; for you cannot place less confidence in Catholicity than we do in Protestantism. Turn about is fair play, and I know not that you Protestants are moulded of finer clay, or have richer blood in your veins, than we Catholics, that you should be entitled to demand stronger guaranties than you are able to give. If the Protestant minority would be at the mercy of Catholics, it is no more than is the case with the Catholic minority now. If you find yourselves hereafter under a Catholic state, you will find nothing worse than Catholics have suffered and still have to suffer in every Protestant state; and it will perhaps bring you to your senses and lead you to repent of the abuse you made of power when it was in your hands."

"But the laws protect you here."

"Hardly, and you are even agitating to alter them."

"But we are not required to persecute you by our religion."

"If not by your religion, you contend you are by your politics, which is as bad. We are required neither by our religion nor by our politics to persecute you, and we are

as long as the world stands much more likely to be persecuted, whether the State be nominally Catholic or Protestant, than to persecute. We know, indeed, in whatever land or condition we are, persecution awaits us. No one who follows Christ can escape it.

"But in the present prevalence of statolatry, the Church can expect from the State at most only that it will not oppress her. The normal government of Christendom has pretty much everywhere been broken up, and there is little to choose between nominally Catholic governments and others. The Church is to-day very nearly in the condition she was under Pagan Rome. The most she can now hope is liberty, and liberty for good, only at the expense of liberty for evil. I have asserted her powers and prerogatives *de jure*, because it will not do for her children to forget or to deny them, and because they have a practical importance for Catholics in governing their own conduct; but I do not forget the actual state of the world, or the actual triumph of Cæsar. In practice, I am content to give what I take, and I would be among the last to ask of the government of my country anything more than to grant to my religion the same protection it extends to the sects."

ART. II. — *Know-Nothingism; or Satan warring against Christ.*

OUR readers have no need to be informed that there is a secret anti-Catholic organization throughout the Union, bearing some resemblance to the Orange lodges of Ireland, of persons who very appropriately call themselves Know-Nothings. The party that is represented by this organization is substantially the late anti-Catholic Native American party, and is led on, avowedly or unavowedly, under the direction of foreign anarchists, and apostate priests and monks, by men of desperate fortunes, fanatics, bigots, and demagogues, some of home and some of foreign production. The party reduced to its own elements would have little or no importance, but, affecting to be national, it is, in the actual state of the country and

of national, religious, and political passions and prejudices, somewhat formidable, and demands the grave consideration of every true American, and especially of every Catholic citizen.

The Know-Nothing party, taken in a general rather than in a special sense, rely for their success on two powerful sentiments; — the sentiment of American nationality alarmed by the extraordinary influx of foreigners, and the anti-Catholic sentiment, or hatred of the Catholic Church, shared to a greater or less extent by the majority of our countrymen, and which, by the anti-Catholic declamations of Protestant England, Exeter Hall, and apostate priests and monks, and by the extension and consolidation of the Church, and the freer, bolder, and more independent tone of Catholics, in the United States, has been quickened just now into more than its wonted activity. The strength of the party consists in the appeals it is able to make to these sentiments, especially to that of American nationality, for with the American people this world carries it over the other, and politics over religion.

From neither of these two sentiments should we as Catholics have much to apprehend, if they were not combined and acting in concert. Our obvious policy is, then, to do all we lawfully can to keep them separate in the public mind, and prevent them from combining. This can be done, humanly speaking, only by satisfying the sounder portion of our non-Catholic countrymen, — as every Catholic knows to be true, — that there is no incompatibility between Catholicity and the honest sentiment of American nationality, and that whatever of foreignism attaches for the moment to Catholics in this country attaches to them in their quality of foreigners, and not in their quality of Catholics. This is certain, for the sentiment of nationality is as strong in the bosom of the American Catholic as in the bosom of the American Protestant. Nothing seems to us more important at this crisis in relation to the Know-Nothing movement, than for us clearly to distinguish the sentiment of nationality from the anti-Catholic sentiment, and to be on our guard against offering it any gratuitous offence, and by our indiscretion enlisting on the side of that movement the large class of respectable non-Catholics who love their country more than they hate Popery.

It cannot be denied that the immense majority of our Catholic population have emigrated from various foreign states, principally Ireland and Germany, and have brought with them, as it could not otherwise happen, foreign sentiments, attachments, associations, habits, manners, and usages. They bear not on coming here the stamp of the American mint, and are to the American people foreigners in feeling and character. This is not said by way of disparagement to either party, but as a fact, and a fact that gives to our Church something of a foreign aspect, and prevents her from appearing to the natives as a national or integral element in American life. They are apt, therefore, to conclude from it, not only that the mass of Catholics are foreigners, or of foreign birth and manners, tastes and education, but that Catholicity itself is foreign to the real American people, and can never coalesce with our peculiar national sentiment, or prevail here without altering or destroying our distinctive nationality. This conclusion, all unfounded as it is, is nevertheless honestly entertained by many, and directly or indirectly enlists on the side of the Know-Nothing movement, not simply the anti-Catholic bigots and demagogues of the country, but a very considerable portion of the more sober non-Catholic body of Americans, who, though they love not our religion, would otherwise stand by the religious liberty recognized and guaranteed by our Constitution and laws.

It was to meet this view of the case, that we wrote in our last Review the article on *Native Americanism*. We saw, or thought we saw, the sentiment of American nationality fearfully excited against Catholics; we saw a storm gathering and ready to break in fury over our heads; we saw anti-Catholic mobs and riots taking place in a large number of the States; we saw that Catholics could be attacked, their persons and property endangered, and their churches desecrated or demolished, with impunity; we saw that the authorities were in most places favorable to our anti-Catholic assailants, and indisposed to afford us protection, and that Catholics, a feeble minority as we are, could, however brave and resolute, do little to protect ourselves in a hand to hand fight. We found a secret sympathy with the Know-Nothing movement where we least expected it, and men secretly encouraging it who would naturally loudly condemn it, actuated by dislike to

foreignism rather than by any active hostility to Catholicity as distinguished from the foreign elements accidentally associated with it. We wrote mainly for these, to show them that they had no reason for their secret or open sympathy, for we, a stanch Catholic, were a natural-born American citizen, and as truly and intensely American as the best of them.

Some of our friends, mistaking our purpose and wholly misconceiving the drift of our argument, construed our remarks into an attack on our foreign population, and as an especial insult to Irish Catholics, — not stopping to reflect that a Catholic American publicist could not possibly dream of insulting the Irish Catholics in the United States, unless an absolute fool or madman, neither of which will any of our Catholic or non-Catholic friends readily believe us to be. We deeply regret the misapprehension of our friends, and their hasty and uncalled-for denunciations of us; because they have thereby, unwittingly, played for the moment into the hands of the Know-Nothings; because they have, as far as they could, given a practical refutation of our argument, and confirmed in the minds of our non-Catholic countrymen the very impression which we wished to efface, — that an American cannot become a Catholic, be a good Catholic, and maintain his standing among his Catholic brethren, without virtually renouncing his nationality, ceasing to feel and act as an American, and making himself a foreigner in the land of his birth. We fear the denunciations of us, under the circumstances, by the larger portion of the Catholic press in the English tongue, will hereafter, when it is no longer an object with them to excite Catholics against us personally, be used by the Know-Nothings with terrible effect against the Catholic population of the country. We hope, however, that the candid among our non-Catholic countrymen — and we trust that there are many such — will not fail to perceive, what is the real fact, that these denunciations, after all, do not make anything against our position, for the offence which our Catholic friends took was taken in their quality of foreigners, not in their quality of Catholics.

The misapprehension of our article, as it seems to us, has been extreme, and we can explain it only on the ground that Almighty God has suffered it to remind us

that he has his own method of defending his cause and protecting his children, and to impress upon our heart, what in our pride we were perhaps in danger of forgetting, that his Church does not stand in human policy, human wisdom, human sagacity, or human virtue; that he will prosper no policy, however wise or just it would otherwise be, which might in him who devises and urges it rob God of his glory, or render his supernatural providence less visible and striking. He has permitted a momentary delusion to blind and mislead the judgments of our friends, for his greater glory and our spiritual good. We bow therefore in humble submission, and cheerfully kiss the rod that chastises us.

But while we murmur not against Providence, we may, we trust, be permitted to say that the *animus* of our article has been wholly misapprehended, and an interpretation given to our remarks which was not intended, and which, with all deference to our critics, we do not believe warranted by any recognized rule of construction. For what we said, fairly construed, we hold ourselves responsible; but we do not, and will not, hold ourselves responsible for what we did not say, and what, with our known sentiments, our character, position, and antecedents, it must be obvious on the slightest reflection we could not have meant. Our article was written by one who combines in his own person the character of a stanch Catholic and a natural-born American citizen, who wrote to reassure his non-Catholic countrymen, to prove practically to them, that there is nothing in Catholicity to offend their nationality, and to caution his Catholic friends of foreign birth and education against so obtruding the foreignism, which as a matter of course adheres to them, as to offend the national sensibility; — to separate in the minds of both parties the Know-Nothing movement from the question of nationality, and to make it obvious to every one that the Know-Nothings are not a national party, and have not the slightest claim to be regarded as such, though, through an ordinary confusion of ideas, they are just now able to enlist on their side, to some extent, the honest feeling of American nationality. Had our friends understood us, we feel sure that they would have stood by us, and seconded our efforts. If they had done so, we think Know-Nothingism would have received a deadly wound. But God has ordered it otherwise, and we submit.

Questions which touch national feelings and habits are, no doubt, delicate things to deal with, but we believe it the wisest way, when they must be dealt with, to approach them in a bold, straightforward, and manly manner, and deal them such a blow that no second blow will need to be struck. This is our policy. No Catholic can consent to be impeded in his free speech or independent action, so far as they are lawful and necessary to promote the cause of truth and virtue, by the tyranny of any nationality, whether his own or another's. Every Catholic knows that there are among Catholics, as well as non-Catholics, diversities of race and nation, and that these diversities do not pertain to Catholicity. No Catholic can confound them with his religion itself, without falling into the modern Protestant heresy, that diverse races and nations demand diverse religions,—the old Pagan doctrine, which generated national religions, and imposed on each individual, as both Plato and Cicero taught, the obligation to follow the religion of his nation. Catholicity stands directly opposed to this doctrine of national religions, and teaches that there is one religion and only one for all men; for God has made of one blood all the nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth. Protestantism, it is well known, originated to a great extent in nationalism, and it has latterly become a favorite doctrine with many liberal Englishmen and Americans, that, while Catholicity is adapted to the Celtic nations, Protestantism is the religion adapted to the Anglo-Saxon race. For the former, Romanism, as they call it, is the true religion, for the latter, Protestantism,—not considering that in this they concede that their religion is not Christian, for Christianity breaks down the partition-walls of nationality, and is adapted alike to all races and nations, as is evident from the commission which our Blessed Lord gave to his Apostles, which was, "Go ye and teach *all nations*; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."

The Protestant may boast that Protestantism is the religion of Anglo-Saxons, and deny that Catholicity can prevail among them, but no Catholic can entertain the notion without denying Catholicity and becoming a Pagan. The Catholic religion is for the German or Teutonic family of nations as well as for the Celtic, and the Anglo-

American can, if he chooses, be as good a Catholic as the warm-hearted son of the Emerald Isle. Catholicity is not insular, it is continental, universal, and the Teutonic races have played a distinguished part in the history of the Church ever since the fall of the Roman Empire of the West. St. Thomas of Aquin, St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Boniface the Apostle of Germany, Albertus Magnus, the author of *De Imitatione Christi*, St. Wilfred, St. Dunstan, St. Thomas of Canterbury, and the long line of Anglo-Saxon saints who won for noble old Catholic England the glorious title of *In-sula Sanctorum*, were all, we suppose, of the Teutonic family. Charlemagne was a true German; the Franks, who gave to France her name, her laws, her institutions, and her rank among the nations of the earth, were a Germanic tribe, and it was precisely in those parts of France where the Germanic element was weakest that the Albigenses had their seat, and Protestantism erected its strong-holds. For ages nearly all the royal, and the great majority of the noble, families of Europe, who have given so many saints to the Church Triumphant and to the veneration of the faithful on earth, have pertained to the same family. Your old Catholic chivalry, so renowned in chronicle and romance, were, for the most part, of Teutonic descent. If ever there were Catholics, they were the Hidalgos of Spain, and their very title, *Sons of the Goth*, tells you from what race they sprang, — the same race from which have sprung the Anglo-Saxons, the Anglo-Normans, and of course, so far as Saxon or Norman, the Anglo-Americans. One half of the Germans in Europe are still Catholics, and a large and not the least important portion of the Catholics in this country — as edifying and as devout Catholics, and as dear, we doubt not, to the Church and her Celestial Spouse, as any amongst us — are Germans; and better Catholics are not in the world than may be found to-day in England, Belgium, and Holland, all, according to the common reckoning, of the Germanic family.

Why do we say this? To exalt the Teutonic race at the expense of the Celtic, — to excite a war of races, and to pit race against race? Nonsense. Nobody can be silly enough to accuse us of a purpose so insane. We do it to repel the senseless Pagan doctrine of our modern Protestant gentlemen, who teach that the Germanic family, especially the Anglo-Saxon branch, were intended by Almighty God

to be Protestants, and cannot be really Catholics, and to prove by an appeal to history that Catholicity *is* Catholicity, and embraces alike all men and nations, — to combat from the high stand-point of Catholicity the narrow prejudices of race and nation, and to assert that our holy religion is not, like Protestantism, confined to particular nations, and can advance only as the nation itself advances, as we see in the case of Anglicanism, but is, so to speak, cosmopolitan, independent of all geographical lines and national distinctions. No race is debarred from entering the Church, none is doomed to be Protestant or infidel against its will. No race or nation has the monopoly of Catholic faith or piety, and nowhere, in order to introduce Catholicity, is it necessary to introduce a foreign nationality. Father De Smet despairs of finding better Catholics than he finds among his dear Christian Indians, who yet remain Indians, and the Catholic missionary, that true hero, will never tire of telling you of the edifying and consoling examples of Catholic faith and piety that he finds in China, Cochin China, the Corea, Tonquin, Siam, and the South Sea Islands. Christ died for all men, instituted his Church for all men, and adapted his religion to the wants and capacities of all races and nations. Catholicity asserts the unity of the race, the common origin and brotherhood of all men, and nothing is more repugnant to its spirit than to judge individuals by the race from which they have sprung or the nation in which they were born. Never should we treat any race with contempt, or claim every virtue under heaven for our own. Away with these petty distinctions and miserable jealousies. What is it to the Catholic that the blood that flows in his brother's veins has flowed from Adam down through an Anglo-Saxon or a Celtic channel? Through whichever channel it has flowed, it is the same blood, and has flowed from the same source. All men are brothers, with one and the same Father, and one and the same Redeemer. We know but one religion, but one sort of Catholicity, and that is not Irish, French, German, Spanish, Dutch, English, or American, but Roman and Apostolic, — *Roman*, because Rome is the centre of its unity on earth, and *Apostolic*, because Rome — not as a nation, as a city, or state, but as the Holy See — teaches and administers it with the authority of Peter, to whom Christ gave the keys of the kingdom.

Nevertheless, even under Catholicity, diversities of race

and nation, of genius, language, education, tastes, habits, and manners and customs, do and will obtain. Every nation, in that it is a nation, lives a life of its own, which distinguishes it morally, as well as geographically, from all others. This distinctive national life, its informing principle, the principle of its unity, of its collective individuality, conversion to Catholicity purifies and exalts, but does not alter or destroy, any more than it does the peculiar traits or characteristics of individuals. While, then, the American respects the nationality of others in so far as it leads them to infringe no principle or precept of justice, he has the right to retain his own, uncensured, unmolested, and to prefer it, as he does his own wife and children, to all others. Every independent and sovereign nation has the right to preserve its own nationality, its own identity, and to defend it, if need be, by war against any foreign power that would invade it; and then, *a fortiori*, to close its political society, if it sees proper, against all foreign immigrants who, in its judgment, would endanger it, or not prove advantageous to it. In so doing, it exercises only the inherent right of every sovereign state, and persons born citizens or subjects of other states have no right to complain; for naturalization is a boon, not a natural and indefeasible right, — a *boon*, not in the sense of a simple gratuity, for the sole advantage of him who receives it, with no direct or indirect advantage resulting to the nation, as some of our friends have supposed we must have meant, although we said expressly to the contrary; but a boon in the sense of a *grant*, as contradistinguished from a natural and indefeasible right, and therefore a concession which a nation is free to make or not to make, according to its own views of policy or humanity, without violating any principle of natural justice. This was obviously what we meant, and all we meant, when we called naturalization “a boon, and not a natural right.” Whether the word was happily chosen or not, we leave to verbal criticism to settle; our meaning was plain enough, and to that we have heard no objection.

Naturalization is a civil right conferred by our laws, and the rights it confers are held by as valid a title as that by which the natural-born citizen holds the same rights. Legally and politically considered, with one solitary exception, naturalized citizens stand on a footing of perfect equality with natural-born citizens. Our friends who have taken so

much pains to inform us of that fact will perhaps permit us to remind them in return, that there are some things which an American citizen of ordinary capacity and intelligence may be presumed to know, and some things which he cannot be presumed to deny. Every foreigner of good moral character, by complying with certain conditions, can enter our civil and political society, except as to the Presidency of the United States, on perfectly equal terms with natural-born American citizens. This we suppose everybody knows. But the wisdom of this policy is an open question, and a fair subject of discussion. A party in the country, stronger than we wish it, is agitating for the alteration or repeal of the naturalization laws. We trust it will fail; but it will not do to oppose this party on the ground that naturalization is a natural right, held antecedently to civil legislation, and therefore a right which Congress is bound to recognize and protect, and is not competent to withhold. No foreigner has a right to demand of our government, antecedently to its own legislation, to be admitted either into our political or our civil society. Congress is perfectly competent, in case it breaks no faith expressly or tacitly pledged to foreigners already here, though not yet naturalized, to repeal the naturalization laws it has itself enacted, and would in so doing violate no principle of natural justice. Whether it would be good policy to do so, is another question, and one to be discussed on its merits.

As a general rule, we think the true policy of a nation is to reserve political—we say not civil—citizenship to persons born on its territory, or to citizens temporarily resident abroad, and to distinguished foreign-born individuals, as a reward of eminent services. We do not believe it sound policy to make political citizenship too cheap, lest we make it valueless, and encourage a neglect of its duties. But we can understand that there may be exceptions to this rule, and we have hitherto considered our own country as one of them. We had, on setting up for ourselves, a large territory, thinly peopled, and in great part uncultivated. We wanted settlers and laborers from abroad, and we invited them by offering liberal terms of naturalization. This policy was natural, and in our case, under the circumstances, not unwise, and hence we have always hitherto supported it, as equally advantageous to the country and to

foreign settlers. If the case stood now as it did ten, or even five, years ago, we should not hesitate a moment to continue to lend it all the support in our power. But the case has altered. From 1790 to 1820, when we most wanted foreign settlers, our naturalization policy attracted but a small immigration, and it is very clear that it is not that policy that has attracted or that attracts the great mass of foreign immigrants to settle among us. Nevertheless, during that period, the immigration, though comparatively small, was upon the whole advantageous as far as it went. From 1820 to 1845, the immigration became much larger, and had a sensible effect on the country, and was in our judgment highly advantageous. It was principally Catholic, and therefore an immense moral and religious as well as material gain. Since 1845, especially since 1849, when the reaction of conservative principles in Europe became decided, and the revolutionary movements were suspended, if not finally defeated, the immigration has been larger still, but of a different character. The Catholic element has been relatively smaller, and far less pure, and the anti-Catholic element, the infidel and revolutionary or anarchical element, now largely predominates, and is likely to continue to predominate.

While the Catholic element predominated, we were in favor of our liberal naturalization laws. The really Catholic immigration we certainly greet with a most hearty welcome, from whatever foreign country it comes. Through it we have obtained a large Catholic population, and the Church has been, not introduced indeed, for that honor belongs to one of the "Old Thirteen," the noble Colony of Maryland, but extended through the Union and consolidated. We need not say that we regard this as an immense gain in a national as well as in a religious point of view, for, as our readers know, our sole reliance for the preservation of American liberty and American institutions, and therefore for the success of what is called the American experiment in self-government, is on the Catholic Church. Catholicity, so far from being opposed to republicanism, as so many of our countrymen believe or pretend, is absolutely essential to its wholesome working and successful maintenance. Hence, identifying genuine republicanism with genuine Americanism, we regard real Catholics as by far the truest Americans amongst us. We expressed this when we

placed the Catholic population, whether Irish or German, at the head of the American people, as the most truly conservative body in the country. This, we should think, might have spared us the unjust accusations which have been so liberally, and, we will say, so inconsiderately, brought against us, of setting up one race against another, of insulting Irish Catholics, and of being hostile to the foreign Catholic immigration.

With regard to the mass of non-Catholic, or merely nominally Catholic, revolutionary, socialistic, and radical immigrants, now pouring in upon us at a frightful rate, we confess that we are opposed, we do not say to their coming here, but to their admission into the bosom of our political society. We are not opposed even to these on the ground of their foreign origin, but solely on the ground of their well-known character, and the abominable principles which they avow, and labor with all their might to carry into effect. These, we confess, with the present fillibustering, ultra-democratical, fanatical, philanthropical, and Abolition tendencies of so many of our natural-born countrymen, make us fear for our American republicanism, such as it was in the minds of our fathers, and we do not believe it wise or safe to open to them the entrance into our political society. We do not, in fact, believe them entitled to be admitted even under our present naturalization laws, for they are to a fearful extent banded together in secret societies, affiliated to the terrible secret societies of Europe, and directed by foreign demagogues and revolutionists, such as Kossuth and Mazzini. Their riotous proceedings in many parts of the country during last winter, in what are called the Bedini riots, their revolutionary programmes, and their avowed intention to revolutionize American society, prove to us that they have no intention or disposition to be quiet, orderly, and loyal American citizens. As an American citizen and an American republican, we cannot but be opposed to their naturalization, and *a fortiori* as a Catholic; for they are the worst enemies of the Church in this country, are hand and glove with the Know-Nothings taken generically, and may be regarded as the real instigators and most effective supporters of the Know-Nothing movement. Know-Nothingism is no Yankee invention, no American production, but an imported combination of Irish Orangeism, German radicalism, French socialism, and Italian astuteness and hate.

But the country cannot, certainly will not, discriminate in our favor against these *mauvais sujets*, naturalize Catholic immigrants, and refuse to naturalize the non-Catholic. We cannot ask it to do so, for the dominant religious sentiment of the country is in favor of these and against us. Considering the danger from them both to our country and our religion, considering that the Catholic immigration is diminishing, and will most likely cease before many years altogether, we threw out by the way a suggestion, that it might become a question with Catholics, whether it would not be well for them, that is, in the case of future Catholic immigrants, to forego the privilege of naturalization, if by so doing they could prevent these non-Catholic immigrants from being naturalized; that is, whether it would not be well for us to consent to the prospective repeal of the naturalization laws, in order to exclude from American political society the dangerous class of non-Catholic foreigners. If it would have that effect, we do not think the sacrifice would be too dear on the part of Catholics. But we did not advocate it; we merely said, that, in case there was no discrimination against us, we should not oppose, as we would not advocate, a repeal or alteration of the naturalization laws. Here was nothing at which Catholic adopted citizens, or Catholic immigrants not yet naturalized, could reasonably take offence, because the distrust expressed was not distrust of them, but of non-Catholics, — not of foreigners as such, but of a particular class of foreigners, with whom they could not expect us to sympathize, and with whom we could not suppose that even their Catholic countrymen could make common cause with a good conscience. We do not insult an American Catholic when we denounce an American radical, if we denounce him because he is a radical, not because he is an American. Why then do we insult Irish Catholics because we denounce Irish radicals, when we denounce them simply as radicals, and not as Irishmen?

Although constitutionally and legally adopted citizens are equal members of our political and civil society, it does not follow that the country, that is, the dominant sentiment of the country, makes no distinction between them and natural-born citizens, and it is going a little too far to say that their position here, with the solitary exception specified in the Constitution, is in no respect inferior to

that of natural-born citizens. The title by which they hold their rights is not inferior, but no man can be acquainted with the prevailing sentiments of the country without being well aware that things will be tolerated or suffered to be done without offence in natural-born citizens, that will not be in naturalized citizens; for the country, when these last do not please her judgment, fancy, or caprice, is sure to remember that they are not her natural-born children, and to throw their foreign birth in their face. We do not say that this is right; we did not and do not pretend to justify it, for we are not democrat enough to believe the country either infallible or impeccable, but we do say that it is fact and human nature. In reality, the country, not by her laws, but by her sentiments, always regards even naturalized citizens in the light of guests enjoying her hospitality, and expects of them the modesty and reserve expected in well-bred guests. Therefore there are some things permitted to natural-born citizens from which adopted citizens must abstain if they would avoid unpleasant collisions, from which they can gain nothing, and may lose much. Theory is all very well, but a prudent regard to actually existing facts is seldom amiss in regulating our conduct. We did but describe facts as they are, and put into the mouth of the country the language which expresses, *so far as not restrained by religion*, her actual sentiments. Our friends, with a liberality which will prove its own reward, have done us the honor to ascribe those sentiments to us personally, and to conclude that we described them only because we approved them. We have been in the habit, however, of considering the historian not responsible for the crimes he narrates, unless expressly or implicitly indorsing them, and also that one may counsel prudence in the exercise of rights without denying or calling in question the rights themselves. Knowing the sentiments of the country with regard to the class of persons concerned, where was the harm in our stating them? Or where was the harm, since it never entered into our head that our friendship to that class could or would be questioned, in offering them such advice as those sentiments, whether just or unjust, made proper and necessary.

But it is not the country alone that makes a practical distinction between adopted citizens and natural-born citizens, and they who study our article will perceive that the

gist of our complaint was, that the foreign-born population make and insist on it themselves. It is their insisting on this distinction, their keeping it in various ways constantly fresh in the minds of the American people, that constitutes the gravamen of their offence. It is unjust for those who insist on this distinction to blame us for calling attention to it. If adopted citizens make no distinction between themselves and natural-born citizens, why is our highly esteemed friend of *The American Celt*, at the moment we are writing, publishing a series of essays addressed to adopted citizens, as a distinct class, and advising them to abstain from voting in the next Presidential election? Why do their own demagogues, as well as ours, always address them as a distinct class? And why are our American ears saluted with such unpleasant sounds as "the foreign vote," "the Irish vote," "the German vote," "the vote of adopted citizens"? If no distinction is made, why have they special organs, and why are they not through these organs addressed as simple American citizens, and not as adopted citizens, or as Irish or German Americans? If they themselves make no distinction in their own minds and hearts, why did our remark that it is for them to conform to our nationality, not for us to conform to theirs, strike a portion of our Irish Catholic friends as so unjust and so insulting?

That adopted citizens do to a great extent look upon themselves as a distinct and separate class in the American community, and that their leaders, their demagogues and ours, labor to keep them so, for selfish and political purposes, is a notorious fact. A man who can bring ten, twenty, or fifty thousand votes to a party by addressing adopted citizens as a distinct class, when he could bring only his own, if he addressed them simply as American citizens, has a very obvious interest in keeping them a distinct and separate class; and it is the facility with which they can be so kept, and influenced by appeals to their old national interests or affections, foreign to the American, that creates no small share of the hostility felt towards them, and that provokes Native American movements against them. Would our excellent friend — and such we really hold him — address the advice to American citizens generally to abstain from voting, which he is giving to adopted citizens? Does he not see that he regards them as a distinct class of citi-

zens, with interests and duties other than those of American citizens generally? For ourselves, we have uniformly studied to avoid a recognition of such distinctions, except to rebuke them. We have addressed Catholics as a distinct class, for in religion they are so; but we have never urged upon them a political policy which we have not equally urged upon all citizens, whether of our religion, or of the Protestant, or of none. We have opposed always every such thing as a Catholic party in politics, and have always refused to recommend any man for an office on the ground of his being or not being a Catholic. We have wished the Catholic press to abstain from committing Catholics as such either to the Democratic party or to the Whig party, and to leave them free as Catholics to vote for either party according to their own judgment as free and independent American citizens. We have wished to keep the Catholic element separate from the conflicts of party politics. We wish always to do the same with regard to the foreign element. As long ago as 1838, we entered our protest against any class of citizens being addressed or brought to the polls by a foreign appellation, as *Irish American* or *German American*. We did this in reviewing a work on the Americans, by Francis J. Grund, Esq., a German by birth and education, in which he advocated the forming of the German portion of our population into a distinct political party, and endeavored to show that by so doing the Germanic element would ultimately rule the country, — an idle dream, indeed, yet one that it could not be attempted to realize without provoking a most serious conflict with the Native American sentiment.

In fact, our adopted citizens, at least their leaders, are not always satisfied to be treated simply as Americans, and they would take it as an offence if we refused to recognize their foreign nationality. This is not indeed the case with all, we trust not with a majority, but it is the case with a large number, and especially with those who figure most in our political contests. They are willing to be treated as Americans certainly, but it must be as *Irish Americans*, or as *German Americans*, which leads to the use of the offensive term *Anglo-American* as designating the mass of the original population of the Union, through whose heart flows the main current of the distinctive American nationality. Our Irish friends show this in the very titles of

their journals. They would be offended if an American journal should call itself *The Anglo-American*, and yet they give us *The American Celt*, and *The Irish American*. These titles imply a double nationality, the American and the Irish, and indicate the light in which they who support them regard themselves. We have no objection to the Irish nationality. We love and honor it as much as any man can love and honor a nationality not his own. Personally, we have always been partial to the old Celtic order of society, as we met it among the Scottish Highlanders and the original Irish, and we have wept bitter tears over its disappearance in Ireland before the axe or rope and confiscation of the Anglo-Saxon or the Anglo-Norman, and the extinction of its last hope on the field of Culoden; but our tears wake not the dead, and recall not to life the dear ones we have laid in the grave. There is no more gathering of the clans, and the stranger revels in the hall of the Irish chieftain. The old Celtic order of life, even in the Irish Catholic peasantry, is to-day little more than a reminiscence and a regret, and will, if the National Schools remain, very soon cease to be even so much. It cannot be revived; certainly not on American soil, where it has never been even a tradition. Here a different order of tradition rules, a different — we say not a better, but a different — order of national life predominates, and we have nothing to do but to accept it, and make the best of it. Those who regret their own old national life are not to be blamed for doing so, and much must be pardoned to them, as to the mother in the paroxysm of her grief over the lifeless remains of her darling boy; but still they must make up their minds to one thing or another, and not be, as Mrs. Malaprop says, “two gentlemen at once.” We cannot be required to recognize two distinct and mutually repellant nationalities at the same time and in the same persons. As to our Irish Catholics, we are willing to treat them either as simply Catholics and Americans, if they will permit us, or as simply Catholics and Irishmen, if they prefer; but we insist that they shall make their election, for we cannot, even if we would, treat them as both at once, because the national type they bring with them from Ireland — that is, those of them who are called *the Irish* — is different from the American type, and unity is possible only by the assimilation of the one to the other.

There need be nothing offensive in this statement, for it is made in no offensive sense, and with no thought of exalting one nationality at the expense of another. We do not enter into the old quarrel of Saxon and Celt when we say the dominant type of American nationality is *Anglo-American*, and not *Irish American*, for we only express a simple fact and call things by their right names. We do it not to imply that our nationality is any better because it is derived from the English than it would have been if derived from the Irish. Perhaps it is inferior. Into that question we have not entered, and will not enter, for, as Dogberry says, "comparisons are odorous," and we have no wish to flatter the pride of the one race or excite the envy of another. We only assert our American identity as we do our own individuality, which, though very much inferior to another, is yet the best for us, because it happens to be ours. The Colonies, which have grown into the United States, were *English* colonies, and the great bulk of their inhabitants were of *English* descent. When we became an independent nation, we were substantially an *English* people. From England we have derived our language, our literature, our laws, our political and social institutions, our habits, manners, and customs, only modified by the incidents of colonial and a subsequent separate national life. This is simple fact, which nobody in his senses can deny. There were indeed Dutch in New York, and Germans in Pennsylvania, who had and still have a local influence, but none in determining the national type of the American people regarded as a whole. There were Irish and Scottish settlers, before the Revolution, in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and in most of the other Colonies. They were a valuable accession to the colonial people, and are honorably distinguished in our annals; but they introduced no foreign element, no distinctive or foreign nationality. They were to a great extent Anglicized before leaving home, were assimilated in language, religion, and manners to the English settlers, and formed but one people with them. It never even occurred to us to distinguish them from the people we called Anglo-American, for we were discussing no question of blood or race, and never dreamed of restricting the Anglo-Americans to the unmixed descendants of the old Anglo-Saxons, who, for aught we know, were far enough from being an unmixed race themselves.

We wish we could convince our friends that the question of blood or race has with us not the least importance in the world. The English are a distinct people, but not a distinct race. They are a mixed people, eclectic, like their language, composed of Angles, Saxons, Britons, Danes, Normans, Angevines, Gascons, Irish, Scotch, Flemings, Dutch, French, Italians, and we know not how many others. These, assimilated to a common national type, are what in modern times we call Anglo-Saxons, but whose proper name is *the English*. Now what we mean, when we call the American nationality Anglo-American, is, that it is derived from the English type, and all who are assimilated to it we call Anglo-Americans; or simply Americans, except when we are obliged to distinguish between them and those who call themselves *Irish* Americans or *German* Americans. We can conceive nothing offensive in this. The word itself may be unpleasant to Irish ears, and call up many unpleasant associations in Irish minds, but then do they not call themselves *Irish* Americans? Is that a term pleasing to the Anglo-American. We used the term not as a boast, nor to express a preference. A blue-eyed man might as well take offence at our saying to him, Sir, your eyes are blue, mine are black, and therefore of a color different from yours; or an Irishman might as well take offence at us for writing our name, after the manner of our ancestors, in the Anglo-Saxon form, *Brownson*, instead of the Celtic form, *McBrown*. Yet we are quite willing that anybody who dislikes the Saxon termination of our name should drop it, and give it the Celtic prefix. The only objection we have is, that it might create some confusion and give rise to a question of identity. But all this is childish, and they wrong the Irish who represent them as so weak and sensitive as to be unable to bear the very innocent epithet *Anglo*, without imagining an insult is intended them.

That our national life has been and will continue to be *enriched*, as we expressed it in our article, by contributions from various foreign sources, we have not the least disposition in the world to deny, but that these flow into the main current of our Anglo-American life, without diverting its channel or essentially altering its type, we consider a "fixed fact." Such has been the case in the past, as nobody acquainted with our history will gainsay; that it

will continue to be the case, we infer from the fact that it is on American soil by far the strongest, and absorbs every foreign nationality that meets it. It has the digestive power of the ostrich. It assimilates the very children of foreign parents, unless kept separate by difference of language, who grow up as good Anglo-Americans, in the sense in which we use the term, as the best of us. There is very little that is distinctively Irish, or that is not distinctively American, in the children of Irish parents born or brought up here, unless they have been kept from all intercourse with the old American people, — we mean the descendants of the English-speaking American people of 1790.

“But suppose you are right, why insist on it, especially in a time of such excitement against foreigners as the present?” For two reasons. First, to allay that very excitement, or to calm the fears of the more sober part of our non-Catholic countrymen, alarmed by the influx and movements of foreigners within the last few years. Secondly, to show our foreign-born population, not yet Americanized, that they cannot, if they would, force their foreignism upon the country, and that all efforts on their part to preserve their distinctive nationality on our soil are not only dangerous, inasmuch as they excite the fears and hostility of native Americans, too strong here to be trifled with, but absolutely unavailing. We think it bad policy, to say nothing else, for foreign settlers in a country, naturalized or not, to tell that country that it has no nationality, that its nationality is not yet formed, and that it is to be, when formed, an “amalgam” of theirs and various foreign nationalities, — *foreign*, because introduced as distinctive national elements since the country became a nation, and was recognized as such by the nations of the earth. We think it would be very impolitic, even if it were not an idle dream, to hint, much less to insist on it; for no people on earth, not restrained by deep and earnest religious principle, which cannot be said of the Americans, will bear it, — especially if these settlers constitute a very considerable portion of the population, and boast that they and their children are over one half of the whole nation, and tell those who have always considered themselves and been considered by the world as constituting the great body of the people, that they are only about one third of its whole white population. We cannot quiet public excitement against us by insisting on

the very things which produce it. That were in policy — a blunder. We must be pardoned, then, if, having the good of all the inhabitants of the country at heart, we refuse to adopt that policy, and take what seems to us the more common-sense course of seeking to allay the excitement, by showing that its causes are unreal, that the danger apprehended is imaginary, and that the puerile boasts with which enthusiastic foreigners amuse themselves, or seek to relieve the tedium of their exile, should never be suffered to drive a great people from their propriety.

It is all very natural that immigrants should wish to find again their fatherland in the country of their adoption, or should console themselves with the thought, that, if they must ultimately part with something of their own nationality to the country, it, in return, must part with as much or more of its to them. We would not say a word to deprive them of this source of consolation, if indulged in private, and not paraded before the public, to frighten our timid old women of either sex. We do not mean to deny that the influx of foreigners has and will have a local and temporary effect on our national character, but what we do mean is, that it will not absorb our nativism, nor dissolve our nationality, or produce a new amalgam. We look upon it as inevitable that the immigrant population will, in time, become assimilated to the dominant national type, be completely nationalized as well as naturalized, and to become nationalized in a foreign country is to become conformed to its nationality, not its nationality to become conformed to them, which would be to conquer and subdue it. Believing this to be inevitable, that our immigrant population will Americanize even in spite of themselves, we conclude, alike for the benefit of both parties, first, that these pretensions, and these efforts and organizations to preserve a foreign nationality, or to modify the American, which only excite the hostility of the country, will in the long run effect nothing in favor of the foreign-born population; and secondly, that it is very unwise and unmanly for us native Americans to be disturbed by them, or to fear that the foreign elements will absorb the native.

Here are our reasons for doing what we have done, and for doing it at this particular time. We can see nothing in it to aid the Know-Nothings in their insane movements

against foreigners. We did not in the remotest degree justify their movement, for we labored to prove that in the case of Catholic immigrants, the only class to which they are opposed, the fears they appeal to are groundless. The storm was gathering, and we wished to avert its fury as far as possible from the heads of the Catholic population of the country, native or foreign born, but more especially from the Irish Catholics, who, as it generally happens, would be the chief sufferers. In this, we said not one word in disparagement of any one's nationality, we spoke neither in favor of our own countrymen nor against foreigners as such. We merely said that there is an American nationality,—of which we could not doubt, for we felt it throbbing in our own bosom,—and contended that it had a right to prevail, and would prevail, on American soil. It seems to us that we had just reasons to think that our readers, who never knew us to boast the superiority of one race over another, to treat any race with pride or contempt, or to disparage any man on account of his birth or nation, would attribute our assertion of Anglo-Americanism or of our own personal Anglo-Saxon descent to some motive, even if a mistaken one, less unworthy than that of asserting the superiority of Saxon to Celt, or the supremacy of New England over the rest of the Union. It is humiliating, indeed, to find such unworthy motives attributed to us, and by men who should know us better. But there is no reasoning with men who take their ungenerous suspicions or their unmanly fears for their premises. There is not a man in the country who has given stronger proofs of freedom from national and sectional prejudices than we have. We have never hesitated to censure our own country, or even New England, whenever we thought her in the wrong, and in the severest terms when we thought them deserved. We have defended Mexico, we have defended Spain, we have defended Austria, against our own government; we have defended Louis Napoleon against American radicals; Ireland against England; the South against the fanaticism of the North; and spoken of the West in comparison with Massachusetts, in terms by no means flattering to the pride of our adopted State. And yet there are men who do not blush to accuse us of being controlled by both national and sectional prejudices, and others silly enough to believe them! Verily, the race of

poets is not extinct, if, as it has been said, the essence of poetry consists in *invention*.

In point of fact, the freedom of our censures upon our own country, though made with an American heart, had excited a suspicion of our patriotism, and was beginning to be used as a proof of the anti-American character of Catholicity. We owed it to our brethren and to the cause to which our Review is devoted to remove this unfounded suspicion, and to show that we can be sufficiently American, whenever the hour comes for the assertion of Americanism. We have always told our readers that we conducted a Catholic American Review, rigidly Catholic in religion, and in nationality and politics rigidly American. We have repeated this, time and again, and certainly not without a purpose, and a purpose which we should suppose could be easily divined. It is, we think, the proper character for a Catholic publicist in this country. But we have repeated it as our profession of faith, and as indicating a distinct and settled line of policy. The great controversy with Protestantism is no longer conducted on purely theological grounds, but is now made, as Balmes, Donoso Cortés, Montalembert, and all the great Catholic champions of the day, assure us, a national, a political, or a social question. Protestantism has virtually yielded the question as a theological question, and now debates it as a question lying within the secular order. The grounds taken by our non-Catholic countrymen against Catholicity are three: 1. It is foreign and opposed to our nationality; 2. It is anti-liberal and incompatible with our republicanism; and 3. It is anti-industrial, and repugnant to the material growth and prosperity of nations. It is on these grounds, however humiliating, that the Catholic publicist must now meet the question between Catholics and Protestants, if he would meet it at all, or say anything to the purpose.

Now we all know that this first objection is very strong in the non-Catholic American mind, and that it is strengthened by the fact that the great body of Catholics here are immigrants and their children. The American not a Catholic regards the Church as un-American, and to him she comes in and spreads here only in conjunction with a foreign nationality. For large masses of the American people Catholicity is simply the *Irish* religion, and to become a Catholic is regarded as the same thing as to become an Irish-

man. Of the fact there is no doubt, and that, humanly speaking, it operates unfavorably to the reception of our holy religion by our countrymen, there can be just as little, because it adds to their prejudice against the Church the no less strong prejudice against a foreign nationality. Nothing is therefore more prudent than for one in our position thus to show that he preserves his Americanism. The most natural thought of an Irish Catholic in relation to this prejudice undoubtedly is to seek to remove it by reminding us of the past glories of the Irish people, and of the important services which they have rendered to his country.* We do not question these glories or these services, but this method, since it presupposes a conversion to Irishism as the condition of removing prejudices against Catholicity, can be relied on only in the case of here and there an individual; for the country, though not prejudiced against the Irish as individuals, yet is as much prejudiced against them collectively as against the Church herself, and is only irritated by the means they take to vindicate their national glory. Grant, as we certainly do, that this prejudice is unjust, as are all national preju-

* The facts usually alleged by our Irish Catholic friends to prove the claims of the Irish people on American gratitude are not quite to the purpose. By *the Irish*, the American people understand the Catholic Irish of the poorer classes, in whom only they recognize what they regard as the distinctively Irish nationality. It is against these, or more properly against their self-constituted leaders, that they are chiefly prejudiced. The faults real or imaginary which they discover in them they charge to Catholicity, and hold the Church answerable for. Now this difficulty is not met, this prejudice is not removed, but confirmed rather, by proving to us that a large number of those whom the country delights to honor were Irishmen, but of another order. To show that Irish Protestants played a distinguished part in the early history of this country, or in our struggle for independence, is to say nothing for the Catholic Irish, but in the non-Catholic American mind much against them. Protestant Ireland sympathized with us in our struggle, and many of our distinguished men in the civil and military service were Irish Protestants or Irish Presbyterians; but this lays no foundation for our national gratitude to Catholic Ireland. Here is the point, and the reason why, as a Catholic, and as the friend of the Catholic Irish, we do not set any great value on Mr. M'Gee's very instructive and interesting work, *The Irish Settlers in America*. The Catholic Irish have rendered our country infinitely greater service than Irish Protestants, but, unhappily, they are services of a kind which our non-Catholic countrymen cannot appreciate, and do not count as services at all, but the reverse. These services are those which they have rendered to the cause of Catholicity. Beyond these, however, they have rendered immense services in the material order, which our countrymen might, but which they do not, appreciate.

dices, as are the prejudices of the Irish themselves against the Anglo-Saxons as a race, yet it exists, and nothing that that we or the Irish themselves can do or say in their favor will do anything towards removing it; for nations, as well as individuals, can be unreasonable. We are grieved and mortified that it is so, but so it is, and the Catholic American must not be required to shoulder this national prejudice, but must be permitted in all freedom to distinguish for his countrymen between Catholicity as Catholicity, and Catholicity as identified with the Irish or any other foreign nationality. Why should he beat his head against a granite wall?

In Ireland Catholicity and nationality march hand in hand. During the long and painful struggle of Catholic Ireland with Protestant England, the two have become as it were identified in the national heart. Faith has sustained the sentiment of nationality, and nationality has come to the aid of faith by making it a point of national honor not to apostatize. The priest can appeal to the deep national sentiment to support the Church, and the patriot can appeal to religion to keep alive the sacred fire of nationality. But these appeals, so natural and so effective in Ireland, where the Catholic faith and the national sentiment are so strictly united, cannot be effective here beyond the circle of the Irish immigrants themselves, because here the nationality is American and not Irish, and to appeal to the Irish nationality as an auxiliary beyond that circle is to confirm the very objection we wish to remove. The more prominent we make the Irish nationality, and the more we identify it with Catholicity, the more do we confirm the prejudices of the American people against our religion. What we want, so far as our non-Catholic countrymen are concerned, is, that our religion be presented to them free from all association with any foreign nationality whatsoever. We do not mean by this that they who present it must be of American birth. Far from it. He who presents it may be an Irishman, a Frenchman, an Italian, a Spaniard, a Belgian, a Hollander, a German, for the American people are not at all prejudiced against the foreigner as an individual; but what we mean is, that he must distinguish it from his foreign nationality if he be a foreigner, and present it as simple Catholicity, superior to all national distinctions

and adapted alike to all nations. It always is so presented when introduced by the missionary into an infidel or an heretical country; yet so it is not easily presented where it is not introduced by the missionary, but by the migration of an old Catholic people, who seldom, if ever, distinguish even in thought between their religion and their nationality.

Here is the difficulty in this country with the great body of our Catholics. Catholicity is their old national religion. They embrace, cherish, and defend it as the religion of their fathers, and identify it so closely with their own nationality, that they hardly conceive the possibility of the one without the other, and are therefore exceedingly apt in Americanizing to lose their Catholicity. Hence the question has two grave aspects, the one affecting non-Catholic Americans, and the other the Catholic immigrants themselves. It is necessary to convince the former that they can, so to speak, *Catholicize* without ceasing to be Americans, and to enable the latter to Americanize without ceasing to be Catholics. We know, humanly speaking, no way of effecting this double object but by distinguishing between Catholicity and nationality, and having it practically understood, on both sides, that our religion is bound up with no particular nationality, but can coexist, without collision, with any. We say *practically* understood, that is, presented as a living fact here and now; for in the abstract, in theory, no Catholic, at least, denies it. To this end, the Catholic who embraces the question under both of its aspects is required to present Catholicity solely as the religion of God, and to repulse all appeals to any particular nationality as an auxiliary. But, unhappily, he cannot do this without coming into frequent collision with those who are more intensely national than Catholic, or who, consciously or unconsciously, take it for granted that their religion and their foreign nationality must extend themselves together; and if of Anglo-Saxon origin, especially if a convert, he will be accused of hostility to foreigners, of arrogating everything for his own hated race, of being governed by mean and narrow-minded national prejudices, or Anglo-Saxon disdain of the Irish. Denunciations after denunciations follow as a matter of course. The poor American Catholic, rejected by his countrymen as a Catholic, and by his Catholic brethren as an American

asserting the right of American nationality on American soil, runs but a narrow chance for his life. Happily, however, if his motives are pure, he has an unfailing resource in God.

Such a narrow chance seems at the present moment to be ours. Yet what have we done? We have simply attempted to prove to our non-Catholic countrymen, that Catholicity is not a foreign religion; that it is not hostile to American nationality; that whatever of foreignism is associated with it in the minds of a portion of the Catholic population of the country is accidental, owing to their foreign birth and education; that really Catholic citizens, though adopted citizens, are the most conservative and reliable portion of the American people; and that the only dangerous class of foreigners are non-Catholics, infidels, apostates, radicals, socialists, and revolutionists. Here is what we have done under one aspect of the question, and here is nothing to which a Catholic can honestly object. We have called upon our Catholic friends of foreign origin, and who naturally and without thinking of it bring their foreign nationality with them, to accept American nationality such as it is; to forbear making war on it, or setting up their own against it; to be discreet, and on their guard against offering it any gratuitous offence, for here they are the weaker party, and cannot, if lawful to do so, resist it with effect; in a word, to study to become nationalized as well as naturalized, and merge themselves in the great American people. Believing that, as an American citizen whose ancestors were among the first settlers of the country, we know the feelings of our non-Catholic countrymen better than any foreigner can know them, we have described the dominant sentiment of the country with regard to adopted citizens, and pointed out to them some of the respects in which they have not in our judgment been prudent, and have unnecessarily offended the national susceptibility. We have utterly exploded the national pretensions of the Know-Nothings, or the so-called Native American party, and denounced them as a miserable anti-Catholic faction, led on by foreign and native demagogues, who care not a straw for Americanism any further than they can use it for their own base and selfish purposes. Finally, we have reminded our own countrymen of their own faults, greater than those they presume to lay

to the charge of foreigners, and called upon them to reflect on the immense services rendered by foreign immigrants to the material prosperity of the nation. Here, again, is what we have done under the other aspects of the question. And what is there here that any Catholic, whether native-born or foreign-born, can construe into an insult? Have we found some faults to reprove in our foreign-born population? Do they imagine that they are faultless, or that no one is to speak of them but in terms of high-wrought eulogy? But have we pretended that they are more faulty than our own countrymen, or have we reproved them with a tithe of the severity that we have native-born Americans? Had we said a hundredth part as much against foreigners as we, or many of them, have said against our own countrymen, our life would hardly be worth a year's purchase, judging from the fury with which we have been assailed by a portion of the foreign-American press. We assure our Catholic friends, that they have in some instances allowed their national feelings to run away with their Catholic charity, and have been far from presenting an edifying example to the American people. Understanding, indeed, our remarks in the marvellously incorrect manner it seems they did, we can account for much of their wrath, and pardon their fury. But taking what we have done in the sense obviously intended, we are sure that there was nothing in it that could have reasonably offended a single Catholic in the world, and we should have felt that we were offering a gross insult to our whole Catholic population had we even hinted the possibility of any one's taking offence at it. But let this pass.

The Know-Nothings, whom it has been said we have joined, are really an anti-Catholic party, and only accidentally and by false pretension a Native American or national party; real, genuine Americans, in their true national character, whom we distinguish from the Know-Nothings, though national, are anti-Catholic only by accident and through ignorance. To the true American feeling and the American system of government, Catholicity offers no opposition; but accepts and consecrates them as American. Consequently, between Catholicity and genuine Americanism there can never be any collision, and our honest non-Catholic countrymen would see and acknowledge it, if they were only well acquainted with our holy religion. This is what we said, when we asserted that the Native American

party is only accidentally anti-Catholic, and which some of our friends have, singularly enough, interpreted to mean that the Know-Nothing party are only anti-Catholic by accident. We should suppose the remarks of Mr. Delery, which we cited, and our well-known sentiments and character, might have saved us from so gross a misapprehension. If there had been any obscurity or ambiguity in our language, we should suppose it was removed in a subsequent part of our article, where we deny the claims of the Know-Nothings to Americanism, denounce them as a miserable anti-Catholic faction, and say that we utterly repudiate them, both as a Catholic and as a natural-born American citizen.

It would seem that we presumed too much on the credit we supposed would be given us for common sense, and we did not therefore enter into as minute explanations as were necessary to save us from the suspicion of being either insane or a downright blockhead. There has, ever since the second term of Washington's administration, been in the country what may be called a Native American party, opposed to the liberal policy of our naturalization laws. This party was called into existence by the very censurable proceedings of Genet and the French Jacobins, who opposed the neutrality which Washington and the majority of the people sought to maintain in the war then raging between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and was invigorated by the violence of foreign radicals, and their gross libels on the government under the administration of the elder Adams. To this party we had reference when we said the Native American party is only accidentally anti-Catholic, for the foreigners to whom it was opposed were not Catholics, but Jacobins, in the language of that day. Catholics, whether of native or foreign birth, were not then sufficiently numerous in the country to be counted, and the Catholic element did not enter into the question between nativism and foreignism.

A Native American party, in reality, has always existed in the country. A few years ago it was separately organized, and made some noise and did some notable things. This was called the Native American party, and on the question of nationality simply continued, under another name, the party that passed the "alien and sedition laws,"

and was not anti-Catholic in its origin or the first moments of its organization ; that is, it did not oppose Catholics in their quality of Catholics, but opposed them only in their quality of foreigners. It was then only accidentally anti-Catholic. Now the sentiment which underlies this party, regarded as simply a native American party, is respectable, for it is only a phase of patriotism or nationality, and is shared alike by every natural-born American, whether Whig or Democrat, Catholic or Protestant. This is what we meant, and what we said.

But we beg our readers to note what it precisely is that we do say. Our expression was, "the sentiment which *underlies* the Native American party." A man uses this form of expression only when he approves the sentiment, and disapproves the use or application that is made of it. The language approves the sentiment, but condemns the party. The sentiment is that of nationality, one phase of patriotism as Mr. Delery defines it, a preference for the men of one's own country, — the sentiment of nationality, or identity of one's own nation, as we say ; for in our estimation the sentiment of nationality does not always give the preference to one's own countrymen ; when a foreign-born citizen can render the nation more valuable services than the natural-born, it prefers him. If an Irishman, as well may happen, can do more to develop and preserve our nationality than an American, it is no impeachment of our patriotism to prefer him. But this sentiment, which underlies the Native American party, we have described as shared by all Americans. The American feeling, we suppose, was as pure and as strong in the bosom of the Jeffersonian or Republican party which supported, as in the bosom of the Federal party which opposed, our liberal naturalization policy. We do not think the Republicans were less patriotic or less unwilling to sacrifice their national identity than were the Federalists ; they thought, and the event has proved that they were right, that the fears of the Federalists were groundless, and that the liberal policy might be adopted with advantage to the country as well as to foreign immigrants themselves. But there has always been a party that has cherished those fears, and within the last few years not entirely, as we showed in our last Review, without reason, — though by no means with so much reason as some imagine, as we also showed ; and this party,

a few years ago, organized themselves into the late Native American party. Well, the sentiment which underlies this party as so organized and so named, we said, and we still say, is respectable, and is as strong in the bosom of the American Catholic as in the bosom of the American Protestant. We did not say, and we do not now say, that we approve the use or application which the party makes of that sentiment. In its origin the party was not directly anti-Catholic; but even then we did not like it, and wrote against it, though we shared the sentiment of nationality on which it professed to be based. But the organization had hardly been effected before it ceased to be American, before it was seized upon by no-Popery demagogues, — some native and some foreign-born, among whom figured now and then a North of Ireland Orangeman, and especially, as the most prominent leader in this section, the ex-priest Hogan, born, we believe, in Ireland, — and perverted to a simple anti-Catholic faction, disgraceful to itself and to the country. Now *Native Americanism*, in the sense of this miserable anti-Popery faction, with its foreign leaders, with an Irishman for its Mayor of New York and a Jew for its Representative in Congress, is no doubt in bad odor with all our foreign-born Catholics, and with a large portion of non-Catholic Americans. But it was not of this party, *after its perversion*, that we said the sentiment which underlies it is respectable, or as strong in the American Catholic bosom as in that of the American Protestant; nor was it of this party after, but before, its perversion, that we said it was only accidentally anti-Catholic, for our expression was, "The Native American party *in its origin* was only accidentally anti-Catholic."

The Know-Nothings are generically considered this same party, after its perversion to an anti-Catholic faction, under a new name and organization. But we can tell our friends, that if they flatter themselves that these same Know-Nothings enlist, despicable as they are, nothing of the respectable sentiment of nationality in their favor, they are very much mistaken. The Know-Nothings themselves have not the slightest conceivable claim to be regarded as a national or American party. They are, if you will, Orangemen, hoping by means of maintaining Protestant ascendancy to rule the country, and to share the loaves and fishes of office; they are anti-Catholics, carrying on the

war of the world, the flesh, and the Devil against the Lord and his Christ; they are revolutionists and libertines, who find the Church in their way, and who would destroy her and bring back the reign of Night and Chaos. This is what they are, caring not a straw for Americanism any further than they can use it to accomplish their own infernal purposes. But they profess to address the honest sentiment of American nationality, and, in the present state of feeling against the Church, they are able, we are sorry to say, to enlist that sentiment to a very considerable extent on their side, and it was to defeat them in this that we wrote our article.

There can be no question that there is at this moment a strong public excitement against Catholics and Catholicity in the country. The very successes of the Know-Nothings prove it. As to the more immediate causes of this excitement, there may be some difference of opinion. Some Catholic journals have not hesitated to ascribe it to the inconsiderate zeal and ultraism of some converts, among whom the first rank is given to ourselves and our highly gifted friend, Bakewell, editor of the late *Shepherd of the Valley*. It is very well, no doubt, to throw the blame upon us poor converts, who of course have no party to protect us, and to make us responsible for the hostility felt towards Catholics. There is something generous and manly in such a proceeding. At least, such a proceeding is safe. But if our Catholic journals had merely said that we and our friends have produced excitement amongst Catholics themselves by our fearless assertion of the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation, and our high-toned doctrines on the freedom of religion and the supremacy of the spiritual power, they would not have been far out of the way; but if they suppose that we, by the things they allege, have excited the active hostility of the American people against the Church, we can tell them that they have fallen into a grave mistake. Our non-Catholic countrymen would suffer us to advocate the doctrines supposed to be so offensive to them till doomsday, without suffering themselves to be provoked into anything more than a laugh, or a newspaper squib at our expense. No assertion we can make of exclusive salvation, or of the power of the Pope, can disturb them, because, not being Catholics, the assertion of the former has no force for them, and, having some knowledge of the present state of society,

they have no fears of the latter. It is never safe to ascribe the convictions and feelings of Catholics to non-Catholics, and to suppose that things which often alarm us for them appear to them in the light they do to us. We feel quite certain, that, had it not been for the fears and the complaints of Catholics themselves, our so much harped upon virulence, harshness, and ultraism, which they were the first to proclaim, would never have been detected, certainly never complained of, by our non-Catholic countrymen. The American people are little moved by anything that we or anybody else may do, as long as we keep within the region of doctrine and speculation, and they are roused only when some practical question in which they take an interest is touched practically, or when there is a practical effort made to dismount them from one of their hobbies.

Yet that we have had something to do, though not in the way alleged, in producing this excitement against Catholics in this country we are not disposed to deny. There are, if we may so speak, two Americas, Old and Young, conservative and radical. Old America, or Old Fogie America, is republican to the backbone, but a constitutional as distinguished from a democratic republican. It is the America of the Constitution, of the political and social institutions adopted or founded by the colonists and fathers of our republic. It places the political sovereignty in the people collectively, existing as civil society, and acting according to constitutional rules, but subjects them to the empire of the laws, and recognizes their will as law only when constitutionally expressed. It recognizes the state as the state, not as a mere association, dissoluble at the will of the members acting individually or outside of the body politic; and, though limiting the sphere of government, and guarding with all possible care against its arbitrary exercise of power, yet allows it to be imperative within its sphere, and arms it with full force to make itself obeyed, whoever or how many may attempt to resist it. It is the true, genuine, original, political America, whose constitution and principles we have so often and so fully set forth in our pages during the last eleven years.

By the side of this America has grown up another America, sometimes called Young America, a bastard America, which we have all along contended is not legitimately American, because not warranted by the Constitu-

tion and institutions of the country, because not consonant to the real genius and habits of the real American people, and because as a matter of fact of foreign, not of American origin. This is what we call radical or ultra-democratic America, the America of the greater part of American electioneering documents, of American periodicals and newspapers, which is on the tongues of the greater part of us when we speculate, and which many natives and all foreigners, unless German radicals, take to be the real Simon Pure America. The real American political system, though remarkably simple in its operation, is exceedingly complex in its structure, and can be fully comprehended only by political heads of the first order, after years devoted to its study. Comparatively few of our own countrymen are able to seize its precise character and give a just account of it, and those who do are laughed at as *Old Fogies*, — a term, by the way, imported from Ireland, by a Young Irishman, and applied in the *Democratic Review* to such men as General Cass, the late Judge Woodbury, Mr. Buchanan, and to almost every man of mature age and distinguished services in the Republican or so-called Democratic party. The great majority of our journals and politicians speak of our institutions as purely democratic, and nearly all foreigners except, as we have just said, the German radicals. Democracy is a word we do not ourselves use when speaking of our institutions, because it does not accurately describe them; for it names one of the simple or absolute forms of government, and our government is not as to its form simple, but complex, and belongs to the order of mixed governments. But the simple forms of government, as they have but a single idea, but a single principle, are much more easily understood than the complex forms. Any understanding can grasp the idea of a simple monarchy, where the will of one man is law, of a simple aristocracy, where the will of a particular class is law, and of a simple democracy, where the will of the whole people, or, practically considered, the will of the majority, is law. But all simple forms of government are governments of mere will, are absolute, arbitrary, and incompatible with freedom, are in reality despotisms; and hence our fathers, who loved liberty no less than they loved order, and were as anxious to secure the freedom of the subject as the power of the state, did not establish any one of the simple forms of

government. They established, however, a government in which the democratic element preponderates. Hence all superficial politicians and demagogues at home, and nearly all foreigners, take that element to be exclusive, and consider whatever they find opposed to it as an anomaly to be reduced to the rule at the earliest possible moment. In consequence of this, Young America, which did not derive its political principles from the study of the American institutions, but from abroad, becomes identified with the European democracy, with French Jacobinism, and the universal Red Republicanism or revolutionism of the Old World.

Now as Catholics and conservative Americans we accept and defend the old genuine Republican America ; but we can neither as Catholics nor as genuine Americans accept or defend the latter. We are obliged by our religion and by our Americanism to oppose the so-called Young America, and all the more earnestly in consequence of the influx of foreigners, who are sure to adopt on landing here its doctrines, because they are the simpler and more easily to be comprehended, because they are those they most frequently meet in American journals, because they correspond to their previous ideas of Americanism, and because, having felt the pressure of authority at home, they are predisposed to them. These foreigners, having adopted these doctrines, when naturalized naturally seek to carry them out in their practice, unless restrained by their religion, because they have not those interior republican habits which restrain in practice the exaggerations of the democratic theory. Men at home, and under institutions under which they have been formed, act from habit and routine, and, ordinarily, however they may speculate, in their practice conform without even thinking of it to the established order of things ; but when transplanted to another country, placed under a different order, they cannot do it ; they get first the theory, and then study to conform their practice to it. They are like a man speaking a foreign tongue, which he has learned by the study of lexicon and grammar. His own mother tongue he speaks from habit, and it may be with correctness, though he has never learned its grammar. But the foreign tongue he speaks not from habit, and can speak it correctly only as he has learned it by study, and if he has had a grammar and lexicon that did not give him

the correct rules of the language, he will be continually committing solecisms in his speech. Now the native American, no matter of what blood he was originally, trained up under our institutions, becomes a practical republican in the American sense, and will when it comes to practice, for the most part, act as an American in the true sense, though he speculates as a foreign radical, for in his practice he acts from American instincts, habit, routine, and he speculates according to a theory. Ordinarily, we have less fault to find with the political conduct than with the political speculations of natural-born American citizens, but the political conduct of the foreigner will be governed by his political theory. This explains what we said in our article as to foreigners not being republican in their habits and interior life. They lack, we said, practical republican training, and are apt to confound republicanism with democracy, and democracy with radicalism, and therefore we concluded that non-Catholic foreigners, in whom religion does not supply, as in the Catholic immigrants generally, the lack of republican training, are dangerous to American republicanism.

Now this Young America, radical America, identical with the European democracy, we have from the first opposed, both on national and religious grounds. We have opposed the party as un-Catholic, un-American, and anti-social. We have opposed it wherever we have encountered it, in our own country, in Ireland, in France, in Italy, in Germany, in Austria, in Hungary, in a Mazzini, a Kosuth, a Mitchell, or a Meagher, when leagued with the Turk, or when combining against Russia, in principle and detail, in theory and practice, in whatever shape or disguise we detected it, and brought to our opposition all the knowledge and experience acquired by twenty years of service as one of the members, and sometimes as one of the subordinate chiefs, of that very party. Here is our offence, and which has won us the character of "the best abused man" in all America. We have been the foremost offender in this way of all American journalists. We commenced it in 1841, in *The Boston Quarterly Review*. We continued it more decidedly in the *Democratic Review* during the year 1843, and we have continued it on higher grounds, with clearer and more comprehensive views, during the eleven years that we have almost single-handed con-

ducted our present journal, in our essays, in our orations, in our lectures, in our letters, in our conversations. We have done all that was in our power to detach our own countrymen, and especially our Catholic population, from the un-Catholic, anti-American, and anti-social party, and to enlist every Catholic principle, sentiment, and aspiration on the side of our American institutions, and against destructive radicalism. We have not been alone in this. The Catholic press has nobly sustained us and seconded our efforts, at least since the reaction against the youngsters commenced in Ireland and on the Continent; nevertheless, ours was the first Catholic journal in the country, so far as our knowledge extends, that took this stand, and for some years we stood alone among our journals, without hearing one single fraternal voice saying, "God speed you, brother." Latterly, however, the view which we were the first Catholic journalist in our country to assert, has been generally avowed by the Catholic body, we have not the vanity or presumption to think in consequence of any humble services of ours, but because events have made it necessary and proper, and radicalism has met the Church at every corner, opposing to it the eternal principles of truth and justice. Here, we apprehend, together with the things mentioned in our article, is the principal secret of the extraordinary excitement now raging against the Catholic body, an excitement that is fanned and kept alive chiefly by foreign radicals, and not least by Irish radicals, for, the most part nominal Catholics, and to whom we personally owe nearly all the abuse we have received since our conversion, and whose obvious policy it is to prevent us from acquiring any influence with the Catholic, especially the Irish Catholic body, whom they regard as their stock in trade, and would keep up as a distinct and foreign body, to be worked for their especial benefit. The genuine Catholic sentiment has in this country ventured to assert itself, and to take its stand, not on the side of Whig or Democrat as such, but on the side of Old against Young America, on the side of conservatism against radicalism, of genuine Americanism against the false and imported pretender who claims its honors; as it could not but do, when so many nominal Catholics, under pretext of exercising their acknowledged political liberty, were doing all in their power to destroy both religion and society. Hence the extraordinary excite-

ment against the Church, and the extraordinary efforts to drive Catholics into the arms of Young America, or to drive them out of the country.

Now it is this excitement, stirred up against us by the causes we have mentioned, and by the practical measures which the pastors of the Church have found it advisable to take to save the children of the faithful from apostasy, of which the Know-Nothings, pandering to the basest passions and the silliest prejudices of our countrymen, seek to avail themselves, and which they think will prove strong enough, with the aid from Exeter Hall, the Protestant Alliance, foreign demagogues, and that illustrious class of ill-instructed Catholics who hold political atheism, expressed in the popular maxim, "Religion has nothing to do with politics," and whom we call custom-house Catholics, to enable them to effect their hellish purposes. In this they are indirectly aided by large numbers of our countrymen, who, though non-Catholics, are not anti-Catholics in an active sense, but who, from the decided stand which the Catholic press has taken against radicalism, foreign movements, and domestic Free-Soil and fanatical and filibustering movements, in favor of authority, which we have ourselves sometimes appeared to push, as our friends will tell us, too far, and the fact that the Church professes to teach with authority, and exact unhesitating obedience to her orders, conclude that Catholicity is hostile to republicanism; although she makes it a point of conscience in the Catholic to support it where, as with us, it is the legally established order; and also, from the fact that the great mass of Catholics here are of foreign birth and education, and that the noisiest portion of them, those who assume to be the leaders of the body, make a very unnecessary display of their foreignism, and talk largely of the numbers and power of the adopted citizens, conclude that practically it cannot co-exist here compatibly with American nationality.

Now, if our readers have paid any attention to what we have written, they must have perceived that since Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état*, we have labored to remove the false impressions as to our love of liberty produced by our necessary war against revolutionism, and to show that we were equally the enemy of despotism. In accordance with the same thought, we have sought to defeat the Know-Nothing movement, by showing, what is strictly true, that

Catholicity is not inconsistent with our nationality, and is in perfect accordance, not with wild Jacobinical democracy, but with genuine American republicanism. This has been our aim, our policy, if you will, and which should have been divined by our friends without forcing us in self-defence to explain it. Our end we have believed sacred, our means, we think, are just and honorable, and within the province of the lay editor, especially if writing with the sanction of his Bishop or a theologian appointed by him. If, however, we have overstepped our bounds and trespassed on the province of the pastors of the Church, it has been unwittingly and unintentionally, and we doubt not that we shall be pardoned at least by those who have considered it our grossest fault that we are in the habit of pushing the spiritual authority over the temporal too far.

As to the accusation brought against us of insulting the Irish Catholics, amongst whom are nearly all our friends and associations as a Catholic, we repel it with all the indignation and scorn compatible with Catholic meekness and humility. For the ten years since we became a Catholic we have labored as a writer and a lecturer with the honestest intentions, and with what ability God gave us, to serve the great body of Irish Catholics, in the only way in which we believed we could serve them. We have not appealed to their warm sensibilities as Irishmen; we have not bespattered them with praise; we have not addressed them as children who could not endure a rough, manly voice; we have addressed them as men, strong men, full-grown men, who could hear and applaud the plain truth honestly spoken. We shall continue to address them in the same manner, if we address them at all. We have aimed to be just and honorable to them, and have been grateful to them for their kindness to us as a Catholic. We have always respected their nationality, and have regretted and rebuked the Anglo-American prejudice against the Irish immigrants. We have wished them to stand and to be regarded as standing on a footing of perfect equality with natural-born American citizens. But we have believed and we still believe that that result can be obtained only in proportion as they become nationalized, assimilated in some degree to the national type, and merged, so to speak, in the general population of the country. They can never, in our opinion, occupy their true position here, so long as they remain

as a foreign colony, or distinctively Irish. We believe, let them strive as they will to the contrary, they will in time Americanize, and become as to national character undistinguishable from the mass of our citizens, and therefore that they should give up all attempts to preserve here as it were an Irish organization, and to act, not as Americans, but Irishmen. We do not ask them to forget Ireland, for which and with which they and their fathers have suffered so much and so unjustly; we do not ask them to cease to love or to succor the friends and kindred they have left behind them; we do not ask them to disown their blood, to be ashamed of their national origin, or to give up their share in the traditions and past glories of the Irish race; but we do ask them not to regard this country as the land of their exile, but to look upon it as their new home, freely chosen, around which are to cluster the affections of their hearts, and with whose fortune, not with that of Ireland, are henceforth bound up their own fortunes, and those of their children and their children's children, and give to it what they owed to the home of their birth. As Catholics we ask them to Americanize, and to suffer their children to Americanize, without ceasing to be Catholics. The greater number of their children, let them do or say what they will, are sure to grow up substantially American, with the American interests and affections predominating over Irish interests and affections, and if they cannot with Catholicity they will without it.

These remarks have run to a greater length than we intended; but we have considered them necessary for a full explanation and defence of that Americanism which we have uniformly professed and advocated since we became a Catholic, and which has recently been so singularly misapprehended and so imprudently denounced by a portion of the Catholic press. They were due to that large class of our friends who have honestly mistaken our purposes, and really felt hurt at some things we have said, and whose friendship it would be a sore grief to us to forfeit. But we have done. If the Know-Nothings try to use the denunciations with which we have been assailed as an argument against the compatibility of Catholicity with our American nationality, or against the American intentions and devotedness of the great body of our really Catholic population, or even their truly American conduct, when not misled by demagogues, they will only justify their name of

Know-Nothings. As for ourselves, we have not forfeited the confidence of our Catholic friends, and we have no doubt that they will stand by us as they have heretofore stood by us. They are sound at the heart, and love and honor an independent editor, and will sustain him, though they may not accept everything he says.

ART. III.—*Speeches of the HON. CHARLES SUMNER on the Memorial for the Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Bill, and in Reply to Messrs. Jones of Tennessee, Butler of South Carolina, and Mason of Virginia.* In the Senate of the United States, June 26 and 28, 1854. Washington: Buel & Blanchard.

WE have no disposition to treat Mr. Sumner, one of our Senators in Congress, otherwise than with the respect due to his station, to his learning and ability, and his private virtues. But with the party he has joined, and to which he gives an earnest and energetic support, we have not the least conceivable sympathy. We are, as our readers well know, utterly opposed to that party, not from sympathy with slavery, but from love of liberty and from devotion to constitution. As the friend of social order, as the advocate of wise and practicable government, and as the defender, according to the measure of our poor ability, of genuine American republicanism, we are obliged to oppose with all our might the anarchical and despotic doctrines it holds and seeks to propagate, because those doctrines cannot prevail in this country without involving the subversion of constitutional government, the disruption of society, and the destruction of all possible guaranties of freedom, whether for white men or black men.

It is by no means our present purpose to discuss the question of slavery on its merits. We are personally, in feeling and principle, as much opposed to slavery in any and every form as Mr. Sumner and his party, and take as deep an interest as they in the real welfare of the negro race. We do not admit that Free-Soilers and Abolition-

ists enjoy a monopoly of the love of liberty, or of interest in the slave population. We are men as well as they; we are human, with human understandings and human hearts, as well as they; and nothing human is more foreign to us than to them. We throw back upon them their charges against those who do not see proper to join them, and assure them that we are as far from conceding either their infallibility or their impeccability as they are from conceding ours. We recognize in no self-constituted party, sect, or association, the authority to declare the moral law binding in conscience. According to their own rule of private judgment, we stand on as high ground as they, and deny to them the right to make those arrogant assumptions in which they so liberally deal. If private judgment is good for them, it is good for us, and our private judgment, since opposed to theirs, reduces it, even if theirs reduces ours, to zero.

But we are not among those who say, *Finis justificat media*, or who under pretext of philanthropy hold themselves at liberty to trample down more good in going to their end than they could possibly secure by gaining it. It is never lawful to do evil that good may come. There is a wrong as well as a right way of seeking even lawful ends, and he may well distrust his intentions who seeks to realize them by means obviously unjust, imprudent, or rash. Men are held to be prudent as well as just, and there is seldom gross imprudence where there is not some lack of a clear perception or a sincere love of justice. The end proposed by Abolitionists and Free-Soilers is the emancipation of the negro slaves in the United States. This end, in itself considered, is lawful; for all men, under the law of nature, are born free, and slavery is the normal condition of no man or race of men. The negro is a man, a man sprung from the same original stock from which the whites have sprung, and the same blood courses in his veins that courses in our own. He had the same first parents on earth, he has the same Heavenly Father, and the same Redeemer; he is placed under the same moral and religious law, and may aspire to the same heaven. We should belie our convictions as a man, and our faith as a Christian, were we to deny this, and we should disgrace our manhood, and sink into a miserable moral coward, were we to fear to assert it when or where its assertion is required. That negro

slave is my brother. For him as well as for me Christ has died on the cross. He has an immortal soul as precious as my own, and he may reign with the saints in heaven, while I may be doomed to suffer eternally with the Devil and his angels in hell. Nothing shall make us forswear the unity of the race, or fear to assert the common brotherhood of all men, white, red, or black.

But what conclude from all this? That no man, in any circumstances whatever, can have a good title to the bodily services of another? By no means; for otherwise the father could have no property in the bodily services of his son, the master in those of his apprentice, the creditor in those of his debtor. Nothing can be concluded but that one cannot have the dominion of the soul or the conscience of another, that the property of the master extends only to the bodily services of his servant, and that he must leave him his moral freedom unabridged, and full liberty to obey in all things the natural and divine laws obligatory alike upon all men. The master may have property in the bodily services of the slave by various titles, among which is that of services rendered him, benefits conferred on him, care taken of him in his infancy, maintaining him, nursing him when sick, or making provision for him in old age. It may be in the actual state of things the best practicable condition of the slave that he should remain under the guardianship or as the ward of the master, who, in consideration of the right to his bodily services, shall take upon himself the whole charge of his care and maintenance, on the same principle that minors and persons not regarded as competent to manage for themselves are, even in the Free States, placed by the law under guardians. In a state which authorizes slavery, or recognizes property in slaves, the master has a title, whatever it be as against the slave, that is good against the state. If the public has by its laws permitted slavery, recognized the master's title as good, it cannot in justice abolish it, without full indemnification. If the state has legalized a wrong, it may undoubtedly undo it, and is even bound to do so, but not at the expense of the individual citizen. The Abolitionist, therefore, who calls upon the public authorities to emancipate the slaves without just compensation to the masters, calls upon it to commit gross injustice. This should for ever shut the mouth of every Abolitionist, for every one, without exception, we

believe, holds that compensation would itself be a wrong, as it would recognize the title of the master.

But waving this for the moment, we may oppose the Free-Soil and Abolition movements on the ground that their complete success would, in the present state of things, prove a serious injury to the negro race on this continent.

We have no great admiration for the so-called "patriarchal institution" of slavery, and we think that many ameliorations of it are not only possible, but imperatively demanded. But we must treat it as a practical question. The negroes are here, and here they will remain, unless exterminated; for the project of sending them all back to Africa is perfectly visionary. Now, no man of ordinary sense and judgment, with some little knowledge of the subject, can for a moment doubt that the best practicable condition of the negro race here is, for the present at least, that of slavery, or that they should remain, as Mr. Calhoun liked best to express it, *wards*, under the guardianship of the masters. Our foreign friends may throw up their hands in holy horror at this statement, and declaim lustily against our American prejudices; but it is possible that we are as sincere friends of liberty as they are, and that we understand the question even better than they do. The most degraded race, morally and physically, among us, are the free negroes in the Free States. The slaves, if emancipated, thrown upon their own resources, and compelled to provide for themselves, would very generally sink to the level of these free negroes. They would have all the responsibilities of freemen, and all the disadvantages of slaves, without any of the compensating advantages of either. The simple difference of color alone would suffice to keep them a distinct and degraded class, and therefore a dangerous class in the republic. You may tell us that this ought not to be so; but it is so, and you cannot make it otherwise. In Europe, where a black man is a sort of curiosity, the prejudice against color may not be very strongly manifested; but here it is, humanly speaking, invincible, and in none more so than in European settlers and Northern Abolitionists. Certainly, then, if emancipation, as there is every reason to believe, would prove a serious injury, a real calamity to the slaves, we show no lack of humanity in refusing to labor for it.

The evils of slavery, as it exists amongst us, are moral,

not physical. Physically considered, the negro slaves are in a better condition than any other class of simple laborers in the country. As a general thing, they are treated with humanity, are sufficiently fed and clothed, and not overworked. They are free from all care or anxiety as to their means of living, which is, for poor people, even in this land of plenty, no small thing; they are light-hearted and merry, and the only class of laborers we have ever seen in the country that have the heart to sing at their work, or that are not too much exhausted by the labors of the day to join in the evening dance and frolic. Their physical sufferings are nothing in comparison with those of free laborers at the North or on our numerous public works. But the moral evils connected with slavery are great. The principal of these are the lack of proper Christian instruction, the want of respect paid to the sacrament of marriage, and the separation of husband and wife, and parents and children. But these evils are not inherent in the system. They are abuses which might be corrected without weakening the system, or in the least impairing the value of the services of the slave to his master, and they probably would have been corrected to a considerable extent before this, if the movements of the Abolitionists had not compelled the slaveholding States to direct all their energy to the preservation of the system itself. These movements, being directed not to the amelioration of the institution, but to its destruction, have operated, and still operate, to make the lot of the slave much worse than it would otherwise be.

Thus far we have considered the Abolition and Free-Soil movements solely as they affect the slave population; but we have no right to leave the white population of the country entirely out of the account. The freedom and well-being of the whites are as dear to humanity as the freedom and well-being of the blacks. Let slavery be as great an evil as it may, we have no right to abolish it by means that would inflict a still greater evil on the country at large. Of two evils we are bound to choose the least. It will not do to seek freedom for either white man or black, by means which destroy the very conditions of freedom. Freedom in our country, whether for black or white, depends on the maintenance of our constitutional order. The Abolition and Free-Soil movements tend directly to destroy that order, for they are based on the denial of all political author-

ity, all civil rights, and all political justice. If successful, they would render power arbitrary or null, destroy all the guaranties of freedom, and leave the whole population of the country a prey, now to despotism, and now to anarchy.

So much on the general question. We can now easily dispose of the special question, that of the rendition of absconding slaves, or the Fugitive Slave Law, which some of our citizens, not well knowing what they are about, are endeavoring to get repealed. It is always well to understand the state of the question before proceeding to discuss it. If Mr. Sumner had taken this precaution, he would have saved himself and us a good deal of trouble. The Constitution of the United States ordains, that "no person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but *shall be delivered up*, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." The rule here is, that the civil constitution binds in all things not repugnant to natural justice or the law of God, declared by the competent tribunal. The rendition of the fugitive slave, then, is obligatory on us in conscience, unless to do so is repugnant to natural justice or to the law of God; neither of which can be pretended, for St. Paul sent back to St. Philemon his fugitive slave Onesimus.

If the master has a title to the bodily services of his slave which is good in morals, as he certainly may have, he has the right in justice to recover his slave, the same as he would have in the case of any other species of property. In such case, the slave would himself be bound in conscience to return to his master, unless his master had forfeited his title by abusing it, by inhumanity, or the denial to his slave of his moral freedom. The master may forfeit his title, and in such case the slave is free from all obligations to him, on the same principle that the tyranny of the prince forfeits his title, and absolves his subjects from their allegiance. But in case there has been no abuse of the title, and there is no proximate danger to the soul of the slave, he would be bound to return, on the same principle that he who should entice away a slave from his master, or prevent the master from recovering him, would be held in justice to restitution.

But if the master has no title in justice, or that is good

as against the slave, he nevertheless has a good title as against the state, and this title every American must concede. As it concerns the Slaveholding States themselves, there can be no doubt, for these States have certainly by their laws recognized and guarantied property in slaves. The citizen who has inherited his capital in slaves holds his property in them, as against the state, by as good a title as he holds or can hold any other species of property. The state is bound in justice to protect him in that property, although his title to it as against the slave is vicious. The state may, if the title is not good as against the slave, abolish it, and ought to abolish it, but it cannot do so without indemnifying the master; for if it has recognized and guarantied an unjust title, that is its fault, and the maxim of law and morals, that no one can take advantage of his own wrong, is as applicable to the state as to the individual. The state, then, is bound to deliver up the slave, or to pay his ransom. The obligation of the state binds all its citizens, and they must either permit the master to recover his slave, or, like the state, pay his ransom. Such is the obligation in morals of the Slaveholding States and their citizens to the master.

Now, by ratifying or acceding to the Constitution, which contains the provision we have cited, each State has recognized the master's title, and guarantied it so far as delivering up the slave on claim of the master is to guaranty it. To this extent, then, the title of the master, even though vicious as against the slave, is good against every State in the Union and the citizens thereof. The State has no option in the case. It must deliver up the slave when claimed by his owner, or pay his ransom. The citizen must do the same. If his conscience will not permit him, he must negotiate his freedom, which in all ordinary cases may be done at a reasonable price. But if it cannot, if the owner refuses to put his slave at ransom, or if the citizen is unable to pay it, he must permit the master to take him back, and submit to it as he is obliged to submit to a thousand other evils which he would, but cannot, redress.

But let us understand precisely what *delivering up* a fugitive slave means. Even if the master's title were good as against the slave, I am not bound to send him back, for I am not the keeper of his property. All I am bound to do is not to deprive him of his property, or to hinder him from

recovering his man. My duty is simply that of non-intervention. It is the same under the Constitution. We are sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States,* when we say that the Constitution does not impose on the State into which the slave escapes any obligation to send him back to the master, and therefore, of course, no obligation on its citizens to do it, or to aid or assist in doing it. The right secured to the master is the right to come and take his absconding slave where he can find him, and the duty imposed on the State and the citizens or subjects thereof is to suffer him to do it in all freedom, and to interpose no obstacle, to offer no resistance of any kind to his doing it. The obligation is not to assist, but not to resist.

We may now understand the *Fugitive Slave Law*. This law does not confer on the master the right to come and take his slave, for that right he has under the Constitution, nor does it impose on the State or its citizens any obligation to *send* back or restore the fugitive slave. It creates no positive rights, and the obligations it imposes are, in relation to the recovery of the slave, strictly negative. Its objects are two;— 1. To prevent the master, under the plea of recovering his slave, from taking back with him to servitude a man to whose services he has no claim under the laws of his State; and, 2. To prevent the State or its citizens, or any portion of them, from hindering him or interposing any obstacle to prevent him from coming and freely taking back with him the one to whose services he has such claim. The law aims to enable the master to exercise his constitutional right against all opposition, and only that right. It imposes no active duty on the part of the State or of its citizens, except in case of resistance, and then to suppress the resistance, not to send back the slave to servitude. The law is for strictly constitutional purposes, and, as experience proves that it is not more stringent than is absolutely necessary to effect its purpose, it is ridiculous, or worse, to pretend that it is unconstitutional. No law is or can be unconstitutional that is *necessary* to secure the exercise of an acknowledged constitutional right. The clamor set up against it, that it does not give the alleged slave the benefit of a jury, is, in our

* *Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 16 Peters, 539.

judgment, worthy of no attention, because the question at issue before the magistrate is not that of Freedom and Slavery, as Mr. Sumner would persuade us, but simply whether the master has a *claim* under the laws of his State to the services of this man, say, Anthony Burns. There are but two questions for the magistrate to determine; — 1. Has he who claims the man, as an absconding slave, a *claim* under the laws of his State; and, 2. Is this Anthony Burns the man to whom he has such claim? The record of the court of the Slaveholding State answers the first question, and evidence of identity settles the second. There is no sitting in judgment on the claim, any further than to see that it is made under the laws of the State from which the alleged master and alleged fugitive comes. Judgment on the claim itself can be rendered only in the courts of that State, where the alleged slave has the benefit of a jury secured to him. But as there is no trial on the claim before the magistrate, but a simple inquiry as to the fact that the claim is made under the laws of that State, Virginia for instance, the proceedings are ministerial, not judicial, and the introduction of a jury would be an unheard-of anomaly. Why not insist on a jury in the case of the rendition of absconding apprentices, or of fugitives from justice? The demand for a jury is not, when made by a lawyer, honest, because he knows that the proper matter for a jury does not come before the magistrate, and can be in issue only before the courts of the State from which the slave has escaped, where only "the great question of human freedom," as Mr. Sumner calls it, can be tried. The only thing a jury could do, and the only thing, we suspect, that a jury is desired for, is to interpose an additional obstacle to the exercise of his constitutional right by the master.

We can now appreciate Mr. Sumner's defence of himself. He was asked, by Mr. Butler of South Carolina, if, in case Congress should repeal the Fugitive Slave Law, "Massachusetts would execute the constitutional requirements, and send back to the South absconding slaves?" Mr. Sumner answered, "Do you ask if I would send back a slave?" Mr. Butler replied, "Why, yes." Mr. Sumner answered, "Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?" Taken literally, Mr. Sumner's answer, though not marked by proper senatorial courtesy,

is defensible, and we could say as much ourselves; for neither in morals nor under the Constitution are we bound to *send* back absconding slaves. This has been settled, we suppose, by the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision affirming the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. We understand the *delivering up* to be a passive, not an active, delivering up, and consider that the Constitution recognizes and guaranties the right of the master to recover or take back his slave, but does not impose upon the State or the citizens thereof the active duty of sending him back. Judge Butler must permit us to say that his question was framed without sufficient regard to the precise obligation in the case. He should have said, "I would like to ask the Senator, if Congress should repeal the Fugitive Slave Law, would Massachusetts *comply* with the requirements of the Constitution and leave the master free to take back to the South his absconding slave?"

Mr. Sumner. Do you ask, if I will suffer, as far as depends on me, the master to take back his slave?

Mr. Butler. Why, yes.

Mr. Sumner. Is thy servant a dog, that he should do this thing?

Now, if the question had been put in this form, and Mr. Sumner had answered as we have here supposed, his answer would unquestionably have been indefensible, and in direct conflict with his oath to support the Constitution. But as the question was put, he escapes the charge of declaring his willingness to perjure himself, at least in so many words. But his answer is evasive, almost a verbal quibble, and his defence of it is by no means successful, or creditable to a Senator in Congress.

Mr. Sumner defends himself on the ground that, in swearing to support the Constitution, he swears simply to support it as he understands it, not as others understand it, and cites General Jackson as his authority. But this ground of defence, if taken without any qualification, is untenable. That every public officer, in the discharge of his official duties, is, to a certain extent, free to interpret for himself the Constitution imposing them, we do not deny; but this is only in those cases where his duty is not defined by law, and the meaning of the Constitution has not been judicially settled. But even here he is bound to understand

the Constitution in its plain, obvious, or natural sense, and is never at liberty to understand it in some out-of-the-way sense, in a non-natural or an arbitrary sense of his own. But will Mr. Sumner maintain that, as a citizen, as a lawyer, or as a Senator, in swearing to support the Constitution, he does not swear to support it as authoritatively defined by the proper tribunal? We grant that he does not swear to support the Constitution as interpreted by the private judgment of individuals, for his private judgment is to be regarded as the equal of theirs; we grant that where the meaning is doubtful, and is an open question, he is free to follow his own judgment, that is, his own honest judgment, which must be judgment, not caprice; but will he venture to say that he does not, according to the honest intent of his oath, swear to support the Constitution or to understand the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, declaring its meaning on the points formally brought before it for adjudication? Will he say, that the sense of the Constitution thus declared does not bind him as a citizen, as a lawyer, and as a Senator? If so, will he tell us where in our political system is lodged the supreme judicial authority. What is the province of the Supreme Court, or the value of its decisions? In every government there is lodged somewhere a supreme judicial authority, whose decisions in the civil order are final. In our political system this authority is separated from the legislative power, and also from the executive, and is vested in a distinct department, called the Judiciary. In every question of a judicial nature, the Judiciary is supreme, the highest civil authority in the land, and the meaning of the Constitution as involved in a legislative or executive act is by its own nature a judicial question, and comes within the legitimate province of the Judiciary, unless expressly excepted by the Constitution, as perhaps it is in cases of impeachment, when the judicial functions are by express constitutional provision transferred to the Senate. The Constitution says: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law or equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States," &c. Now in every one of these cases there may arise the question of the constitutionality of the law under which the case is brought, and the Judiciary has, as a matter of course, supreme jurisdiction of that question, as long as the Constitution remains what it is, and its

decision is final, and ends all litigation. So at least we understand the matter. Does the Senator mean to deny this, and to maintain that the question, though a *res adjudicata*, is still an open question, and that with regard to it the *civil* conscience remains free? If so, we would like to know by what right the judgment of the court can in any case be pleaded, or how any case can ever be settled, or a sentence of the court be regarded as the sentence of the law.

The act of Congress, if unconstitutional, is null and void, is no law at all. It is impossible, therefore, to decide whether it is law or not without deciding the question touching its constitutionality. If then the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction of this question, it can decide no case, and can perform no judicial act, that is to say, is no court at all, and if its decision is not conclusive on the constitutionality of the law, it cannot be on the matter in issue under it. The consequence would be, that there is, under our system, no supreme judicial power, no provision for terminating litigation, or coming to a final decision in any case whatever. There can be no final award, and no judgment that can be enforced; which would be simply tantamount to no government at all. If there is no authority to determine the law, there can be no judgment, and we are as if we had no law at all. If there be such authority, it must be binding, not only upon every private citizen, but also upon every public officer, and the true sense of the oath to support the Constitution is *to support it as authoritatively defined or declared by the supreme judiciary*, or as subject to the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States.

To take Mr. Sumner's ground, if that be really his ground, that each public officer is his own judge of the meaning of the Constitution, is to clothe each public officer with supreme judicial authority in his own case, which were a supreme absurdity. To compel a man to swear to support the Constitution as he sees proper, in the exercise of this supreme judicial authority to interpret it for himself, is nonsense, for such an oath binds him to nothing, and leaves him as free as before taking it. If the man interprets the oath for himself, and there is no authority but his own private judgment to declare its sense, how would you ever be able to convict a man of perjury? or how

would you ever be able to bring his oath home to his conscience? Moreover, if the Constitution may be interpreted by each individual for himself, it can be practically only the private judgment of each individual. It has no practical significance beyond that judgment. By what right then do you call it a constitution, or a fundamental law of the State?

Mr. Sumner in his defence appeals to the law of humanity as superior to the Constitution. Be it so. But that is to appeal from the civil constitution to the principles of natural justice. We allow the appeal, and we maintain that no oath does or can bind any one to do anything against natural justice, for such oath is unlawful, and the oath to support the Constitution is taken with the limitation, *in so far as not repugnant to natural justice, or the law of God, authoritatively declared by the proper tribunal*, for the individual has under the superior no more than under the inferior law supreme judicial functions in his own case. But in the case of the Fugitive Slave Law, this appeal will not avail him. Grant for the sake of the argument, that the master has in natural justice no title to the services of his slave, as against the slave himself, yet he has a good title as against the state, or the Union, under the Constitution which recognizes and guaranties it. The Constitution recognizes the title, and as against it the title is sacred in natural justice. The state may declare that to be property which is not and cannot be so in natural justice, but the state cannot take advantage, as we have said, of its own wrong, and therefore as against it the claim of the proprietor is as much a claim in natural justice as though the property itself had been property under the same natural justice. Grant that justice to the slave requires his liberation, justice to the proprietor requires that he shall not be liberated without indemnification. It is idle, then, to appeal to the law of natural justice against the master, for justice in his case is justice as much as in the case of the slave, and the superior law itself commands you either to deliver up to him his slave who has taken refuge with you, or, if your conscience or your humanity will not allow you to do that, to pay his ransom. The appeal to the law of conscience is good, but it cannot be made as an excuse for doing injustice, or withholding justice.

Does Mr. Sumner concede that the master has a title to

the services of the slave which he as a citizen of Massachusetts or as a Senator in Congress is bound to recognize and respect? If not, he denies the authority of the Constitution, and has no right to hold his seat in the Senate. If he does, he must concede that the master has the right in morals to claim his slave where he can find him, and that he cannot be deprived of him without injustice, save on the condition of full indemnification; for private property is sacred in natural justice. No reasonable man can deny that the title of the master under the Constitution is valid, and that Congress is bound to protect him in the enjoyment of it. Congress had then the right, and it was its duty, to pass the Fugitive Slave Law, and resistance to that law is a crime, and, if an organized, deliberate, determined, and persevering resistance, it is treason, whatever be the value of the master's title as against the slave.

This conclusion rests, it will be seen, on the principle that every title to property, whether originally vicious or not, recognized and guaranteed by the state, is good as between the holder and the state, and cannot be lawfully suppressed by the state without indemnification. The several States in acceding to the Constitution of the United States have recognized and guaranteed the title of the master to the services of his slave. If the slave absconds, it is not the duty of any one of the Free States, or of any citizen thereof, to hunt him out and restore him to his owner, for the guaranty extends only to delivering him up, that is, permitting him to be taken and carried back on the claim of the master. If the State refuses to do this, it is the right and the duty of Congress to compel it to do it or to pay the slave's ransom, because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. If a portion of the citizens oppose the master in the exercise of his right to recover his property, they disturb the peace, they do an illegal act, and either the State or the Union has the right to use force to suppress the opposition, and preserve the peace, and both are bound to do it. In the Fugitive Slave Law the Union takes this duty on itself, and leaves the State to aid or not, as it sees proper. Now under this law every citizen is liable to be called on to assist, not in restoring the slave, but in suppressing the opposition to the exercise by the master of his constitutional right to take his slave. The law does not require me to send back or to

aid in sending back the slave, but it does call upon me not to hinder, and may call upon me to aid in preventing lawless Abolitionists from hindering, his being taken back. If Mr. Sumner had paid attention to this, he would have spared the heroics with which his speeches so abound.

With regard to the memorial for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, we have not much to say. It was got up in a moment of excitement, and we have no doubt that most of those who signed it are before this heartily ashamed of having done so. The repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law could have only one meaning, that of practically expunging from the Constitution the clause which requires fugitive slaves to be delivered up, and to petition for it is simply to petition to be released from a duty imposed by the Constitution; for nobody is such a fool as to suppose that, without that or some other law equally offensive to the antislavery feeling of the Free States, a single absconding slave would ever be recovered. The simple question raised by the memorial, then, is, Will we stand by the Constitution as it is, or will we not? For ourselves, we raise no such question. We shall stand by the Constitution, and as far as depends on us keep our plighted faith, and when our conscience becomes so tender on the subject that we feel it necessary to interpose and prevent the master from recovering his property, we will do so only by purchasing the slave's freedom, or paying his ransom. This we find is the course that the Church has always pursued. It is the morality which we have learned from her, the morality of common sense.

We have nothing to say here of the question debated in the Senate as to the comparative strength or merits in past or present times of the different sections of the Union. We have no occasion to defend the North, and we shall not volunteer a defence of the South, unless we see that she needs it. We cannot conclude these remarks without expressing our gratification at finding the national administration finally taking a decided stand in defence of the Fugitive Slave Law. On this question, notwithstanding certain questionable manoeuvres in the beginning, we are happy to see that it stands firm, and is likely to secure the confidence of a large portion of the Union. Many of its appointments have been bad, many of the doctrines it has put forth are highly objectionable, but it will come out

much better than we at one time feared, and we shall be much disappointed if it does not prove to be the strongest and upon the whole the most popular administration the country has had since General Jackson's time. All our readers know that we are of no party, not neutral indeed, but independent. What we ask is an honest and intelligent administration of the government according to the Constitution. Beyond that, we care not whether it is administered by Whig or Democrat. But one thing is certain, a Democratic administration will generally be stronger than a Whig administration, and possess to a far greater extent the confidence of the American people, therefore is more able to repress evil and do good. We think we hazard little in saying, that the measures of the present administration which its opponents think they can use with killing effect against it will turn out to have contributed greatly to its strength. The Nebraska Bill will prove popular, and if it frees Central America from British *protection*, we can assure its party a long lease of power.

ART. IV. — *Works of FISHER AMES. With a Selection from his Speeches and Correspondence.* Edited by his Son, SETH AMES. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1854. 2 vols. 8vo.

FISHER AMES, sprung from one of the oldest families in Massachusetts, was born April 9, 1758, in the old parish of Dedham, a pleasant country town about nine miles south of Boston, and the shire town of Norfolk County. He died July 4, 1808, in the prime of life, but he had lived long enough to gain a distinguished rank among the patriots and statesmen of his native country. He was a man of fine natural ability, a good scholar, a fresh and vigorous writer, and a chaste and eloquent speaker. He was bred to the bar, at which he does not appear to have attained to much eminence. His tastes and his studies fitted him to be a statesman rather than a lawyer, and had his health been good, and had he lived to a good old age, we cannot doubt that he would have stood in the front rank, if not at the head, of the eminent men of his generation.

Fisher Ames was a Federalist, and strongly opposed, as were his party generally, to French Jacobinism, the Red-Republicanism of his day, and has shared the opprobrium cast upon his party by their successful rivals who came into power with Mr. Jefferson in 1801; but nobody can read these volumes edited by his son, without feeling that he was a true American in his feelings and convictions, a thoroughgoing republican, and ardently attached to liberty. He was a member of Congress from the organization of the government under the Federal Constitution, in 1789, to the close of Washington's second presidential term, in 1797. His increasing ill-health required him then to retire from public life, though his interest in public affairs continued as long as he lived. He retained to the last the confidence of his party, and the affection and admiration of his friends.

Mr. Ames was in Congress during the most important and the most critical period of our history, and we may almost say, in the history of the modern world, for it was the period of the old French Revolution. The eight years that Washington was at the head of the new government, and when nothing but his wisdom and prudence, his sober judgment, and his immense personal popularity could have carried it through the dangers and difficulties which beset it on either hand, from abroad and at home, have been but superficially studied by the politicians and pretended American statesmen of the present generation, and have seldom been studied at all save through the spectacles of party prejudice. During that period the government in all its departments had to be organized. What the French call Organic laws had to be passed, a practical application of the Constitution had to be made, a proper direction had to be given to the administration, an independent American policy had to be adopted and sustained, and the fruits of the war of Independence to be secured. All this could not be and was not done without opposition, and Washington in effecting it overcame more serious obstacles than he had encountered in conducting the war of Independence to its successful termination in the peace of 1783.

The supporters of Washington's administration were called Federalists, and they were so called because they supported the Federal Constitution, and a Federal government instead of a league or confederation of the States.

The party opposed to them, little numerous in 1789, were at first called Anti-Federalists; after 1798 they took the name of *Republicans*, which, since 1832, they have generally exchanged for that of *Democrats*. Whatever we may think or say of the Federalists of a later day, we must all concede that to them we owe the formation and adoption of the Constitution, the organization of the Federal government, and the adoption, in regard to European states, of an independent American policy. They, we may say, made the United States one people, and consolidated the national government. To them we owe it that we are one people under a popular, but strong and efficient, Federal government, instead of being an aggregation of hostile States, held together by a rope of sand, and tending constantly to separation, and to anarchy or despotism, as would have been the case if at that early period the views of the Anti-Federalists had prevailed. That the Union now exists, and the United States rank as one of the great powers of the earth, it is not too much to say, is owing to the fact, that during the first twelve years of the Federal government the administration was in the hands of the Federalists.

We know perfectly well that nothing can be more unpopular than this assertion. The Federalists were in power from 1789 to 1801, when Jefferson and his party triumphed over them, by what he called a revolution. Since then the Federalists have had to bear the odium of a defeated party. Their opponents before their defeat blackened them as much as possible in order to secure their defeat, and have blackened them as much as possible since in order to justify it. Ever since, the easiest and cheapest way to prove one's patriotism and to win popularity has been to declaim lustily against the Federalists, and it has been and is now more than any man's political reputation is worth, in the Union at large, to attempt to soften the judgment pronounced against them. Not a little of the indignation excited against ourselves, by our recent article on Native Americanism, is to be attributed to our supposed sympathy with old Federalism. The Federalists had in their day to fight the battles of Americanism against foreign influence, especially that of the French Jacobins and their American sympathizers, who proposed to overthrow the administration of the father of his country, and

even to revolutionize the government. They had a hard struggle to prevent the country from being virtually governed by Jacobinical France, and to maintain an independent American policy. They were opposed by all the partisans of the French Revolution, and owed their defeat in 1801 in no small degree to the hostility of foreign radicals; and from that day to this, the foreign-born population of the country have been among their bitterest opponents. We have scarcely ever known an adopted citizen that did not suppose the readiest way to prove his Americanism was to declaim in good set terms against old Federalism and the Federalists.

For ourselves personally, we were brought up in the Republican school, and were early imbued with as strong prejudices against the old Federal party as the sage of Monticello could have desired. Whatever party associations we have ever had, have been with the Republican or Democratic party. The Federal party was defunct years before we were old enough to cast a vote, and the Whig party of to-day is, as a party, farther removed from genuine Federalism than the Democratic party itself. We have never had the folly of wishing to resuscitate the Federal party, and perhaps, were it resuscitated and in power, we should be far enough from supporting it. But we plead guilty to a tendency to sympathize with defeated parties.

We cannot accept the doctrine that victory is always a sign of merit, and defeat of demerit. In this world, evil, left to the natural course of things, triumphs oftener than good, and we always find ourselves seeking what there was good in the party that has failed, rather than shouting pæans to the victor. When a party has triumphed, we lose our interest in it, and feel our heart open to the victim. This may be very undemocratic, unworldly, and very wrong, but it is a fact. Hence our sympathies are usually given to defeated parties and oppressed nationalities. When the revolution of 1848 had the upper hand in Europe, we opposed it, defended the sovereigns; but since the sovereigns have triumphed, and authority is vindicated, our sympathies pass to the camp, not indeed of the revolutionists, but of the people, who suffer many wrongs that it is the duty of power to redress. It is to the unpopular cause, to the forgotten or neglected truth, to those who need help, not to those who are abundantly able to help themselves,

that we feel instinctively drawn. It is, perhaps, a perverse tendency; it certainly is constantly getting us into scrapes with our own party and friends, and prevents us from ever being popular, or relied on as a leader or as a partisan. It was never in our nature to follow the multitude, and of course we are never disappointed when the multitude refuse to follow us.

The old Federalists were far enough from being immaculate, and were they now in power, we feel pretty certain that we should find them full of faults. As a party, they are dead, and we are far enough from wishing them to awake to life. They were defeated for ever in 1801, and the power has passed into the hands of their rivals. Jefferson and his party triumphed. That party continues, and, in a right or a collateral line, it will continue, to administer the government, for weal or for woe, most likely as long as the Republic stands. The Whigs may now and then attain to place, but they have not and are not likely to have the confidence of the people in a sufficient degree to enable them really to govern the country. We complain not of this. We complain not that the Federalists were defeated in 1801. We are not sure that the re-election of the elder Adams would have been for the best interests of the country. It is possible, and we think not improbable, that the Federalists were pushing their tendency to a strong government too far, and that, if they had succeeded in their efforts to retain power, they would have thrown too much power into the Federal government, and destroyed the nicely adjusted balance between it and the several State governments. All we mean to say is, that their defeat was not an unmixed good, and that the joy felt at the triumph of their opponents should be mingled with regrets; for if by that triumph some evil was prevented, some good was lost. The Federalists had errors from which the Republicans were free, but they had certain tendencies and principles which the Republicans want. We think, the danger, if danger there really was, having now passed away, it is time for the Republican party to do justice to the Federalists, and to profit by liberal loans from their principles and policy. Our motive for calling attention to them is not to displace the Democratic party, but to induce it to correct its own exclusive tendencies by the sound principles which they held. All parties are more or

less exclusive, and none of them embrace the truth under all its phases. Each has its dominant idea, true enough if you will, but incomplete and dangerous if taken alone, and pushed to its last consequences. The true and accomplished statesman is an eclectic, and above all parties, and never the slave of any, because all wise and wholesome civil government is founded on compromises, or in the nice adjustment of mutually opposing principles.

The great danger against which every real statesman has to be on his guard is that of leaving the practical for the theoretical or speculative. In teaching, we are always to aim at first principles, and to push our principles to their last consequences. Theoretical truth knows no just medium, no compromises, because all truth is homogeneous and one, and what is not truth is falsehood. Here we must seek logical unity and consistency. But in government, which is a practical affair, we have to distrust strict logical unity and consistency, because they invariably lead to despotism. Every simple government is despotic. Hence, your European republicans, who adopt the simple democratic idea, and seek to conform the whole political and social order to it, always establish, as far as they establish anything, not liberty, but social despotism, the most intolerable of all despotisms. The gravest error of Mr. Jefferson and his party was in their tendency to render the democratic idea exclusive. Mr. Jefferson was a great man, but he was a philosopher after the manner of the eighteenth century, and, though a brilliant theorist, was not a statesman in the higher sense of that word. A statesman is not merely one who knows the various theories of government, and is able to select one of them and give it a scientific exposition, but one who comprehends the genius of his countrymen, and knows how to adapt the government to them so as in its practical workings to secure the public good.

Mr. Jefferson, like the philosophers of his time, made no account of the genius of a people, but looked upon them as wax, which takes readily any impression that it is thought best to give it. He overrated the powers of government in the formation of national character, and believed it quite possible to form the American people to the ideal model framed by the infidel philosophers of France, and to change them from an English to a Continental people. He hated Great Britain, and adored infidel France, for France in his

day was regarded as infidel, and he wished to make us substantially Frenchmen, after the pattern of the revolutionists. In this he proved his want of statesmanship. We are no worshippers of the English social system, and, as distinguished from the political system, we think it far inferior to that of most Continental states. Great Britain is the richest country in the world, and she stands undeniably at the head of the modern industrial system, but in no Continental state can you find that social degradation and that squalid misery that appall you in her larger towns. But the statesman must take as his point of departure the social system he finds existing, whatever its merits compared with that of other states, for the life of every people is indissolubly connected with their social system. Destroy that, and you destroy them. You may develop, modify, improve it, but you must always preserve its essential character, and proceed according to its essential principles.

We do the memory of Jefferson no injustice when we say he overlooked this important fact. He was a materialist, and ignorant of Christian philosophy. He knew not that in nations, as in individuals, there is something substantial, persisting, and unchangeable, mightier than the mightiest despots, and against which the best-devised theories are sure to break. You cannot alter this essential genius of a people without destroying it. We were essentially an English people, living essentially an English life. We had grown up under and with the English social system. Whether the Federalists understood this in theory better than Mr. Jefferson and his friends, may be a question, but they certainly understood it better in practice. They adhered more closely to the English model, and wished, in their interpretation of our institutions and the administration of the government, to depart as little from the English type as possible. They were therefore, in our judgment, the truer statesmen. They sought not to change the social system or the genius of the American people, but to conform to it, and to make the best of it. They indulged no dreams of ideal perfection, imagined no Utopia, and were content to draw from fact and experience. They were as strongly republican or anti-monarchical as their opponents, even more so; but they were less democratic, they were more English and less French, more American and less foreign, more practical and less speculative, more disposed

to be satisfied with the existing order, and less disposed to try new experiments.

The American genius is republican as opposed to monarchy, but it is not democratic. Democracy as an exclusive element is in American society an exotic, imported originally from the philosophers and speculators of Continental Europe. The American people did not throw off their allegiance to the British crown because they wanted to establish a democracy, or because they wanted to get rid of monarchy, but they did it because they wanted national independence. With all the talk to-day about democracy, the American people at bottom remain as they were under Washington and Adams. Democracy is a speculation with them, not a life. At bottom, in their interior political life, they are, as we have so often contended, constitutionalists, and cling to *Magna Charta*. A struggle is no doubt going on in our country between the constitutional order, inherited from our British ancestors, and the democratic order, imported by the Anti-Federalists from France, and reinforced by the foreign radicals naturalized or resident amongst us, and on the result of this struggle depends the life of the American people. If the efforts made to conform our life to the foreign democratic theory succeed, the United States of Washington and Adams, the "Model Republic," is no more, whatever may take its place, whether anarchy or despotism.

Whether the democratic order be the best of all possible orders or not, this much is certain, it is not the American system, and whoever labors to introduce it, or to secure its triumph, labors to destroy the very life of the American people. As yet, democracy is with us only a theory, a false interpretation of our system. We are more American in our practice than in our doctrines, and act far better than we speculate. But how long this will continue to be the case it is not easy to say. The manifest discrepancy between our speculative theory and our interior habits, instincts, and inherited constitutionalism, is certainly fraught with danger, and if we do not before a great while conform our theory to our political and social system, we may be sure that, with the influence of unprincipled demagogues aided by the mass of foreign radicals pouring into our larger towns and cities, and who, as we have elsewhere shown, confound republicanism with democracy, we shall

conform our practice to our theory, and not so much change as utterly destroy American life.

Names have great influence. "It is very unfortunate," said one evening to us, in a long conversation on this subject, the great Southern statesman, Mr. Calhoun, "that the Republican party calls itself *democratic*." That party does and will rule the country, for, as a party, it is the most truly national party now in existence. The Federal party has long since ceased to exist; the Whig party numbers a great many excellent individuals in its ranks, who have correct views of government, but they do not determine the policy or the action of their party. As a party, it has no principles, no definite policy, and seeks success by courting almost any and every temporary or local excitement, which is undoubtedly a proof that it is weak, and feels itself weak. In former times it did good service to the country as a check on the excesses of the dominant party; but since 1838, when the *Boston Atlas* denounced the "Aristocratic Whigs," claimed the name of Democrat for the Whig party, and recommended its party to descend into the forum and to take the people by the hand, it has attempted to outbid the Democratic party, and has served only to push the country into a wilder and more excessive democracy. It may have some local and temporary successes, but, as we have said, when it attains to place, it possesses in too feeble a degree the confidence of the people to be able to govern. As a general rule, the government of the country will remain in the hands of the Democratic party. We do not complain of this, for it is not that party we are opposing in what we call democracy, as so many fools imagine, and so many knaves pretend. That party, though from the first inclining too much to the democracy of the European school, is not, properly speaking, democratic, and ought not to call itself by that name. The fact that it has so called itself does harm, for we cannot bring out and insist on American constitutionalism, in opposition to exclusive democracy, without seeming to many to be making war on that party itself, and not without being represented as doing it by a much larger number. If we warn the country against the dangers of democracy, a hue and cry is raised against us, as if we wished to displace the party in power, and put in some other party. Such, however, is by no means our wish. What we want is, not to turn out

the Democratic party, or to throw any obstacle in the way of its success, for, faulty as it is, we prefer it as a national party to any other organized party in the country ; but we do wish to impress upon that party itself certain wholesome lessons, lessons which it would readily accept if it had adhered to its old name of Republican, and had not suffered itself to consecrate by its new name certain un-American speculations. The safety of the country requires it to develop and render more prominent its conservative elements, and to restrain within more moderate limits its ultra-democratic or radical tendencies.

Unquestionably in a country like ours popular sentiment will in the long run have its way, but men who really love their country will take as much pains to form a wise and just popular sentiment as they will to ascertain and follow the popular sentiment for the time. The will of the people constitutionally expressed is law for us in all civil matters, but it does not follow from that that the will of the people is always just, or that popular sentiment is infallible. The statesman, if worthy of the name, has something more to do than to ascertain the wishes of his constituents and to conform to them. He is bound, indeed, to consult those wishes, but he is bound also to go back of them, and to ascertain whether they are wise and just ; for there is for every statesman a higher law than the popular will, that of right, of justice, of the public good. A truly national party should aim to form as well as to follow public opinion, and it should be prompt to call back public opinion to the Constitution, to the genius and essential nature of our political and social system, whenever it departs from them either on the right hand or the left.

We think, as we have often said, that public opinion misinterprets the American political and social system, and makes it far more democratic than it really is, and that the prevailing public opinion on the subject cannot be safely followed. It is that public opinion we wish to see corrected. To correct it is, no doubt, a difficult task, but not in our judgment impracticable, for we believe the great body of the American people are yet sound at the heart. We do not believe the old Federalists were free from errors, but we do believe that they had in their political creed the corrective of the errors of the present Democratic party. Hence we believe that the publication and study of the

writings they have left behind them will have a salutary effect on the public mind. A few by the study of these writings will no doubt adopt old Federalism as a whole, and utterly condemn their opponents, which in our judgment would be both unjust and foolish. Times have changed, and Federalism has passed away. But the larger class of readers, while they will not make themselves Federalists, will yet learn that the question involved has two sides, and that all the truth, the wisdom, or the patriotism was not on the side of Jefferson and his party, and they will take broader and juster views of our institutions themselves, and modify their previous doctrine by the addition or infusion of the political truths held by the old Federalists, which have been rejected or not sufficiently appreciated by their Republican opponents.

The merit of the Federalists was in their just appreciation of the un-American character of the Jacobinism favored by Mr. Jefferson and his party. They may have leaned too much to the English system, and failed to make sufficient account of the modifications which that system might and ought to undergo in being transplanted to this New World. They perhaps were unwilling to allow the democratic element of that system so prominent a place as it had already attained in the Anglo-American colonies, and it is probable that this is the reason why they failed to maintain themselves in power. In the American modification and development of the English system, the democratic element has and will have a prominent place. Under any just interpretation of our system the democratic element must be recognized, and the labor of the statesman must not be to exclude or suppress it, but to prevent it, as it is constantly striving to become, from becoming exclusive. Restricted to this, the old Federalists were right, and meritorious. Understood simply as maintaining that our system is not a pure democracy, that it is, on the contrary, a mixed system, in which none of the simple elements of government are excluded, or permitted to be exclusive, their writings are just the sort of thing now to be studied, and the study of them will go far to check the tendency to render the democratic element exclusive, and to bring back the thought of the country to the genius of its institutions. To this end will contribute the publication of the papers of Hamilton, the *Life and Correspondence of Gouverneur*

Morris, and the Life and Works of the Elder Adams, edited by his Grandson, Charles Francis Adams. These works bring up the other phase of American politics, and compel us to re-examine our system from the other point of view.

Among the recent publications of this class, there is none from which we augur more practical utility than the volumes before us, which are not a simple republication of the volume published in 1809, with an exquisitely written Life of Fisher Ames by the late Dr. Kirkland. The edition contains one volume of entirely new matter, never before published, consisting chiefly of the correspondence of the author during the period he held a seat in Congress. There may have been greater men in the Federal party than Fisher Ames, but there were none purer, honester, or more sagacious. We have read no American writer who had a clearer or more just appreciation of the nature and elements of government. He foresaw and distinctly pointed out the dangers of Jacobinism, both at home and abroad. We can almost read in his pages the political history of our country for the whole period since his death. His writings seem to us specially adapted to our times, and the patriotic warnings with which they are filled are as applicable now as they were when written. In fact, the struggle between Americanism and Jacobinism had commenced in his time, and still continues with unabated fury.

We regret that our limits do not permit us to enrich our pages with some extracts from these most interesting volumes. We can only say, that they are full of just thought, of deep reflection, of sagacious remark, and of patriotic warning, clearly, freshly, and vigorously expressed, in a style of rare purity and elegance. We must add, that they are sent out by the publishers in a casket not unworthy of the gems they contain. They are printed in a style of chaste beauty and elegance that we have never seen equalled by any productions of the American press. We are happy also to learn from the publishers that the work meets a ready sale. This is encouraging, and indicates that, whatever the external appearances, the American people are still politically sound at the heart, and that it is yet too soon to despair of the republic. We hope much from the younger educated men growing up in all parts of the country, while we trust they will avoid the rock on which the old Federalists split. We hope they will grow up wedded to gen-

uine Americanism, ready to sacrifice themselves to defend it against all attacks, whether made from the side of democracy, from that of monarchy, or that of aristocracy. The destiny of our country is bound up with constitutional republicanism, in which the will of the people constitutionally expressed is law, and is endangered alike by efforts to convert it into a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a pure democracy.

ART. V. — *Neue Gespräche aus der Gegenwart über Staat und Kirche*. Zweite Auflage. Erfurt und Leipzig. 1851. 16mo. pp. 495.

THAT the name of Radowitz is not so well known here as the names of Donoso Cortés and Montalembert is an injustice to him which we must attribute to the great ignorance we have of Germany, of its statesmen and authors, except in their external relations with other countries of Europe. Of its internal affairs, little reaches us in comparison with the long and minute details which we receive from many of the Continental nations.

General Von Radowitz held nearly the same rank among the Catholic statesmen of his fatherland as the Marquis de Valdegamas held in Spain, or the Count de Montalembert holds in France. As an author, he has left us in the work before us a most valuable acquisition to our Catholic and political literature, which we regret to think must remain a sealed book to many of our countrymen, because it is not written in our own tongue.

Radowitz was a Prussian. He commanded the armies of his country for a long time, and when his services were no longer needed in active defence of his sovereign, was appointed by him to the honorable post of forming a new generation of soldiers. This was his employment at the time of his death, which occurred on the morning of last Christmas.

The work, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article, is the second series of dialogues which he wrote on the relations of Church and State. He here treats

all the principal questions of the day from a truly Catholic point of view, such as is seldom to be met with in any other writer. The work is divided into conversations, in which the true doctrine is explained, objections raised, and answered, in such a manner as to amuse and interest while instructing the reader.

The subject of the first conversation is the unity of Germany and the obstacles which prevented its realization in the Frankfort Diet. Our readers may perhaps remember some remarks on this subject in our Review for July, 1848. We then expressed great hope for the reconstruction of the German Empire destroyed by Napoleon in 1806, or the reconstitution, on an improved plan, of all Germany into one grand federative state. This was the desire of a large number of the members of that assembly. Our author's views almost entirely coincide with our own. He frequently in these dialogues expresses his regret at the failure of the grand attempt. One of the principal causes which he gives of its want of success is the rivalry between Prussia and Austria, and the apprehensions entertained by Protestants that the central power might be held by a Catholic, and those of Catholics that it might be held by a Protestant. If the German Empire had been restored, either Hapsburg or Hohenzollern must have given it a chief. No Catholic, unless at the same time a Prussian, could be willing to see all Germany under a Prussian Protestant emperor, and here is the only fault we find with the author of the *Neue Gespräche*. He seems rather to have regarded the private interest of Prussia, than the common weal of all Germany, or even of Catholicity. This would have given to Protestantism the preponderating influence in Germany, and have been a severe blow to the Catholic interests of the country; and on this ground we were not sorry to see the attempt fail in favor of Prussia, after it had proved unsuccessful in favor of Austria.

Many of the smaller states of Germany, according to Radowitz, were opposed to the union, because they imagined they would cease to be Hessians, Saxons, or Bavarians, and become Prussians or Austrians. Such an apprehension was unfounded. For Bavaria, Saxony, or any other state of Germany, was as distinctly Saxon, Bavarian, &c. under the old empire as it is now, and would remain so under a reconstitution of that empire. Nor was there

any more reason for the complaint which he makes in the name of Prussia, that, from one of the great powers of Europe, it would become a mere province of the Empire, and sink to the same level as all the rest, from Bavaria to Lichtenstein. There would have been no danger of this had a federal constitution been adopted, though it would have been the consequence of the introduction of a centralized government. Such a government, however, was neither possible nor desirable. A centralized government, properly so called, is only despotism, whether it be monarchical or democratic. Radowitz was as much opposed to this as we could wish, and the Germans would not have accepted it. Absolutists as well as democrats, he says, are in a very small minority in Germany, and the Germans would reject absolutism or democracy, whether open or disguised. Germany must have a constitutional or federal government. Had the German representatives at Frankfort opened their eyes to their true interests, they would have established a federative government or empire, dividing the powers of government between the federal empire and the several particular states, guarantying through the empire to the people of the several states certain rights or privileges in the face of the local governments. Such a government, if adopted and perfected in detail, would, we think, be the most perfect, after our own, that is now possible. While securing the freedom of the subject on the one hand, it would maintain order and efficiency on the other, and shelter the nation alike from anarchy and despotism. At the time of the Frankfort Diet, this seemed practicable and on the point of being realized, and while we regret its want of success, we see little ground to hope for a future occasion of its realization.

In another of the dialogues, the author discusses the question of government. His views please us, and are substantially our own. They are, that "it is the duty of the state to procure for the individual what, in his individual capacity, he cannot obtain for himself. The individual demands of the state the protection of his rights, and the increase of his happiness. These two claims mark, in a certain manner, the negative and positive sides of political society, and are expressed in the conceptions of freedom and order. There is freedom in a state when every individual may, without let or hindrance, use his natural and

acquired rights so long as they do not conflict with the rights of another. To enable him to do this, order must give citizenship, and also those means which each one requires to advance his happiness. In a well-organized state these two conditions are secured. Freedom requires that the government of the state be founded on the idea of right; and order consists in a real authority which unites power with justice. This conceded, I build my state. First comes the individual, then the family, then the parish or commune, then the district, and lastly the state. The rights and happiness of each degree are distinct from the others. When the means of protecting their rights and of advancing their prosperity cease, the obligation and authority of the next higher order begin. This authority begins no sooner, and goes no farther, than necessity demands. The highest degree, that is, the state, and because it is the highest degree, possesses a coercive right in case of necessity, to which all private rights must yield. But this is lawful only when there is actual danger of some sort to be averted, and not in favor of intended gain; and it extends no further than the impending danger. The community of members in each degree should manage their own affairs freely and unimpeded by others; hence the organic representation of their particular interests is formed in an ascending series. It specially belongs to the highest, which is the representation of the members of the collective State, to decide on the exercise and extent of the coercive right. There should also be a magistracy in each degree, an authority, with the duty and power to maintain right and order in the face of the masses, whose duty it is to obey.

“Freedom and order are possible under any form of government, or not at all. The dependent monarchies of the Middle Ages gave the greatest possible freedom to the individual, but did not always preserve great order; whilst, on the other hand, the government of Frederic William the First of Prussia did all that was possible for order, but not much for freedom. The English representative monarchy unites both in a great degree, because it has engrafted the order of modern upon the freedom of former times. More than one of the small democracies of Switzerland maintained great freedom with equal order. It is also true that the reverse of this has happened under all these

political forms. In republics and representative states, whenever a party obtains rule, it seizes for itself the freedom which belongs to all."

Such is the idea of government expressed in the *Neue Gespräche*. The author is a constitutionalist, and favors constitutional monarchy as the best government for Germany. He is never a democrat, in the proper sense of the word, nor an absolutist. He regards the simple forms of government as despotisms, whether monarchy, or aristocracy, or democracy. For in all simple forms of government, the will of the governor is law, and he is both judge and executor of the law which he makes. This is equally true whether the state is ruled by a prince, or by the nobles, or by the mob. In the first case there is but one tyrant, in the others there are many tyrants. There is no security for freedom and order in a state governed by the free will of the sovereign, and hence the civilized nations of Europe have rejected them. There is no government in Europe, says Radowitz, in which the sovereign rules according to his will, unrestrained by law. There are very few absolutists in Germany, and democrats are in so small a minority that they do not threaten any great danger to the state. Constitutional monarchy is the law of the land, and cannot be expelled even were there any so wanting in prudence or love of their country as to attempt it. The recent events of Europe have opened the eyes of many, and though there are many evils which weigh on the people, they are wise enough to see that the way to redress these evils is not by plunging into greater. There were indeed radicals and demagogues in Germany, as there are everywhere, who tried to flatter the people into believing that the democratic form of government was the only one compatible with perfect liberty; but the Germans rose not at their cry, or, if they did, they soon relapsed into their wonted order.

But though our author maintains that constitutional monarchy is the best and legitimate form of government for Germany, he does not place any one form, in the abstract, above another. Though freedom and liberty on the one hand, and order on the other, the great ends for which all government exists, are possible under every form of government, they are the necessary consequences of no particular political form. We have seen life and proper-

ty sacrificed to the caprice of the rulers during the short-lived and bloody republics of France and Rome, as well as under the most despotic and absolute tyrant, and there is no instance of greater order, in union with equal liberty, than in our own and many of the Swiss republics. No one form of government is the best for all nations. The wants, customs, dispositions, and habits of the people must be consulted. A nation that has for a long time been ruled by a king and nobility cannot easily be converted into a republic. The poor peasants and tenantry will either retain their awe and respect for their former masters, or else, launching into the worse and more natural extreme, as has been the case in the European attempts to frame republics, will plunge the nation into the worst horrors of anarchy. The institutions of the country should grow up with the nation. They cannot be permanent unless they have taken root in the affections and are associated with the traditions and memories of the people.

The purpose of changing the existing form of government can never justify a rebellion. Every independent people possesses the right of self-government, the right to determine its own political constitution, but it is bound to obey the existing authority in the legal discharge of its legal functions, whatever may be the constitution of that authority. Whether the prince or the people, in their collective capacity, be sovereign, the obligation to obey the laws is equally strict. All authority is from on high, and though the people are the ordinary means or channel through which that authority attaches to the rulers, it ceases to be in the people from the moment the government is established, and they are the lawful subjects of the government so established.

In a constitutional government like that of England or this country, the sovereign authority is vested in the constitution, not in the Queen of Great Britain, nor the collective mass of the citizens of the United States. If it were otherwise, what need would there be of the constitution? If the people of this country irrespective of the constitution are sovereign, what mean the terms constitutional and unconstitutional?

After our country threw off allegiance to Great Britain, it was, in some measure, without government. A convention met and formed a constitution. As soon as that

constitution was framed and adopted, the sovereign authority attached to it, and the people were bound from that instant to obey it. It is a great and common error to suppose a sovereign authority persistent in the people, coexistent with that vested in the constitution. Authority is not an attribute of the people even in their collective capacity. They do not give authority to the government as efficient, but as instrumental cause. The right to govern is from God, and belongs, as a right, neither to one man, nor to a number of men. But where no legitimate form of government exists, it belongs to the people to select and constitute a form, and the rulers are not the servants of the people, but the officers or embodiment of the law. And so long as these rulers legally established do not exceed the legal exercise of the powers conceded them by the constitution, the people are subject to them. All exercise of sovereign authority in the people contrary to their constitution and laws, is a usurpation; for the authority being vested in the laws and constitution, the people have no longer any authority as people, and if they have any authority at all, it is only because the constitution concedes them that authority in electing its officers and such an authority is not the authority of the people, but the authority of the law and constitution, of which they, under the constitution, are the exponents.

After our author has established and explained his conception of government, and its application to the present state of Germany, he proceeds to consider the relation between it and the Church. He defends manfully the freedom of the Church, and independence of, but not separation from, the state. We give his views on this point in his own words. Themar and Büchner are conversing. The latter, a Protestant, says he would join in Themar's petition for the freedom of the Church, if he would only be satisfied with the freedom of religion. Themar replies : —

“Precisely what you call freedom of religion is the irresistible ground on which we must demand the freedom of the Church. The state has laid aside the character of Christian, and thereby acquired an omnipotence which it had not before. The laws of election give every one the right to coöperate in the framing of the laws, whether he belongs to the Christian religion or to none; whether he is a Jew or a free-thinker; a disciple of Ronge, or a ‘Nothingarian’; whether baptized in the name of the Holy Trin-

ity, or in the virtue of the father and grace of the mother. He has the entrance to every office in the state, and we shall soon see, not merely, as formerly, Protestants ruling the religious affairs of Catholic communities, and Catholics charged with the interests of Protestants, but even non-Christians governing both. Only a free Church can withstand the all-extensive and all-ruling preventive system of a non-Christian state.

"*Büchner*. Let me first of all ask you, what you intend to steal under the name of the freedom of the Church.

"*Themar*. To steal? Nothing at all. Do you call it stealing if one entertains the modest wish to have the debt paid of which he has the note in his pocket? We ask nothing more than what all new constitutional charters have determined, after the precedent of the sacred right of property, what the present constitutions of Austria and Prussia have distinctly promised as a right; namely, the independent ordering and management of our own affairs.

"*Büchner*. Show me, I pray, wherein precisely consists this ordering and management, and do not merely repeat the ambiguous passages of the constitutional charter.

"*Themar*. Most willingly. Every church must understand it to mean, the determining and announcing of their doctrine of faith, the ordering of their worship, the administration of their church revenues, the maintenance of their constitution, the intercourse of individuals as of communities with their superiors, the relations between the clergy and the parishes, the education and appointment of their pastors, the regulation and direction of their particular religious societies, and the management and expending of the church property. These are the affairs which the Church should be allowed to order and manage with independence. She must be permitted to prescribe the principles and precepts for this management, and to see to their performance, without interference on the part of any foreign power. This is the freedom of every individual and of every corporation, and it is also the freedom of the Church.

"*Büchner*. I should do wrong not to tell you what I think of such a demand. I have seen how it arose from the movement of 1848. But it cannot be accomplished. Though it may be unguardedly extorted from the government in a moment of excitement, it will never be really performed. As man is one, so is the state. The state is the people, the will, the conscience of the people. There can be only one power in it. This one constraining power is citizenship, which no foreign power can share, and this would be the case were your demand satisfied. What you call freedom of the Church would prove only a priest-rule.

"*Themar*. Priest-rule! Not for the first time do I now hear that term. It has never made any great impression on me, at least, as an argument of any weight against me. If you under-

stand by it an intended interference of the spiritual order in the circle of political and civil life, I wholly reject the suspicion. No one who longs for the freedom of the Church has any such intention. We give to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, but we will not be hindered from giving to God what belongs to God. But if by priest-rule you mean the government of the Church in spiritual things that is nothing more nor less than the right as well as the duty of the spiritual order. Your concern about arbitrariness is quite unfounded. I can assure you that no modern state has a constitution more firmly opposed to arbitrariness than the Catholic Church. Its members need no defence of the state against its spiritual government. Your plain expression, however, gives me a valuable insight into what the Church has to expect from certain quarters. You will not succeed. Truth and justice will force themselves a way. What the age is authorized to demand, must and will be granted.

"*Büchner*. What the age demands! Dear Rector, you use a dangerous argument. It is the age which demands, not the freedom of the Church in your sense, but the freedom of faith and of conscience. The Church must cease to be an institution of force, must give up its power over the conscience. First emancipate men from the Church, and the religious society which follows may be independent. But understand me well. I say, independent in the state, not independent of the state. But until you do this, every attempt will lead no farther than to deliver up the individuals and parishes to their priests, and these again to the higher clergy. The bishops can no longer be mere servants of the Pope, nor the parish priests the servants of the bishops, but constitutional superiors in free communities. Then is the Church free in the true sense of the word. So would the spirit of the age, to which you appeal, also demand it.

"*Themar*. You have carried the controversy into the province of matters on which I can allow you no authorized voice. I spoke of the relations of the Church in general, and you make it a question of creeds, and place it on the principle of majority. It is not now my intention to point out to you the inconsistency of this view in your application of it to the Catholic Church. But the party basis of your reasoning is erroneous throughout. You do not know the Catholic people, but judge them by a few clamorers in the Chambers and the press, by a few corrupted priests, who seek such an outlet for their base desires, and by the echo of the same tone in which those join who have always hailed every falling off from the body of Christ. The sad termination of Ronge's sect should have opened your eyes to the true state of things. You have given what was the aim of the so-called German Catholic movement, but the Catholic Germans have rejected this sort of emancipation with contempt." — *Neue Gespräche*, pp. 94 – 101.

In the course of the same dialogue, Büchner uses the expression, "separation of the Church from the State," upon which Themar remarks :—

"Not separation, for we seek not that, but independence. Neither is their relation a lifeless juxtaposition. The Church is in the State, inasmuch as it is composed of men ; its chiefs and members are also subjects of the State, with the same burdens and the same obligations as all others. The State is in the Church, in so far as it is composed of Christians ; the prince, ministers, and subjects are members of the Church, if they wish. We may compare it to any individual man. In every man there is a body and a soul ; both belong together, and to a certain point are independent of one another. The example, however, I admit, is not very select.

"*Büchner.* Show me some examples of this relation between the Church and the State.

"*Themar.* Such are not wanting. I may say, as it legally is in France, practically in England, and both legally and practically in Belgium.

"*Büchner.* Why not rather as it is in the United States of America? There the independence reaches the complete isolation of both parties.

"*Themar.* Because there is real separation, there is no relation, as we could desire for the interest of both parties. Church and religion there are only private affairs ; as such, they neither are subject to any control, nor enjoy any protection. This was the state of the Church before Constantine. . . .

"*Büchner.* . . . But without the persecution.

"*Themar.* Without the persecution and without the recognition. Neither the collective body of the Church, nor the particular communities, have any right of corporation ; they cannot be legal persons. The State knows nothing of any church property. All expenses must be afforded by voluntary contributions. . . . In Belgium the Church is not opposed as a political power to the State ; it holds fast to this point of view, that the spiritual power is only for the protection of the spiritual interests of the people, but as far as concerns these interests it cannot be restrained by the State. There the State interferes in the appointment neither of the priests nor of the higher officers of the Church. Their revenues are secured by the State-budget, wherever the income of the local church does not suffice for the necessary expenses. The Church exercises unrestrained freedom of the press, of doctrine, and of association, like any other physical or moral person in the State, and herein consists its power.

"*Büchner.* There is nothing to object to that. The power of the clergy in Belgium depends then solely on the favor of public

opinion. If the authorities of the Church come into opposition with it, they lose their power. But do you sincerely hold such a position of the Church in regard to the State possible also in Protestantism? It seems to me to be putting equal weights on a lever of unequal arms. Protestantism has not the same weapons as the Catholic Church, and must not this lead to its dissolution as a church? I do not suppose Catholics would put on mourning for such an event, but one can hardly expect us to commit suicide.

"*Themar*. I do not wish to conceal from you that, when I ask for the freedom of the Church, I have my own Church principally in view. If, however, the demand is just, it cannot and should not be withheld from Catholics because it does not also suit other creeds. But I cannot so soon consider a correspondent organization of the Protestant national Church as impossible. Why may not the prince, through a spiritual supreme court, govern the Protestant Church, which should be responsible only to him, and not to the State, excluding the ministers and the Chambers from all authority? There would then be two independent organizations in every country, the one political, the other ecclesiastical: that both acknowledge their chief in the prince, would not destroy their independence of one another.

"*Büchner*. This would be to establish a particular Pope in every German country. Protestantism, as well as the constitutional state, must oppose such a scheme. The Catholic Church once emancipated from the State, and placed as an independent power beside it, would in reality, as well as in appearance, take place of the Protestant religious society. The latter would then lose all right of community, and its consequent church constitution. Let us have no royal Papacy." — pp. 108–113.

We might easily select a large number of passages worthy to be extracted. The work is all equally good. We can find on every page much that we like, and it is so seldom that we find a work which we can heartily commend, that we are the more pleased with these dialogues. The profound statesmanship of our author, united with his thorough Catholicity, commands our praise, and whoever would translate this work into English would confer a great benefit on the Catholic community. We hope some one may be induced to undertake it.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Loss and Gain ; or the Story of a Convert.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. Boston : Donahoe. 1854. 12mo. pp. 252.

WE much regret that *Loss and Gain* did not sooner fall under our notice. Had we read it in 1848, when it was first published in England,—and we should have done so, had a copy of it been within our reach,—many things in our articles relating to the Theory of Development and the views of the Oxford converts, which must have given pain to the illustrious author and his friends, would never have been written, for we find on reading it that Dr. Newman insists with great emphasis on certain points which we had been led to believe he and they either denied or overlooked. We should have opposed no less strenuously than we did the theory of development itself, but we should not have given it so important a place in their system of doctrine, nor made it the key to the real sense of their writings. The view we gave, especially in our review of *Jesus the Son of Mary*, by the Rev. J. B. Morris, of their general order and habits of thinking, we are now satisfied, was not just to those eminent men, who had left all to follow Christ. We gave to certain expressions in those of their writings which fell under notice a systematic sense, which *Loss and Gain* has satisfied us they did not themselves give them. We cannot find that we erred in doctrine or censured what is not really censurable, nor can we blame ourselves very severely for supposing that we were to interpret their writings generally by their theory of development ; but we are satisfied now that the theory was not fundamental with them, and that aside from it their thought was Catholic, and should have been interpreted from the point of view of Catholic principles.

Were we writing our review of Mr. Morris now, we should omit all the strictures it contains, except those on the theory of development, and certain objectionable passages in the book itself. All beyond was uncalled for. The danger we feared, of the introduction of a new school, which might perhaps with other individuals become a sect, if it ever existed, has now passed away, and reserving all our views as heretofore expressed of the development theory itself, we wish to express our full and entire confidence in the whole class of converts, against whom we have maintained an attitude of reserve, if not of opposition, but whom personally we have always loved and honored, and never doubted. This much we have felt it due, in justice to ourselves, as well as to Dr. Newman and his friends, to say, that the state of our feelings towards them may not be misapprehended, or referred to for the pur-

pose of exciting prejudice either against them or against us. We have no longer any controversy with them; the cloud that was between us has passed away, and we hold ourselves among the warmest and most devoted of their friends.

We have taken up so much space with these remarks, that we have hardly room to say anything of the book before us. We have read it with deep interest and great satisfaction. It is a work of rare literary merit, and presents its illustrious author in a phase of character in which we had not before seen him. After reading this book we can better understand the remarkable influence he exerted before his conversion. We formed our estimate of the intellectual power of the author mainly from his *Essay on Development*, and rated it altogether too low. We can now, what we were never able to do before, accept the rank usually awarded him. His powers are far more varied than we had supposed, and he is endowed with a genius of a far higher order than we had given him credit for. The book is a masterpiece as a work of art. It is a genuine work, deep, earnest, free from all cant, from all sham, or artifice, and says just what should be said, and no more, and says it in the proper place and the most fitting words. It is a work which lets us into the secret of the Oxford movement, and explains to us many things which were hitherto unintelligible to us. We can, after reading it, understand, as we could not before, the state of mind of the Puseyites, and the position in regard to them of the converts. We came to the Church by a different road, from a different quarter, and had an entirely different experience, and we can now see where, in many respects, we have done these converts injustice in our own mind, for which we heartily beg their pardon, for it was not intentional.

Loss and Gain professes to point out only one of the many processes by which individuals are brought into the Catholic Church, and is addressed more immediately to those with whom the author was associated prior to his conversion; but it may be read with nearly equal profit by all classes of Protestants. The author shows that his studies have extended to all classes of non-Catholics, and that he understands the spirit and tendencies of the age as well as those of Church-of-Englandism. We thank Mr. Donahoe for his very neat edition of this beautiful and most interesting work, which we can and do commend to the public most earnestly and unreservedly. It is a work which should be studied by all who would contribute something to our growing English Catholic literature, for it commends itself alike to good taste, sound judgment, and Catholic sentiment. We are most happy that such a man as its author is the Rector of the new Irish University.

2. *The Lives of the Fathers, Martyrs, and other principal Saints, compiled from Original Monuments and other Authentic Records. Illustrated with the Remarks of judicious Modern Critics and Historians.* By the Rev. ALBAN BUTLER. Baltimore: Murphy. 1854. 4 vols. 8vo.

THIS is a reprint of the Metropolitan Press edition, issued ten years ago, and comes to us in a neat and tasteful form. It is a work too well known to require any praise. We need not say that we wish it success.

3. *The Science of the Saints in Practice.* By the Very Rev. Father J. P. PAGANI. London: Dolman. 1853. 2 vols. 16mo.

IN this book the author has collected gems from the lives of all the saints, and arranged them in lessons or chapters to be read daily throughout the year. He has so united them with extracts from the writings and sayings of holy men, and with remarks of his own, as to form one of the most valuable books of piety that we have ever met with. The work is in *good* English, and proves, what we had almost doubted, that it is possible to find an ascetic work in our language written in good taste. Pagani is known to many as the author of the *Anima Divota*, an excellent manual of prayer.

4. *The British Poets.* — 1. *The Poetical Works of* THOMAS CAMPBELL. 1 vol. — 2. *The Poetical Works of* WILLIAM COLLINS. 1 vol. — 3. *The Poetical Works of* MATTHEW PRIOR. 2 vols. — 4. *The Poetical Works of the* EARL OF SURREY. 1 vol. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1853-54. 16mo.

To review the *British Poets* were useless, as the public judgment has not to be formed of them. We can only announce them as they successively appear. We have already spoken in terms of high commendation of this elegant edition, and the more we examine it, the better are we pleased with it. The editor is doing his duty well, and the life of each poet which is given deserves high commendation. Among the poets whose works are here mentioned we call the particular attention of our readers to Surrey, who was a genuine poet, and whose poems make us almost regret the changes our language has undergone since the age of the Reformation. It may have gained in melody and sweetness, but it has lost in simplicity, terseness, and energy.

5. *A History of England, from the first Invasion by the Romans, to the Accession of William and Mary, in 1688.* By JOHN LINGARD, D.D. A new Edition, as enlarged by the Author shortly before his Death. In Thirteen Volumes. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1854. 12mo. Vols. V., VI., and VII.

WE have already given our opinion of this work in noticing the previous volumes. Although not a perfect History of England in all respects, it is nevertheless the best we possess, and we wish the publishers success.

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6. *The Shipwreck; or, The Desert Island.* New York: E. Duni-
gan & Brother. 1854.

A VERY pretty story and well told, inculcating a good moral lesson which we should all do well to practise.

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7. *The New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Translated from the Latin Vulgate; and diligently compared with the Original Greek. Newly revised and corrected, with Annotations, explanatory of the most difficult Passages.* Illuminated after original Drawings, by W. H. HEWETT, Esq. New York: Hewett & Spooner. 1850. 8vo. pp. 296.

WE cannot say much in the praise of this illuminated Testament. The letter-press and paper are passable, and the correctness of the text is assured by the approbation of many of the Bishops of the United States. The engravings are generally after good designs, but badly executed, and sometimes very badly. We think illustrated editions of the New Testament had better not be attempted, unless they can be better executed.

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8. *A Short, Complete, and Easy Mass; including a Veni Creator Spiritus, for Three Voices, with an Accompaniment for the Organ.* Composed, and most respectfully dedicated to the Rev. John McCloskey, by DR. HENRY DIELMAN, Mount St. Mary's College. Baltimore: Murphy & Willis.

SINCE we received this Mass we have had no opportunity of hearing it played and sung as it should be; but as far as we can judge from looking over it, we think it adds to the already high musical reputation of Dr. Dielman.

9. MESSRS. DUNIGAN AND BROTHER have sent us *The Canary Bird*; *The Daisy*; *The Carrier Pigeon*; and *The Water Pitcher*; by Canon von Schmidt. We have heretofore noticed these little tales and commended them, and are glad to see them republished. The same publishers, we are happy to see, continue their splendid edition of *Haydock's Bible*, which draws near its conclusion.

10. *Philosophie :—De la Connaissance de Dieu.* Par A. GRATY, Prêtre de l'Oratoire de l'Immaculée Conception. Paris : Douziol. 1853. 8vo. 2 vols.

WE are indebted to the learned and philosophical author for a copy of this remarkable work. It is without question one of the profoundest and most learned philosophical works that has appeared in France for many a day. We have, however, had only time since we received it to glance through its pages, and to be judged, it needs to be studied. We have not yet mastered it, and must reserve our judgment of it till we have studied it, perhaps till we receive the author's *Logic*, which we have not yet seen; but we have no hesitation in saying, that whoever would grapple with the profoundest problems of metaphysics must make himself familiar with its contents.

11. *Tales of the Five Senses.* By GERALD GRIFFIN, Author of "The Collegians," "Tales of the Jury-Room," "The Rivals," "Tales of the Munster Festivals," &c. New York : W. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1854.

GERALD GRIFFIN ranks deservedly high among the many celebrated writers of fiction which Ireland has produced, and were we to assign his position among them, we should place it still higher. *The Tales of the Five Senses* are well written, and have a high and good aim.

12. *Tubber Derg ; or, The Red Well ; and other Tales of Irish Life.* By WILLIAM CARLETON, Author of "Valentine M'Clutchy," "Poor Scholar," "Art. Maguire," etc., etc. New York : D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1854.

THIS volume contains several interesting tales of the Irish peasantry, in the delineation of whom Carleton particularly excels, although he pleases us far less than Gerald Griffin.

13. *Phædo ; or, The Immortality of the Soul.* By PLATO. Translated from the Greek by CHARLES D. STANFORD. A new Edition, enriched with Archbishop Fénelon's "Life of Plato"; the Opinions of Ancient, Mediæval, and Modern Philosophers and Divines on the Soul's Immortality; together with Notes Historical, Biographical, and Mythological. To which is added a Catalogue of all the Works known to have been written on a Future State. New York : William Gowan. 1854. 12mo.

THE idea of this work, as it existed in the author's mind previous to its realization in the external and corporeal world, was good; but the "divine Plato" tells us that created things always fall below their prototypes or the ideas after which they are formed. This work proves no exception to the doctrine of Plato.

14. *Bertha ; or, The Pope and the Emperor. An Historical Tale.* By WILLIAM BERNARD MACCABE. Second Edition. Dublin : Duffy. 1853.

THIS is an historical romance, designed to vindicate the character of St. Gregory the Seventh by portraying the real character of Henry the Fourth of Germany. It is a specimen, and a favorable specimen, of the class of works we wish to see multiplied among us. It is interesting and really meritorious as a romance, and it is highly instructive as a work illustrating a much misrepresented period of history. We most cordially and earnestly commend it to our readers, and we are most happy to learn that an American edition of it may soon be expected from a Catholic publisher in this city. Its author is one of the first and most meritorious literary men in Ireland, a vigorous writer, and a Catholic after our own heart.

15. *Christmas Nights' Entertainments ; or, The Pastor's Visit to the Science of Salvation.* Translated from the Spanish of DON JOHN DE PALAFOX, Bishop of Osma. Baltimore : Hedian & O'Brien.

THIS little book is from the pen of the "divine" John of Palafox and Mendoza, who was perhaps the most renowned ecclesiastic of his age in Spain. It is well translated, though the translator has not seen fit to give his name. The work is full of unction, is instructive, and most interesting.

16. *A Catechism of Scripture History, compiled by the Sisters of Mercy, for the Use of the Children attending their Schools.* Revised by M. J. KERNY, Author of a "Compendium of Ancient and Modern History," "Catechism of the History of the United States," "Columbian Arithmetic," &c., &c. First American from the last London Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 18mo.

THIS is a very good work of its kind, and well adapted, we presume, to its purpose.

17. *The Spirit-Rapper; an Autobiography.* By O. A. BROWN-SON, Author of "Charles Elwood." Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. London: Charles Dolman. 1854. 12mo. pp. 402.

IN this work, through which runs a slight veil of fiction, the author has attempted to tell his readers what he supposes they ought to think on the new superstition, or rather the recent manifestation of an old superstition, which has latterly made so much noise, and turned so many heads, as well as tables. He perhaps will not please entirely any party, for he concedes for the most part the phenomena, but assigns them a Satanic origin. This, of course, is not the place to speak of the merits or demerits of the work. We may well be supposed to think very well of it, and are willing to commend it to the attention of our Catholic readers.

18. *An American View of the Eastern Question.* By WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT. Charleston, S. C. 1854. 12mo. pp. 64.

THIS upon the whole is the fairest and most correct view of the Eastern Question that we have seen taken, that is, viewed solely in its political bearings. It is substantially our own view of the question given in our last Review, for which the *London Catholic Standard* abuses us most furiously. There is no country where the Eastern Question can be so well viewed and so impartially judged as in the United States. We are equally friendly to all the European parties engaged, and can study the controversy without having our judgments warped by prejudice. The statement of the *Catholic Standard*, that in our view of the case we simply followed the statements of the Czar, is quite unfounded. We followed the facts, though not the reasoning, of the *London Times*, the official documents in the case, and the admissions of the British government. Mr. Trescot has gone more largely into the case than we

did, and has sustained himself throughout by documentary evidence.

As a Catholic we do not like Russia, but Russia is a far more honorable and less dangerous enemy of the Church than England. We have never found Russia intriguing in foreign countries against our religion. France regarded as a government has no religion. The Emperor is Catholic, and so are a majority of the French; but the Emperor has not engaged in a war for the protection of Catholic interests. Both France and England are fighting for political and commercial interests; in a word, to maintain against Russia a preponderating influence at the Court of Constantinople; and, judging from the past, we can see no reason for supposing it better for Turkey or for Europe that it should be held by them instead of Russia. However the contest may terminate as between the contending powers, the European balance of power will suffer. On this point we beg our readers to consult Mr. Trescot's *brochure*.

19. *The Holy Bible, translated from the Latin Vulgate; diligently compared with the Hebrew, Greek, and other Editions, in divers Languages. The Old Testament first published by the English College at Douay, A. D. 1609; and the New Testament first published by the English College at Rheims, A. D. 1582. With Annotations, References, and an Historical and Chronological Index.* Published with the Approbation of the Right Rev. Dr. Denvir, R. C. Bishop Down and Connor. London: Dolman. 1854.

THIS is a new edition of the Belfast Bible, the plates of which have been purchased by Mr. Dolman. It is a very neat and convenient copy of the Holy Bible.

20. *The Metropolitan.* Edited by J. V. HUNTINGTON. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. Monthly.

WE are glad that Dr. Huntington has the editorship of our only monthly periodical. He gave some offence by a few passages in his *Alban* and *Forest*; but he is certainly one of our first literary men, and capable of doing more, perhaps, than any other man among us, towards creating a popular literature for our Catholic community. We do not accept his theory of art, we do not always approve his taste, but we cheerfully acknowledge his genius and ability, and have full confidence in his purity of character and intentions. His *Lady Alice*, written before his conversion, we lay upon the shelf;

but his publications since he became a Catholic we find little fault with, save now and then under the point of view of taste.

The Metropolitan has, under Dr. Huntington's management, been an interesting and a valuable periodical. Its attacks upon our Review are such as we are accustomed to and expect. Its half-ironical praise of us we let pass, and although it has done its full share towards creating the excitement raging against us, we cherish none but kind and respectful feelings towards its editor. He has said some good words in our behalf, and, although he has taken care to dash them with a sufficient amount of censure to prevent them from doing us any good, or himself any harm, we still thank him for them.

We have read in his number for September, with some interest, a continuation of an article on *Catholic Journalism*. Some of the strictures are perhaps deserved; yet their general tone is too severe. The Catholic press in the United States has its faults, but, although *The Freeman's Journal*, *The Telegraph and Advocate*, and the *Catholic Mirror*, have treated us with an ebullition of passion, a discourtesy, and a harshness, as ungentlemanly as uncatholic, we dare maintain that it merits well of the country, and is far from deserving the sweeping censures of the writer in *The Metropolitan*. Some of our journals, such, for example, as *The Catholic Miscellany* and *The Southern Journal*, are conducted in a Catholic spirit, with refined taste and gentlemanly feelings. These and some others we could name have nothing of the Cobbett style, and are able to express their dissent from another without insulting or abusing him. Even our young friend of *The Western Tablet*, though not quite as polished as we could wish, or as he will be after a few more rubbings from the editor of the *Propagateur Catholique*, who forgets the politeness of the Frenchman only when he has occasion to scold us or those of our friends who have the courage to defend us without a *but*, shows a good spirit, and bids fair to be an honor to Catholic American journalism. He is young, and does not merit the treatment he receives from Father Perché. *The Pittsburgh Catholic*, *The Catholic Herald* of Philadelphia, and *The Catholic Vindicator* of Detroit, are for the most part manly and courteous in their tone. Our journals are, indeed, filled to a great extent with matter not of much interest to Catholics not from Ireland or of Irish parentage. But that is no objection to them; they circulate and are intended to circulate chiefly among Irish Catholics, and they should be taken up chiefly with matters in which Irish Catholics are especially interested. A few of our journals, no doubt, lack refinement and courtesy, fairness and candor towards their opponents; but, upon the whole, the Catholic press of the country is well conducted, and is constantly improving. We do not think that, taken in the aggregate, it de-

serves the severe strictures of *The Metropolitan*, and we do not believe such strictures will do any good. Newspaper editors feel very delicately the pulse of *their* public, and will, in spite of all that can be said, to some extent consult the tastes of the majority of their readers. Even in those journals whose faults are most numerous, the offences are few in comparison with their merits. The best way to correct the faults of the press is for those who are aware of them and are annoyed by them to set an example free from them. The Catholic journalists must learn to bear with one another, treat one another with kindness and courtesy, and to be always ready to maintain each other's rights and to defend in an honorable manner each other's honor.

The Metropolitan lays down the doctrine that a journalist is bound, *titulo justitiæ*, to notice the books he receives, unless he returns them. This doctrine we cannot accept. The most a publisher can ask of us is that we announce the title of the book. That is all we hold ourselves bound to do. If we have announced the title, we have given the value of the book; whether we read and review the book is optional with us.

We hope these remarks will be taken in good part by our Catholic journalists. We do not believe that they or we have no faults to amend, or no virtues to acquire; but we are not disposed to read them a lecture, and do not recognize in them the right to read us one. With us, and we trust with them, the interests of religion are paramount, and those interests will not be promoted by our finding fault with one another. The true policy, we suppose, is, in all open questions, for us to express our dissent from opinions we disapprove, to assign our reasons, but to do it with courtesy, without passion, without vituperation, and in a calm, serene, and respectful tone, although in a firm and manly manner. In this respect most of us undoubtedly have something to learn.

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21. *Theses defended during the Scholastic Year 1853-4, by the Students of Rational Philosophy in Georgetown College, D. C.* Georgetown: A. L. Settle, Printer. 1853.

THE number of students at Georgetown College during the last year was larger than it has been for many years, and we believe even larger than ever before. We are sincerely rejoiced at the increased prosperity of this College. It holds the first rank among the Jesuit colleges in the United States, and many of our eminent men were educated within its walls. The *Theses* defended by the Students of *Rational Philosophy* have been sent us, and we have read them with care. Although we are not prepared to accept every one of the hundred and twenty-two propositions, there are

many of them which approach nearer to what we consider the truth than we should have expected. Such is Proposition CIX. : "The title from which, as from a first source, the *jus* emerges in God to make a law for man, is not founded in God's perfection and bounty, nor in his irresistible power and the contrary weakness of man ; but in the supreme dominion which belongs to God as the cause and author of nature, especially rational, which, inasmuch as it is rational, depends solely upon him." From this proposition, we should be likely to infer that God has the right to impose law upon man in consequence of the supreme dominion which belongs to God as the Creator. And as the right to impose a law upon man connotes an obligation in man to obey the law, we might look for the foundation of right in this supreme dominion. The ninety-ninth proposition, however, that "Man is not impelled to seek objects unless by felicity ; nor does he naturally desire felicity, unless it be complete and without defect," — seems to acknowledge no other source of obligation in man than the desire of felicity. In one or two places the Latin and English versions differ somewhat in sense ; witness the ninety-seventh thesis. The Latin says : " Quæ ex libertatis abusu humanæ profluunt actiones, quæ, prout morali inficiuntur turpitudine, non permittenti Deo, quod impium foret, sed tamquam unicæ principalique causæ sunt adscribendæ pravæ hominis voluntati." The English version says, these actions "are not to be attributed to God as permitting them," thereby denying that God permits them. The proposition as expressed in English is not defensible. To write correct English is not precisely a merit, but it is sometimes an inconvenience not to do it.

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22. *The Philosophical Works of DAVID HUME. Including all the Essays, and exhibiting the more important Alterations and Corrections in the successive Editions published by the Author.* Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1854. 8vo. 4 vols.

THIS is a complete edition of all Hume's Philosophical Works. We can only announce it at present, but we hope to make it the subject of an article in our next number.

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23. *The Meaning of Words ; analyzed in Words and Unverbal Things, and Unverbal Things classified into Intellections, Sensations, and Emotions.* By A. B. JOHNSON. New York: Appleton & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 256.

MR. JOHNSON is well known as one of the most profound and

original thinkers in our country, and the very errors of such a man are instructive. This neat and well-written volume demands a fair and thorough review, with some attempt to appreciate the philosophical merits of the author, and we shall recur to it at our earliest opportunity. It is a work which to be appreciated must be studied, but what will turn out to be its precise value we are as yet unable to say.

ART. VII.—THE END OF VOLUME XI.

WITH the present number we complete the eleventh volume of our Review, which was commenced in January, 1844. The first volume was published before we were received into the Catholic communion, the other volumes we have published as a Catholic.

When we commenced this Review, we had no intention and no expectation of ever becoming a Catholic, although our mind was not at rest, and we had some strong tendencies towards Catholicity ; but we resolved that our Review, as long as we continued it, should honestly represent our own personal conviction on every subject which we saw proper to discuss ; that it should in no case become the organ of any party ; and that it should never seek popularity by any disguise of the actual sentiments of the editor, by any forbearance to discuss any topic freely and unreservedly which we believed it necessary for the interests of religion, of truth, or morality to discuss, however delicate the topic might be, or however unpopular might be the doctrines set forth or defended. We took a solemn resolution before God that not a word should be withheld or inserted with a view to its effect on our subscription list. We resolved that we would be free and independent in the face of all men and parties, and, as far as mortal man could hope to be, in face of our own private interests, passions, and prejudices. With these resolutions, which we have done our best to keep, we started our Review, on our own responsibility, without a cent of capital, and without a subscriber. It was received on its first appearance with a favor shown to few periodicals, aiming to instruct rather than to please, ever started in the country, and before six months had elapsed its success seemed no longer doubtful. We had on our list, as voluntary subscribers, the names most honored and distinguished in the country.

But before the end of the first year we found that the great affair of our soul's salvation must be attended to, and that our position outside the Church was untenable, and accordingly, on the 20th of October, 1844, we made to the present Bishop of Boston the abjuration of our Protestantism, and was by him admitted into the

Catholic communion. It was the great event of our life, and placed us in new relations on all sides. The question naturally came up as to what we were to do. Should we drop or continue our Review? Full of the zeal of the new convert, all absorbed in our new faith, it was evident that, if we continued it at all, it must be as a Catholic Review, devoted to Catholic interests, for we were in no frame of mind to write on those general topics which would be alike acceptable to Catholics and Protestants. The late lamented Bishop of Boston, the saintly Fenwick, who in more ways than one was a father to us, wished us to continue it as a Catholic periodical. He consulted several of his episcopal brethren, and in their name and his own gave us a formal request to do so. We complied with that request, and for ten years we have almost single-handed conducted the periodical on Catholic principles, and in subserviency to Catholic interests.

When we found ourselves providentially placed at the head of a Catholic Quarterly Review, we were almost totally unacquainted with the Catholic population of the country; we knew very little of Catholic theology, were unfamiliar with Catholic language, and ignorant of Catholic literature and Catholic tastes and habits of thought. We had much to unlearn, and everything to learn. We had Catholic faith, Catholic fervor, and Catholic docility, and scarcely anything else to qualify us for our post. We did not dare trust our previous philosophy, our previous reading, or our previous knowledge, any further than we could review it in the light of our Catholic faith, and the teachings of approved Catholic doctors. We had to study day and night, and to task both our physical and mental powers to the utmost. Our position was new and strange, and what for any one would have been under any circumstances a difficult task, was more than doubly difficult for us. We felt our incompetency, but we felt that we had been placed by legitimate authority in the position we held, and we looked for help to the only Source from which real help ever comes. The Bishop of Boston and his clergy treated us with great indulgence, and took unwearied pains to instruct us, and to aid us to think and speak as a Catholic, and we got on perhaps as well as could have been reasonably expected. The noise made by our conversion, and the efforts made by our Catholic friends, soon procured for our Review a wide circulation, which, however, fell off considerably at the end of 1845, and continued to decrease till the spring of 1849, when our friends in Canada, especially in Montreal and Quebec, came to our relief, and saved the Review from failure. In May of the same year, the Archbishops and Bishops of the United States, who had met in council at Baltimore, generously addressed us a letter of approbation and encouragement. Since then, the Review has been gradually gaining ground, and last year

it had even a wider circulation than it had reached in 1845. It is now reprinted in England, a distinction attained to, so far as we are aware, by no other American periodical. It is read with interest, we are assured, by many of the best Catholic minds on the Continent. It has obtained us the friendship and esteem of men in Europe, whose friendship and esteem are a rich remuneration for a whole life of literary labor.

Last December we gave to the Bishop of Boston a set of the volumes of the Review from the commencement, with the request that he would in our name lay them at the feet of the Holy Father, as a public token of our filial devotion and unreserved submission to the Apostolic See, and of our profound veneration of the person of the reigning Pontiff. These volumes, together with a letter from us, the Bishop on his late visit to Rome was so kind as to present to the Holy Father, who has deigned to acknowledge their reception in the most gracious and benignant terms. We hope we shall be pardoned for laying his Brief, with a translation, before our readers.

“ PIUS PP. IX.

“ Dilecte fili salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem. Litteras tuas VII. kalendas Januarii proximi datas quibus plura opuscula a te exarata dono nobis obtulisti, ad Nos attulit Venerabilis Frater Joannes Episcopus Bostoniensis. De tuis iisdem libris merita ipse cum laude Nobis coram locutus est; adeoque majorem in modum in iis quos eadem litteræ omni ex parte præferunt, tuæ ergo Nos Sanctamque hanc Sedem filialis omnino devotionis, obsequii, ac pietatis sensibus lætati, et consolati sumus. Supplicibus votis, ac precibus Deum misericordiarum, ac Luminum Patrem obsecramus, ut illos, quos apud te perpetuos confidimus futuros, cœlesti præsidio suo foreat, actueatur. Ac tanti hujus boni auspicii, et grati tibi pro officio animi Nostri pignus, adjungimus Apostolicam Benedictionem, quam tibi ipsi, dilecte fili ac domi tuæ universæ effuso paterni cordis affectu amanter impertimur.

“ Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum die 29 Aprilis Anni 1854, Pontificatus Nostri Anno VIII.

“ PIUS PP. IX.”

“ PIUS IX. POPE.

“ Beloved son, health and apostolical benediction. Our venerable brother, John Bishop of Boston, brought to us your letter of the 26th of last December, in which you offered us several works written by you. He spoke to us with merited praise of those same books of yours, and therefore we are in a greater degree rejoiced and consoled by your sentiment of truly filial devotion, obedience, and piety towards us, and this Holy See, which your letter expresses throughout. With our suppliant vows and prayers we beseech the God of Mercies and Father of Lights that with his celestial protection he may cherish and guard these sentiments, which we trust you will always preserve. And as a token of our so great benignity, and as a pledge of our gratitude to you for the service you have done us, we add our apostolical benediction, which we lovingly impart, with the poured

forth affection of our paternal heart, to you yourself, beloved son, and to your whole family.

“Given at St. Peter’s at Rome, on the 29th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1854, and the eighth year of our Pontificate.

(Signed,) PIUS IX. *Pope.*”

This is indeed no formal approbation of our Review, and no such approbation was deserved or expected; but it is more than a simple acknowledgment of the reception of the volumes and accompanying letter. It is a recognition and encouragement most dear to our heart, and which it will be our study, as far as in us lies, to justify.

We always hope with trembling. Our Review has, in spite of its many imperfections, in spite of many enemies, some secret and some open, attained to an honorable rank among the better class of periodicals at home or abroad, but we know not what a day may bring forth. We have been assailed within the last few months with a storm of indignation from a portion of the Catholic press, not often surpassed among those who are ignorant of Catholic freedom and Catholic charity. This indignation has been wholly uncalled for, and is a blow aimed at the just freedom and independence of Catholic journalism, and at that freedom of thought and manly discussion which our religion not only tolerates, but approves and cherishes. However, it is not worth while to attach much importance to it. It is, we apprehend, but a sudden squall, which will soon pass over, if it have not already done so, and leave the heavens as cloudless and serene as we can expect them to be in this variable climate. Undoubtedly there are individuals amongst us who exhibit a Protestant rather than a Catholic spirit, and attempt to exercise a sort of tyranny over the opinions of their brethren, who forget that in the domain of opinion men are free to differ, and no one is responsible to another for his opinions. Every good Catholic yields an unhesitating and unreserved submission to the divinely instituted authority wherever it claims the right to command, for its voice is to him the voice of God; but where authority leaves him free, in all open questions he claims for himself full and entire freedom, and what he claims for himself he cheerfully concedes to all others. Catholics know this, and they know that, if in open questions we differ with some of them, we have a right to do so, and we do them no more wrong in doing so than they do us in differing with us. Yet there is a portion of human infirmity in all men, and we must be as ready to pardon its manifestations in others, as we are to ask them to pardon it in ourselves.

We apprehend no serious injury to the future prospects of our Review from the passing squall. We cannot expect that everything we write will please everybody, and if it did, we should fear that

we had failed in our duty. He who cannot in a world like ours excite opposition or incur reproach would have reason to regard himself as of no great note in the commonwealth. "Woe unto you, when all men speak well of you." We have never taken the sentiments or wishes of the multitude as our guide; we have never courted popularity; and it has been always our aim to lead public opinion, not to follow it. The resolution we took when we commenced this Review we have preserved, for the teachings of the Church are our convictions, — our faith, — and they constitute our standard of true and false, right and wrong. In matters not covered by them, we are free to follow our independent judgment, and recognize in no man or body of men as such any right to censure us for our honest, deliberate, and conscientious opinions. In political and national matters, saving Catholic dogma and morals, we have a perfect right to form and express our opinions, and we do not believe that the great body of serious, earnest-minded Catholics are disposed to deny us the free and full exercise of that right, or will suffer that right to be permanently violated to our prejudice by the morbid sensitiveness of any class of the community. We do not believe it, because we believe that in the body of the Catholics of this country there is a right sense, a love of justice and fair play, and an honest respect for free and manly discussion of all open questions; and furthermore, because as yet no Bishop in the country has signified to us the withdrawal of the approbation heretofore given, and not a subscriber has asked us to erase his name from our subscription list in consequence of the excitement against us. On the other hand, the clamor raised against us has called forth numerous private letters expressing their full approbation of our course, and their cordial sympathy with us. It has also brought us several new subscribers, and we have no doubt produced a determination among our friends not only to sustain our Review, but even to extend its circulation. We therefore propose to continue our course as if nothing had happened, trusting in the same kind Providence to sustain us in future that has sustained us in the past. We have the promise of more assistance hereafter than we have had heretofore, and nothing shall be spared on our part to make our Review acceptable to all who really love their religion, and wish to see this country become really and universally Catholic.

